









ABSTRACT OF THESIS (Regulation 7.9)
This thesis is an attempt to analyse the jurisprudence of the
European Court of Justice in the review of safeguard measures in the
European Community. The safeguard measures considered are the
Community's anti-dumping and anti-subsidy rules under Regulation
2423/88, safeguard measures under Regulation 288/82 and rules to
combat illicit commercial practices under Regulation 2641/84. These
instruments are part of the European Community's arsenal designed to
counteract unfair trade practices of Third Countries. Emphasis is
placed on the anti-dumping rules given that the measures imposing
anti-dumping duties are most frequently challenged before the Court.
The thesis begins with a synopsis of the Community's competence to
deal exclusively with these matters. The respective roles of the
Community authorities and the Member States in the adoption of
protective measures is also considered.
In order to understand the rationale of the Court's rulings in cases
involving safeguard measures each of the instruments are viewed from
an international ancl European perspective. The latter involves an
analysis of the Community's legislation with respect to the
substantive and procedural rules governing the imposition of
protective measures to combat unfair trade practices of Third
Countries.
Having placed the safeguard measures in their proper perspective,
judicial review by the Court is viewed first from the standpoint of
an applicant's locus standi or standing to challenge a Community act
imposing protective measures. If an applicant has locus standi he
may apply to the Court for an award of interim measures pending the
outcome of the main application. The rules relating to such awards
are considered and the Court's rulings in cases involving safeguard
measures are analysed. Judicial review 'proper' in the sense of the
Court's review of the merits of the cases that have come before it to
date are considered in the light of the grounds of review in Article
173 of the EEC Treaty. This final chapter attempts to determine the
extent to which the Court is prepared to review the findings of the
authorities upon which the measures were adopted.
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In a recent article in the Financial Times-'- Mr. Tien, the Vice
Chairman of the Japanese Committee on anti-dumping proceedings, in
criticising the European Community's anti-dumping policy was of the
opinion, like so many others outside the Community, that the creation
of the Single Market in 1993 would bring with it a "fortress Europe"
mentality hurting export led economies such as Japan.
Safeguard measures dating back to the beginning of the Twentieth
Century have been used by the major trading nations of the Western
world to combat unfair competition in the market place. This unfair
competition normally, but not always, takes the form of price
discrimination, i.e. subsidising low cost exports with profits from
selling at high prices in the domestic market.
By far the greatest weapon in the European Community's arsenal of
safeguard measures are the anti-dumping rules. Anti-dumping duties
may be imposed if it can be established that dumping has caused
injury to Community industry. Dumping occurs when a product is sold
for export at a price lower than it is sold on the domestic market.
Anti-dumping duties can be applied on a selective basis to those
producers whose products cause injury to Community industry. It is
one of the exceptions to the GATT (General Agreement on Tariffs and
Trade) principle that safeguard measures must be applied on a
non-discriminatory basis.
The Community's trading partners, in particular Japan, are now of the
opinion that the Community is increasingly applying its anti-dumping
1st September 1989.
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legislation in a protectionist manner. Up to a few years ago Hong
Kong was subject to only one anti-dumping proceeding which was
subsequently discontinued. More recently, it has been the subject
of an increasing number of investigations. To its surprise, in
December 1987, its imports of video cassette tapes were subject to
anti-dumping duties in the region of 22 per cent. The Hong Kong
producers argued that the Community rules were applied in an
arbitrary and unfair manner. Given the small size of its market,
Hong Kong, they contended, was not an example of dumping in the
classical sense of subsidising low cost exports with high profits
obtained on the domestic market.
Another trend to emerge with the new anti-dumping policy is the
greater number of "high tech" consumer products which inevitably are
subjected to higher duties. Because such products involve greater
amounts of money, investment and employment there is greater pressure
on the Community authorities to take action where injury is
established. It is due to the importance of the anti-dumping
legislation that the Chapters to follow hereon concentrate on the
application and review of these rules. Reference will be made to
the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC) and European Atomic
Energy Community (EURATOM) Treaties only in passing. Therefore
reference to the Treaty is intended to refer to the Treaty of Rome or
the EEC Treaty and reference to the Community is intended to refer to
the European Economic Community.
Apart from the anti-dumping legislation, the Community also has at
its disposal anti-subsidy legislation to counteract the use by
foreign governments of export and domestic subsidies. It can also
impose quotas, designed to reduce the influx of low cost imports
which have not been dumped but which nevertheless cause injury to
Community industry. New legislation has been brought into force
designed to combat 'illicit commercial practices' which cause injury
to both Community imports and exports;
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The review of safeguard measures by the Court involves an analysis of
the procedural and substantive rules relating primarily to an action
for annulment of a Community act under Article 173 since this is by
far the most important right of action at the disposal of an affected
party. Because the application of safeguard measures involves an
evaluation of highly complex and technical findings, the writer also
considers the extent to which the Court will review the exercise of
powers which confer on the Community authorities a margin of
discretion.
Chapter 1 deals with the competence of the Community authorities to
bind both the Community and the Member States in the field of
external trade relations. The role and functions of the Community
authorities and the Member States in the application of safeguard
measures are also examined.
Chapter 2 concerns safeguard measures from an international
perspective. The chapter begins with an overview of the General
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade ("the GATT") with respect to its aims
and principles. The remainder of the chapter is a synopsis of the
main safeguard provisions in the GATT. In the second section the
anti-dumping rules are considered from an historical, an economic and
a legal perspective. The third section concerns the rules in the
GATT relating to subsidies and countervailing duties, and in
particular Articles XVI and VI. The fourth section deals with the
general safeguard provision, namely Article XIX, and the final
section deals with those GATT rules which are within the ambit of the
Community's new commercial policy instrument and in particular the
rules relating to dispute settlement.
In Chapter 3 the safeguard measures are considered from a European
perspective. Those measures considered are Regulation 2423/88 -
anti-dumping and anti-subsidy rules; Regulation 288/82 - common
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rules for imports; and Regulation 2641/84 - new commercial policy
instrument. Each is analysed in relation to its procedural and
substantive rules.
Chapters 4 to 6 deal specifically with the matter of judicial
review. The analysis concentrates primarily on the Community's
anti-dumping rules as these have been almost exclusively the subject
of Court proceedings to date.
Chapter 4 concentrates on the admissibility of actions, i.e. has the
applicant sufficient locus standi or standing to challenge the
disputed Community act before the Court? It is divided into two
parts. Part one deals generally with the matter of locus standi in
relation to the various rights of action at the disposal of an
affected party. The second part of the chapter deals specifically
with the various categories of persons who would seek to challenge a
Community act imposing protective measures under the various
safeguard measures.
Chapter 5 involves an examination of the jurisprudence of the Court
with respect to the granting of interim measures in proceedings
involving safeguard measures.
Chapter 6 deals with the review by the Court of the substantive
issues in proceedings involving safeguard measures. Part one of the
chapter involves a synopsis of the main grounds of review under
Article 173. The second part of the chapter analyses the
jurisprudence of the Court to date in relation to each of these
grounds of review. The analysis concentrates on the application by
the Court of the general principles common to the laws of the Member
States and also the extent to which the Court will review the
exercise of the powers of the Community authorities which confer on
them a margin of discretion.
The law is stated, as much as is possible, as at 31st March 1990.
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CHAPTER 1
THE EXTERNAL COMPETENCE OF THE
EUROPEAN COMMUNITY ON THE
INTERNATIONAL RLANE AND THE
POWERS OF THE COMMUNITY
AUTHORITIES IN THE ADOPTION
OF SAFEGUARD MEASURES
INTRODUCTION
In dealing with unfair trade practices by third countries in the
European Community it is principally the Community authorities and
not the Member States who regulate and adopt safeguard measures.
This power flows from the fact that the Community has for the most
part exclusive competence in dealing with matters affecting trade
with third countries.
The aims of this chapter are to analyse the external competence of
the European Community on the international plane, and to consider
the basic powers of the Community authorities and the Member States
in the context of the main safeguard measures examined in the
chapters which follow.
1. THE EXTERNAL COMEETENCE OF THE
EUROREAN COMMUNITY
The scope and extent of the Community's capacity to act on the
international plane is determined in accordance with the rules of
international law, by the legal nature of the Community and by the
powers assigned to it under the Treaties-'-.
Elhenermann, "Scope and extent of the capacity of the
Community to act on the international plane", House of
Lords Select Committee on European Affairs, Report 1985.
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The further the Common Market comes to repricate a "domestic" market
for goods originating within the Community the greater is the need
for uniformity in the rules applying to the goods originating in
third countries and imported into the Community. This is all the
more crucial when one takes into account the increased economic
interdependence of the major industrialised nations over the last two
decades. Furthermore, the Community is increasingly dependent on
the world economy both for the supply of raw materials and as an
international market for its goods.
In the field of external relations, the EEC Treaty vests power in the
Community in a limited number of areas, for example those Articles^
which deal with the Common Commercial Policy (hereinafter referred to
as "the CCP").
Apart from these express provisions, the European Court of Justice
(hereinafter referred to as "the Court"), has developed a doctrine of
implied powers^. In relation to the Community's Commercial Policy
the Court stated in Opinion 1/75^ that within the sphere of the CCP
the Community is competent to conclude agreements with regard to a
particular facet of that policy even if it has not yet established
any Community rules which occupy the field internally.
Articles 110-116.
Case 22/70 Commission v. Council [1971] ECR 263.
[1975] ECR 1355.
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1.1. The Scope of the Community's Powers within the CCP
The main Treaty provision with regard to the CCP is Article 113.
This confers on the Community the power to create and conduct a
Common Commercial Policy based on uniform principles. It refers
specifically to changes in tariff rates, the conclusion of tariff and
trade agreements, the achievement of uniformity in measures of
liberalisation, export policy and measures to protect trade such as
those taken in the case of dumping or subsidies. Apart from these
express powers the scope of Community powers in the area of the CCP
depends on the definition of the term "Commercial Policy".
This was defined by the Court in Opinion 1/75 when it held that its
meaning may not be interpreted more narrowly for the sake of the
Community than it is practised generally by the Member States^.
It further stated that Commercial Policy is made up by the
combination and interaction of internal and external measures without
priority being taken by one over the other^. This echoed the
dictum of the Court in the Massey-Ferguson case'' where it had
already emphasised the necessity of giving a broad construction to
the Articles of the Treaty relating to customs union and trade
policy.
In Opinion 1/78 the Court stated that the enumeration of Article 113
was not exclusive^. It held that an interpretation restricting
the CCP to the use of instruments intended to have effect only on the




[1978] ECR 2871 at 2913.
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developed mechanisms would create a Commercial Policy destined to
become nugatory in the course of time^.
The Council was of the view that a measure, in order to be a measure
of Commercial Policy, must have the object of altering the volume or
the flow of trade"®. Bourgeois"" has argued that this
definition, although it sounds convincing, had two main drawbacks.
First, for the purposes of autonomous Community commercial measures
it produces results that were unsatisfactory when applied to measures
that were inherent to the conduct of any Commercial Policy, e.g.
customs formalities or marks of origin. Under the Council's
interpretation these measures would be unlikely to fall within the
ambit of Article 113 as it would be difficult to show that they
affected the volume or flow of trade. Second, the interpretation
imported a subjective element which would allow reluctant Member
States to argue that the measure was beyond the Community's powers or
that it required unanimity. The Commission, on the other hand,
argued that a measure of Commercial Policy must be assessed by
reference to its specific characteristics as an instrument regulating
international trade"*". This definition is also unsatisfactory in
that the term instrument is a very broad concept.
A better interpretation of the scope of the Community's Commercial





"" "The Common Commercial Policy - Scope and Nature of the
Powers" in (ed.) Volker, 'Protectionism in the EEC', p. A.
Opinion 1/78 supra at 2910-1.
See Ehlermann, Director-General for Commission Legal
Service expose at 10th Congress of International Federation
for European Law held in Dublin, 24-26 June 1982.
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All measures which regulate openly and specifically trade
with third countries should always be considered as part of
the Common Commercial Policy; they are per se measures of
commercial policy unless the Treaty provides for an
exception. Other measures should be considered as part of
such policy by a sort of 'rule of reason' viz. when their
dominant purpose is to influence the volume or flow of
trade.
The measures enumerated in Articles 112 and 113 and measures
ancillary to these such as customs regulations and procedures for
import and export licensing would come within this formulation as
would measures such as taxes and measures having an effect equivalent
to quantitative restrictions.
Bourgeois^ provides some helpful guidelines in determining what
constitutes "dominant purpose". They are as follows
(a) the form of the agreement - the purpose, structure,
instruments and effects;
(b) the framework within which it was concluded, for
example if it takes place within an institutional
organisation whose aim is to promote trade.
The construction does, however, require further elucidation, but it
goes some way in attempting to reconcile the differences in the views
held by the Council and Commission. There is no doubt that the
Community's safeguard measures used to counteract unfair trade
practices are per se Commercial Policy measures and as such are
within the scope of the Community's powers.
1.2. The Nature of the Powers within the CCP
The Court, since its judgment in the ERTA case^, has




Case 22/70 Commission v. Council supra.
- 10 -
is exclusive in nature. When such a power is exclusive the Member
States may no longer unilaterally enter into international agreements
or adopt autonomous measures in the field of external relations.
The principle in ERTA^ was based on two grounds. First, the
Community power excludes the possibility of concurrent or parallel
powers on the part of the Member States since any steps taken outside
the framework of the Community would be incompatible with the unity
of the Common Market and the uniform application of Community law.
Second, upon entry into force of a common internal rule it is the
Community alone that is in a position to carry out contractual
obligations towards third countries affecting the whole sphere of
application of the Community legal system.
More specifically, in Opinion 1/75^, which concerned an area of
Commercial Policy, namely export credits, the Court concluded that
the CCP was conceived in the context of the operation of a Common
Market for the defence of the common interests of the Community.
The Court stated that:-
Unilateral action on the part of the Member States would
lead to disparities in conditions for the grant of export
credits calculated to distort competition between
undertakings of various Member States in external markets
... It cannot be accepted that in the field such as that
governed by the understanding in question which is covered
by export policy and more generally by the Common Commercial
Policy, the Member States should exercise a power concurrent
to that of the Community in a Community sphere and in an
international sphere^®.
At a later stage in its judgment the Court again unequivocally








powers concurrently in the sphere of Commercial Policy^. The
Court reiterated the principle in Donckerwolcke^^ in which it
indicated that at the end of the transitional period, responsibility
in the field of Commercial Policy was transferred en bloc to the
Community and unilateral action by the Member States was excluded
across the whole field.
2. THE BASIC ROWERS OF THE
COMMUNITY AUTHORITIES AND THE
MEMBER STATES IN THE ADOPTION
OF SAFEGUARD MEASURES
The EEC Treaty which established the European Economic Community
(EEC), like the Treaty of Paris (hereinafter referred to as the ECSC
Treaty) which established the European Coal and Steel Community
(ECSC), created a Community with legal personality and four
autonomous institutions. The European Atomic Energy Community
(EURATOM) was established by a separate Treaty at the same time as
the EEC. It too had a separate legal personality and four
autonomous institutions. The institutions included an Assembly (now
known as the European Parliament^), a Council of Ministers, a
Commission (equivalent to the High Authority under the ECSC Treaty
but which had more limited autonomous powers) and a Court of Justice.
A single Court and Assembly were established for all three
Communities by a Convention signed at the same time as the EEC and
Euratom Treaties. On 1st July 1967, as a result of a Merger Treaty
(Treaty establishing a Single Council and Single Commission of the





Case 41/76 [1976] ECR 1921.
Article 2, Single European Act.
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was established. At the same time the ECSC High Authority and the
EEC and Euratom Commissions were merged to form a single body known
as the Commission.
Even though the three Communities have common institutions they are
legally distinct with the powers and functions of the institutions
based on the terms of the Treaty under which they were established.
This is of importance in relation to the Commission since it enjoys
the more wide-reaching powers which are conferred on the High
Authority under the ECSC Treaty.
The aim of this part of the chapter is to examine the respective
roles of the Community institutions and Member States in combating
unfair trade practices. For the most part the emphasis will be on
the EEC rules since the ECSC rules are limited solely to Coal and
Steel products.
2.1. The Commission
Under the safeguard measures discussed in the chapters to follow
the Commission has as its major role the task of investigating the
facts and determining whether there is sufficient evidence to
initiate a proceeding. This is quite a large undertaking for the
Commission now that there are many more complex cases being brought
to its attention. As the number of complaints increase rapidly the
Commission is faced with an acute shortage of staff necessary to
investigate unfair trading practices. This is particularly so in
relation to anti-dumping cases. In 1986 only 26 officials were
employed by the Commission to investigate complaints of dumping
compared with 110 in the US for the same purpose^. t0 overcome
this problem it was suggested that the Commission should consider
Financial Times, 8th October 1986.
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employing private investigators to supplement its own staff^. In
1987 the number of case workers was increased to 33 and they were
aided by 15 officials lent to the Commission by the Member States.
There are currently AO case workers assisted by 30 officials seconded
from the Member States.
Under Regulation 2423/88^, the Commission has the power, if
certain conditions are fulfilled, to impose provisional anti-dumping
and countervailing duties^. Such duties are valid only for six
months, however, whereupon it is the responsibility of the Council to
adopt definitive duties. Under Regulation 288/82^6 the Commission
has the power to limit the period of validity of import documents or
alter the rules for the product in question by providing that it may
only be put into free circulation on production of an import
authorisation^. This can be done either on the request of a
Member State or on its own initiative. By virtue of Article 1(b) of
the New Commercial Policy Instrument - Regulation 2641/84^8 the
Commission has the power to initiate, conduct and terminate formal
international consultations or dispute settlement procedures.
Under Regulation 2423/88 the Commission also has the power to
terminate proceedings where there is no injury or where it is not in
the interests of the Community to impose protective measures. This
is the case, however, only where no objection is raised within the
Advisory Committee, otherwise the matter must be submitted to the
ibid.
For an analysis of the Regulation see Chapter 3 infra.
Article 11.
For an analysis of the Regulation see Chapter 3 infra.
Article 15.








Council^. Jt can accept undertakings if it considers them
appropriate instead of adopting anti-dumping duties or countervailing
duties. Until very recently the Commission favoured settling most
cases in this way. However, with the emergence of anti-dumping
cases involving "high tech" consumer products from Japan and other
Far East countries it has become less inclined to accept them owing
mainly to the fact that large price increases are required in order
to eliminate the injury caused by dumping. Although it does not
specifically provide for it in Regulation 288/82 the Commission may
accept a Voluntary Export Restraint agreement^. This is unlikely
to occur very often since these agreements are for the most part
offered on an industry to industry basis. To accept such an
undertaking would mean that the appraisal of the injurious effects of
imports on Community industry, as well as the choice of any
protective measures, would be decided by someone other than the
Commission.
2.2. The Powers of the Commission under the ECSC Treaty
Under the ECSC Treaty, the High Authority was vested with the
supreme powers of decision making. By virtue of the Merger Treaty,
the High Authority and the Commissions which were established by the
Treaties of Rome were merged into one single Commission. This does
not mean that the Commission's powers are always the same. When
acting under the ECSC Treaty it has all the decision-making powers
which were vested in the High Authority.
This explains why the Commission, when acting under the ECSC
anti-dumping rules for example, has the power not only to order the
definitive collection of provisional duties but also the power to
Article 9(1).
See Chapter 3, Part 3: Safeguard Measures section 1.7.
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impose definitive duties^. It is also competent to terminate
proceedings when protective measures are thought to be unnecessary
without seeking the permission of the Advisory Committee^. Even
though it must consult the Advisory Committee throughout all the
important stages of the procedure, it can adopt decisions quickly
without having them vetoed as may be the case under the EEC Treaty.
2.3. The Council
Under the EEC Treaty the Council of Ministers is the institution
endowed with supreme decision-making powers.
Under Regulation 2423/88 it is only the Council which is competent to
impose definitive duties and to order the definitive collection of
the provisional duties. Likewise it can adopt protective measures
on a proposal from the Commission under Regulation 288/82 and
Regulation 2641/84.
The fact that the Council adopts definitive duties has caused
difficulties in the handling of cases before the Court mainly because
it is the Commission which carries out the investigation. These
difficulties have been made all the more acute by the number of
highly complex cases that are coming before the Court^^. In each
of these cases it is the Council and not the Commission which is the
defendant because the Council and not the Commission adopts the
definitive duties. In most cases the Commission is only an
intervener. Members of the Council Legal Service have intimated
that they often find it difficult and unsatisfactory to represent the
Council as defendant in anti-dumping cases with which the Commission
Article 12, Decision 2424/88, O.J. L209/18.
Article 9(1), Decision 2424/88. cf.: Article 9(1) of
Regulation 2423/88.
See Chapters 4, 5 and 6 infra.
- 16 -
officials are more familiar. At the moment the Commission Legal
Service helps the Council draft its memoire.
There are two possible means of avoiding duplication and also
preventing the Council from being held responsible for errors made by
the Commission. It is possible to introduce, if only in theory,
legislation enabling the definitive duties to be adopted by the
Commission. This would have to be made subject to the proviso that
the Member States be consulted. This solution has, however, its
drawbacks, the major one being the political obstacles to the
change. The alternative solution is an administratrive one and it
could take one of three forms. First the Commission Legal Service
could prepare the Council's memoire. This tends to be the case, to
a large extent in the more complex cases now coming before the
Court. Second the two institutions could instruct counsel from one
of the Member States. The problem with this alternative is that it
is difficult to find suitable counsel. In anti-dumping cases
especially, the questions which need most work are those on which the
Community is in a weak legal position. Inevitably, the institutions
will not wish to divulge the points they are most concerned about
irrespective of whatever promises counsel makes regarding disclosure
to private clients. Furthermore, anti-dumping actions will almost
always give rise to issues of policy. It is difficult and often
undesirable to make counsel aware of policy considerations. Third
in cases where there is no conflict of interest, there is no reason
why the Commission's lawyer could not act as the Council's agent.
2.4. The Member States
The Member States have an important role to play in the
administering the safeguard measures designed to counteract unfair
trading practices. They, in the form of the Advisory Committee, are
required to be consulted at each stage of the procedure. The
Committee is made up of a representative from each of the Member
States with a representative of the Commission as Chairman.
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Under Regulation 2423/88 they also have the task of collecting the
duties imposed by the Community institutions through their customs
authorities.
Finally, under Regulation 288/82, the Member States have the power to
adopt interim protective measures where there exists in their
territory a situation authorising the adoption of protective
measures; or where such measures are justified by a safeguard clause








The General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade ("the GATT") came into
existence in 1947^. It provides a framework of rules and
standards for international trade. The GATT was based largely on
the ill-fated International Trade Organisation Charter^. The
contracting parties to the GATT aimed at:
raising the standard of living, ensuring full employment and
a large and steadily growing volume of real income and
effective demand, developing the full use of the resources
of the world and expanding the production and exchange of
goods^.
There were two means of contributing to these objectives. The GATT
was concerned not only with the liberalising of trade policies by the
reduction of tariffs but also with the elimination of discriminatory
treatment and the anti-competitive effects of unfair trade practices
such as dumping.
The GATT is based largely on three basic principles. First,there is
the principle of non-discrimination. This means that goods of any
contracting party are to be given no less favourable treatment than
that given to any other contracting party. This principle - or most
See generally, Jackson "World Trade and the Law of GATT"
(1969); Dam, "The GATT: Law and International Economic
Organisation" (1970); GATT 4th Supp. BISD (1956).
Jackson, ibid. Chapter 2.
3 Preamble of the GATT.
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favoured nation clause as it is known in the GATT - is contained in
Article 1^. The object of the clause is to ensure that all
foreign goods are treated equally. As a corollary, Article III
attempts to impose the principle of non-discrimination between goods
domestically produced and those which are imported with respect to
internal taxation and other forms of governmental regulation. Such
a provision is necessary, otherwise such measures would be
substituted for tariff reductions.
The second principle is the prohibition on the use of quotas or other
commercial measures as a means of protecting domestic industry^.
Unlike tariffs, the impact of which an exporter can gauge, non-tariff
restrictions such as quotas are arbitrary with the result that an
exporter will be unable to assess how his product will be treated.
The third principle is that the GATT proceeds on the basis of
consultation in resolving its trade disputes. The GATT outlines
those situations when a contracting party can deviate from its
obligations^ and also the circumstances in which retaliatory action
can be taken against unfair trading^. Furthermore, if a party
considers that a benefit accruing to it under the GATT has been
There are a number of other mfn or non-discrimination
clauses in GATT - for example Article 111(7) Internal
mixing requirements, Article IVb Cinema films, Article
V(2), (5) & (6) Transit of goods, Article IX(l) Marks of
origin, Article XIII(1) Quantitative restrictions, Article
XVII(1) State trading, Article XVIII(20) Measures to assist
economic development, Article XX(j) Measures for goods in
short supply.
Article XI GATT. See Jackson op. cit.
Article XIX (Safeguard Clause); Articles XX and XXI
(General Exceptions); Article XXV (Waivers); Article XXIV
(Regionalism).
Articles XI and XIII (Quantitative Restrictions);
Article XVI (Subsidies); Article VI (Anti-dumping and
Countervailing Duties).
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nullified or impaired as a result of another party's breach or
adoption of other measures the GATT dispute settlement procedure can
be initiated under Article XXIII®.
In order to achieve reduction of tariffs and the elimination of
discriminatory treatment there have been a number of major rounds of
multilateral trade negotiations®. Originally the objective of the
negotiations was to bring about a substantial reduction in tariffs
and the elimination of tariff preferences. From the outset it was
agreed that the negotiations should be held on a "reciprocal and
mutually advantageous basis"-'-®. This idea of reciprocity, i.e.
that one concession should be matched by another of similar value,
was at the core of the international trade order. It worked well in
relation to the reduction of tariffs. Great progress was made at
the Kennedy Round on the reduction of tariffs with regard to
industrial goods where the contracting parties applied a 'linear'
approach to cut tariffs^. This was in sharp contrast to the
previous round of negotiations - the Dillon Round - where
negotiations were conducted on a product by product basis^. The
GATT is concerned not only with the reduction of tariffs but also
with the elimination of other barriers to trade. As tariffs are
reduced the role of non-tariff barriers becomes more important.
Kelly has defined a non-tariff barrier as:
See generally Jackson, op. cit. Chapter 8.
Geneva 1947; Dillon Round 1960-1; Kennedy Round 1965-7;
Tokyo Round concluded in 1979; Uruguay Round 1982-
Article XXVIIIbis para. 1. cf. Part IV GATT (added in
1964/5) provides that reciprocity will not be expected from
less developed countries.
GATT 13th Supp. BISD 109 (1965).
GATT 8th Supp. BISD 119 (1960).
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any law, regulation, policy or practice of a government,
other than an import duty that has a restrictive effect on
trade-^.
Most of the general clauses in the GATT deal with specific non-tariff
barriers. As these barriers are reduced, those not controlled by
the GATT become increasingly significant. Owing to their opacity,
however, non-tariff barriers are much more difficult to value in
terms of trade concessions and, as a result, it is much more
difficult to achieve reciprocity.
The Tokyo Round of Multilateral Trade Negotiations concluded in 1979
was concerned with formulating new, fairer and more transparent rules
on international trade relations in order to bring about the
advantages in tariff reductions. Unlike the Kennedy Round, which
was negotiated during an era of world economic expansion,
unfavourable conditions - rising oil prices, world trade recession
and rampant inflation - dominated the Tokyo Round Negotiations. In
periods of expansion it is relatively easy to reduce barriers to
trade since, generally speaking, imports do not give rise to a threat
of loss of employment or closure of local industry. On the other
hand, in times of recession protectionist policies prevail and
national frontiers are closed.
The result of the Tokyo Round was a number of Codes which improve and
update the rules and procedures governing world trade in that they
facilitate the abolition or reduction of a number of non-tariff
barriers and improve surveillance. These Codes were seen as a way
of reducing, if not eliminating protectionism so as to facilitate
more freedom in international trade1^.
"Non Tariff Barriers" in (ed.) Balassa 'Studies in Trade
Liberalisation: Problems and prospects for industrial
countries' (1967).
GATT 26th Supp. BISD (1978-9).
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In September 1982 the contracting parties agreed to launch a new
Round of trade negotiations to be called the Uruguay Round. One of
the objectives of the negotiations is to continue with the work of
reducing tariffs and non-tariff barriers. These negotiations are
special, however, in that they cover not only trade in goods but also
trade in services. Trade in services has increased in importance
owing to the development of communications and data processing
technologies and the general trend towards deregulation in many
service sectors and their trade. This has resulted in an increase
in the proportion of services that can be traded across borders in
recent years^. It was, therefore, considered important to
negotiate a multilateral framework of principles and rules in order
to increase transparency and to liberalise trade in services.
The aim of this chapter is to analyse the rules relating to the
safeguard measures, as applied by the European Community against
unfair trade practices from an international perspective, in order to
show how they have developed and the extent to which they meet the
demands of an ever changing world economy.
1. DUMPING
1.1. Historical Background
Prior to the GATT there was little international regulation of
dumping^. The question first arose at an international level in
See Focus: GATT Newsletter 57 (1988); GATT economists
estimated that in 1988 trade in services amounted to some
600 US$ billion. (See Focus: GATT Newsletter 71 (1990)).
At national level a number of countries had already in
existence legislation which enabled them to impose
anti-dumping duties. The first country to have such
legislation was Canada in 1904 - an act to amend the
Customs Tariff, 1897 S.C. 1904, ell, s 19.
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1920 at the World Economic Conference in The League of Nations. The
general reaction to laws which would permit a country to impose
anti-dumping duties was a fear that they would be used as a
protectionist device by distorting competition and protecting
domestic industry. Against this background, the power to impose
anti-dumping duties where it could be shown that the dumping caused
injury to the domestic producers of the like product was included in
the new General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade^. However, the
major drawback of the original anti-dumping provision was that it was
subject to the grandfather clause contained in the Protocol of
Provisional Application-^. This meant that in relation to those
provisions in Part II of the GATT (Article VI was such a provision)
the pre-existing legislation of the contracting parties was not
superseded by the GATT. The result of this was that the
requirements of Article VI were disregarded, in particular by the
United States whose legislation^, which existed prior to the GATT,
did not require injury to be proved.
Owing mainly to the insistence of the European Community, the
question of dumping was considered at the Kennedy Round of
Multilateral Trade Negotiations. The European Community was in
favour of more specific and binding rules with regard to
anti-dumping. The result was an Anti-Dumping Code^O. This Code,
however, was only an extensive interpretation of Article VI and
binding only on those contracting parties which signed it.
At the Tokyo Round of Multilateral Trade Negotiations the
Anti-Dumping Code concluded at the Kennedy Round was replaced by a
Article VI GATT.
GATT, 1st Supp. BISD 81 (1952).
Tariff Act 1897 Chapter 11 30 Stat 205 as amended by the
Tariff Acts 1922 and 1930.
GATT 15th Supp. BISD 24 (1968).
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new Code^ which for the most part was incorporated into the
legislation of those signatories to the Code, including the United
States.
1.2. Economic Rationale
In his authorative work Dumping a Problem in International
Traded jacob Viner defined dumping as price discrimination between
national markets. This essentially means that the producers in one
country sell their goods for whatever reason in the market of another
producer at unusually low prices^.
It is generally agreed that three preconditions are necessary for
price discrimination between national markets to occur^:
(a) There have to be separate markets. This will usually
be accompanied by the situation whereby the dumper's
market will be insulated from the re-importation of
the dumped goods. In order for this to occur certain
barriers to trade will exist in order to distort the
free flow of trade. They may take the form of high
tariffs or transport costs but more often they will be
GATT 26th Supp. BISD 171 (1978-9).
Reproduced in M. Kellay, New York 1966; first published in
1923.
See Fisher "The Anti-Dumping Law of the US: A Legal and
Economic Analysis" 5 Law & Policy in International Bus.
(1973) 85 at 85-93; Bryan "Taxing Unfair International
Trade Practices" pp. 31-43; De Jong "The Significance of
Dumping in International Trade" 2 JWTL 162 at 168.
Viner op. cit. pp. 94-101; Bryan ibid, p. 33; Ehrenhaft,
"Protection against international price discrimination: US
countervailing and anti-dumping duties" 58 Columbia Law
Rev. (1958) pp. 48-49.
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non-tariff barriers such as different technical
standards^.
(b) The dumper must exercise some form of control over the
price in his domestic market. This in essence means
that conditions of imperfect competition must exist.
In other words, the producer of the dumped goods must
have a relatively large share of the domestic market
and must produce a product which can be differentiated
from that which is sold by the other producers^.
The dumper does not have to be a monopolist unless he
is involved in predatory dumping, i.e. a foreign
monopolist who sells his product in the importing
country at a loss in order to eliminate his
competitors in that market. Thereafter he will be
able to sell at higher prices^.
(c) There must exist in the importing country a greater
elasticity of demand in order for the dumping to be
profitable. This is more likely to be the case where
demand in the domestic market for the product is
no
inelastic"10. In such a case the price will be
higher since a reduction in the price will have little
effect on the level of sales.
In his analysis of dumping^ Professor Viner broadly outlined three
categories of dumping: sporadic dumping, short term or intermittent
dumping and continuous or long term dumping.
25 Bryan op. cit. pp. 31-2. This situation can be contrasted
with one in which perfect competition prevails. Each firm
sells a small amount of the total sold in any given market
and each sells identical or homogenous products.
25 Barcelo "The Anti-Dumping Law: Repeal or revise it" (1979)
NYB of International Legal Studies p. 65.
22 De Jong op. cit. p. 168.
2® An example of highly inelastic demand for a product was the
case of Electronic Typewriters (Japan) O.J. 1984 L335/43.
In the domestic market the demand for alphanumeric
typewriters was small and inelastic. This enabled the




Sporadic dumping ususally takes the form of unloading excess stock on
to foreign markets in order to protect the dumper's position in the
domestic market. It may be that demand in the dumper's market is
inelastic, in which case a reduction in the price will have little
effect on sales. Viner saw this as not causing serious injury and
at worst it deprived the consumer in the country of origin of the
benefit of a bargain sale^O,
Short term or intermittent dumping is aimed at gaining a foothold in
the foreign market, or preventing the development of competition or
eliminating competitors altogether^^ . This last situation is
known as predatory dumping, and it occurs when a foreign producer
sells abroad at a loss while maintaining monopoly profits in the
domestic market. His temporary losses will in time be recouped by
higher prices. Professor Viner saw this type of dumping as
objectionable irrespective of whether or not predation was
involved. He contended that, owing to its impermanence, it was
liable to cause injury to the domestic producer in that its sudden
cessation could render valueless investment or cut off a source of
supply for materials. He argued that on the whole the injury to the
domestic producers outweighed the short term gain for the
32consumer-"1.
Long term or continuous dumping may occur as a result of the
producer's determination to maintain the price structure in the
domestic market or for reasons of maximising economies of scale. In
both cases he will sell his product abroad at reduced prices in order






noted that this was the only occasion in which dumping would benefit
the foreign country in terms of efficiency and welfare^.
1.3. The Regulation of Dumping in the GATT
Dumping is regulated primarily by Article VI. However, as will be
shown below, Article VI suffered from a number of serious drawbacks.
First, it was subject to the grandfather clause which meant that it
did not supersede the pre-existing legislation of the contracting
parties-^. Second, there were no multilateral procedural
regulations to govern its application^. This meant in effect
that by carrying out lengthy and time-consuming investigations the
anti-dumping procedure could be used as a protectionist device.
This was one of the main reasons why it was added to the list of
non-tariff barriers to be discussed at the Kennedy Round. Finally,
Article VI suffered from a serious lack of definition of key
concepts. Although the Expert Group on Anti-Dumping and
Countervailing Duties^ went some way in clarifying the position it
was not really until the Anti-Dumping Codes of the Kennedy Round-^®
and the Tokyo Round^ that a more specific set of standards were
adopted with respect to the determination and investigation of
dumping and injury.
ibid. at p. 133; De Jong op. cit. p. 177.
See footnote 18 supra.
See generally Curzon & Curzon "GATT" in (ed.) Shonfield
'International Economic Relations of the Western World
[1959-71] ' .
GATT 8th Supp. BISD 146 (1960).
Reproduced in GATT 15th Supp. BISD 24 (1966-7).
Reproduced in GATT 26th Supp. BISD 171 (1978-9).
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In the following analysis of the GATT regulation of dumping reference
to the Anti-Dumping Code is to the Code concluded at the Tokyo Round
as it replaced that adopted at the Kennedy Round^®.
Dumping is defined in Article Vl(l) as the situation where the price
of the product from one country to another is less than the
comparable price in the ordinary course of trade for the like product
when destined for consumption in the exporting country^. The
term "like product" was not defined in Article VI^. Because this
is central to the question of dumping and injury it was defined in
Article 2(2) of the Anti-Dumping Code"^.
1.3.1. The Determination of Dumping
In order for dumping to exist the export price of the product must
be less than its normal value. Article Vl(l) provided that the
export price was simply the price of the product exported from one
Article 16(5) Anti-Dumping Code (1979).
This definition was maintained in Article 2(1) of
Anti-Dumping Code.
The Expert Group defined "Like product" thus:
'a product which is identical in physical characteristics
subject however to such variations in presentation which
are due to the need to adapt the product to special
conditions in the market of the importing country'
GATT 8th Supp. BISD 146 at 149 (1960).
In the Anti-dumping Code "Like product" was defined as
a product which is identical, i.e. alike in all respects to
the product under consideration or, in the absence of such
a product, another product which, although not alike in all
respects, has characteristics closely resembling those of
the product under consideration.
♦
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country to another"^. However, it did not deal with the situation
where no export price existed or where the export price proved to be
unreliable owing to association or compensatory arrangements. This
was rectified by Article 2(5) of the Anti-Dumping Code. It provided
that the export price may be constructed on the basis of the price:
(i) at which the imported products are first resold to an
independent buyer; or
(ii) if the products are not sold to an independent buyer
or not resold in the condition imported, on such a
reasonable basis as the authorities may determine.
In both these cases allowances are permitted for costs incurred
between importation and resale"^.
With regard to the normal value the preferred price was to be the
domestic price, i.e. the comparable price in the ordinary course of
trade for the like product when destined for consumption in the
exporting country"^. In the absence of the domestic price,
Article VI provided for two alternative methods of establishing
normal value. It could be established by taking the highest
comparable price for the like product for export to any third country
in the ordinary course of trade"^7. Although it could be the
highest price it had to be representative"^. Alternatively it
could be established by taking the cost of production of the product
^ According to the Expert Group on Anti-Dumping and
Countervailing Duties this was to be the price at which the
product left the exporting country and not that at which it
entered the importing country, GATT 8th Supp. BISD 146
(1960).





Article 2(4) Anti-Dumping Code.
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in the country of origin and adding to it a reasonable amount for
selling expenses and for profit^.
In order to ensure a fair comparison between the normal value and the
export price, Article Vl(l) provided that allowances should be made
for differences in taxation, in conditions and terms of sale and for
other differences affecting price comparability. Article 2(6) of
the Anti-Dumping Code added to this the requirement that the normal
value and the export price should be compared at the same level of
trade, i.e. the ex-factory level and in respect of sales made as near
as possible in time. Once these allowances have been made the
dumping margin could be determined.
1.3.2. Determination of Injury
Dumping on its own, however, was not to be condemned unless its
effect was such that material injury was caused to domestic industry
in the importing country^. Unfortunately, Article VI did not
define injury^ and it was not until the Anti-Dumping Codes of the
Kennedy Round and Tokyo Round that guidelines for the determination
of injury were laid down.
Under Article 3 of the Anti-Dumping Code a determination of dumping
can only be made where the dumped imports are the cause of material
injury to a domestic industry. This was a much less stringent test
than that provided for in the Anti-Dumping Code of the Kennedy Round,
Article Vl(1)(b)(ii).
Article Vl(l); no precise definition or set of rules could
be given in respect of the injury concept. With regard to
a definition of industry the Group of Experts agreed that a
single firm within a large industry could generally not
constitute an industry, GATT 8th Supp. BISD 150 (1960).
51 See Article Vl(l) and (6)(a).
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by which the authorities of the importing country had to show that
dumping was demonstrably the principal cause of material injury^.
According to Article 3, the determination of injury must be based on
positive evidence, involving an examination of the volume and prices
of the dumped imports and the consequent impact on the domestic
producers of the like product^. In other words, the dumped
imports have to be the cause of injury and other factors such as the
volume and prices of non-dumped imports which are causing injury are
not to be attributed to the dumped imports^. As injury has to be
caused to the producers of the like product in the importing country
it is important to know what constitutes domestic industry.
Article 4 of Anti-Dumping Code defines it as:
the domestic producers as a whole of the like products or to
those of them whose collective output of the products
constitutes a major proportion of the total domestic
production of those products".
This general rule is subject to two exceptions. First, where the
producer is related to the exporter or is himself the importer, then
domestic industry may be interpreted as referring to the rest of the
producers and second, the territory of a party may be divided into
two or more competitive markets and the producers within each may be
regarded as domestic industry-^.
1.3.3. Anti-Dumping Duties and Undertakings
When it has been determined that the producers of the like product
have been injured as a result of the effects of dumping a contracting
Article 3(a); Barcelo op. cit. contends that Article 3 of
the Anti-Dumping Code adopted at the Tokyo Round was a soft
injury test.
Article 3(2)-(3) Anti-Dumping Code.
Article 3(4) Anti-Dumping Code.
Article 4(2) Anti-Dumping Code.
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party can impose anti-dumping duties^. The amount of duty levied
cannot exceed the margin of dumping in respect of such product-^
and the framers of the Code considered it desirable to impose a
lesser duty if this would be adequate to remove injury-^.
Furthermore the imposition of duties is not subject to the principle
of non-discrimination. In other words, duties can be imposed
selectively on the dumped goods while the same goods from other
sources which were not dumped would be free of such duties^.
Apart from the imposition of duties, the authorities in the importing
country may accept price undertakings which revise the price or cease
exports at dumped prices so as to eliminate the injurious effects of
dumping*^. The advantages of such undertakings are their
flexibility and the fact that they bring about a more amicable
solution.
1.3.4. Procedure
A major drawback of Article VI was that it did not require the
contracting parties to comply with any procedural requirements.
This resulted in it being used as a protectionist device with
investigations dragging on for many months. This situation was
rectified by the Anti-Dumping Code. It provided that anti-dumping
investigations had to be concluded within one year after
initiation^-'- and furthermore that the investigation on dumping and
Article Vl(6)(a).
Article Vl(2); Article 8(3) Anti-Dumping Code.
Article 8(1) Anti-Dumping Code.
This can be contrasted with Article XIX GATT which permits
the adoption of safeguard measures in cases of emergency.
Such measures have to be applied on a non-discriminatory
basis.
Article 7(1) Anti-Dumping Code.








injury had to be considered simultaneously^^. The gathering of
evidence and its verification is regulated by Article 6 of the
Anti-Dumping Code. It provides that in cases where the offending
exporter does not co-operate, the authorities in the importing
country may proceed on the basis of facts available*^.
1.4. Evaluation
The Anti-Dumping Code concluded at the Tokyo Round, like its
predecessor, is binding only on those parties which signed it.
Whereas most of the industrialised nations of the Western World
signed it, the less developed countries did not. More importantly,
the United States bound itself by the injury criteria and it
incorporated the Code into its domestic legal order^^.
The Code has also resulted in greater transparency with respect to
the determination of dumping and injury. This process has continued
through the work of the Anti-Dumping Committee and in particular with
regard to its recommendations on greater transparency in anti-dumping
proceedings and on-the-spot investigations, to name but two^.
As a result of the recent GATT Panel's report in the dispute between
the European Community and Japan concerning the importation of
anti-dumping duties by the Community on "screwdriver assembly"
products^, the delegates at the Uruguay Round are at present
Article 5(2) Anti-Dumping Code.
Article 6(8) Anti-Dumping Code.
Trade Agreements Act 1979 s. 2(b)(3), 19 USC
s. 2503 (b)(3).
GATT 30th Supp. BISD (1982-83).
See Chapter 3, infra.
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debating the question of introducing provisions into the Anti-Dumping
Code to counteract the circumvention of duties by such methods^.
2 . SUBSIDIES A.ND COUNTERVAILING
DUTIES
2.1. Historical Background
The GATT rules on subsidies are much stricter than those regulating
dumping. Whereas dumping is prohibited by the GATT only when it
causes injury, some subsidies are prohibited altogether, notably
export subsidies on non-primary goods, while others are to be
restricted in their application.
The main GATT provision on subsidies is Article XVI. It
distinguishes between export subsidies and subsidies in general, the
former being subdivided into export subsidies on primary goods and
those on non-primary goods'^.
The term subsidy is not defined in the GATT nor in the Code on
Subsidies and Countervailing Duties though it is generally accepted
that it involves a net loss to government^. In 1961 the GATT
Panel of Experts agreed that a definition was neither feasible nor
necessary. Further they pointed out that to formulate a definition
might give rise to a situation where measures are included which were
never intended to come within the meaning of Article XVI ^C).
See Focus: GATT Newsletter 70 (1990).
Article XVI(3) and (4).
Pestieau "Revising GATT approach to Subsidies: A Canadian
View" p. 95 in (ed.) Warnecke 'International Trade and
Industrial Policies' (1978).
GATT 10th Supp. BISD at 208 (1962).
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Originally, the country granting the subsidy had to notify GATT of
the nature, extent and effects of the subsidy^. Not
surprisingly, this provision was ignored, largely because it meant
confessing to a practice that was trade distorting. The reason for
such a weak provision was twofold. First, subsidies were regarded
as a less serious obstacle to trade than, for instance, tariffs or
quotas. Second, as we live in a buyers' market rather than a
sellers' market, most countries tend to use subsidies as a means of
increasing their exports^. This is due largely to the fact that
the economies of the various contracting parties are at different
stages of development and many have industries which are not
internationally competitive^.
In 1955 new rules on subsidies were added in order to strengthen
Article XVI. These new rules banned export subsidies on non-primary
goods altogether and limited the application and effect of export
subsidies on primary goods^.
The new Code on Subsidies and Countervailing Duties recognises that
subsidies are used by governments to promote important objectives of
social and economic policy^. However, at the same time it
provides that the signatories should seek to avoid the use of any
subsidy which causes:
(a) injury to domestic industry of another signatory;
Article XVI(1).
See generally Kock "International Trade Policy and the GATT
1947-67".
Warnecke "Government Intervention and Open Global Trading
System" p. 15 in (ed.) Warnecke op. cit.
Article XVI(3) and (4).
Article 8(1) Subsidies Code.
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(b) nullification or impairment of the benefits accruing
directly or indirectly to another signatory;
(c) serious prejudice to another signatory^.
2.2. Export Subsidies and Domestic Subsidies
Article XVI deals almost entirely with export subsidies. This is
due to the fact that domestic subsidies were seen as less harmful
than export subsidies since they were used primarily to further
social and economic goals.
2.2.1. Export Subsidies
Barcelo defines an export subsidy as a subsidy conditioned on the
export of a product or on export performance^. The primary aim
of the exporting country in granting a subsidy is not to further
socio-economic goals but is rather an attempt to increase their share
of the market in the importing country^®. The GATT further
distinguishes between export subsidies on non-primary goods and those
on primary goods'"^.
Article XVI(A) prohibits contracting parties from granting
subsidies on non-primary goods which result in the sale of such
products for export at a lower price than the comparable price
charged for the like product in the domestic market. The 1960
Working Group had the task of giving effect to Article XVI(4). The
Article 8(3) Subsidies Code.
Barcelo "Subsidies, Countervailing Duties and Anti-dumping
Duties after Tokyo Round" 13 Cornell L.J. 257 at 261.
ibid, at 261-2.
79 At the Uruguay Round of Multilateral Trade Negotiations the
United States has proposed that this distinction should be
ended.
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result was an illustrative list of those subsidies they considered
were not compatible with Article XVI(4)®0. This prohibition and
illustrative list is reproduced in Article 9 of the Subsidies Code.
It is, however, subject to one qualification in that the developing
countries can grant such subsidies provided they do not cause serious
prejudice to the trade or production of another signatory®-*-.
Article XVI(3) provides that the contracting parties should seek to
avoid the use of subsidies on the export of primary products.
Primary products are defined as:
"a product of farm, forest, or fishery or any mineral in its
natural form or which has undergone such processing as is
customarily required to prepare it for marketing in
substantial volume in international trade"®®.
Article XVI(1) then provides an exception to Article XVI(3) in that a
contracting party can grant an export subsidy on a primary product
but only if this is applied in a manner which does not result in that
party having more than an equitable share of world trade in that
product. What is meant by the term "more than an equitable share of
world trade" is uncertain. Phegan argues that since the term
"equitable" connotes fairness what may seem fair to one producer may
not be fair to another®®. Unfortunately, the Subsidies Code has
failed to resolve the difficulties posed by the term. Article 10(1)
reproduces Article XVI(3) and Article 10(2) attempts to define what
is meant by the term "more than an equitable share of world trade".
It states that the term shall include:
GATT 9th Supp. BISD 187 (1961).
Article 14(3)-(6) Subsidies Code.
Notes to Article XVI Section B para. (2).
"GATT Article XVI.3: Export subsidies and equitable
shares" 16 JWTL 251.
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any case in which the effect of an export subsidy granted by
a signatory is to displace exports of another signatory
bearing in mind development in world markets.
2.2.2. Domestic Subsidies
Barcelo regards these as being primarily production subsidies which
are granted irrespective of output destination^. Such subsidies
are granted largely for social and economic reasons though they may
have the effect of indirectly increasing a country's exports. They
are often used as a tool in a country's industrial policy in order to
prevent or promote structural change. Such subsidisation can be
justified from an economic point of view in that it eliminates
distortions that are not self-correcting such as those brought about
by the problems associated with infant industries and foreign
government interference^. As a tool of industrial policy,
subsidies have become more apparent today. This is due largely to
the worldwide recession which has resulted in high inflation coupled
with stagnation. There is therefore a need for temporary measures
to protect jobs and prevent the collapse of industry. However, as
the number of firms in trouble continually grows, these temporary
measures inevitably become more permanent.
We, today, are also witnessing an industrial revolution in the Far
East countries. These newly industrialised countries such as
Taiwan, Korea, etc., along with Japan, produce large quantities of
high-tech goods, the majority of which are exported at very low
prices. In such cases subsidies are used to counteract fierce
competition and protect infant industries.
op. cit.
See generally Curzon Price "Industrial Policies in the EEC"
(1981).
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Domestic subsidies can, however, have adverse effects. They can,
and often do, amount to protectionism which runs contrary to the
liberal trade order as laid down by the GATT. Second, they may have
the effect of increasing the number of imports into the country
complaining of low priced imports. Third, as a corollary of the
above, such subsidies may bring about a reduction in the number of
exports of other countries to third country markets®^.
The Subsidies Code refers to domestic subsidies as subsidies other
than export subsidies. On the whole the GATT takes a more tolerant
view of these subsidies. Prior to the Tokyo Round no separate
provision dealing with such subsidies existed. Now, Article 11 of
that Code recognises that domestic subsidies could be used as
important instruments for the promotion of social and economic policy
objectives^ and therefore as such are not prohibited. However,
it was also noted that such subsidies may have adverse effects on
trade^. In such a case they may be subject to countervailing
duties if they cause injury to the domestic industry of the like
Barcelo op. cit.
The objectives noted in Article 11 are as follows:
(a) the elimination of industrial, economic and social
disadvantages of specific regions;
(b) to facilitate the restructuring, under socially
acceptable conditions, of certain sectors especially
where this has become necessary by reason of changes
in trade and economic policies including
international agreements resulting in lower barriers
to trade;
(c) generally to sustain employment and to encourage
retraining and change in employment;
(d) to encourage research and development programmes,
especially in the field of high technology
industries;
(e) the implementation of economic programmes and
policies to promote the economic and social
development of developing countries;
(f) redeployment of industry in order to avoid congestion
and environmental problems.
88 Article 11 Subsidies Code.
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product in the importing country*^. On the otherhand where such
subsidies are being maintained in such a manner as to cause injury or
serious prejudice or nullification or impairment of benefits accruing
to other signatories, they may be subject to whatever countermeasures
are deemed appropriate by the Committee on Subsidies and
Countervailing Measures^.
2.3. The Procedures for Counteracting the
Adverse Effects of Subsidies
The new Subsidies Code provides two different procedures for
counteracting the adverse effects of subsidies whether they be export
or domestic subsidies.
2.3.1. Countervailing Duties
The effect of a subsidy is similar to that of dumping. It results
in the importation of unfairly low priced products on to the domestic
market. The difference between the two lies in the fact that
whereas dumping is practiced by the individual firm, subsidies are
granted by foreign governments or out of public funds.
Article Vl(3) provides that a countervailing duty may be imposed to
offset a bounty or subsidy which has been granted directly or
indirectly on the manufacture, production or export of a product.
Where the subsidy causes or threatens to cause injury to the domestic
producers of the like product the GATT permits the countracting




Article VI GATT; Part I Subsidies Code.
Article 13 Subsidies Code.
Article Vl(6) GATT; Article 6 Subsidies Code.
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is of no relevance whether the subsidy in question is prohibited
under the GATT^ or the Subsidies Code^.
Article VI, however, was not uniformly applied by all the contracting
parties. More importantly, the United States did not require that
injury be determined before it could impose countervailing duties.
It relied on the grandfather clause which provided that pre-existing
legislation was not superseded by the GATT, in order to avoid some of
the requirements of Article VI^.
Now, by virtue of Article 1 of the Subsidies Code, the signatories to
the Code must take the necessary steps to ensure that the imposition
of countervailing duties is in accordance with Article VI. Part I
of the Subsidies Code deals at length with the procedures involved in
determining whether or not a subsidy has caused injury to the
domestic producer of the like product in the importing country. The
procedures relating to anti-subsidy actions are similar to those
which apply to anti-dumping actions and therefore they do not need to
be considered here.
2.3.2. Dispute Settlement Procedure
Article 13 of the Subsidies Code provides that signatories may,
after authorisation has been given, adopt such counter measures as
they consider appropriate including withdrawal of concessions or
obligations, in order to counteract export subsidies that are
inconsistent with the Code or any subsidy which may cause injury or
serious prejudice or nullification or impairment of benefits accruing
to a signatory.
Article XVI(4). See also Report of GATT Experts GATT,
8th Supp. BISD 146 (1960).
Article 9(1) Subsidies Code.
See supra Footnote 18.
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However, such measures cannot be adopted unilaterally. They may
only be authorised by all the contracting parties^ or by the
Committee on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures'^.
Furthermore, authorisation will be granted only after the necessary
consultation, conciliation and dispute settlement procedures have
been complied with^"7.
2.3.3. Evaluation
It was hoped that the new Code would strengthen the multilateral
regulation of subsidies and go some way in helping to achieve the
primary aim of the Tokyo Round Negotiations - a greater expansion and
liberalisation of world trade. Some success was achieved with a
need to prove injury before countervailing duties could be imposed
but at the same time it did not bring about a greater control over
subsidisation policies per se. Owing to their variety and ambiguity
a large proportion of subsidies tend to remain outside the ambit of
GATT multilateral regulation. Instead of it becoming more difficult
to distort international trade it has become easier by the device of
Q ft
domestic subsidies^ . The problems and difficulties raised by the
Code on Subsidies and Countervailing Duties are very much on the
agenda at the Uruguay Round of Multilateral Trade Negotiations^.
The United States in particular has called for greater transparency
in countervailing duty proceedings and the establishment of clearer
Article XXV(l) GATT.
Article 15 Subsidies Code.
Articles 12, 13, 17 and 18 Subsidies Code.
Curzon Price op. cit.








guidelines for the administration of multilateral rules on
subsidies. It has also proposed updating the Code by including
provisions designed to prevent circumvention of countervailing
duties"^®,
3 - SAFEGUARD MEASURES
3.1 Historical Background
By virtue of Article XIX of the GATT, a contracting party can take
emergency action on imports where:
if as a result of unforeseen developments and of the effect
of the obligations incurred by a contracting party under
this agreement including tariff concessions, any product is
being imported into the territory of that contracting party
in such increased quantities and under such conditions as to
cause or threaten serious injury to domestic producers in
that territory of like or directly competitive products, the
contracting party shall be free, in respect of such product,
and to the extent and for such time as may be necessary to
prevent or remedy such injury, to suspend the obligation in
whole or in part or to withdraw or modify the concession.
The situation envisaged by Article XIX is that in which serious
injury is caused by a large influx of imports of a particular product
at prices lower than those on the domestic market but which are not
at dumped or subsidised prices1®1.
100 See Focus: GATT Newsletter 70 (1990).
101 This corresponds to what the Special Working Party in 1960
described as "market disruption". They concluded that
this concept had a number of elements:
(i) sharp and substantial increase (or potential
increase) of imports of particular products from
particular sources;
(ii) offered at prices substantially lower than those on
the domestic market;
(iii) serious damage or threat of it to domestic producers;
(iv) difference in price is not due to either subsidies or
dumping.
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As a result of a number of serious drawbacks inherent in Article XIX
the contracting parties tend to resort to other means of relief
permitted by the GATT^^. The main drawbacks are as follows:
(1) The injury criterion under Article XIX is much more
stringent than that under Article VI (Article VI
refers to material injury rather than serious
injury). This can be explained by the fact that they
have not been imported at dumped or subsidised prices.
(2) Article XIX is subject to the rule of non¬
discrimination in that safeguard measures must not be
applied in a discriminatory or selective manner.
This in effect means that protective action must be
taken against all contracting parties even though the
problem imports come only from a few.
(3) Resort to Article XIX tends to be expensive in that
the country wishing to rely on the escape clause will
have to offer equivalent compensation to any
contracting party having a substantial interest at
stake303.
3.2. Voluntary Export Restraint Agreements (VER's)
As a result of these drawbacks in Article XIX, Voluntary Export
Restraint agreements (VERs) have become more prolific. As a
non-tariff barrier they are much more difficult to control and are
not subject to multilateral surveillance.
The concept has been defined by Metzger as follows:
Action of restraint by the exporting country taken because
of its concern that unilateral quotas would otherwise be
imposed against it by an importing country which might well
produce more adverse trade effects than those voluntarily
Merciai "Safeguard Measures in GATT", 15 JWTL 41 at 45-6.
103 Article XIX(3).
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agreed to by the exporting country through a more flexible
medium-'-®^.
VERs are based on either:
(1) formal bilateral voluntary restraint agreement between
exporting and importing country; or
(2) unilateral action on the part of an exporting
country-1^.
As a means of counteracting injury from a large influx of imports of
a particular product they are more flexible than action taken under
Article XIX, which normally takes the form of quotas. As far as
VERs are concerned it is the exporting country which for the most
part maintains control over them. Their duration and severity are
open to periodic review through the negotiation process. Quotas on
the other hand are applied by the importing country on the basis of
an independent and non-negotiable decision.
The flexibility of VERs is enhanced by the fact that they can be
applied on a discriminatory basis and, unlike action under
Article XIX, they do not involve payment of compensation.
3.3. The Need for Selective Safeguards
Because of the proliferation of VERs and the fact that the
Contracting Parties tend not to resort to Article XIX some countries,
and notably the Community, advocated at the Tokyo Round of
Multilateral Trade Negotiations a Code on Safeguard Measures.
Behind this call for a new Code was the hope that safeguard measures
could be adopted on a selective basis.
"Injury and market disruption from imports" in Williams
Commission Papers 1 at 167, 168-73 (1971).
See generally McGovern "International Trade Regulation"
(1982).
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Certain advantages would be gained from having selective safeguard
measures. First, it would limit the action taken to the problem
imports, with the result that this would be less disruptive to
trade. Second, it would avoid the need to pay compensation which is
required in the case of official action under Article XIX. Thus, it
has the advantage over VERs in that they would be subject to
multilateral surveillance.
On the other hand strong legal, economic and political arguments can
be put forward against the introduction of selective
safeguards!^. ip^e adoption of safeguard measures on a
discriminatory basis is against the spirit and aims of the GATT which
is based for the most part on the principle of non-discrimination.
To allow such measures would, in the words of Curzon-Price!®'',
"open the floodgates of discrimination in all kinds of
circumstances". There must be a commitment to the
non-discriminatory application of such measures in order to expose
and control protectionist interventions. In the absence of
non-discrimination, small and weaker countries would suffer from the
abuse of power by the larger and more powerful ones. A
discriminatory system also has the effect of penalising the most
disruptive producers, i.e. the most efficient, the result of which is
a reduction in world income. Lastly, from the political viewpoint,
the GATT would lose. It would find itself virtually unable to
handle the disputes and trade wars that would inevitably arise under
a discriminatory system.
Since the Tokyo Round, there has been little progress with regard to
selective safeguard measures. At the GATT Ministerial Meeting in
1982 there was a call for more predictability and clarity of
safeguard measures in order to bring about a greater security for
Curzon Price op. cit. pp. 5-10.
ibid, at p. 8.
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both importing and exporting countries. In doing so the results of
trade liberalisation to date would be preserved and it would avoid
1 OR
the proliferation of restrictive measures1" .
At the Uruguay Round of Multilateral Trade Negotiations the question
of safeguard measures has arisen. In remaining true to the spirit
and aim of the GATT, one of the objectives specified in the
Ministerial Declaration was an agreement on safeguards based on the
principles of the GATT including the fact that it should apply to
everyone.
The European Community has again raised the question of selective
safeguards!®®. Earlier this year it proposed a selective
safeguard regime applicable in special circumstances!!®. jts
proposal would allow interim precautionary action against one or a
group of suppliers whose products have been found to be causing
serious injury to domestic producers as a result of the large influx
in imports.
Following consultations, action to restrict these imports would have
to be proportional to the injury suffered and would be removed after
a maximum of eight months or at the end of a full injury
investigation. Where serious injury is definitively established,
the importing country would be able, following consultations, to
adopt selective safeguard measures for a period which should be the
subject of negotiations at the Uruguay Round. Those countries
affected either by the interim or definitive measures would be free
to withdraw equivalent concessions to the importing country. During
the period during which the measures are in force, imports of the
product from other countries can be monitored. If they are found to
See full text of GATT Ministerial Declaration reproduced in
17 JWTL 67.






be causing injury to domestic producers, the countries covered by the
measures could request that they be extended to these suppliers.
This proposal has not received broad support. The majority of the
less developed countries are of the opinion that such a regime would
benefit only the more powerful trading nations. The idea of the
affected exporters being able to request the extension of safeguard
measures to other exporters is seen as an attempt to shift the
political burden from importer to exporter.
It appears, therefore, that the question of selective safeguards will
be discussed in greater detail in the months ahead and it seems
unlikely that agreement will be reached, at least not in the
foreseeable future.
3.4. Evaluation
Because of the shortcomings of Article XIX, an increasing number of
cases are determined on the basis of the Anti-Dumping Rules. In
essence, the Anti-Dumping Rules are used as a surrogate escape clause
because they are less rigid than emergency action under Article XIX.
In order to make safeguard measures more effective they have to be
much more predictable and precise. This could be achieved by
shortening the duration of the measures and by allowing imports to
increase at a reasonable rate while at the same time bringing about
the adjustment of the domestic industry in question"'. Also VERs
and similar arrangements have to be monitored in order to prevent the
movemenL away from trade liberalisation to protectionism'".
Bulletin of European Communities No. 9 (1986) Vol. 19
pp. 13-21 at 19.
Executive Branch GATT Studies No. 8, GATT Provisions on
Relief from Injurious Imports, 124-9.
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Apart from the issue of selective safeguards, the Negotiating Group
on Safeguards are at present discussing a draft text of a new
codel-^ .
A. ILLICIT COMMERCIAL PRACTICES
4.1 Historical Background
Inevitably there are other forms of unfair trade practices not
caught by the anti-dumping, anti-subsidy or safeguard measure
provisions. The majority of these take the form of non-tariff
barriers, such as discriminatory treatment of imported goods
vis-a-vis domestic goods and infringement of intellectual property
rights, to name but two.
In 1964 the European Commission had discussed the idea of "common
principles and a Community procedure concerning abnormal trade
practices of Third Countries"^^ with the Council of Ministers.
The idea received little attention and it was temporarily dropped.
It was not until 1980 that the matter was again discussed by the
Welsh Committee, the Committee for External Economic Relations in the
European Parliament. In its report, the Committee recommended that
new legislation should be considered by the Community authorities to
cover those areas of unfair trading practices not covered by the
existing legislation"--'-^.
In 1983, the Commission submitted a proposal to the Council for a new
Regulation designed to strengthen the Common Commercial Policy. The




See generally FOCUS: GATT Newsletter 63 (1989).
EEC Bulletin 1964, Supp 1.
European Parliament, Doc. 1 422/811.
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2641/84116 is aimed primarily at illicit commercial practices not
covered by the existing trade policy instruments in the
Community^-^. The Regulation was designed to produce the same
effects as Section 301 of the US Trade Act 1974!!^. Unlike
Section 301, however, it does not aim at opening up third markets but
seeks to protect European trade interests in such markets against
illicit commercial practices. In effect it is a means of permitting
the Community to use its existing rights with regard to the
commercial practices of third countries.
The Regulation in part allows the Community authorities, if certain
conditions are satisfied, to take unilateral action!!^. Prior to
this, unilateral action could be taken only in the case of dumping
and subsidisation. In all other cases unfairness had first to be
established by the GATT membership before a complainant could
retaliate!^'!.
110 See Chapter 3 Part 4 infra.
!!^ Article 13 Regulation 2641/84.
!!® 19 USC 241. The Regulation was not modelled on Section
301 as the Community Institutions saw it as a substantial
derogation from the spirit of the GATT.
!!9 By virtue of Article 10(2) Regulation 2641/84
countermeasures can only be taken if they are compatible
with the Community's international obligations and
procedures. This means that where there is provision for
consultation and dispute settlement, this must be exhausted
before retaliatory action can be taken. However, where an
applicant cites a breach of a rule outwith the GATT then
the Community may take unilateral action if injury has been
caused to Community industry as a result of the illicit
commercial practices see: Unauthorised reproduction of
sound recordings (Indonesia) O.J. 1987 C136/3.
120 M.C.E. Bronckers "Private response to foreign unfair trade
practices" N.W.J.Int.Law & Bus. (No.3 Winter 1985) 651 at
718.
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Regulation 2641/84 provides the Community authorities with procedures
allowing them to:
1. respond to illicit commercial practices causing
injury;
2. ensure full exercise of the Community's rights with
regard to the commercial practices of third
.171
countriesXZ-L.
The Regulation is aimed at strengthening the Community's hand in the
GATT dispute settlement procedure under Article XXIII. This section
of the chapter will therefore be concerned for the most part with an
analysis of Article XXIII. However, it is important to first
consider the type of practices which are to be regarded as illicit.
4.2. Illicit Commercial Practices
The term illicit commercial practice is defined in Regulation
2641/84 as:
any international trade practices attributable to third
countries which are incompatible with international law or
generally accepted rules-*-^.
The Regulation further provides that the Community authorities can
respond to such practices where they affect either Community imports
or exports. The definition focuses on trade practices




suggest that it covers trade practices only of governments and not of
private companies'^3#
It is not yet clear what activities of third countries are caught by
Regulation 2641/84. A number of complaints have however been
brought to the attention of the Community authorities'-^. Two of
these have concerned practices in third countries which have affected
Community exports and have been held to constitute illicit commercial
practices'^.
Aramid Fibres concerned the exclusion from the United States market
of the unlicensed importation of certain aramid fibres manufactured
by Akzo NV or its affiliated companies outside the United States
under Section 337 of the US Tariff Act 1930'^, The complainant,
Enka, Akzo's fibre subsidiary, contended that this was a breach of
Article 111(4) of the GATT and the exclusion of the unlicensed
importation of aramid fibres was not necessary under Article XX(d) of
the GATT. Article 111(4) sets out the obligation to treat imported
products no less favourably than like products of national origin in
respect of all laws, regulations and requirements affecting their
internal sale, purchase, transportation, distribution or use. Enka
See Steenbergen "The New Commercial Policy Instrument"
(1985) CMLRev. 421 at 425 where he contends that one cannot
rule out the possibility that the new instrument can be
used where unfair trade practices of private companies are
directly or to a substantial degree caused or promoted by
government intervention in third countries, for example in
the fields of government contracts, price regulations,
rules on advertisements, technical standards, etc.
Aramid Fibres (US) O.J. 1986 C25/2; Sound Recordings
(Indonesia) O.J. 1987 C136/3; Soya Meal (Argentina)
unpublished decision 22nd December 1986; Commission
Decision rejecting complaint lodged by Smith Kline & French
Laboratories Ltd. against Jordan O.J. 1989 L30/67.
125
126
See Aramid Fibres and Sound Recordings ibid.
O.J. 1986 C25/2.
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claimed that, by not being able to challenge the standing of DuPont
in the United States aramid fibre industry, it was deprived of
establishing that DuPont's position was achieved as a result of an
infringement of Enka's patent.
The complaint, as the Commission noted, raised important questions of
interpretation which had considerable economic implications. It
referred the matter to the GATT under Article XXIII327. In
November 1989, the GATT Council adopted a panel report finding
Section 337 of the United States Tariff Act 1930 to be inconsistent
with Article III(4)328. The importance of this finding lies in
the fact that it was not the substantive elements of the law that
were contrary to the GATT rules but rather the procedures for
enforcing it in the national courts32^.
In Unauthorised Reproduction of Sound Recordings3313 the
complainant, the association of members of the International
Federation of Phonogram and Videogram Producers (IFPI), alleged that
Indonesia was in breach of both international law and of generally
accepted rules. The breach of international law was Article 10 of
the Paris Convention for the Protection of Intellectual Property of
which Indonesia was a signatory.
The complaint also referred to a breach of "generally accepted
rules". The question to be considered here is "how does a rule
become generally accepted ?" Professor Sohn provides us with
several ways in which a rule can become generally accepted333.
127 O.J. 1987 L117/18.
128 36th Supp. BISD (1990).
32^ ibid.
130 O.J. 1987 C136/3.
333 "Generally Accepted International Rules "61 Washington
L.Rev. (1986) 1073 at 1073-4.
- 54 -
This may occur when a rule is supported by the constant practice of
1 in
States who consider that the practice is obligatory . It is not
clear how generally accepted the practice of States must be, but
"universality" is not required^-^. Sohn identified two factors
which had to be taken into account: first, there had to be express
acceptance of the rule by a reasonable number of States representing
different political, economic and ideological views and, second,
acquiesence by other States^-^.
In Unauthorised Reproduction of Sound Recordings, the complainant
relied on the Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and
Artistic Works and the Paris text of Universal Copyright
Convention. Indonesia was not a signatory to either Convention but
it was argued that in view of the large number and importance of the
countries adhering to those Conventions they constituted generally
accepted rulesAs a result of an undertaking by the
Indonesian authorities, the Commission suspended^6 an(j more
recently terminated the proceedings without further examination of
the complaint^^.
On the otherhand, the Commission has in two cases rejected complaints
on the basis that the alleged act of unfair competition was not
incompatible with international law or generally accepted rules. In
ibid, at 1073.
Brownlie "Principles of Public International Law" 7,
(3rd ed.) (1979).











Soya Meal^^ FEDIOL, the Community association of oil-seed crushers
and oil processors, alleged that Argentina's system of differential
export taxes for soya goods and export restrictions were incompatible
with the GATT and in particular with Articles III and XI thereof.
In an unpublished decision the Commission refused to initiate
proceedings on the basis that the measures complained of were not
contrary to the GATT. FEDIOL appealed to the Court against this
decision^^. They argued that Article III was not designed simply
to remove any discrimination whereby imported products were adversely
affected by a system of domestic charges but also to prevent the
protection of domestic products by a differential export tax system
as existed in the present case, from harming production in another
country to which those products were imported.
The Court rejected this argument. It held that Article III could
not be applied to a case such as the one in issue which related to a
system of differential charges on exports levied solely on categories
of domestic products.
The applicant also argued that the fixing of artificial reference
prices as a basis for calculating the differential charges on soya
products intended for exportation constituted a measure having an
effect equivalent to a quantitative restriction and was therefore
contrary to Article XI. The Court rejected this argument on the
ground that Article XI applied only to quantitative restrictions and
could not be interpreted as covering measures having an effect
equivalent to quantitative restrictions.
It also rejected the applicants' subsidiary arguments based on
Articles XX and XXIII.
Unpublished Decision dated 22nd December 1986.
Case 70/87 EEC Seed Crushers' and Oil Processors'
Federation (Fediol) v. Commission [1989] ECR 1781.
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The Commission also rejected a complaint lodged by Smith Kline &
French Laboratories Limited against Jordan^41-1. In that case the
complainant alleged that an amendment to Jordan's intellectual
property law amounted to "an act of unfair competition" in terms of
Article 10 bis (1) of the Paris Convention for the Protection of
Industrial Property. In refusing to initiate proceedings, the
Commission held that the term "act of unfair competition" could not
include the legislative acts of a signatory State.
As these complaints were brought by "natural or legal persons", this
may be an indication of how the new instrument will develop. Along
with the courts in many other contracting States the Court has,
however, until recently denied the direct effect of GATT
provisions14^. The Court has in the Third Fediol-*-^^ case held
that for the purpose of the new Commercial Policy instrument natural
or legal persons can rely directly on the provisions of the GATT.
The Court relied on the fact that the GATT forms part of the Rules of
Public International law, and by virtue of Article 2(1) of Regulation
2641/84 the applicants were entitled to apply to the Court to review
the legality of the Commission decision applying those provisions.
This decision is to be welcomed and it is hoped that the reasoning of
the Court may be extended to cover the other major safeguard
measures.
140 O.J. 1989 L30/67.
14^ See Petersmann "Application of GATT by the Court of Justice
of the European Communities" 20 CMLRev. (1983) 397-437;
Chapter 6, infra.
l4^ Case 70/87, supra; see also Brand "Private Parties and
GATT Dispute Resolution: Implications of Panel Report on
Section 337 of US Tariff Act of 1930" 24 JWTL (vol. 3) 5.
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A.3. Dispute Settlement under Article XXIII GATT
Protective measures under the new Regulation may be adopted only
insofar as they are compatible with the Community's international
obligations and procedures# This in essence means that the
procedures providing for consultation and dispute settlement at
international level must be exhausted before the Community
authorities can adopt any protective measures. Only where there is
no provision for such procedures can retaliatory action be taken
unilaterally. It should also be noted that the procedure laid down
in Article 1(b) Regulation 2641/8A (i.e. ensuring the full exercise
of the Community's rights with regard to the commercial practices of
third countries) relates specifically to the implementation of the
relevant dispute settlement procedures under international law.
A.3.1. Article XXIII
A party which believes that a benefit accruing to it has been
nullified or impaired by another contracting party's breach or other
measure may seek consultations with the aid of other interested
parties and the GATT secretariat^-44.
The first question to be considered is, "what is meant by the term
'nullification or impairment' in Article XXIII ?" As the term has
never been defined it is necessary to look at the decided cases to
date for guidance. It is arguable that the term implies that some
1A3 Article 10(2) Regulation 26A1/8A.
144 Article XXIII(l)
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sort of injury must have occurred to the trade expectations of a
contracting party before it can invoke Article XXIII-'-^^.
Owing to the lack of definition, however, there has developed the
principle of prima facie nullification or impairment!"^. This
principle presumes nullification or impairment in at least three
situations:
(i) when a quantitative restriction has been imposed on a
product;
(ii) when a domestic production subsidy is introduced on a
product which has previously been the subject of a
tariff concession resulting from tariff negotiations;
(iii) when a State has been held by a GATT panel to have
violated its GATT obligations.
By presuming nullification or impairment the burden of proof is
shifted on to the defendant State which as a result has to prove its
innocence-'-^''. If a contracting party fails to reach a
satisfactory solution through consultations, it can by virtue of
Article XXIII(2) request the setting up of a working party or a panel
to investigate the dispute!"^. If the recommendations of the
panel are not implemented then the contracting party can ask the GATT
plenary body
1 ° This became clear in one of the earliest cases: see Chile
v. Australia GATT 2nd Supp. BISD 188 (1952); see also Disc
case 23rd Supp. BISD 98 (1977); Jackson "The jurisprudence
of international trade : the DISC case in GATT" 72 AJIL
(1978) 747 at 755; Klabbers & Vrengdenhil "Dispute
Settlement in GATT : DISC and it successor" (1986) 1 LIEI
115 at 118.
Klabbers & Vrengdenhil op. cit. at 119.
ibid.
148 mapn difference between a working party and a panel is
that the former consists of national representatives
whereas the latter normally consists of GATT experts.
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to authorise the suspension of the GATT obligations or application of
149concessions14'.
Some of the Codes negotiated at the Tokyo Round of Multilateral Trade
Negotiations have their own dispute settlement procedures^®. For
the most part these correspond to the general system under Article
XXIII. The Code on Subsidies and Countervailing Duties, however,
contains more stringent time limits and it also allows the Committee
administering the Code to authorise the injured parties to take a
number of wide-ranging counter measures.
4.3.2. Evaluation
Most of the leading commentators on the GATT have criticised the
dispute settlement procedure under Article XXIIll51. The major
criticism is that the system is subject to many delays.
Furthermore, it is often the case that diplomatic or other political
pressures ensure compliance with the panel's recommendations. These
extra-legal means are inappropriate to an adjudicatory procedure
which, if it is to succeed, needs to develop trust and
149 Article XXIII(2); see also Netherlands v. US GATT 1st
Supp. BISD 32 (1953); GATT 7th Supp. BISD 23 (1959) - the
only case in which the provision was invoked.
15® Code on Technical Barriers to Trade; Code on Government
Procurement; Code on Customs Valuation and Code on
Subsidies and Countervailing Duties. See generally GATT
26th Supp. BISD (1978-9).
See Jackson, "The Jurisprudence of International Trade :
the DISC case in GATT" 72 AJIL (1978) at 747; Bronckers
"Selective Safeguard Measures in Multilateral Trade
Relations" (1985); Hofbauer & Schott, "Trading for growth
: the next Round of Trade Negotiations", 11 Inst. Int'l
Econ. 79 (1985); Richard Sutherland Whitt "The Politics of
Procedure: An examination of the GATT Dispute Settlement
Panel and Article XXI, Defense in the context of the US
embargo of Nicaragua" (1987) Law, Policy & Int'l Bus. 603.
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confidence^^_ Inevitably, diplomatic and political pressure
works well in the case of the more powerful contracting parties but
less so in the case of the less developed countries.
The panel procedure is also criticised. It is argued that it is
often difficult to find an impartial panel where members are not
allied to one of the parties to the dispute. Owing to the fact that
consensus is required at each stage of the process this also results
in endless delays.
Whatever the solution to the problems facing the GATT dispute
settlement process and the panel procedure, one has to be very aware
of the restrictive political environment in which it operates.
Reform of the rules is one of the objectives of the Uruguay Round of
Multilateral Trade Negotiations. According to the Ministerial
Declaration of Punta del Este, the aim of the negotiations in this
area was to improve the Rules and procedures of the dispute
settlement process, with the object of ensuring compliance with the
adopted recommendations^^. jn this respect the special
negotiating group have produced a new decision of the contracting
parties styled "Improvements to the GATT Dispute Settlement Rules and
Procedures". The result is a more adjudicatory approach to dispute
settlement in the GATT and a movement away from the institutionalised
negotiating forum it was designed to be^-^.
See Jackson, ibid, at 780.
1^3 see Focus: GATT Newsletter 47 (June 1987).
154 GATT, 36th Supp. BISD 1990; see also Eric Canal-Forgues
and Rudolf Ostrihansky "New Developments in the GATT
Dispute Settlement Procedures" 24 JWTL 5 (vol. 2). They
noted a shift in emphasis from consultations to panel
proceedings, strict determination of time limits, inclusion
of arbitration provisions to name but a few.
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Because the GATT Dispute Settlement Procedure lacks both the
political will to ensure effectiveness and also consensus on the
interpretation of certain GATT Rules^-^, the new Regulation can be
seen as strengthening the Community's hand within the system. As
Steenbergen points out, much will depend on the attitude of the
Commission, the Council (especially the Member States who insisted on
the insertion of Article 10(2)) and, in the last instance, on the
Court if not on the contracting parties
155
156
See Richard Sutherland Whitt, op. cit. at 628.
op. cit. at 430.
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CHAPTER
SAFEGUARD MEASURES INT THE
EUROREAN COMMUNITY
INTRODUCTION
In order to consider the extent to which the findings of the
Community authorities are reviewed by the Court, it is important to
be familiar with the manner in which safeguard measures are applied
in the Community. The aim of this Chapter is to analyse the
substantive and procedural rules of the following safeguard
measures:-
Part 1 - Anti-Dumping rules under Regulation 2423/88
Part 2 - Countervailing measures under Regulation 2423/88
Part 3 - Common Rules for imports under Regulation 288/82
(as amended)
Part 4 - Response to illicit commercial practices under
Regulation 2641/84 - the new commercial policy
instrument.
RART 1 : ANTI—DUMRING MEASURES
INTRODUCTION
Dumping occurs when a supplier sells his product at different
prices in different countries-'-. Such a practice is regarded as a
form of unfair and undesirable competition. As a result, the
majority of industrialised nations in the Western World have adopted
legislation which permits them to impose anti-dumping measures
Dale, Anti-Dumping in Liberal Trade Order 1980, p.l.
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against such practices. A number of commentators have, however,
questioned the economic rationale of such measures^.
In the European Community it is the institutions of the Community
which have the power to take action against dumped products from
third countries. This power stems from Article 113 of the EEC
Treaty, which provides for a Common Commercial Policy after the end
of the transitional period based on uniform principles including
measures to protect trade such as those to be taken in the case of
dumping or subsidies^. This competence is exclusive with the
exception of new Member States who can adopt national measures
against dumped goods during the transitional period^.
See generally Dale, ibid.; Barcelo, "The Anti-Dumping
Law: Repeal it or revise it", 2 [1979] 1 Michigan Yearbook
of International Legal Studies 53; Davey, "An analysis of
European Communities legislation and practice relating to
anti-dumping and countervailing duties", in (ed.) B. Hawk,
'Anti Trust and Trade Policy in International Trade1
(1983).
Prior to the end of the transitional period (1969) the
Member States were competent to apply their own
anti-dumping legislation. From 1962 onwards there was a
obligation to consult at Community level. By virtue of
Article 91 of the Treaty, the Member States could adopt
measures against intra-Community dumping. This however
was no longer applicable at the end of the third stage of
the transitional period.
e.g. Article 380 Act of Accession of Spain and Portugal.
Note: the Commission can also take action against dumping
within the Common Market - see Article 91(1) EEC Treaty.
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The anti-dumping rules are laid down in Regulation 2423/88^. They
do not, however, apply to the field of coal and steel. The relevant
instrument here is Commission Decision 2424/88^. This section
will deal primarily with the rules as laid down by Regulation
2423/887.
Dumping must cause injury® to Community industry before
anti-dumping duties may be imposed. Regulation 2423/88 also
provides that the imposition of such duties must be in the interests
of the Community^.
1. DUMPING
Article 2(2) of Regulation 2423/88 states that "a product shall be
considered to have been dumped if its export price to the Community
O.J. 1988 L209/1. The first Regulation adopted was in
1968 (Regulation 459/68 - O.J. 1968 L93/1); for a
Commentary see Beseler, "EEC Protection against dumping and
subsidies from 3rd States" [1968] CMLRev. 327. It was
substantially revised in 1979 (Regulation 3017/79 - O.J.
1979 L339/1) as a result of the new Anti-Dumping Code which
was adopted at the Tokyo Round of Multilateral Trade
Negotiations (reproduced in O.J. 1979 L71/90) and the
opinion of Advocate-General Warner in Case 113/77 NTN Toyo
Bearing Co. Ltd. v. Council [1979] ECR 1185 at 1212;
Regulation 2176/84 (O.J. 1984 L201/1 (as corrected - O.J.
1984 L227/35)) was adopted in 1984 and amended by
Regulation 1761/87 (O.J. 1987 L167/9) permitting the
Community authorities to impose anti-dumping duties on
components of products which were already subject to
duties.
O.J. 1988 L209/18.
For the most part the anti-dumping rules involving EEC
products and ECSC products are the same. Where they
differ, specific reference to the differences will be made.
Article 2(1) Regulation 2423/88.
9 Article 11(1), 12(1).
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is less than the normal value of the like product". In order to
determine whether dumping has taken place the following must be
considered:
the normal value of the product^®
the export price of the product^
the comparison of the normal value and the export price
properly adjusted^.
1.1. The Like Product
Dumping can take place only if the product is sold abroad at a
price below the normal value of the like product and if it causes
injury to the Community producers of the like product.
"Like Product" is defined in the Regulation as:
a product which is identical, i.e. alike in all respects, to
the product under consideration, or, in the absence of such
a product, another product which has characteristics closely
resembling those of the product under consideration^.
The Community authorities have recently held that the requirement
that a product be similar to an imported product should not be
interpreted narrowly and that only differences in quality or basic
use are grounds for considering that a product is not similar to
another1^. The position under Regulation 2423/88 can be compared
Article 2(3)-(7) Regulation 2423/88.
Article 2(8) Regulation 2423/88.
Article 2(9)-(10) Regulation 2423/88.
Article 2(12). This was taken directly from Article 2(2)
GATT, Anti-Dumping Code.
See Small Screen Colour Televisions (Korea) O.J. 1989
L314/1. The Commission excluded higher range small screen
colour televisions which included features such as flat
square screens, teletext modules and digital chassis. It







to the regime under Regulation 288/82 (Safeguard Measures) where the
term "like product" applies to both producers of like and also
directly competing products^.
In ascertaining whether the exported product and that sold on the
domestic market are like products within the meaning of Article 2(12)
the Commission for the most part relies on their physical
characteristics and the degree of interchangeability of the products
in question. For example, the Commission held that nickel produced
in the Community had a purity the same as that originating in the
USSR and that each product was almost interchangeable in application
with one another
The degree of interchangeability has, however, not been defined. It
is essential, therefore, to look at the decisions to date. In one
case the Commission noted that the products under consideration all
had the same chemical component, magnesium oxide. Although the
content varied it lay within a range from 71-90 per cent. While
this and other factors may be relevant for cerrain specific uses all
products were used for the same purposes^. In another case,
however, the Commission was satisfied on the basis of available data
characteristics were not found in the Korean export
models; Synthetic Fibres of Polyester (USA, Mexico,
Taiwan, Romania, Turkey, Yugoslavia) O.J. 1988 L348/49.
Article 15(1) Regulation 288/82.
Unwrought Nickel (USSR) O.J. 1983 L286/29. See also
Bisphenol (USA) O.J. 1983 L23/9 where the Commission noted
that the few differences between the specifications for US
and Community were minimal; Glass textile fibres (Rovings)
(GDR, Czechoslovakia) O.J. 1983 L354/15, the Commission
concluded that as regards the physical characteristics the
products closely resembled one another and that in a large
number of cases they could be used for the same
application.
17 Natural Magnesite (caustic burned) (China) O.J. 1982
L371/21.
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that sodium carbonate in light and dense forms were not randomly
interchangeable by end users. They were therefore held not to be
like products^. Where a large variety of models are concerned
the Commission has to decide whether they form one single category of
products or whether they fall into different categories separated by
clearly defined dividing lines. Such a situation arose in Dot
Matrix Printers^. In order to determine this, the Commission
considered the following criteria:
(i) the physical and technical characteristics of the
printers;
(ii) their application and use;
(iii) particularities of the printer market and the
consumers' perceptions of these products; and
(iv) other factors inter alia production, equipment,
and personnel.
It concluded that the printers formed one single category of
products .
In a number of cases, the Commission has held that the products in
question were not like products. It held that transparent drawn
glass and transparent float glass obtained by the float method were
Sodium Carbonate (Bulgaria) O.J. 1982 L283/9.
O.J. 1988 L130/12. See also Daisy Wheel Printers (Japan)
O.J. 1988 L177/1; Compact Disc Players (Japan, South
Korea) O.J. 1989 L205/5.
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not like products^. jt took into account the fact that the
process of manufacturing drawn glass led to optical defects which
were evident when regarded at an angle. Also the float process made
it possible to obtain larger rectangles which were essential for
certain uses. Finally, only float glass could be used for certain
purposes. Similarly, in Freezers it concluded that chest freezers
and upright freezers were not like products^!.
On the other hand the Commission has held that even where the
products sold in the domestic market and those for export are not in
exactly the same form, the product sold on the domestic market is a
like product because it has characteristics that closely resemble
that exported to the Community^.
Glass (Turkey, Yugoslavia, Romania, Bulgaria, Hungary,
Czechoslovakia) O.J. 1986 L51/73 (Note: for the purpose of
an investigation under Regulation 288/82 the two types of
glass were regarded as directly competing products O.J.
1986 L128/7); see also Outboard Motors (Japan) O.J. 1983
L152/18 Commission excluded Outboard Motors above 85 h.p.
since Community industry did not produce models in question
and because there was no evidence that the establishment in
the EEC of such production was being envisaged; Small
Screen Colour Televisions (Korea) O.J. 1989 L314/1.
O.J. 1986 L259/14.
See Sensitized Paper for Colour Photographs (Japan) O.J.
1984 L124/45. Two of the exporters sold the product for
export in large width rolls but for the domestic market
these were cut into smaller widths. Exporter suggested
that normal value should be based on the export prices to
non-EEC countries or on their constructed value. The
Commission however considered that the product sold on the
domestic market was a like product since it had
characteristics which closely resembled that exported to
the EEC; see also Aluminium Foil (Austria) O.J. 1982
L339/58. The Commission held that the product sold to the
Community was not in exactly the same form as that sold on
the domestic market. It therefore based normal value on
the cost of production of the like product in Austria.
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1.2. Normal Value
1.2.1. The Domestic Market Price
The preferred basis for the determination of normal value is the
domestic market price, i.e. the price actually paid or payable in the
exporting country or the country of origin.
Normal value is defined in the Regulation as:
the comparable price actually paid or payable in the
ordinary course of trade for the like product intended for
consumption in the exporting country or the country of
origin*^.
Article 2(3)(a) of Regulation 2423/88 provides that this price
shall be net of all discounts and rebates directly linked to the
sales under consideration provided that the exporter claims and
supplies sufficient evidence that any such reduction from the
gross price has actually been granted. In Compact Disc
Players^ one of the exporters claimed that normal value
established for sales on the domestic market should take account
of the purchase value of compact discs which were given in the
form of rebates on the price paid for the product under
consideration. They argued that these were directly related to
the sales under consideration. The Commission noted that the
compact discs were purchased by the exporter several years
before the investigation period. They were not provided with
any indication of their cost nor an estimate of the effect of
these goods on the market value of the compact disc players.
In these circumstances the Commission estimated this effect to
be the cost of similar compact discs purchased during the
Article 2(3)(a).
O.J. 1990 L13/21; see also Synthetic Fibres of Polyester
(Mexico, Romania, Taiwan, Turkey, USA, Yugoslavia) O.J.
1988 L348/49.
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investigation period by the exporter. This cost was deducted
from the domestic selling price.
On the other hand, in Small Screen Colour Televisions^ it
refused to deduct a rebate which it held was not directly
related to the sales under consideration. Two of the Korean
producers operated a form of rebate to their customers, i.e.
retailers. This was paid when the products under consideration
were resold by their customers to final customers on instalment
terms. The Commission held that this was an event posterior to
and independent of the producer's sale to their customers.
Article 2(3)(a) also permits the Commission to take into account
deferred discounts, provided they are directly related to the
sales under consideration and evidence is produced to show that
these discounts were based on consistent practice in prior
periods or an undertaking to comply with the conditions required
to qualify for the deferred discount.
In three main situations the domestic market price will not be
used namely, when there are no sales of the like product on the
domestic market; when there are no sales of the like product in
the ordinary course of trade and when such sales do not provide
a proper comparison, i.e. insufficient sales^.
1.2.1.1. No Sales of the Like Product on the
Domestic Market
The domestic market price will be disregarded when there are no
sales of the like product on the domestic market. Such a situation
will normally arise if for example the exporter only manufactures the
O.J. 1989 L314/1.
Article 2(3)(b) Regulation 2423/88.
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4
product in question for export^, or where there are no sales on
the domestic market of the models comparable to those exported to the
Community^®.
A new Article 2(3)(c) was introduced by Regulation 2423/88 to deal
with the increase in the number of original equipment manufacturers
(hereinafter referred to as OEMs), i.e. importers who sell in the
Community under their own brand names, products which they neither
sell nor produce in the country of origin but which are purchased
from other producers of the product who export the product in
question to the Community. This Article provides that in such cases
the normal value shall be established on the basis of prices or costs
of other sellers or producers in the country of origin either by
reference to their domestic market price or the constructed
value^®.
1.2.1.2. No Sales in the Ordinary Course of Trade
The domestic market price will also be disregarded when there are
no sales in the ordinary course of trade. This concept is not
defined in the Regulation. It does, however, signify the fact that
the Commission will disregard the domestic price when it does not
reflect normal trading conditions^®. In other words, the domestic
See e.g. Ballbearings (Thailand) O.J. 1986 L113/61;
Stainless Steel House Cooking Ware (S. Korea) O.J. 1986
L74/83; Chemical Fertilizer O.J. (1983) L15/1.
See Electronic Scales (Japan) O.J. 1984 L80/9.
See Small Screen Colour Televisions (Korea) O.J. 1989
L314/1; Glutamic Acid and its Salts (Indonesia, Korea,
Taiwan, Thailand) O.J. 1990 L56/23.
See Van Bael & Bellis "EEC Antidumping and other Trade
Protection Laws" (1985) at p. 33.
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prices used to determine the normal value must be arms length
31prices-^.
The Regulation expressly refers to the fact that sales made at a
loss-^2 and sales between parties who are associated or who have a
compensatory arrangement are not made in the ordinary course of
trade-^. Sales are made at a loss when they are made at a price
less than the cost of production-^. Such sales may be considered
as not having been made in the ordinary course of trade if they:
(a) have been made in substantial quantities during the
investigation period as defined in Article 7(l)(c) and
(b) are not at prices which permit recovery, in the normal
course of trade and within the period referred to in
paragraph (a), of all costs reasonably allocated^.
The changes made to Article 2(4)(a) and (b) confirm that the
Commission must confine its examination to the investigation period.
Transactions between parties which appear to be associated or to have
a compensatory arrangement with each other may be considered as not
being in the ordinary course of trade^. This means that the
Commission can disregard prices charged in transactions between
Article 2(4) Regulation 2423/88.
ibid.
Article 2(7).
"Cost of production" is defined in Article 2(3)(b)(ii) of
Regulation 2423/88 as:
... all costs, in the ordinary course of trade,both fixed
and variable, in the country of origin, of materials and
manufacture plus a reasonable amount for selling,
administrative and other general expenses ...
Article 2(4)(a)and (b) Regulation 2423/88. See e.g. Dot
Matrix Printers (Japan) O.J. 1988 L317/33; Video Cassette
Tapes (South Korea, Hong Kong) O.J. 1989 L174/1; DRAMS
(Japan) O.J. 1990 L20/5.








associated companies unless the prices and costs involved are
comparable to those involved in transactions between parties which
have no such link-^.
The term associated is not defined in the Regulation. It has,
however, been the subject of controversy in relation to sales
companies which form part of the corporate structure. In Electronic
Typewriters it was held that the sales from the manufacturing company
to its sales company were in reality transactions between associated
companies. In arriving at such a conclusion the Council took into
account that they both formed part of the corporate structure in
which the sales company had a function similar to a sales department.
It also noted that although they were legally separate entities this
did not alter the existence of a single economic entity and what was
relevant was not the legal structure but the fact that the principal
function of these sales companies was to sell or facilitate the sale
of the corporate product^.
This approach has since been followed by the Commission in a number
of recent decisions^.
Electronic Typewriters (Japan) O.J. 1985 L163/1; Compact
Disc Players (South Korea, Japan) O.J. 1989 L205/5.
ibid; see also Electronic Typewriters (Japan) O.J. 1984
L335/13. The Commission considered that an exporter had a
controlling interest in Japanese sales company because "all
other shareholders have individually only minor
shareholdings" and because "the main reason for the sales
company's existence is to sell the exporters product in
Japan".
Electronic Scales (Japan) O.J. 1985 L275/5; Photocopiers
(Japan) O.J. 1986 L239/5; Synthetic Fibres of Polyester
(GDR, Romania, Turkey, Yugoslavia) O.J. 1987 L103/38; UREA
(GDR, USSR, Czechoslovakia, Yugoslavia, Kuwait, Saudi
Arabia, Libya, Trinidad & Tobago) O.J. 1987 L121/11; Daisy
Wheel Printers (Japan) O.J. 1988 L177/1; Compact Disc
Players (South Korea, Japan) O.J. 1989 L205/5.
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Even if an association does exist Article 2(7) does not rule out the
possibility of allowing the Commission to use the sales in question
if the prices are comparable to those at which the like product is
sold to unrelated parties^.
Article 2(7) also allows the Commission to treat as associated,
parties who have a compensatory arrangement"^. The term however
is not defined in the Regulation. It could for example be an
arrangement between an exporter and an importer which involved the
sale of a product at an artificially high price (in order to avoid
dumping) with the loss compensated by his receiving other goods at
artificially low prices'^.
1.2.1.3. Sales not Permitting a Proper Comparison,
i.e. Insufficient Sales
Finally the domestic market price will be disregarded when the
quantity of sales involved is so residual or so negligible that they
cannot be considered as reliably reflecting prices in the ordinary
Sensitized Paper for Colour Photographs (Japan) O.J. 1984
L124/4.
See Polypropylene Film (Japan) O.J. 1982 L172/44. The
Commission excluded sales because of existence of a special
processing arrangement; Polyester Yarn (USA) O.J. 1983
L50/14 - textural arrangement; Phenol (USA) O.J. 1981
L195/22 - Conversion operation.
See Cuanne & Stanbrook "Dumping and Subsidies" (1983) p.
34/5; Briet "Antidumping in de EEG - De Kinderschoenen
ontgroeid ?" SEW (1982) 145 at 150 note 30 - he suggests
that it could include buy back arrangements, swap deals and
conversion operations.
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course of trade^. The Commission has now set a threshold below
which sales on the domestic market should be disregarded. It held
that given the commercial importance of the Community as an import
market, sales on the domestic market should be used if they exceed 5
per cent of volume of exports to the Community^. The Commission
has recently held that even if sales on the domestic market are low
in absolute terms, so long as they exceed the threshold amount, such
sales will be used to determine normal value"^.
1.2.2. The Alternative Methods of Determining
Normal Value
In those cases where the Commission cannot use the domestic market
price it has the power to base the normal value of the product in




The Commission simply stated that domestic sales did not
permit a proper comparison because "minimal quantities were
involved" Potato Granules (Canada) O.J. 1981 L116/11):
"quantities involved are insufficient" Ferrochromium (South
Africa, Surinam, Turkey, Zimbabwe) O.J. 1983 L161/15);
"small quantities were involved" Unwrought Aluminium
(Norway, USSR, Yugoslavia, Surinam) O.J. 1984 L57/19):
"virtually no sales" Ballbearings (miniature) (Singapore,
Japan) O.J. 1984 L79/8.
Electronic Typewriters (Japan) O.J. 1984 L335/43; see also
Photocopiers (Japan) O.J. 1986 L239/5; Dot Matrix Printers
(Japan) O.J. 1988 L130/12; Video Cassette Tapes (Hong
Kong, South Korea) O.J. 1989 L174/1; Compact Disc Players
(Japan, South Korea) O.J. 1989 L205/5; Ferro Silicon
(Iceland, Norway, Sweden, Venezuela, Yugoslavia) O.J. 1990
L38/1. Cf. Under the law of the United States, domestic
sales are insufficient if they are less that 5% of exports
to countries other than the United States, 19 CFR (1983)
5 353(4)(a).
Compact Disc Players (Japan, South Korea) O.J. 1989
L205/5. The Council concurred with the Commission, O.J.
1990 L13/21.
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1.2.2.1. The comparable price of the like product when
exported to any third country, i.e. export price
to a third country^.
1.2.2.2. The constructed value^.
There are two further methods by which normal value can be determined
where the sales are made at a loss in the country of origin^:
1.2.2.3. The remaining sales on the domestic market made at
a price which is not less than the cost of
production.
1.2.2.4. Adjusting the sub-production cost price in order
to eliminate the loss and provide for a reasonable
profit.
Finally, with regard to state trading countries', normal value is
determined by a different set of rules'^.
1.2.2.1. The Export Price to a Third Country
Normal value may be determined by the comparable price of the like
product when exported to any third country^. This may be the
highest such export price but it should also be a representative
one^l. This method has been used by the Commission
Article 2(3)(b)(i) Regulation 2423/88.
Article 2(3)(b)(ii) Regulation 2423/88
Article 2(4) Regulation 2423/88.
Article 2(5) Regulation 2423/88.
Article 2(3)(b)(i) Regulation 2423/88.
ibid.
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infrequently^, as more often than not export sales to another
country will also be at dumped prices^.
1.2.2.2. The Constructed Value
The constructed value is the method most often used by the
Commission when the domestic market price cannot be used. It is
calculated by adding the cost of production plus a reasonable margin
for profit^. The cost of production is to be computed on the
basis of all costs in the ordinary course of trade both fixed and
variable in the country of origin, of materials and manufacture plus
a reasonable amount for selling, administrative and other general
expenses^,
Article 2(3)(b)(ii) of Regulation 2423/88 permits the Commission to
calculate selling, general and administrative expenses (hereinafter
referred to as "SGAs") by reference to the expenses incurred by the
producer or exporter on the profitable sales of the like product on
the domestic market. In Compact Disc Players the Commission
See Saccahrin and its Salts (Korea) O.J. 1980 L331/25 where
normal value was calculated on the basis of exports to the
United States and Australia.
See Ballbearings (miniature) (Japan, Singapore) O.J. 1984
L79/8. The Minebea Group requested that normal value be
constructed on the basis of the prices at which its
products exported from Singapore are first resold to an
independent buyer on the Japanese market. The Commission
held that with regard to these exports it could be ruled
out that dumping was being practised by Minebea on the
Japanese market. See also UREA (Libya, USSR, GDR,
Yugoslavia, Czechoslovakia, Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Trinidad
& Tobago) O.J. 1987 L317/1; Ferro Silicon (Iceland,
Norway, Sweden, Venezuela, Yugoslavia) O.J. 1990 L38/1.
Article 2(3)(b)(ii) Regulation 2423/88.
ibid. For a detailed analysis of the factors involved in
the calculation of cost of production see Van Bael & Bellis
op. cit. pp. 37-40.
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calculated SGAs on the basis of the weighted average of SGAs incurred
by the exporters who had insufficient sales for some models by
reference to sales of their other profitable models^.
If such data is unavailable or unreliable or is not suitable for use,
SGAs will be calculated by reference to the expenses incurred by
other producers or exporters in the country of origin or export on
their profitable sales of the like product^?. In Compact Disc
Players the Commission calculated the SGAs for those exporters who
had no sales, insufficient sales or who made sales at a loss on the
domestic market, by reference to the weighted average of SGAs
realised by all the other producers on the domestic sales of
profitable models of compact disc players^.
Article 2(3)(b)(ii) concludes by stating that, if neither of the
above two methods can be applied, the expenses incurred shall be
calculated by reference to the sales made by the exporter or other
producers or exporters in the same business sector in the country of
origin or export or on any other reasonable basis. In Daisy Wheel
Printers the Commission noted that the exporters in question had no
or insufficient profitable sales of the product under consideration
on the domestic market. It therefore calculated the SGAs for one
exporter on its profitable sales of dot matrix printers and for the
other, on its profitable sales of line printers. The Commission







This concept of SGAs has given rise to controversy in the context of
whether the selling expenses of sales companies should be included in
the determination of the constructed value. In Electronic
Typewriters^ these sales companies were held in essence to be
sales departments of the manufacturing company. The Commission held
that such expenses should be included because:
where normal value is based on domestic selling prices,
these prices if they are in the ordinary course of
trade cover all SG&A incurred by the sales
organisation.
where normal value is based on constructed value under
the structure of Regulation (EEC) No. 2176/84 this
surrogate method should yield the same result as
above. Article 2(3)(b)(ii) therefore expressly
provides that SG&A expenses be included^.
This means, and rightly so, that the constructed value is a
constructed normal value. It, therefore, should yield as far as
possible the same result as if there had been sufficient sales on the
domestic market and if Article 2(3)(a) had applied^.
With regard to selling expenses, it should be emphasised these do not
refer to expenses related to export sales as some authors have
O.J. 1984 L335/43.
ibid. See also Electronic Scales (Japan) O.J. 1985
L275/15 where the Commission held that: "this method
[constructed value] is designed to lead to normal value as
would be established if sales on the domestic market had
taken place. Since sales prices have necessarily to
reflect SG&A's by the seller, the amount of such expenses
equal to that usually reflected in sales prices in the
ordinary course of trade of a product of the same general
class or kind has to be included in the constructed
value"; Ballbearings (Thailand) O.J. 1986 L113/61;
Photocopiers (Japan) O.J. 1986 L239/5; Dot Matrix Printers
(Japan) O.J. 1988 L130/12. " _
62 See Case 260/85 and 106/86 TEC Co. Ltd. v. Council
[1988] ECR 5855. The Court condoned the practice of the
Community authorities.
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suggested*^. Such a contention confuses a constructed export
price with a constructed normal value. It is true that normal value
and export price should be on an equal footing for the purposes of
Article 2(9) of Regulation 2423/88^. Article 2(9), however,
refers to the adjustments which have to be made in order to make the
normal value and the export price comparable. It has nothing to do
with the constructed normal value.
To the cost of production a reasonable margin of profit has to be
added. Article 2(3)(b)(ii) states that the margin of profit is to
be determined, on the basis of "the profitable sales of the like
product on the domestic market". This new wording as opposed to
that under Regulation 2176/84, namely "the profit normally realised
on the sales of products of the same general category on the domestic
market of the country of origin" reflects the recent Commission
practice to use profit margins from profitable sales^.
Where an exporter has no domestic sales or insufficient domestic
sales or where these are made at a loss, Article 2(3)(b)(ii) permits
the Commission to calculate the margin of profit by reference to the
profit realised by other exporters in the country of origin on
profitable sales of the like product. In Electronic Typewriters the
Commission, in considering the profit margins of those exporters who
had insufficient sales on the domestic market, thought it reasonable
to include a margin of 32.39 per cent which corresponded to the
lowest profit margin of the three exporters who had sufficient
domestic sales^.
cf. Van Bael & Bellis op. cit. at p. 40.
Photocopiers (Japan) O.J. 1987 L54/12; O.J. 1986 L239/5.
O.J. 1985 L163/1; see also Dot Matrix Printers (Japan)
O.J. 1988 L317/33.
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Article 2(3)(b)(ii) does not specify a single percentage rate of
profit unlike the American regulations which state that profits shall
not be less than 8 per cent of direct costs and general
overheads^^.
Exporters have argued that the present practice of the Community
authorities in determining profit margin results in high dumping
margins and does not reflect the true position^®. The practice,
now codified in Article 2(3)(b)(ii), allows them to use artifically
high profit margins in constructing normal value given that
unprofitable unit sales do not have to be included.
1.2.2.3. Remaining Sales on the Domestic Market, if they
have been made at a Price not less than the Cost of
Production
When some sales on the domestic market have been made at a loss,
the Commission can, if it wishes, determine normal value by using the
remaining sales if they have been made at a price not less than the
cost of production*^. por instance, in Potato Granules'7^ the
Commission concluded that since one-third of the sales on the
domestic market were not made at a loss, these could be used as a
reliable basis for determining normal value. The Commission in
Photocopiersestablished normal value on the basis of remaining
i.e. profitable sales only, even though according to some exporters
CFR S.353 (6)(a)(2) 1983.
See case 277 and 300/85 Canon Inc. v. Council [1988] ECR
5731. The Court held however that the authorities were
not in error when they established normal profit on basis
of data relating to other electronic typewriter models.




by restricting the calculation to these sales and thereby eliminating
certain sales at a loss, an artificially high profit margin was
established.
1.2.2.4. Adjusting the Sub-production Cost Price in order
to Eliminate Loss and Allow for a Margin of Profit
Alternatively, when sales are made at a loss the Commission can
calculate normal value by adjusting the sub-production cost price in
order to eliminate loss and allow for a margin of profit. It is
basically a simplified form of the constructed value and is quite
often used by the Commission to determine normal value^. por
example in Outboard Motors^, the prices of the product on the
domestic market by one company were lower than the costs ordinarily
incurred in its production. Normal value was therefore determined
by adjusting the sub-production cost prices in order to eliminate
losses and allow for a reasonable margin of profit.
See Van Bael & Bellis op. cit., p. 42 at footnote 78.
O.J. 1983 L152/18. See also Textured Polyester Fabrics
(USA) O.J. 1981 L133/17; Perchlorethylene (Czechoslovakia,
Romania, Spain, USA) O.J. 1982 L371/47; Electronic Scales
(Japan) O.J. 1984 L80/9; Artificial Corundum
(Czechoslovakia, China, Spain, Yugoslavia) O.J. 1984
L255/9; Hydraulic Excavators (Japan) O.J. 1985 L68/13.
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1.2.2.5. State Trading Countries
In the case of state trading countries (or non-market
economies)^ the domestic market prices are not used. Instead the
Regulation lays down special rules for the determination of the
normal value^. It states that:
... normal value shall be determined in an appropriate and
not unreasonable manner on the basis of one of the following
criteria:
(a) the price at which the like product of a market economy
third country is actually sold:
(i) for consumption on the domestic market of that
country; or
(ii) to other countries, including the Community; or
(b) the constructed value of the like product in a market
economy third country;
(c) if neither price nor constructed value as established
under (a) or (b) provides an adequate basis, the price
actually paid or payable in the Community for the like
product, duly adjusted, if necessary, to include a
reasonable profit margin^.
In determining normal value the first step is to select the analogue
country, i.e. the comparable free market economy. In doing this the
This concept is not defined in Article 2(5). It basically
refers however to those state trading countries outlined in
Regulations 1765/82 and 1776/82. (They are: Bulgaria,
Romania, Poland, GDR, USSR, Hungary, Czechoslovakia,
Vietnam, North Korea, Mongolia, People's Republic of
China). The use of the words "in particular" in Article
2(5) suggest however that other countries could be
classified as non-market economies. It should be noted
that, as a result of the changes in Eastern Europe the
German Democratic Republic has now merged with the Federal






Commission is guided by Article 2(5) which states that normal value
has to be determined in an appropriate and not unreasonable
manner''''. In most cases, the Commission will proceed by
considering the proposal put forward by the complainants. In a
number of cases this was not objected to by the other parties
involved''®. It will, however, consider the alternatives suggested
by the importer or exporter in question. For example in Barium
Chloride the main importer of the product from China suggested the
German Democratic Republic. This was rejected however, since the
prices were not representative, i.e. they were made at a loss and
fell outside the reference period^. Generally speaking, if the
Under the American Regulation, the market economy used
should be at the same stage of economic development. This
is to be determined inter alia by the per capita gross
national product and the infrastructure development in the
industry producing the product in question, 19 CFR s.
353(8)(b) [1983].
See Photographic Enlargers (Poland, USSR, Czechoslovakia)
O.J. 1982 L212/32 (Japan was used); Trichloroethylene
(GDR, Poland, Romania, Spain, USA, Czechoslovakia) O.J.
1982 L223/76 (prices on American domestic market were
used); Kraftliner (USSR) O.J. 1983 L64/25 (American
domestic prices were used); Sanitary Fixtures
(Czechoslovakia, Hungary) O.J. 1983 L325/18 (Austria was
used); Paint, Distemper, Varnish and Similar Brushes
(China) O.J. 1987 L46/45 (Sri Lanka was used).
O.J. 1983 L110/11. See also Natural Magnesite (China)
O.J. 1982 L371/21 (the importer suggested Austria, no
evidence was produced to show that this would be more
suitable); Unwrought Nickel (USSR) O.J. 1983 L159/43 (the
exporter and one dealer suggested the London Metal Exchange
quotations. The Commission rejected this on basis that
they doubted whether the quotations covered production
costs in market economy countries); Non-alloyed Unwrought
Aluminium (USSR) O.J. 1984 L57/19 (London Metal Exchange
was again suggested as an alternative, again rejected.)
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case involves a market and a non-market economy the Commission will
invariably use the prices on the free market economy^.
In determining the analogue country, the Commission will normally
look to see if the product in question has undergone a similar
production process and whether it is subject to the same degree of
technology and technical standards^-. On a number of occasions it
has also taken into account the fact that production has been carried
out on a substantial scale^ ancj that there has been strong
See Codeine (Hungary) O.J. 1983 L16/30. The Hungarian
exporter suggested that normal value should be based on the
export price in Germany and not the domestic price in
Yugoslavia. The Commission held however that the
additional administrative burden which would be imposed on
it by carrying out investigations in a further market
economy country would be unjustified, unless it could be
demonstrated that it would be manifestly more appropriate
and reasonable to use another third country's normal value
rather than use the prices or costs in Yugoslavia.
See for example Oxalic Acid (China, Czechoslovakia) O.J.
1982 L19/26; Standardized Multiphase Electric Motors
(Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, GDR, USSR, Poland, Romania) O.J.
1982 L85/9; Refrigerators (Yugoslavia, USSR, GDR, Poland,
Romania, Hungary, Czechoslovakia) O.J. 1982 L184/23;
Sodium Carbonate (GDR, Bulgaria, Poland, Romania, USSR)
O.J. 1983 L160/18; UREA (GDR, Czechoslovakia, USSR) O.J.
1987 L121/11.
See for example Sodium Carbonate (USSR) O.J. 1979 L297/12;
Lithium Hydroxide (USA, USSR) O.J. 1980 L23/19;
Standardized Multiphase Electric Motors (Bulgaria,
Czechoslovakia, GDR, USSR, Romania, Poland) O.J. 1982
L85/9; Natural Magnesite (China) O.J. 1982 L371/21;
Hexamethylenetetramine (GDR, Czechoslovakia, Romania) O.J.
1983 L40/24; Glass Textile Fibre (Rovings) (Japan, GDR,
Czechoslovakia) O.J. 1983 L160/18.
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internal competition. This latter factor usually guarantees that
price levels are in a reasonable proportion to costs^.
Usually, the Commission uses the domestic price prevailing on the
analogue market in order to determine the normal value®^. When
this is unreliable the Commission has used either the constructed
value^ or the export prices of the analogue country*^.
As a last resort the Commission can establish normal value by the
price actually paid or payable in the Community for the like product
duly adjusted, if necessary, to include a reasonable margin of
See for example Hexamethylenetetramine (GDR, USSR,
Czechoslovakia, Romania) O.J. 1983 L40/24; Glass Textile
Fibre (Rovings) (Japan, GDR, Czechoslovakia) O.J. 1983
L160/18. Note: the existence of price controls also
ensures that price levels are in reasonable proportion to
costs; Sodium Carbonate (USSR) O.J. 1979 L297/12.
Sodium Carbonate (USSR) O.J. 1979 L297/12; Lithium
Hydroxide (USA, USSR) O.J. 1980 L23/19; Cylinder Vacuum
Cleaners (Poland, GDR, Czechoslovakia) O.J. 1982 L172/47;
Kraftliner (USSR, Sweden, USA, Austria, Canada, Finland,
Portugal) O.J. 1983 L64/25.
Angles, Shapes and Sections of Iron and Steel (Romania)
O.J. 1980 L56/34; Hardboard (Czechoslovakia, Spain,
Hungary, Poland, Bulgaria, Sweden, Norway, Finland, USSR,
Romania) O.J. 1982 L181/19; Paracetamol (INN) (China) O.J.
1982 L236/23; Unwrought Nickel (USSR) O.J. 1983 L159/43;
Asbestos-Cement Corrugated Sheets (GDR, Czechoslovakia)
O.J. 1984 L259/48.
Mechanical Alarm Clocks (GDR, USSR) O.J. 1980 L185/5
(exports to EEC); Saccharin and its Salts (China, Japan
and USA) O.J. 1980 L331/41 (Exports to third countries);
Ballbearings (Japan, Romania, USSR, Poland) O.J. 1981
L152/44 (exports to EEC); Photographic Enlargers (Poland,
USSR, Czechoslovakia) O.J. 1982 L212/32 (exports to EEC);
Sanitary Fixtures (Czechoslovakia, Hungary) O.J. 1983
L325/18 (export prices to third countries); Mechanical
Wrist Watches (USSR) O.J. 1987 L213/5 (exports to third
countries and the EEC).
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profit^. The Commission did so in Oxalic Acid^ having
rejected every other possibility. It rejected the following:
South Korea: the South Korean exporters refused to
co-operate.
Domestic prices charged in China: China was one of the
countries under investigation. Article 2(5) did not
cover such a possibility.
Taiwan: it was rejected on the ground that the prices
charged on the Taiwanese market were artificially high.
Japan: as the manufacturing processes and raw
materials were different, Japan was rejected.
Prices of exports to the United States from Brazil:
the Commission considered that it was highly likely
that such products were dumped. It therefore rejected
this possibility.
Domestic prices charged in Brazil: the Brazilian
exporter refused to co-operate.
India: the Indian producer also refused to
co-operate.
1.3. Export Price
Dumping is determined by comparing normal value with the export
price of the like product. Article 2(8)(a) of Regulation 2423/88
states that:
The export price shall be the price actually paid or payable
for the product sold for export to the Community net of all
taxes, discounts and rebates actually granted and directly
related to the sales under consideration. Deferred
discounts shall also be taken into consideration if they are




Article 2(5)(c) Regulation 2423/88.
O.J. 1988 L343/34.
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This price, however, may not always be reliable, where for example
there is no export price, or where there is an association or
compensatory arrangement between the exporter and the importer or a
third party^. pn such a case the Commission can construct the
export price on the basis of "the price at which the imported product
is first resold to an independent buyer, or if the product is not
sold to an independent buyer or not resold in the condition imported,
on a reasonable basis''^.
The normal method for constructing the export price is on the basis
of the price at which the product is first resold to an independent
buyer. In constructing this, the Regulation states that allowance
shall be made for all costs incurred between importation and resale
including all duties and taxes and for a reasonable profit
margin^. The Regulation provides in Article 2(8)(b) that these
costs shall include those normally borne by an importer but paid by
any party either in or outside the Community which appears to be
associated or to have a compensatory arrangement with the importer or
exporter. This provision permits the Community authorities to
Article 2(8)(b) Regulation 2423/88. See supra
footnote 42.
ibid. The latter method, i.e. on any reasonable basis,
has never been used by the Commission. In Textured
Polyester Fabrics (USA) O.J. 1981 L133/17 an adjustment was
made to the processing costs where the products were not
resold in the state in which they had been imported.
Article 2(8)(b) Regulation 2423/88 provides that:
The allowances shall include, in particular the following:
(i) usual transport, insurance, handling, loading and
ancillary costs;
(ii) customs duties, any antidumping duties and other
taxes payable in the importing country by reason of
the importation on the sale of the goods;
(iii) a reasonable margin for overheads and profit and/or
any commission usually paid or agreed.
For an analysis of the Institutions practice with regard to
allowances see Van Bael & Bellis op. cit. at pp. 52-54.
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deduct not only the costs of the related sales subsidiary but also
the export costs borne by the parent company, for example where the
parent company has paid the advertising costs of its subsidiary in
the Community. One commentator has criticised this provision on the
basis that it permits the Community authorities to construct the
export price in such a way that it results in a higher dumping
• 92margin^.
The Commission will not use the profit margin of the related importer
since this is in essence a transfer price between associated
companies. Rather it will look to an independent importer and the
profit margin it would have made if it had been in the position of
the related importer^. Such a profit margin has so far ranged
from 2 to 12.7 per cent^.
See Norall, "The New Amendments to the EC's Basic
Anti-dumping Regulation" 29 CMLRev. 83 at 89.
r
See Commission Intervention in the Electronic Typewriter
Cases (case 56/85 and 250/85 Brother v. Commission &
Council [1988] ECR 5655 and 5683; case 260/85 and 106/86
TEC & Co. Ltd. v. Council [1988] ECR 5855; case 273/85 and
107/86 Silver Seiko Ltd. v. Council [1988] ECR 5927; case
277 and 300/85 Canon Inc. v. Council [1988] ECR 5731; case
301/85 Sharp v. Council [1988] ECR 5813.
Chemical Fertilizer (USA) O.J. 1981 L39/4 (3%); Textured
Polyester Fabrics (USA) O.J. 1981 L133/17 (5%);
Ballbearings (Japan, USSR, Poland, Romania) O.J. 1981
L152/44 (6%); Phenol (USA) O.J. 1982 L12/1 (5%);
Polypropylene (Japan) O.J. 1983 L152/18 (5%); Dicumyl
Peroxide (Japan) O.J. 1983 L203/13 (5%); Caravans for
Camping (Yugoslavia) O.J. 1983 L240/12 (5%); Ballbearings
(Japan, Singapore O.J. 1984 L79/8 (6%); Electronic Scales
(Japan) O.J. 1984 L80/9 (8%); Sensitized Paper for Colour
Photographs (Japan) O.J. 1984 L124/45 (5%); Artificial
Corundum (Czechoslovakia, China, Spain, Yugoslavia) O.J.
1984 L255/9 (5%); Electronic Typewriters (Japan) O.J. 1984
L335/43; Ballbearings (Japan) O.J. 1984 L340/37 (6%);
Ballbearings (Thailand) O.J. 1985 L113/61 (6%). Housed
Bearing Units (Japan) O.J. 1987 L35/32 (6%); Urea and
Ammonium Nitrate (USA) O.J. 1987 L208/1 (2%); Vinyl
Acetate Monomer (USA) O.J. 1987 L213/32 (5%); Video
Cassette Recorders (South Korea, Japan) O.J. 1989 L57/55
(12.7%).
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In calculating the export price the Commission will normally include
all exports to the Community even those which enter the Community for
inward processing and which will subsequently be re-exported^.
Finally the Commission has, on a number of occasions constructed the
export price on the "basis of the facts available" where it lacked
full and reliable information on the real export prices^. In the
majority of cases it used the Community's import statistics^.
1.4. The Comparison between Normal Value and
the Export Price
Once the normal value and the export price have been determined the
Regulation stipulates that:
For the purposes of a fair comparison, due allowance in the
form of adjustments shall be made in each case, on its
merits, for the differences affecting price comparability,
i.e. for differences in:
(i) physical characteristics;
(ii) import charges and indirect taxes;
(iii) selling expenses resulting from sales made:
- at different levels of trade, or
- in different quantities, or
- under different conditions and terms of
sale^.
Acrylonitrile (USA) O.J. 1983 L101/29; Propan-I-OL (USA)
O.J. 1984 L106/55.
Article 7(7)(b) Regulation 2423/88.
Trichloroethylene (GDR, Poland, Romania) O.J. 1982




The Regulation further provides that the comparison shall be made as
nearly as possible at the same time^. The adjustments will be
granted if an interested party can show that they are
justified!^. The adjustments listed in Article 2(9)(a) which
are required to be made in order to take account of the differences
affecting price comparability shall be made in accordance with the
rules laid down in Article 2(l0)(a) to (e). In Freezers^^ it was
argued that the list of factors in Article 2(9) of Regulation 2176/84
was not exhaustive and that Article 2(10) of said Regulation merely
laid down guidelines for determining these allowances. The
Commission rejected this, concluding that the list of factors
enumerated was exhaustive. The new wording of Articles 2(9) and
(10) of Regulation 2423/88 put beyond doubt the fact that the only
adjustments allowed to effect a fair comparison are those listed in
Article 2(10).
On a number of occasions the Commission has made adjustments even
though these were not requested by the parties involved^^. There
is nothing in the wording of the revised Articles to suggest, that
should the need arise again, the Commission may not make such
adjustments.
Article 2(10) specifies the rules to be considered in establishing
whether an adjustment will be granted. It is an area in which the
Commission has considerable discretion with the result that it has a
powerful influence on what the level of the dumping margin will be.
100 Article 2(9)(b) Regulation 2423/88.
101 O.J. 1986 L259/14.
102 Upright Pianos (USSR, GDR, Poland, Czechoslovakia) O.J.
1982 L101/30; Photographic Enlargers (Czechoslovakia,
Poland, USSR) O.J. 1982 L212/32.
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The new Articles 2(9) and (10) were introduced in order to codify the
existing practice of the Community authorities in the granting of
adjustments in order to effect a fair comparison between the normal
value and export price as established under their separate rules.
When constructing the export price the Commission will normally
deduct all costs of a related sales subsidiary in the Community from
its prices to independent buyers. More recently, many exporters
whose sales were made through an associated sales company argued that
an identical approach should be adopted when constructing the normal
i n tvalueiU . The Commission has consistently argued that this
confused two distinct issues namely, the establishment of normal
value and the export price, and the adjustments allowed for
differences affecting price comparability when comparing these
prices.
For the purpose of constructing the export price, Regulation 2423/88
permits the deduction of all costs incurred between importation and
resale, thereby arriving at an export price which is not influenced
by the relationship between the exporter and its associated
importer. Normal value is established by using the comparable price
in the ordinary course of trade or on a constructed basis where no
such price is available. As regards the subsequent comparison
between normal value and export price as determined above other rules
apply which lead to price adjustments for all allowable expenses.
The same criteria apply whether the factors to be taken into
consideration are in respect of sales on the domestic market or those
see Electronic Typewriters (Japan) O.J. 1985 L163/1;
Photocopiers (Japan) O.J. 1986 L239/5; Compact Disc
Players (Japan, South Korea) O.J. 1989 L205/5.
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destined for export. Many commentators'-®^ have argued that such a
practice invariably always leads to a finding of dumping.
The Commission's practice has, however, been endorsed by the Court in
the Mini Ballbearing'®" and Electronic Typewriter'®® cases. The
Court has held that:
there are three sets of distinct rules, each of which must
be complied with separately for the respective purposes of
determining the normal value, establishing the export price
and making the comparison between the two'-®''.
1.4.1. Differences in Physical Characteristics
The Regulation provides that where there are differences in the
physical characteristics of the product, normal value "shall be
adjusted by an amount corresponding to a reasonable estimate of the
value of the difference in the physical characteristics of the
product concerned"'®®. In Photocopiers some exporters supplied
photocopiers without reprographic drums. Where a comparable machine
was sold for export along with a reprographic drum, an adjustment to
normal value was allowed in order to take account of this
difference. For some exporters the prices of drums on the domestic
See Norall op. cit. at 97; Bell, "Anti-dumping Practice in
the EEC: The Japanese Dimension", LIEI (1987) 21; Kuzmik,
"A Community Export Price Offset", [1988] 2 CMLRev 317.
'®" Cases 240/84 NTN Toyo Bearing Co. Ltd. v. Council [1987]
ECR 1809; 255/84 Nachi Fujikoshi Corpn. v. Council [1987]
ECR 1861; Case 256/84 Koyo Seiko Co. Ltd. v. Council
[1987] 1899; Case 258/84 Nippon Seiko KK v. Council [1987]
ECR 1923; 260/84 Minebea Co. Ltd. v. Council [1987] ECR
1975.
1®®
supra at footnote 93.
'®^ Cases 260/85 and 106/86 TEC & Co. Ltd. v. Council supra at
5920 paragraph 31 of Judgment.
108 Article 2(10(a).
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market were not separately available and in such cases the adjustment
was calculated on the basis of the constructed value of the drums.
This was determined by adding the cost of production as defined in
Article 2(3)(b)(ii) plus a reasonable margin of profitlOO. In the
majority of cases, adjustments under this heading have involved the
price of an exported product being compared with a similar rather
than identical productHO.
Photocopiers (Japan) O.J. 1986 L239/5.
HO Note that in Article 2(12) Regulation 2423/88 the
definition of like product includes products which have
characteristics which closely resemble those of the product
under consideration. See also Section 1.1. supra.
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The Commission has granted adjustments for differences in physical
specifications333 and of the quality of the product in
question333. It has in the past relied on its own judgment in
determining the amount of the adjustment although on one occasion it
consulted an outside expert333. Article 2(10)(a) now provides
that the amount of the adjustment shall be calculated on the basis of
111 See Upright Pianos (USSR) O.J. 1982 L101/30 (adjustments
were allowed for differences in quality of action, the type
of sound board used and the raw material of the cabinet);
Refrigerators (Yugloslavia, USSR, Hungary, Poland, Romania,
GDR, Czechoslovakia) O.J. 1982 L184/23 (adjustments were
allowed for differences in volume freezing capacity and
type of defrosting system); Photographic Enlargers
(Poland, USSR, Czechoslovakia) O.J. 1982 L212/32 (10%
adjustment for differences in physical characteristics);
Ceramic Tiles (Spain) O.J. 1984 L168/35 (adjustments were
allowed for differences in size, colour and pattern);
Ferroboron Alloy (Japan) O.J. 1990 L73/6 (adjustments were
allowed for differences in the boron content of the
product). No adjustment for differences in physical
specifications was allowed in the following: Refrigerators
(Hungary, Poland) O.J. 1982 L184/23; Glycine (Japan) O.J.
1985 L107/8.
333 Studded VJelded-Link Chain (Spain, Sweden) O.J. 1980 L231/10
(differences in steel qualities); Upright Pianos (USSR)
O.J. 1981 L101/30 (adjustment was allowed to take account
of inferior conditions in which the pianos were
delivered); Photographic Enlargers (Czechoslovakia,
Poland, USSR) O.J. 1981 L212/32 (adjustment of 5% allowed
for differences in quality with Japanese product [10% for
Poland]); Copper Sulphate (USSR, Czechoslovakia) O.J. 1983
L151/24 (adjustment was allowed for the lower quality of
the product); Sanitary Fixtures (Czechoslovakia, Hungary)
O.J. 1983 L325/18 (allowance was made for inferior glazing
and polishing of the imported product); Artificial
Corundum (Spain, China, Yugoslavia, Czechoslovakia) O.J.
1984 L255/9 (allowances were made for any transformation of
the product after its importation from the point of view of
quality). Adjustments were rejected in the following
cases because of the lack of proof: Hardboard (Hungary,
Czechoslovakia, Poland, Spain, Bulgaria, Norway, Sweden,
Finland, USSR, Romania) O.J. 1982 L181/19; Barium Chloride
(GDR, China) O.J. 1983 L110/10.
113 Mechanical Clocks (GDR, USSR) O.J. 1980 L344/34.
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relevant data for the investigation period or the data for the last
available financial year.
1.4.2. Differences in Import Charges and Indirect Taxes
Article 2(10()b) states that normal value shall be reduced by an
amount corresponding to any import charges or indirect taxes as
defined in the notes to the Annex, borne by the like product and by
materials physically incorporated therein, when destined for
consumption in the country of origin or export and not collected or
refunded in respect of the product exported to the Community. Such
an adjustment was allowed in Video Cassette Recorders in respect of
import charges included in video cassette recorders destined for
consumption on the Korean market. The Commission did not have
sufficient information to prove the exact amount of the import
charges on parts physically incorporated into the domestically sold
models. In these circumstances, it estimated the adjustment on the
basis of the value of the raw materials directly imported into Korea
by the companies in question using an average import tax rate of 20
per centH^. This approach was confirmed by the CouncilH^.
1.4.3. Differences in Selling Expenses
1.4.3.1. Sales Made at Different Levels of Trade
The Commission has granted adjustments for differences in the level
of trade only in a small number of cases^^. The new text of
Article 2(10) retains the possibility of such an adjustment but gives
O.J. 1988 L57/55; see also: Polyester Yarn (Mexico, South
Korea, Taiwan,Turkey) O.J. 1988 L151/39.
115 O.J. 1988 L240/5.
H6 Vinyl Acetate Monomer (USA) O.J. 1980 L311/13; Electronic
Scales (Japan) O.J. 1984 L80/9; Copper Sulphate (Poland,
Spain, Hungary, Bulgaria) O.J. 1984 L275/12.
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no guidance on how it should apply. The Commission has recently, in
concluding that the comparison was made at the same level of trade,
looked at the categories of customers to whom the product was
soldi-'-''. These categories of customers usually take the form of
OEMs or national/regional distributors. In Compact Disc
Players'- several exporters contended that some of their sales
were made to these special categories of clients and were therefore
at a different level of trade to sales on the domestic market. The
Community authorities noted the quantities sold, the pricing policy
and the consistent pattern of prices. It held, taking into account
these criteria, that normal value should be calculated on the basis
of the weighted average domestic prices of their sales to these
categories of independent customers. This was also held to be the
case with respect to the export prices for sales to OEMs. These
were established on the basis of prices charged when the products
were sold for export by the manufacturers to the OEMs'-'®.
1.4.3.2. Sales Made in Different Quantities
The old Regulation - Regulation 2176/84 - set out at length the
adjustment allowed for differences in quantities. Unlike the
present Regulation, it did not limit the claim to adjustments for
differences in selling expenses resulting from sales made in
different quantities'"®.
Electronic Typewriters (Japan) O.J. 1985 LI63/1;
Electronic Scales (Japan) O.J. 1985 L275/5; Photocopiers
(Japan) O.J. 1986 L239/5; Compact Disc Players (Japan,





1.4.3.3. Sales Made under Different Conditions and
Terms of Sale
The Regulation provides that the normal value shall be reduced by
the directly related costs incurred for conveying the product under
consideration from the premises of the exporter to the independent
buyerl21. This wording gives effect to previous practice in that
it excludes the possibility of deducting transport costs incurred by
the manufacturer to its warehouse or related sales company. In the
same way, the export price shall be reduced by any directly related
costs incurred by the exporter for conveying the product from its
premises in the exporting country to its destination in the
199 197
Community1^. In both cases these costs include transport ,
insurance, handling, loading and ancillary costs.
The Regulation provides that both the normal value and export price
shall be reduced by the respective directly related costs of the
packing for the product concerned-'-^ and they shall be reduced by
the cost of any credit granted for the sales under
IOC
consideration1'--3. The amount of the reduction for the cost of any
credit given shall be calculated by reference to the normal
commercial credit rate applicable in the country of origin or export
in respect of the currency expressed on the invoice^*3.
Article 2(10)(c)(i).
122 ibid.
123 See Synthetic Fibres of Polyester (USA, Mexico, Taiwan,
Romania, Turkey, Yugoslavia) O.J. 1988 L348/49.
12^ Article 2(10)(c)(ii).
123 Article 2(10)(c)(iii).
126 See Synthetic Fibres of Polyester (USA, Romania, Mexico,
Taiwan, Turkey, Yugoslavia) O.J. 1988 L348/49; Video
Cassette Recorders (South Korea, Japan) O.J. 1989 L57/55.
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The Regulation provides that both the normal value and export price
shall be reduced by an amount corresponding to the direct costs of
providing warranties, guarantees, technical assistance and
services^7. jn Mica the exporter claimed an adjustment
corresponding to the direct costs incurred for cutting the product
into slices. This was rejected by the Commission on the grounds
that Article 2(10)(c)(iv) only covers after-sales services, whereas
the services allegedly being rendered related to pre-sales
1services110.
Where commissions have been paid in respect of the sales under
consideration both the normal value and export price shall be reduced
by the corresponding amount paid^^. Article 2(10)(c)(v) also
provides that the salaries paid to salesmen shall be deducted. The
term "salesmen" is defined as "personnel wholly engaged in direct
selling activities".
Regulation 2176/84 provided that as a general rule no allowance or
adjustment could be made for overheads, research and development and
advertising costs^®. This is due mainly to the fact that there
127 Article 2(10)(c)(iv).
128 O.J. 1989 L284/45.
l2^ Article 2(10)(c)(v) Regulation 2423/88. See Synthetic
Fibres of Polyester USA, Romania, Mexico, Taiwan, Turkey,
Yugoslavia) O.J. 1988 L348/49.
1iju This meant that allowances may only have been granted for
overheads and general expenses where it could be shown that
they had a "direct relationship to domestic or export sales
under consideration". For example, one could have a
situation where the overhead is related directly to the
individual sale, for instance - if you have the sale of a
particular car. The person buying it wants to leave the
country for 6 months and therefore wants the car stored.
He pays for this. One can therefore say that such an
overhead is directly related to the sale in question and
will be granted.
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are huge difficulties involved in allocating overhead costs
satisfactorily!3!. The position regarding these costs was
explained in Electronic Typewriters:
... Under Regulation (EEC) No. 2176/84 allowances can only
be granted for differences in the factors mentioned in
Article 2(9). One of these factors is "conditions and
terms of sale". This is a relatively narrow technical term
referring to the obligations inherent in a sales contract
which may be laid down in the contract itself or in the
general conditions of sale issued by the seller. What is
decisive is whether the costs are strictly necessary to
fulfil the terms of the sales under consideration. Where
this first criterion is met it must be shown in addition
that these costs bear a direct functional relationship to
the sales under consideration, i.e. that they are incurred
because a particular sale is made. In general, overheads
and general expenses, wherever they occur, do not have such
a direct functional relationship and are therefore not
i no A
allowable ...J .
Under the wording of the new Regulation no mention is made of these
costs, thereby confirming the fact that they are not deductible.
1.4.4. Amount of Adjustment
The Regulation provides that the amount of the adjustment shall be
calculated on the basis of the relevant data for the investigation
period or the data for the last available financial year!-!-!.
The question of overheads was discussed in great length in
GATT during the Tokyo Round of Trade Negotiations.
Because of the difficulties involved no rule was
incorporated into the new GATT Code.




A new provision has been introduced by Regulation 2423/88134
whereby claims for individual adjustments having an ad valorem effect
of less than 0.5 per cent of the price or value of the affected
transactions shall be considered insignificant.
1.5. The Reference Period
In considering whether or not a product has been dumped the
Commission compares the normal value and the export price over a
given period of time. This is known as the reference period. This
is important when considering the dumping margin, because prior to
the changes in Regulation 2176/84 the Commission had complete
discretion to choose whatever reference period it liked^^. The
problem with this was that if dumping occurred for only a short time
and if the reference period happened to be during that time, then the
resultant dumping margin may have been higher than would otherwise
have been the case. The Regulation now provides that the reference
period shall:
cover a period of not less than six months immediately prior
to the initiation of the proceeding136.
134 Article 2(10)(e).
135 gee e.g. Lithium Hydroxide (USA, USSR) O.J. 1979 L274/26
(Jan.-April 1979: 4 months); Mounted Piezo-Electric
Quartz Crystal Units (USA, Japan, Korea) O.J. 1980 L162/62
(1st Jan. 1979-31st Jan. 1980: 13 months); Chemical
Fertilizer (USA) O.J. 1981 L39/5 (1st Jan.-30th Sept.
1980: 9 months); Hermetic Compressors (Spain) O.J. 1981
L113/53 (1st July-31st Dec. 1980: 6 months); Fluid
Cracking Catalysts (USA) O.J. 1982 Lll/25 (1st Jan.
1980-30th April 1981: 16 months); Hardboard (USSR,
Romania, Hungary, Bulgaria, Poland, Spain, Sweden, Finland,
Norway, Czechoslovakia) O.J. 1982 L181/19 (1st Jan.-30th
June 1980: 6 months).
136 Article 7(l)(c).
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1.6. The Dumping Margin
Once the normal value and the export price of the like product have
been calculated and the proper adjustments made to make them
comparable the dumping margin is determined. This is defined as
"the amount by which the normal value exceeds the export
price"-'-®^. The Regulation further provides that where dumping
margins vary, weighted averages may be established^®®.
The new Article 2(13) of Regulation 2423/88 confirms the Community
authorities' existing practice when prices vary^®^. It provides
that normal value shall normally be established on a weighted average
basis. For the weighted average method, all the domestic prices are
averaged, the average being weighted by the volume of the goods sold
at each price. With regard to the export price, the Regulation
provides that these prices shall normally be compared with the normal
value on a transaction-by-transaction basis®^® except where the use
of weighted averages would not materially affect the results of the
I®'7 Article 2(l4)(a) Regulation 2423/88.
138 Article 2(14)(b).
see Ballbearings (Miniature) (Japan, Singapore) O.J. 1984
L193/1. The Commission held that a comparison of normal
value with a weighted average export price comprising
dumped and non-dumped sales would be in contradiction with
the Council's amendment of the Community's anti-dumping
legislation. Therefore it has been a consistent practice
of the Commission not to use weighted average export prices
for the determination of the dumping margin except in cases
where for administrative reasons it was not considered
feasible to employ the transaction by transaction method or
where the averaging of the export prices would have had no
effect on the overall outcome of the proceedings.
See e.g. Sodium Carbonate .(USA) O.J. 1982 L317/5;
Electronic Typewriters (Japan) O.J. 1984 L335/43.
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investigation^'. By the transaction-by-transaction method,
normal value is compared with the export price for each sale to the
Community. All transactions below normal value are considered but
sales above normal value (say 10 per cent) are not allowed to offset
sales below normal value by the same volume (say 10 per cent).
Export prices above normal value are treated as if they were made at
normal value. Lastly, it provides for the use of sampling, i.e. the
use of the most frequently occurring or representative prices may be
applied to establish normal vaue and export prices in cases in which
a significant volume of transactions is involved.
Where the dumping margin is 1 per cent or less the Commission will
consider this minimal, and therefore not such as would cause injury
to the Community producers'^.
2 . IE1STJURY
There must be injury to Community industry in order for
anti-dumping duties to be imposed. The criteria for the
determination of injury are laid out in Article 4 of Regulation
2423/88. It provides that:
A determination of injury shall be made only if the dumped
or subsidized imports are, through the effects of dumping or
subsidization, causing injury i.e. causing or threatening to
'^' Ballbearings II (Japan, Poland, Romania, USSR) O.J. 1981
L152/44.
See Polyester Yarn (USA) O.J. 1980 L358/91 (for
non-textured yarn a dumping margin of 0.2% was considered
de minimis; for textured yarn a dumping margin of 0.5% and
1.1% were considered de minimis); Non-alloyed Unwrought
Aluminium (Egypt) O.J. 1983 L161/13 (a dumping margin of
0.3% was considered de minimis); Sensitized Paper for
Colour Photographs (Japan) O.J. 1984 L124/45 (a dumping
margin of 0.54% was considered de minimis); Ceramic Tiles
(Spain) O.J. 1984 L168/35 (a dumping margin of less than
0.5% was considered de minimis).
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cause material injury to an established Community industry
or materially retarding the establishment of such an
industry-'-'^.
This involves three main stages each of which will be considered
individually. They are as follows:
2.1. What constitutes Community industry ?
2.2. What is meant by the terms "material injury" ,
"material retardation", and "threatening to cause
material injury" ?
2.3. Is there a "causal link" between the dumped imports
and the injury to Community industry ?
Before considering these criteria two points should be made. First,
it should be noted that the effect of the dumped imports has to be
assessed in relation to the Community production of the like
product-*-^. Secondly, in the majority of cases where dumping has
been found to exist a determination of injury has been made.
Article 4(1).
Article 4(4) Regulation 2423/848. See also Section 1.1.
supra.
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However, in a small number of cases, even though there has been
dumping this has resulted in a no injury determination1*6.
2.1. What Constitutes Community Industry ?
Community industry is defined in the Regulation as:
the Community producers as a whole of the like product or to
those of them whose collective output constitutes a major
proportion of the total Community production of those
products1*6.
The cases in which no injury determinations have been made
are as follows:
(i) when dumping is considered de minimis; see footnote
142 supra.
(ii) when the Community producers show no interest in the
investigation. See Peaches (Greece) O.J. 1980
L110/35; Hammers (China) O.J. 1986 L29/36;
Stainless Steel House Cooking Ware (South Korea) O.J.
1986 L74/33.
(iii) low level of market penetration so that material
injury is not being caused. See Mechanical Wrist
Watches (USSR) O.J. 1982 Lll/14.
(iv) the existence already of other safeguard measures.
See Mechanical Wrist Watches (USSR) O.J. 1982 Lll/14
(existence of quantitative restrictions); Seamless
Tubes of Non-alloy Steel (Spain) O.J. 1980 L196/34
(existence of countervailing duties).
(v) decrease in consumption and increase in the volume of
imports from other countries. See Glass Textile
Fibres (Rovings) (GDR, Japan, Czechoslovakia) O.J.
1983 L160/18.
(vi) the complainant, who accounted for 90% of Community
industry, was the main importer of the dumped
imports. Furthermore he was able to increase his
market share. See Ice Skates (Czechoslovakia,
Hungary, Romania, Yugoslavia) O.J. 1985 L52/48.
1*6 Article 4(5).
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What constitutes 'a major proportion of total Community production'
has not been defined in the Regulation or in decided cases'-^.
For instance, in one case the Commission still held that the rest of
the Community producers represented a major part of the Community
production of the product in question even though the main Community
producer did not support the complaint and where the German producer
considered that it was not injured^^. Furthermore in some cases
the Commission has held that a producer in one Member State may
satisfy the requirements of Article 4(5), if its output constitutes a
major proportion of the total Community production.
Two major exceptions are provided for in Article 4(5) to this basic
rule: related parties and regional industry.
2.1.1. Related Parties
The Regulation provides that "when producers are related to the
exporters or importers or are themselves importers of the allegedly
dumped product the term 'Community industry' may be interpreted as
referring to the rest of the producers^^ . This provision has
Dr. Beseler, then Head of the Commercial Defence Division
DG-1 at the CEFIC Anti-dumping Seminar held in Brussels on
2-3 April 1981, suggested that a share of production of 25
per cent or more would be regarded as acceptable.
See Cylinder Vacuum Cleaners (Czechoslovakia, Poland, GDR)
O.J. 1982 L172/47.
See Edible & Pharmaceutical Gelatine (Sweden) O.J. 1980
C219/2; Louvre Doors (Malaysia, Singapore) O.J. 1980
C286/4; Mechanical Wrist Watches & Movements (USSR) O.J.
1980 C181/3. In all 3 cases, the Member State involved







been used on a few occasions to exclude Community producers from the
examination of injury suffered by the complainant industry^l.
It may nevertheless be reasonable for a Community producer to import
the dumped goods and still be included in the assessment of injury in
certain cases^^. This has now been recognised by the
Courtis. First, a Community producer of certain models of the
product in question may import some models which have been dumped and
include them as part of its overall range at prices corresponding to
its own prices. In this case the producer is not causing injury to
itself or anyone else. For example, in Dot Matrix Printers, one of
the grounds considered by the Commission for not excluding three
Europrint members who imported dumped printers from Japan, was that
it was necessary for printer manufacturers to offer a full range of
printers in order to defend their position on the market. Potential
clients are more likely to buy equipment from a supplier who offers a
full range of products 1^4 _ Second, a Community producer may
import dumped products in order to avoid or minimise injury to itself
or as part of its overall policy to maximise its competitiveness
while at the same time not taking advantage of the dumped imports to
make windfall profits. Lastly, a Community producer may import
dumped products as a means of self protection while an anti-dumping
investigation is ongoing. It should be stressed that these
See for example Textured Polyester Yarn (USA) O.J. 1981
L133/17; Electronic Scales (Japan) O.J. 1984 L80/9;
Skates (Czechoslovakia) O.J. 1985 L52/48; Video Cassette
Recorders (South Korea, Japan) O.J. 1988 L240/5; DRAMS
(Japan) O.J. 1990 L20/5.
Private conversation with Commission officials, November
1985.
See cases 133&150/87 Nashua Corpn. v. Commission & Council
[1990] 2 CMLR 6; case 156/87 Gestetner Holdings Pic v.




154 O.J. 1988 L130/12; O.J. 1988 L317/33.
- 108 -
situations will arise only where the Community producer is an
importer and is not related to the exporter155.
2.1.2. Regional Industry
In exceptional circumstances the producers within a region of the
Community may be treated as constituting Community industry if the
producers within such market sell all or almost all of their
production of the product in question in that market, and the demand
in that market is not to any substantial degree supplied by producers
of the product in question located elsewhere in the Community.
This concept of regional industry was considered by the Commission
in Portland Cement^^. It held that as the producers in Ireland,
United Kingdom and Denmark sold almost all their production in their
domestic markets (95 per cent, 99 per cent and 93 per cent
respectively) and that the demand in each of these markets was not
supplied to any substantial degree by producers of the product in
question located elsewhere in the Community, therefore they
constituted isolated markets within the meaning of Article 4(5)(a)
and (b). In Synthetic Fibres of Polyester the Italian market was
most affected by the dumped imports. The Commission considered
Article 4(5)(a) and (b) with a view to possible measures on a
regional basis. It concluded, however, given the size of the
Italian market (30 per cent in 1985), the share held by other
Community producers and the volume of sales made by Italian producers
outside their home market, the Italian market could not be considered
an isolated market within the meaning of Article 4(5)(a) and
(b)158.
1^5 gee Electronic Scales (Japan) O.J. 1984 L80/9;
Photocopiers (Japan) O.J. 1986 L239/5; Dot Matrix Printers
(Japan) O.J. 1988 1.130/12.
155 Article 4(5)(a) and (b) Regulation 2423/88.
157 O.J. 1986 L202/43.
158 O.J. 1987 L103/38.
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Finally, where the Community production of the like product has no
separate identity the effect of the dumped imports 'shall be assessed
in relation to the production of the narrowest group or range of
production which includes the like product for which the necessary
information can be found'159_ This provision has the effect of
widening the scope of Community industry but to date it has never
been used by the Commission"-®®.
2.2. What is Meant by the Terms "Material Injury"
"Material Retardation" and "Threatening to
Cause Material Injury" ?
2.2.1. Material Injury
The term "material injury" is not defined in the Regulation.
Article 4(2) provides however that "an examination of injury shall
involve the following factors, no one or several of which can
necessarily give decisive guidance:
(a) volume of dumped or subsidized imports, in particular
whether there has been a significant increase, either
in absolute terms or relative to production or
consumption in the Community;
(b) the prices of dumped or subsidized imports, in
particular whether there has been a significant price
undercutting as compared with the price of a like
product in the Community;
(c) the consequent impact on the industry concerned as
indicated by actual or potential trends in the
relevant economic factors such as:
Article 4(4) Regulation 2423/88.
1®® Standardized Multiphase Motors (Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia,
GDR, Hungary, USSR, Poland, Romania) O.J. 1980 L53/15;







prices (i.e. depression of prices or prevention of






In establishing whether the dumped imports have caused material
injury to Community industry, the Commission is required, where more
than one country is under investigation, to decide whether to
cumulate overall imports originating in all these countries or
whether to treat them separately. In coming to its decision the
Commission will take into account the comparability of the imported
products in terms of their physical characteristics, the volumes
imported, price levels and the degree of competition with similar
Community products^®^ .
In Polyester Yarn^2 the Commission, having considered these
factors, held that between 1986-87 the volume of imports from all the
countries had increased. In these circumstances, there should be
cumulation. On the other hand, in Synthetic fibres of
Polyester^3 the United States contended that their products should
be viewed in isolation from those of the other countries under
investigation. It argued that the volume of exports was small,
their market share had fallen and the quality of the product exported
differed from the exports of other countries. The Commission held
that all imports except those of the American producers should be
cumulated.
1°1 Synthetic Fibres of Polyester (Mexico, Romania, Turkey,
Taiwan, USA, Yugoslavia) O.J. 1988 L151/47.
162 O.J. 1988 L151/39.
163 O.J. 1988 L151/47; see also Tungsten Carbide (China,
Korea) O.J. 1990 L83/36.
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2.2.1.1. The Volume of Dumped Imports
Under this heading the Commission normally examines the increase in
the volume of the dumped imports in the Community and also the market
share they attain. Unlike the investigation to determine whether or
not dumping has taken place, which usually covers a period of less
than a year^^, the Commission views the effect of the volume of
dumped imports over the preceding few years-'-^. Generally
speaking this is the reason for the small number of decided cases
which refer to the increase in the volume of dumped imports^^.
Normally they refer to the increase in the total volume of imports.
For the most part the Commission considers the increase in the volume
of dumped imports and the market share they attain in relation to the
Community as a whole, though on a few occasions it considered these
in relation to specific Member States^?. In the majority of
See footnote 136 supra.
e.g. Electronic Scales (Japan) CkJ. 1985 L275/5 (imports
rose from 4167 units in 1980 to 8315 units in 1982, 11,605
units in 1983 and 10,222 units in first half of 1984);
Paint, Distemper, Varnish and Similar Brushes (China) O.J.
1989 L79/24. (In 1980 imports amounted to 10 million
pieces, in 1986 to 33 million pieces, in 1987 to 46 million
pieces and in 1988 to 31 million pieces - equivalent to 62
million pieces per annum.)
e.g. Paraxylene (USA, Puerto Rico, Virgin Islands) O.J.
1981 L158/7 approximately 80% of the total imports were
made at dumped prices. Increase in the volume of dumped
imports: e.g. Mechanical Wrist Watches (USSR) O.J. 1982
LI1/14.
167 Market share attained: e.g. Chromium Sulphate (Yugoslavia)
O.J. 1985 L205/12 (Italy most affected).
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cases the increase in the volume of dumped imports is represented by
an increase in absolute volume168 _
2.2.1.2. The Prices of the Dumped Imports
A finding of price undercutting has been made in virtually all
cases. It is an essential prerequisite to a finding of injury and
the imposition of an anti-dumping duty, since no duty can be imposed
if the export price is at existing price levels in the
Community169_
To date, a finding of price undercutting as high as 56.7 per cent has
been made by the Commission^®. In some cases the Commission
found that undercutting persisted even though the Community producers
reduced their prices in order to meet the competition and preserve
their market sharel71. In Photocopiers the Commission, in order
to facilitate a more comprehensive analysis of price undercutting,
entered into a contract with a German Market Research agency,
Info-Markt, to undertake a technical study of model comparisons on
the German market. It concluded that undercutting took the form not
just of lower prices but also of more highly featured machines being
sold at prices at or even below those of the Community
producers172.
16°
e.g. Polystyrene (Spain) O.J. 1985 L97/30 average annual
rate of increase in imports of around 100% over 1980-84
period.
see the Opinion of Advocate-General VerLoren van Themaat in
Joined Cases 239/82 and 275/82 Allied Corporation & Ors. v.
Commission [1984] ECR 1005 at 1037.
Glass (Turkey, Romania, Yugoslavia, Bulgaria, Hungary,
Czechoslovakia) O.J. 1986 L51/73.
171 Polyester Yarn (USA) O.J. 1980 L231/5.
172 O.J. 1987 L54/12. See also Dot Matrix Printers (Japan)
O.J. 1988 L317/33. The analysis of price undercutting was
based on an Ernst & Whinney Conseil Study.
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2.2.1.3. Consequent Impact on Community Industry
Under this heading the Community authorities consider the effects
of the dumped imports on the overall performance of the Community
producers of the like product. The factors listed in Article
4(2)(c) are merely a guide and are by no means exhaustive-'-^.
Further, the Community authorities do not have to consider all the
factors in Article 4(2)(c) but only those which provide a sufficient
basis for forming a judgment!^.
An analysis of the impact of dumped imports on Community industry
generally begins with a reference to their effect on the Community
production of the like product. In most cases the fall in
production will be quite evident, though in one case the Commission
held that a fall in production of 2 per cent had an impact on
Community industry" In some cases it has referred to the fact
that the effect on production was so severe that it ceased either
temporarily or completely""^. Closely interrelated with the fall
Paraxylene (Puerto Rico, USA, Virgin Islands) O.J. 1981
L158/7 - referred to orders lost by Community producers;
Orthoxylene (Puerto Rico, USA) O.J. 1981 L141/7 - referred
to cancellation of contracts; Electronic Typewriters
(Japan) O.J. 1984 L335/43 - referred to the fact that
Research and Development investment was threatened.
Cases 277&300/85 Canon Inc. v. Council [1988] ECR 5731 at
5808 paragraph 56 of Judgment.
Paraformaldehyde (Spain) O.J. 1984 L282/58.
Ferro-Chromium (Sweden, South Africa) O.J. 1978 L165/20
(production was ceased temporarily); Copper Sulphate
(Poland, Bulgaria, Hungary, Spain) O.J. 1984 L275/12 (fall
of 40%).
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in production is the resultant under utilisation of capacity"-^ and
the accumulation of unsold stocks-'-^8.
In addition to these, the Commission normally considers how the
dumped imports have affected the share of the market held by the
Community producers. In the majority of cases they have had quite a
marked effect^^. However, in a number of other cases a small
decrease has been held by the Commission to have had an impact on
Community industry"-^. A corollary to the reduction in the market
share is a fall in sales"-^"-. On a number of occasions the
Commission has noted that the detrimental effect caused by a fall in
sales would have been greater but for the fact that the producer
increased his sales outside the Community. This meant a reduction
in profits because products were sold at lower prices"-^.
UREA (Austria, Hungary, Malaysia, Romania, USA, Venezuela)
O.J. 1988 L235/5.
Copper Sulphate (Yugoslavia) O.J. 1982 L308/7; Chromium
Sulphate (Yugoslavia) O.J. 1985 L205/12; Glass (Bulgaria,
Romania, Turkey, Yugoslavia, Hungary, Czechoslovakia) O.J.
1986 L51/73; Potassium Permanganate (China) O.J. 1988
1.138/1 . ~
e.g. Glass (Czechoslovakia, Turkey, Romania, Yugoslavia,
Hungary, Bulgaria) O.J. 1986 L51/73 (decrease of 41.9%).
e.g. Glycine (Japan) O.J. 1985 L107/8 (decrease of 2.3%).
e.g. Glass (Czechoslovakia, Turkey, Romania, Yugoslavia,
Hungary, Bulgaria) O.J. 1986 L51/73 (fall of 70%). At the
other end of the spectrum: Non-alloyed Unwrought Aluminium
(USSR, Norway, Yugoslavia, Surinam) O.J. 1984 L57/19 (only







e.g. Chromium Sulphate (Yugoslavia) O.J. 1985 L205/12.
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One of the most important factors is the depression of pricesi88 or
the prevention of price increases which otherwise would have
occurred. Frequently the Commission refers to the fact that prices
have failed to develop in line with production costs, resulting in
these costs not being covered^^. The overall picture is usually
one of a fall in profits with an associated fall in employment.
In Electronic Typewriters, the Commission noted that apart from the
fall in profits, profitability had reached a level where there was
little or no investment in research and development facilities, vital
for the future of the industry!. This was also a factor
referred to by the Commission in Photocopiers. It noted that not
only would there be insufficient resources devoted to Research and
Development, but Community producers would either have to postpone or
abandon the launching of new models 186.
As regards the effect on employment, this normally takes the form of
a reduction in working hoursl8^, the absence of new ordersi88 or
plant closuresl®^.
I88 See Video Cassette Recorders (Japan) O.J. 1988 L249/5.
The sharp and accelerating price depression for video
cassette recorders coincided with the appearance of the
exporters in question on the Community market. The
European producers were forced to follow in order to





e.g. Vinyl Acetate Monomer (Canada) O.J. 1984 L57/17.
185 O.J. 1984 L335/43.
O.J. 1986 L239/5.
l8^ Louvre Doors (Taiwan) O.J. 1981 L158/5.
Herbicide (Romania) O.J. 1979 L44/8.
Roller Chains for Cycles (China, USSR) O.J. 1985 L217/7.
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2.2.2. Material Retardation
Article 4(1) of Regulation 2423/88 also provides that a
determination of injury may be made where the dumped imports are
materially retarding the establishment of Community industry. This
term is not defined in the Regulation and, up until very recently, it
had not been resorted to by the Community authorities.
In DRAMs190, however, the Commission in determining whether injury
had been caused to the complainant industry had to consider whether
the complainant industry was established. If this was not the case
then it had to consider whether it had been materially retarded. As
far as it was concerned, the decisive factor in determining
establishment was the existence of commercial production. The
Commission noted that Community industry had all the necessary
production facilities, equipment, technical know-how and that it had
produced DRAMs though not on a commercial basis.
On the assumption that complainant industry was not yet an
established industry, the Commission noted the following:
The three complainant companies had made detailed
plans on investment, production, costs, marketing and
strict timing schedules with a view to commercial DRAM
production in the Community. It noted that funds
were available to implement these plans. All three
companies had acquired the most advanced technical
know-how necessary for DRAM production, very costly
new facilities were built and state of the art
machinery acquired and installed. Prior to the
investigation period several hundred million ECUs had
been spent. In these circumstances, these three
companies had made a serious commitment to start
commercial production of DRAMs. This was confirmed
by the fact that two of the companies successfully
produced one mega bit DRAMs.
Due to low prices, two of the companies delayed the
start of mass production. The third company
temporarily abandoned its DRAM project.
190 O.J. 1990 L20/5.
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All three companies suffered heavy financial losses as
a result of the delay or abandonment of mass
production. There was no return or a smaller return
on investment and two of the companies had to lay of
staff.
Taking into account all these factors the Commission held that
Community industry had been materially retarded.
2.2.3. Threatening to Cause Material Injury
Article 4(1) further provides that a determination of injury may be
made where the dumped imports are threatening to cause material
injury. Article 4(3) Regulation 2423/88 states that a determination
of threat of injury may only be made where a situation is likely to
develop into actual injury. It then provides that account may be
taken of the rate of increase in the dumped imports^^^; the export
capacity already in existence in the country of origin or that which
will be operational in the foreseeable future^2. and the
likelihood that such exports will be exported to the Community1^3.
e.g. Methylamine, Dimethylamine, Trimethylamine (GDR,
Romania) O.J. 1982 L238/35; Vinyl Acetate Monomer (Canada)
O.J. 1984 L57/17; Binder and Baler Twine (Brazil) O.J.
1987 L34/55.
e.g. Barium Chloride (China, GDR) O.J. 1983 L228/28;
Electronic Typewriters (Japan) O.J. 1984 L335/43;
Herbicide (Romania) O.J. 1988 L26/107; Small Screen Colour
Televisions (Korea) O.J. 1989 L314/1.
e.g. Methylamine, Dimethylamine, Trimethylamine (GDR,
Romania) O.J. 1982 L238/35; Barium Chloride (GDR) O.J.
1983 L228/28; Vinyl Acetate Monomer (Canada) O.J. 1984
L58/17; Electronic Typewriters (Japan) O.J. 1984 L335/43;
Synthetic Fibres of Polyester (GDR, Romania, Turkey,
Yugoslavia) O.J. 1987 L103/38; Small Screen Colour
Televisions (Korea) O.J. 1989 L314/1.
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In the case of Small Screen Colour Televisions^94 the Commission
considered that there was a threat of increased injury to Community
industry, from Korean exports in the future, in view of the
availability of a large production capacity. This, it noted, was
out of proportion to the size of the domestic market - the capacity
of twenty five million tubes per year corresponded to one-third of
the world's consumption. In addition, the Korean companies had been
installed in the United States for some time with the result that it
was no longer capable of absorbing the huge volumes involved leading
them to turn for expansion to the Community.
On the other hand, in Photocopiers the Commission, guided by the
factors in Article 4(3), decided there was no threat of injury from
the imports of a certain model of copier from the end of the
reference period. It concluded that there was little evidence that
such copiers made in Japan had increased their share of the market
rapidly since the end of reference period. Furthermore there was no
evidence regarding the export capacity of the exporter for the copier
in question^9^
2.3. Is There a "Causal Link" between the Dumped
Imports and the Injury to Community Industry ?
Article 4(1) states that:
a determination of injury shall be made only if the dumped
or subsidized imports are, through the effects of dumping or
subsidization, causing injury ...
194 O.J. 1989 L314/1.
^9^ O.J. 1987 L54/12; see also Synthetic Fibres of Polyester -
(GDR, Romania, Turkey, Yugoslavia) O.J. 1987 L403/38; Mica
(Japan) O.J. 1989 L284/45.
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This causality test, taken from the Anti-Dumping Code concluded at
the Tokyo Round of Multilateral Trade Negotiations in 1979, is much
more lenient than its predecessor in Article 4(1) of Regulation
459/68196. It stated that a determination of injury could only be
made if the dumped imports were the principal cause of such
• • 197injury^3'.
The Community authorities have recently held that Article 4(1) should
not be interpreted narrowly. In Dot Matrix Printers198t the
Commission had concluded that dumped imports had caused injury to
Community industry. The exporters argued, however, that the
Commission had failed to show specific injurious effects of the
dumped imports on each of the complainant producers. The Council
contended that such an approach would in most cases be impossible and
would render Regulation 2423/88 unworkable. It referred to the
decision of the Court of Justice in Technointorg v. Commission and
Councilwhere it held that:
It should also be borne in mind that where, as in this case,
the dumped products come from different countries, it is in
principle necessary to assess the combined effects of such
imports. It is consistent with the objectives of
Regulation No. 2176/84 that Community authorities should be
able to examine the effect on Community industry of all such
imports and consequently take appropriate action against all
exporters, even if the volume of each individual exporter's
exports is relatively small^OO.
196 O.J. 1968 L93/1. See footnote 5 supra.
197 This was taken directly from Article 3(c) of the
Anti-Dumping Code concluded at the Kennedy Round of
Multilateral Trade Negotiations in 1967; reproduced in
GATT 1968, GATT 15th Supp. BISD 1966-7 at p. 24.
198 o.J. 1988 L317/33.
1" Joined cases 294/86 and 77/87 [1988] ECR 6077.
200 ibid. at 6116 paragraph 41 of Judgment.
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Article 4(1) also stipulates that:
injuries caused by other factors such as volume and prices
of imports which are dumped or subsidized or contraction in
demand, which, individually or in combination, also
adversely affected the Community industry must not be
attributed to the dumped or subsidized imports.
These, however, are only guidelines with the result that the list is
not exhaustive2®!. For example, the Commission has referred to
other factors in the decided cases to date: exchange rate
fluctuations2®2, miscalculations regarding investment2®2,
decrease in exports from the Community2®^*, substitution by other
products2®2 and competition among Community producers2®® to name
a few.
By far the most important factors considered are the volume and
prices of other non-dumped imports. In one case the Commission
concluded that the fall in imports from other sources benefited the
dumped imports more than Community production-®''. In another case
the Commission rejected the exporter's argument that injury was
caused by imports from other countries. It noted that, with the
2®! Article 3(4) GATT Anti-Dumping Code refers to the
following: changes in the pattern of consumption, trade
restrictive practices of and competition between foreign
and domestic producers, developments in the technology and
the export performance and productivity of the domestic
industry.
202
e.g. Upright Pianos (USSR) O.J. 1982 L101/30.
2®2
e.g. Dicumyl Peroxide (Japan) O.J. 1983 L203/13;
Photocopiers (Japan) O.J. 1986 L239/5.
2®^
e.g. Cycle Chains (Taiwan) O.J. 1976 L312/41.
2®2
e.g. Mechanical Wrist Watches (USSR) O.J. 1982 Lll/4;
Hardboard (Switzerland, Yugoslavia, Argentina) O.J. 1986
L157/63.
2®®
e.g. Textured Polyester Fabrics (USA) O.J. 1981 L133/17;
Freezers (USSR, GDR, Yugoslavia) O.J. 1986 L259/14.
2®2 See Electronic Scales (Japan) O.J. 1984 L80/9.
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exception of the German Democratic Republic, these imports declined
in line with the fall in demand2®8.
More recently, however, the Commission has referred to the changes in
the pattern of consumption as an important factor in considering
causality2®®. in Paraformaldehyde the Commission found that
whilst consumption in the Community had dropped, the market share of
the imported products increased. It concluded that the decline in
consumption affected the Community producers more than the imported
products2^®. Thg Commission noted in Photocopiers that whereas
the market share held by other exporters remained around 1 per cent
that held by the Community producers fell from 19 per cent to 15 per
cent, whilst consumption increased by 100 per cental.
3. COMMUNITY INTERESTS
Even though it has been established that dumping exists and as a
result injury has occurred , a further condition has to be satisfied
before duties can be imposed. The Community authorities must show
that it is in the interests of the Community to impose such
duties2^2. This concept is peculiar to the Community. Neither
Article VI of the GATT nor the Anti-Dumping Code refer to the need to
take into account the interests of others who may be affected by the
imposition of duties such as consumers and processors.
208 See Shovels (Brazil) O.J. 1984 L231/29.
2®® See Electronic Typewriters (Japan) O.J. 1984 L335/43;
Glass Mirrors (South Africa) O.J. 1985 L36/10.
210 O.J. 1984 L282/58.
211 O.J. 1986 L239/5.
2^2 Articles 11(1), 12(1) Regulation 2423/88.
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From the decided cases to date, the Community authorities tend to
give more weight to the interests of the complainant industry than
that of the processors or consumers. For example, in Electronic
Typewriters the Community authorities held that it was in the
Community's overriding interest to maintain the stability of the
industry. They contended that in the long term it was in the
consumers' interest to have a viable Community industry which would
compete with and offer an alternative to imports2^3.
In a number of cases the consumers have argued that it would be in
the interests of the Community for imports to continue, since this
would give them another source of supply and would increase the
competition among the suppliers2^. The Commission normally
rejects this, stating that if the Community producers were to
disappear from the market this would mean a dependence on an external
source of supply, something which is not in the interests of the
Community2^3.
Since the effect of an anti-dumping duty is to raise the price of the
product, users and processors have argued in a number of cases that
their competitiveness will decrease2^3. In Sensitized Paper, it
was argued that the increase in price could not be passed on either
by the photo-finishing laboratories or the dealers to the consumers
thereby resulting in losses for them. The Commission rejected this,
contending that since only one quarter of the total cost of colour
213 O.J. 1985 L163/1.
2^
e.g. Sodium Carbonate (USA) O.J. 1982 L317/5; Kraftliner
(USSR, USA, Sweden, Austria, Finland, Canada, Portugal)
O.J. 1983 L64/25; Sodium Carbonate (USA) O.J. 1984
L206/15.
2^3
e.g. Natural Magnesite (China) O.J. 1982 L371/21.
213
e.g. Methylamine, Dimethylamine, Trimethylamine (GDR,
Romania) O.J. 1982 L238/35; PVC Resin Compounds
(Czechoslovakia, GDR, Romania, Hungary) O.J. 1982 L274/15;
Orthoxylene (Puerto Rico, USA) O.J. 1983 L101/4.
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print was attributable to the cost of sensitised paper, a moderate
increase in the price of this product would have a minor impact on
the cost for the consumer2^7. Furthermore, as the Commission
pointed out in Dot Matrix Printers, the price advantages which buyers
previously enjoyed originated from unfair business practices2^8.
In UREA^l^, importers argued that it was not in the Community
interests to take protective measures against Malaysia. They argued
that this was in conflict with the Community's general policy of
increasing commercial co-operation with ASEAN countries. The
Commission noted that, although it was in the interests of the
Community to maintain good relations with ASEAN countries, the
maintenance of free trading systems implied that sales did not take
place at dumped prices. The Community would be acting in a
discriminatory manner if it took protective measures against
exporters in some countries which sold at dumped prices in the
Community, but not against exporters in other countries which were
engaged in the same practices.
In some cases the Community authorities have decided that it is in
the Community interests to adopt protective measures without fully
eliminating injury. For example, in Glycine it was held that in
view of the competitive situation and structure in the Community
market characterised by the presence essentially of one Community
producer and two non-Community firms, it was considered in the
interests of the Community to take protective measures without fully
eliminating the injury229. The concept was also used in Unwrought
217 O.J. 1984 L124/45.
218 O.J. 1988 L130/12; O.J. 1988 L317/33; see also Daisy
Wheel Printers (Japan) O.J. 1988 L177/1.
219 O.J. 1988 L235/5.
220 O.J. 1985 L218/11.
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Nickel to limit the amount of duty imposed^!. There was a
genuine fear in this case that the goods from the Soviet Union would
be displaced from the market thereby opening the way for other low
priced products from other third countries222_
Finally, on a number of occasions the Community authorities have not
adopted any protective measures since they considered this was in the
best interests of the Community223 >
A. PROTECTIVE MEASURES




221 O.J. 1983 L159/43. See also Van Bael & Bellis op. cit. at
p. 89 who contend that "it may be questioned whether the
Community interest criterion is at all relevant for the
determination of the level of duty. It would seem to
result from the wording of Articles 11(1) and 12(1) of the
Regulation that 'Community interests' come into play only
to determine whether 'intervention' is called for but that
once a decision to intervene has been made, the level of
the duty must be fixed exclusively on the basis of the
dumping and injury findings". C.f. Opinion of
Advocate-General VerLoren van Themaat in case 239 and
275/82 Allied Corporation v. Council & Commission [1985]
ECR 1005 where he developed a theory that the amount of the
duties should not exceed the level required by the
Community interest.
222 ibid.
Furfural (Dominican Republic, China, Spain) O.J. 1981
L189/57; Codeine (Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Poland,
Yugoslavia) O.J. 1983 L16/30; Acrylonitrile (USA) O.J.
1983 L101/29; Non-alloyed Unwrought Aluminium (USSR,
Norway, Yugoslavia, Surinam) O.J. 1984 L57/19; Tube and




Such duties can either be provisional^^ or definitive225.
They apply in general to future imports of the product with the
result that if the duty collected exceeds the dumping margin then the
only remedy available to the exporter is to apply for a
refund226.
Article 13 of Regulation 2423/88 lays down a number of general points
in relation to anti-dumping duties. First, the duties are to be
imposed by Regulation227. Second, the rate of duty will normally
conform to the margin of dumping. However, Article 13(3) gives the
Community authorities the discretion to impose a lesser duty if the
lesser amount would be sufficient to eliminate injury^®. ^he
duty may take the form of an ad valorem duty, i.e. a percentage of
the import price^^, or ^g difference between a floor price and
224 Article 11 Regulation 2423/88.
225 Article 12 Regulation 2423/88.
226 Article 16 Regulation 2423/88.
227 jn pde case of provisional duties this is a Commission
Regulation, and for definitive duties, a Council
Regulation. A Regulation is defined in Article 189 of the
EEC Treaty as:
[a Regulation] shall have general application. It
shall be binding in its entirety and directly
applicable in all Member States.
228 gee Photocopiers (Japan) O.J. 1987 L54/12; Oxalic Acid
(South Korea, Taiwan) O.J. 1988 L72/12.
229
e.g. Glass Mirrors (South Africa) O.J. 1985 L36/10 (rate of
duty was 17.5%); Clogs (Sweden) O.J. 1986 L32/1 (rate of
duty was 7%); Copper Sulphate (Yugoslavia) O.J. 1986
L113/4 (rate of duty was 27%); Paint, Distemper, Varnish
and Similar Brushes (China) O.J. 1988 L272/16 (rate of duty
was 69%).
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the import price230 or it could be a specific duty, i.e. a fixed
amount^-'-. Third, Regulation 2423/88 provides that anti-dumping
duties shall be neither imposed nor increased with retroactive
effect232# There are two exceptions to this general rule,
however. Anti-dumping duties may be imposed on products which were
entered for consumption not more than 90 days prior to the imposition
of provisional duties where:
there is a history of dumping which caused injury or
that the importer was, or should have been, aware that
the exporter practices dumping and that such dumping
would cause injury, and
that the injury is caused by sporadic dumping, i.e.
massive dumped imports of a product in a relatively
short period, to such an extent that, in order to
preclude it recurring, it appears necessary to impose
an anti-dumping duty retroactively on those imports,
or
that an undertaking has been violated^-^.
In three cases the Commission has had to consider whether pursuant to
Article 13(4)(b) of Regulation 2423/88, the imposition of anti¬
dumping duties with retroactive effect was warranted234, in
Mercury the Council confirmed the Commission's finding that this was
a case of sporadic dumping, but it did not consider it necessary to
impose an anti-dumping duty with retroactive effect on these
imports. It took into account that imports from the USSR during the
230
e.g. Copper Sulphate (Czechoslovakia, USSR) O.J. 1983
L274/1; Vinyl Acetate Monomer (Canada) O.J. 1984 L58/17.
231
e.g. Sodium Carbonate (USA) O.J. 1984 L317/5.
232 Article 13(4). Note the position with regard to Article
13(11) Regulation 2423/88. SeeSection 6 infra .
233 gee Article 13(4)(b)(i) and (iii) Regulation 2423/88.
234 UREA (Czechoslovakia, GDR, Kuwait, Libya, USSR, Saudi
Arabia, Trinidad & Tobago, Yugoslavia) O.J. 1987 C34/3;
Mercury (USSR) O.J. 1986 C67/3; Video Cassette Tapes
(South Korea, Hong Kong) O.J. 1989 L174/1.
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ninety days preceding the importation of the provisional duty were
negligible233. Fourth, the duty must be imposed on a
non-discriminatory basis where the product is imported into the
Community from more than one country23^. Finally, the Regulation
stipulates that no product shall be subject to both anti-dumping and
countervailing duties for the purpose of dealing with the same
situation arising from dumping or the granting of a subsidy232.
4.2. Undertakings
The injurious effects of dumping may also be eliminated with the
acceptance by the Commission of a price undertaking, in which case
the investigation is brought to an end without the imposition of
anti-dumping duties238.
The decision whether or not to accept the undertaking is that of the
Commission subject, when appropriate, to the powers of the Council
and review by the Court. In Minebea v. Council239 t^e Commission
suggested that the Court should be slow to interfere with the
decision of whether an undertaking should be accepted on the grounds
that this has been made on purely pragmatic, practical and
administrative grounds and in the light of the Commission's manpower
and workload, and not on grounds of principle. The Court held that
there was no provision in Regulation 2176/84 which compelled the
Institutions to accept an undertaking offered. It was clear from
Article 10 of that Regulation that it was for the Institutions in the
235 O.J. 1987 L346/27.
23^ Article 13(5) Regulation 2423/88.
232 Article 13(9) Regulation 2423/88; see Seamless Steel Tubes
(Spain) O.J. 1981 L165/27.
238 Article 10(1) Regulation 2423/88.
239 Case 260/84 [1987] ECR 2049.
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exercise of their discretionary power to determine whether such
undertakings were acceptable^®.
Neither the GATT Anti-Dumping Code nor the Regulation itself specify
what conditions have to be fulfilled for the undertaking to be
acceptable. Some idea of the necessary conditions may be obtained
by considering the reasons given for rejecting price undertakings.
In a number of cases the undertaking was found unacceptable because,
in view of its special features, its implementation could not have
been adequately monitored^l. The Commission has also rejected
undertakings on the ground that the price increase was not sufficient
to eliminate the injury^^. jn one case it rejected the
undertaking because of the non-existence in the country of origin of
a similar procedure^®. Where there was a breach of a previous
undertaking, a new undertaking will usually be rejected^"^.
Undertakings have the advantage that the investigation is terminated
in a friendly manner. For the exporter it means that the price
increase will accrue to him and not to the Community which would be
the case if duties were imposed. Undertakings, furthermore, are
highly flexible and they save on administrative cost and time.
On the other hand, they do have certain drawbacks. First and
foremost, they are very often difficult to draft so as to prevent
their circumvention. Second, in a small number of cases they have
proved to be difficult to monitor and supervise, e.g. the ballbearing
ibid. at 2011 paragraph 48 of Judgment. See also Joined
cases 133&150/87 Nashua Corpn. v. Commission & Council
[1990] 2 CMLR 6.
e.g. Sodium Carbonate (USA) O.J. 1984 L206/15.
e.g. Electronic Scales (Japan) O.J. 1985 L275/5.
e.g. Vinyl Acetate Monomer (Canada) O.J. 1984 L170/70.








industry^"^. Third, as a corollary of the above, undertakings
require compliance, which is not the case for anti-dumping duties.
Lastly, there are no sanctions for breach of the undertaking except
that duties may be imposed retroactively in terms of Article
13(4)(b).
Between 1980-83, 50 per cent of all anti-dumping proceedings were
terminated by undertakings. However, this policy has been reversed,
as the Community authorities strive to bring about more transparency
to anti-dumping proceedings. This change is reflected in the
Community authorities' attitude towards the acceptance of
undertakings in relation to potential exporters. In Sodium
Carbonate the Council concluded that, in general, undertakings from
potential exporters should not be accepted on the following grounds:
(a) it is difficult to determine an appropriate export
price for a company that has not exported to the
Community;
(b) it is difficult or impossible to determine the volume
of any possible future exports and the impact they
would have on the Community;
(c) an anti-dumping investigation should, in the interests
of all parties, be conducted expeditiously^^.
Finally, the Regulation provides that where an undertaking has been
withdrawn^'' or where it has been violated^^, the Commission
can, if it considers it to be in the interests of the Community,
2^-) See Ballbearings (Miniature) (Japan, Singapore) O.J. 1984
LI 93/1.
246 O.J. 1984 L311/26; see also Electronic Typewriters O.J.
1984 L335/43; Hydraulic Excavators (Japan) O.J. 1985
L63/13.
247 see e.g. Sodium Carbonate (Bulgaria) O.J. 1981 L246/14;
Fibre Building Board. (Czechoslovakia) O.J. 1983 L241/9.
248 See e.g. Hardboard (USSR) O.J. 1984 L61/21; Copper
Sulphate (Yugoslavia) O.J. 1985 L296/26.
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apply provisional anti-dumping duties on the basis of facts
established before the acceptance of the undertaking2*^_
5. THE DUMPING OF COMPONENTS
If a component is sold in the ordinary course of trade to
independent buyers in both the exporting country and the importing
country, an anti-dumping duty may be imposed on it if the conditions
for doing so are fulfilled. In this way, the component is treated
in the same manner as any other product that has been dumped.
Recently, however, it has been the practice of exporters, in
particular the Japanese who face anti-dumping duties, to circumvent
duties that have been imposed on products which have been dumped by
setting up so-called "screwdriver" assembly plants in the Community
producing the same product but which rely heavily on cheap imported
components. The existing anti-dumping rules would not permit an
anti-dumping duty to be imposed on such a component, since no finding
of dumping has been or could be made, merely because a finding of
dumping has been made in respect of the complete product. For this
reason the Council adopted Regulation 1761/87250 which provided the
Community authorities with the means, if certain conditions were
fulfilled, of imposing duties on such components.
Regulation 1761/87 has now been incorporated into Article 13(10) of
Regulation 2423/88. It provides that definitive anti-dumping duties
may be imposed by way of derogation from the second sentence of
2*^ Article 10(6) Regulation 2423/88. See also Paint,
Distemper, Varnish and Similar Brushes (China) O.J. 1988
L272/16.
250 O.J. 1987 L167/9.
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paragraph (4)(a) which states that anti-dumping duties shall neither
be imposed or increased with retroactive ef fect251.
Such duties are only to be imposed on products that are introduced
into the commerce of the Community after having been assembled or
produced in the Community where three criteria are fulfilled252_
First, the assembly or production has to be carried out by a party
which is related or associated to any of the manufacturers whose
exports of the like product are subject to a definitive anti-dumping
duty. In Electronic Scales the Commission found that TEC (UK) Ltd
was a subsidiary of TEC (Japan) and that TEC-Keylard had substantial
capital links and close economic and commercial links with TEC
(Japan)253- In Electronic Typewriters Silver Reed International
(Europe) Ltd contended that it should not be included in the
investigation because the assembly was not carried out by Silver Reed
but by Astec Europe Ltd. The Commission held, however, that they
were in essence those of Silver Reed. It noted that Astec Europe
Ltd simply assembled the parts of typewriters which were delivered to
its premises by Silver Reed. Furthermore, these assembled
typewriters were exclusively sold on the Community market by the
Silver Reed Group who bore all the costs between importation of the
parts and the sale of the finished product254-
z:)i Emphasis added.
252 Article 13(l0)(a) Regulation 2176/84. Proceedings have
been initiated in 6 cases. Electronic Typewriters (Japan)
O.J. 1987 C235/2; Electronic Scales (Japan) O.J. 1987
C235/3; Hydraulic Excavators (Japan) O.J. 1987 C285/4;
Plain Paper Photocopiers (Japan) O.J. 1988 C44/3;
Ballbearings (Japan) O.J. 1988 C150/4; Dot Matrix Printers
(Japan) O.J. 1989 L291/52.
253 O.J. 1988 L101/1
254 o.J. 1988 L101/4.
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Second, the assembly or production operation has to be started or
substantially increased after the opening of the anti-dumping
? SS
investigation .
Third, the value of the parts or materials used in the assembly or
production operation and originating in the country of exportation of
the product subject to the anti-dumping duty must exceed the value of
all other parts or materials used by at least 50 per cent. This is
usually determined on the basis of the company's purchase prices of
the parts or materials when delivered to the factories in the
Community i.e. on an into-factory duty paid basis^^. However, in
Electronic Typewriters some companies' purchase prices were not used
since they did not adequately reflect their true value. In these
cases, the sales prices were adjusted in order to ensure that they
reflected the companies' purchase prices of those parts manufactured
by third parties on the totality of the companies' own production
costs plus the sales, general and administrative expenses incurred by
them and shown in their public accounts^7. pn Dot Matrix
Pr_inters^58^ vapue supplied to the Commission for some parts
corresponded to the parent company's purchase price on the Japanese
market, adjusted to include costs of transport and customs duties
paid. The Commission rejected this method of determining the value
of the products on the ground that it did not reflect a reasonable
profit and did not include selling expenses for the selling
company. It considered that such prices appeared to be influenced
255 Electronic Typewriters (Japan) O.J. 1988 L101/4;
Electronic Scales (Japan) O.J. 1988 L101/1; Photocopiers
(Japan) O.J. 1988 L284/60; Dot Matrix Printers (Japan)
O.J. 1989 L291/52.
256 Electronic Scales (Japan) O.J. 1988 L101/1; Dot Matrix
Printers (Japan) O.J. 1989 L291/52.
252 O.J. 1988 L101/4 (Canon, Kysuhu Matsushita, Sharp).
258 o.J. 1989 L291/52.
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by a relationship between the seller (the parent company) and the
buyer (the subsidiary company).
In determining the value of the parts, some exporters have argued
that certain sub-assembled items of significant value used for some
models were of Community origin and therefore should not be
included. In Electronic Scales the product was assembled in the
Community by an independent Community producer from parts imported
from Japan and from parts manufactured by this producer itself. The
Commission held that this constituted a substantial process or
operation as required by Article 5 of Regulation 802/68 and was
therefore of Community origin2^9. jn a recent case2^9 t]^e Court
stated the tests which require to be fulfilled in order to satisfy
Article 5 of Regulation 802/68. It held that the assembly in Taiwan
of electronic typewriters from Japanese components would be the last
substantial process and thereby confer Taiwanese origin if
technically and in the light of the definition of the goods the
assembly represented the decisive production stage, that if that test
was inconclusive then it could be supplemented by a test of
applicable value. The Court went on to hold that even if it passed
those tests - under Article 5 of Regulation 802/68 the assembly could
still be disregarded if it was transferred solely in order to
circumvent anti-dumping duties on typewriters from Japan. In
Electronic Typewriters Canon contended that the product was assembled
in the Community entirely from parts imported from Japan by a
subsidiary company of a Japanese producer which normally manufactured
them in Japan and supplied Canon's Mother company there. On the
other hand, Sharp Corporation sold all the individual parts to an
unrelated Community company which carried out the sub-assembly and
subsequently sold to Sharp. In both cases the Commission held that
259 O.J. 1988 L101/1.
Case C-26/88 Brother International GmbH v. Hauptzollamt
Giessen [1990] 3 CMLR 658.
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the simply assembly was of a basic and unsubstantial nature compared
with the manufacture of the components which was performed in
Japan. The parts were therefore not of Community original.
The Commission noted in two cases2^2 that for some companies the
weighted average value of the Japanese parts produced by them for all
models did not exceed 50 per cent. In such cases, anti-dumping
duties could not be extended to such parts.
The Regulation states that each case is to be decided on its merits
and that account should be taken of the circumstances of each case.
In doing so, it provides a number of factors that can be taken into
consideration namely: the variable costs incurred in the assembly or
production operation, research and development carried out and the
technology applied within the Community2^2.
5.1. Source of the Parts
The Commission noted in Electronic Typewriters that, with the
exception of Brother, the nature of the parts sourced in the
Community was relatively simple and that they were of a low value.
Those parts of a higher technological value were imported from
Japan. It concluded that there were few attempts substantially to
change the sourcing pattern2^.
261 O.J. 1988 L101/4 Para. 11
2^2 ibid.; Photocopiers (Japan) O.J. 1990 L34/28.
2^2 Article 13(10)(a) Regulation 2423/88.
2^ O.J. 1988 L101/4; see also Photocopiers (Japan) O.J. 1988
L284/60. •
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5.2. Research and Development
In Electronic Scales, TEC (UK) Ltd. claimed that its technical
manager visited TEC Japan's factory for two months in order to
receive training. It also claimed that its decision to set up a
Research and Development Centre should be taken into consideration.
The Commission held that these did not constitute Research and
Development2^. Likewise in Electronic Typewriters the Commission
was not convinced that the activities of Sharp's 'Creative Center
Europe' or its 'Engineering Research Office' related to Electronic
Typewr iters^^.
5.3. Effects on Employment
In both Electronic Scales and Electronic Typewriters the Commission
found that only a limited number of jobs had been created. It noted
that the companies investigated carried out simple assembly
operations of a very basic nature whereas the Community producers
normally had an integrated in depth production which required more
personnel. The net result of these assembly operations was that
there had been a fall in sales by Community producers leading
inevitably to a loss of employment in the Community2^12.
5.4. Protective Measures
When components are found to have been dumped, protective measures
can take one of two forms:
5.4.1. Application of an anti-dumping duty
5.4.2. Acceptance of an undertaking.
265 O.J. 1988 LlOl/l.
266 O.J. 1988 L101/4.
2^2 O.J. 1988 L101/1; O.J. 1988 L101/4; see also Photocopiers
(Japan) O.J. 1988 L284/60. """"
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5.4.1. Application of an Anti-Dumping Duty
The Regulation provides that the rate of duty shall be that
applicable to the manufacturer in the country of origin of the like
product subject to an anti-dumping duty to which the party in the
Community carrying out the assembly or production is related or
associated2^. both Electronic Scales and Electronic
Typewriters, the Commission held that the rate of duty was to be
calculated in a manner to ensure that it corresponded to the
percentage rate of duty applicable to the exporters in question, on a
CIF value of the parts from Japan as established for the
investigation period2^9. pn pQt Matrix Printers, a flat rate duty
on two companies was imposed279.
5.4.2. Acceptance of an Undertaking
The provisions of Regulation 2423/88 relating to undertakings apply
also to the dumping of components27 1. In Electronic Typewriters
the Commission accepted an undertaking from Kyushu Matsushita (UK)
which removed the conditions justifying the extension of anti-dumping
duties to typewriters assembled in the Community272.
268 Article 13(10)(c).
269 O.J. 1988 L101/1; O.J. 1988 L101/4.
270 O.J. 1989 L291/52.
271 Article 13(10)(d).
272 O.J. 1988 L128/39. See also Photocopiers (Japan) O.J.
1988 L284/60; O.J. 1988 L355/66; O.J. 1989 L340/25; Dot
Matrix Printers (Japan) O.J. 1989 L291/52; O.J. 1989
L340/25.
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5.5. Protective Measures Unnecessary
Where the value of the Japanese parts for the product in question
is less than 60 per cent the Commission has concluded that the
adoption of protective measures are unnecessary and has consequently
terminated proceedings^73.
5.6. Application of Anti-Dumping Laws to Components:
Some Problems
The new anti-dumping law was shrouded in controversy even before it
was adopted and it is likely that this controversy will continue.
It is possible to pinpoint three main problem areas:
5.6.1. The legality of the new law in relation to the
GATT and the Anti-Dumping Code
5.6.2. Administration of the new law
5.6.3. Effect on foreign investment.
5.6.1. The Legality of the New Law in Relation to
the GATT and the Anti-Dumping Code
Neither the provisions of Article VI nor the Articles of the
Anti-Dumping Code suggest in any way that an anti-dumping duty can be
imposed on components as such^^. Furthermore, Article VI and the
Code constitute exceptions to the rules of the GATT. For this
reason, they should be interpreted narrowly. It would be contrary
273 Hydraulic Excavators (Japan) O.J. 1988 L101/24 - Komatsu
(UK) Ltd.; Electronic Typewriters (Japan) O.J. 1988
L101/26 - Brother; Electronic Scales (Japan) O.J. 1988
L101/28 - TEC Keylard; cf. Photocopiers (Japan) O.J. 1989
L126/83 the weighted average value of parts and materials
of Japanese origin incorporated in all models assembled or
produced by Sharp Manufacturing (UK) Limited was more than
60 per cent.
274 See Chapter 2 supra.
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to such an interpretation to hold that they allow duties to be
imposed on components which are not necessarily sold elsewhere and
which, if sold separately, had not been dumped merely because there
had been dumping of the completed product of which the components
form a part^75t
In introducing an anti-dumping law which produces such a result, the
Community authorities have increased the protectionist and
anti-competitive effect of the anti-dumping rules. The European
Community has long argued that its approach differed from the United
States in respect of Article VI and the GATT Code in that it remained
within the parameters of the GATT whereas the United States felt able
to ignore such constraints. The position now, however, is that the
Community seems to be shifting away from respecting the spirit of the
GATT. It appears concerned more with maximising the benefits that
accrue from interpreting the rules to its own advantage^76.
The Japanese, at whom this new law was chiefly aimed, filed a
complaint with the GATT. In October 1988 they requested the GATT
Council to establish a panel to examine their complaint. They
argued that the anti-dumping measures adopted by the Community
authorities on the basis of this provision were contrary to the GATT
in that, they had been applied without the requirements in Article VI
having been fulfilled and further, they were aimed at obliging firms
to use parts originating in the Community. The Community
authorities on the other hand contended that this new law was fully
justified by Article XX(d) which permitted a party to adopt measures
necessary to secure compliance with laws or regulations which were




Private conversation with Commission officials.
Financial Times, 22 June 1987.
Focus, GATT Newsletter 58 (1988).
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The Panel in its report in March 1990278 concluded that Article
13(10) of Regulation 2423/88 was contrary to Article III. It
provided further that Article XX(d) could not be invoked by the
Community authorities to justify this law. The Panel recommended
that the Community bring its application of Article 13(10) Regulation
2423/88 into conformity with its obligations under the GATT. The
Community has advised that it will not oppose the adoption of the
report but that the implementation of its recommendations will have
to wait until the results of the Uruguay Round are clear with respect
to the circumvention of anti-dumping duties27^.
More importantly, the Court may be called upon to consider the
legality of the new law in relation to the Anti-Dumping Code. Even
though there are convincing arguments for the view that the Code is
not directly effective28^, such a challenge to the new legislation
would force the Court to declare once and for all whether this is the
case. The Court has held recently in the Third Fediol case28!
that for the purposes of the New Commercial Policy Instrument private
parties could rely directly on the provisions of the GATT. It is
arguable that is now an open issue as to whether the Commission's
practices and its interpretation of Regulation 2423/88 are in
accordance with the GATT and the Anti-Dumping Code.
278 GATT BISD 36th Supp. 1990.
27^ Focus: GATT Newsletters 70 and 71 (1990).
28^ In case 240/80 NTN Toyo Bearing Company Ltd. v. Council
[1979] ECR 1185 the Council has argued that the Code is not
directly effective. This was also stated by the
Commission in the case 191/82 Fediol [1983] ECR 2913.
Case 70/87 Judgment of 22nd June 1989 not yet reported.
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5.6.2. Administration of the New Law
Even before this new provision came into force, the average time
taken for an investigation over the past few years, from the moment
of initiation until the imposition of duties, doubled from four and a
half months to almost nine. Two main reasons can be put forward to
explain this. First, the nature of the products involved in the
complaint has changed from simple products in small markets such as
fertilizers to technologically complicated items such as electronic
typewriters, photocopiers, semi-conductors, etc. In economic and
monetary terms these are very important. Second, until recently
only twenty-six officials were employed by the Commission to
investigate complaints of dumping made by European manufacturers,
compared with one hundred and ten in the United States for the same
purpose. This new Regulation is creating another and even more
complex type of investigation which will mean more work for the
already over stretched officials, longer delays and inevitably more
actions being brought before the Court.
5.6.3 Effect on Foreign Investment
This new provision will undoubtedly affect Japan more than any
other third country. It has many related or associated firms in the
Community manufacturing products comprised mainly of Japanese
components. The Japanese have declared that the new provision will
slow down investment in the European Community. Toshiba have stated
that it would have to raise the local content of the 100,000
photocopiers it produces each year at its French plant. Other
Japanese producers contend that the European components are not
always reliable^^. Upon the adoption of the new provision,
Commissioner De Clercq, then Commissioner for External Relations,
declared that the provision would only discourage assembly plants
282 Financial Times, 24 June 1987.
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with small added value and very limited, if any, transfer of
technology.
6. POWER TO INCREASE
ANTI—DUMPING DUTIES
Regulation 2423/88 introduced a new provision which permits the
Community authorities to impose an additional duty where an exporter
bears the existing duty in whole or in part instead of increasing its
prices^^. In theory, it was possible under the old Regulation to
deal with such a situation, by initiating a review under Article 14.
In practice, however, due to the Commission's limited resources, the
procedure was never invoked. The new procedure was introduced in
order to provide the authorities with a less onerous procedure. It
can also be viewed as a means of discouraging exporters from bearing
the duties, and instead raising their prices.
The Article viewed as a whole appears to be aimed primarily at
related importers. For example it provides that:
In so far as the results of the investigation show that the
absence of a price increase by an amount corresponding to
the anti-dumping duty is not due to a reduction in the costs
and/or profits of the importer for the product concerned
then the absence of such price increase shall be considered
as an indicator that the anti-dumping duty has been borne by
the exporter^"^.
Such a provision, as Norall points out^^, makes no sense in the
case of an unrelated importer. He notes, however, that it seems the
provision does apply in the case of a related importer but there is




op. cit. pp. 83-101.
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The Regulation provides that there has to be a complaint from an
interested party before the procedure can be set in motion28^. jf
the Commission finds that the anti-dumping duty has been borne in
whole or in part by an exporter then the duty can be imposed in
accordance with Articles 11 and 12282. This implies that the duty
can be increased at either provisional or definitive stage. The
imposition of an additional duty is not automatic where the Community
authorities make a finding that an exporter has borne the duty. On
the contrary, it has to be in the interests of the Community288.
The Regulation also provides that the duties may be applied
retroactively289. It appears to be the case that the idea of
retroactivity in this context is the same as that which applies in
respect of Article 13(10). If this is so, then retroactive
application can be justified in circumstances other than those
specified in Article 13(4). In theory, this would mean that
additional duties could be applied from the moment that the exporter
bore the duty. It is unlikely, however, that this would extend back
beyond the adoption date of the new Regulation.
Finally, owing to the problems associated with proof and the fact
that the Commission's resources are limited, it is unlikely that the









The initiation of an anti-dumping investigation is preceded by the
lodging of a written complaint. According to the Regulation a
complaint may be made by "any natural or legal person or any
association not having legal personality, acting on behalf of a
Community industry which considers itself injured or threatened by
dumped imports"291. They are usually brought by European
Manufacturers' Associations, for example "The European Council of
Chemical Manufacturers' Federation (CEFIC)"292# ]-)U^ ^ can
brought by an individual company so long as it states that it is
acting on behalf of a Community industry293#
A complaint may be withdrawn294. jn such a case the proceedings
may be terminated unless such action would not be in the interests of
the Community295. This has occurred on three occasions. In
Paracetemol the main Community producer withdrew its support but the
Commission decided to continue the investigation^1^. However, in
Television Image and Sound Recorders or Reproducers the complaint was
withdrawn after the Japanese offered a unilateral restraint
agreement, whereupon the Commission decided that it was not in the
Community's interest to continue^7. More recently, in Portland
291 Article 5(1).
292
e.g. Styrene Monomer (USA) O.J. 1981 L42/14.
293 e.g.Copper Sulphate (Yugoslavia) O.J. 1982 L308/17.
294 Article 5(4) Regulation 2423/88. See Cellular Mobile Radio
Telephones (Canada, Hong Kong, Japan) O.J. 1988 L362/59.
295 ibid.
296 o.J. 1982 L236/23.
297 o.J. 1983 L86/23.
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Cement the Commission continued with its investigation even though a
Greek manufacturer, representing approximately 11 per cent of the
total Community production, withdrew its support from the complaint,
on the ground that the allegation of dumped imports was not likely to
OQO
cause it injury^3 .
The Regulation stipulates that "the complaint shall contain
sufficient evidence of the existence of dumping and the injury
resulting therefrom"^^. The usual practice, however, is for the
Commission to send the complainants a questionnaire which specifies
the information required. If there is sufficient evidence to
justify initiating a proceeding, and after consultation with the
Advisory Committee, the Commission announces this in the Official
Journal of the European Communities2®®.
7.2. Investigation
All interested parties are invited by way of a questionnaire to
supply information to the Commission within a specified time, usually
30 days (which may be extended by 7 days)2®2.
Basically, the Commission is seeking to determine whether there are
sufficient domestic sales in the country of origin, to allow it to
calculate the normal value, using the domestic prices and so enable
it to establish if dumping is taking place. Once the information is
received it can be verified, if necessary, by carrying out
investigations in the countries involved. This is dependent,
298 O.J. 1986 L202/43.
299 Article 5(2).
300 Article 7(l)(a) Regulation 2423/88.
2®2 See Van Bael & Bellis, op. cit. p. 110 at footnote 4.
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however, on the consent of the firms involved and if the governments
in those countries raise no objections'®'#
Unlike the field of competition law an anti-dumping investigation
does not give rise to any question of extraterritoriality'®'.
Extraterritoriality refers simply to the application of laws outside
the territory of the state which enacted them. Controversy,
however, arises where this concept is used in another sense. This
is where a state extends its jurisdiction on the basis of an effect
on its own territory to conduct outside the limits of that state
(i.e. the "effects doctrine").
International law permits a state to legislate as it wishes on
virtually any matter whatsoever so long as that state respects the
sovereignty of other states in the execution of its laws. What is
objected to with respect to the "effects doctrine" is that it occurs
wholly outside the territory of the state where its effects are felt.
The problems associated with extraterritoriality do not arise in
anti-dumping investigations for a number of reasons. First, the
investigating country does not claim a right to investigate any
matter whatsoever on the territory of another state. The
investigation is carried out on the basis of co-operation (the
Community authorities can however proceed on the basis of the facts
'®' Article 7(2)(b) Regulation 2423/88.
See generally Lowe "Extraterritorial Jurisdiction"; An
annotated collection of legal materials (1983).
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available-^^ where the country alleged to have dumped refuses to
co-operate). Second, both Article VI and the GATT Anti-Dumping Code
permit States to impose duties. Finally, the authorities carrying
out the investigation are concerned with the prices at which the
T 0 S
goods are sold in the importing countryJUJ.
During the investigation, the interested parties have certain
rights. These are access to information "relevant to the defence of
their interests and which is not confidential within the meaning of
Article and a right to be heard-^^.
7.2.1. Access to Information and Confidentiality
Interested parties have the right to inspect, on a written request,
any information made available to the Commission, which is relevant
to the defence of their interests and which is not confidential.
304 Article 7(7)(b) Regulation 2423/88. The Regulation
introduced a new concluding sentence which provides that
"where the Commission finds that any interested party or
third party has supplied it with false or misleading
information, it may disregard any such information and
disallow any claim to which this refers". It is, however,
in the interests of those concerned to co-operate since the
Commission will very often rely on the allegations of
complainants e.g. Chromium Sulphate (Yugoslavia) O.J. 1985
L205/12 (the Commission used prices quoted in the complaint
to determine normal value); Paratungstate (China, Korea)
O.J. 1990 L83/117. (The export price was determined on
the basis of a reply to the questionnaire received from one
importer and information gathered during inspections at the
premises of the two Community importers which imported
Ammonium Paratungstate from China during the
investigation.)
-^5 See Temple Lang "European Community Anti-dumping and
Competition Laws: their actual and potential application
to EFTA countries" (unpublished).
306
307
Article 7(4)(a) Regulation 2423/88.
Article 7(5) & (6) Regulation 2423/88.
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The Court has held that failure to comply with this procedural
requirement will lead to the Regulation in question being annulled.
In Timex v. Council and Commission the Court held that:
all non confidential information, whether supplied by a
Community undertaking or an undertaking in a non-member
country which has been used by the Commission during its
investigation and which has had a decisive influence on its
decision regarding the anti-dumping duty must be made
available to the complainant requesting it.308^
Furthermore, the Regulation provides that the exporters and importers
of the product in question may request to be informed of the
essential facts and considerations on the basis of which the
definitive duties are to be imposed, or the collection of amounts
secured by way of provisional duties-^^.
All information submitted to the Commission is subject to the
confidentiality rules. Such information can be used only for the
purpose for which it was requested-^^®. This rule is important for
two reasons. First, it means that the information submitted for an
anti-dumping action cannot be passed on to other Directorates-
General, e.g. D.G. IV (Directorate-General for Competition).
Second, it is important in securing the co-operation of an Analogue
Country which is necessary in order to determine the normal value of
a product originating in a state trading country.
The Regulation defines information as confidential "if its disclosure
is likely to have a significantly adverse effect upon the supplier or
the source of such information"-^1. For example in Thiophen the
308 Case 264/82 [1985] ECR 849 at paragraph 25 of Judgment.
309 Article 7(4)(b).
310 Article 8(1) Regulation 2423/88.
311 Article 8(3).
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Commission held that the information which it received if published,
even in summarised form, would have a significantly adverse effect
upon these firms^-'-^.
The Regulation allows the Commission to disregard the information as
confidential where the request for confidentiality is not warranted
and the supplier is unwilling either to make it public or to
authorise its disclosure in generalised or summary form, or the
request for confidentiality is warranted but the supplier is
unwilling tu submiL a non-confidentiai summary, provided that the
information is susceptible of such a summary^-^.
Furthermore, the confidentiality rules do not prevent the disclosure
of general information by the Community authorities, in particular,
the reasons on which decisions taken are based or the evidence relied
on by the Community authorities which are necessary to explain those
reasons in court proceedings^^. Such disclosure must take into
account the legitimate interests of the parties so as to ensure that
their business secrets are not divulged.
7.2.2. The Right to be Heard
The Regulation provides for two types of hearing-^-'. First,
there is an oral hearing which takes place between one of the parties
O.J. 1982 L295/35; see also Diesel Engines (Finland,
Sweden) O.J. 1990 L76/28.
Article 8(4). See also Thiophen (United States) O.J. 1982
L295/35.
Order of the Court in Case 236/81 Celanese Chemical Co. v.
Council and Commission [1982] ECR 1183.
The Commission has in the past used another type of meeting
- A "Disclosure Conference" - this depends on the
acquiesence of the parties. Source: private conversation







and Commission Representatives^^. The Commission will hear an
interested party if they have made a written request and can show
that they are likely to be affected by the results of the proceeding
and that there are particular reasons why they should be heard
orally317. These meetings tend to be informal with no official
record being kept of the proceedings. Some Commission officials
would, however, favour a more formal approach to these meetings
similar to the system under United States law where official records
are kept. Such records would be of great value should the outcome
of the anti-dumping proceedings lead to Court action-^^. Second,
there is a confrontation meeting which takes place between the
complainants and those accused of dumping with a Commission official
T I Q
presiding-31 . Confrontation meetings are not as common as oral
hearings330> The Regulation states that there is no obligation on
any party to attend. This is usually what happens when the
Commission arranges such a meeting331, since the issues raised are
those at the centre of the dispute and no doubt involve confidential
information.
316 Article 7(5) Regulation 2423/88.
317 ibid.
9 1 O
010 Private conversation with Commission officials.
319 Article 7(6) Regulation 2423/88.
330 Confrontation meeting was arranged and took place in the
following cases:
Mechanical Wrist Watches (USSR) O.J. 1982 Lll/4
Decabromodiphenylether (USA) O.J. 1982 L319/16.
331 See Barium Chloride (China) O.J. 1983 L110/11; Outboard
Motors (Japan) O.J. 1983 L152/18; Ferro-chromium (South
Africa) O.J. 1983 L161/15; Nickel (USSR) O.J. 1983
L159/43; Caravans for Camping (Yugoslavia) O.J. 1983
L240/12; Sensitized Paper for Colour Photographs (Japan)
O.J. 1984 L124/45; Glycine (Japan) O.J. 1985 L207/85;
Hardboard (Argentina, Switzerland, Yugoslavia) O.J. 1986
L157/61; Ferro Silicon (Brazil, USSR) O.J. 1987 L219/24;
Herbicide (Romania) O.J. 1988 L26/107; Oxalic Acid (China,
Czechoslovakia) O.J. 1988 L343/34.
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7.3. Termination of Proceedings
An anti-dumping investigation can be terminated in one of three
ways:
7.3.1. where protective measures are unnecessary
7.3.2. the acceptance of an undertaking
7.3.3. the imposition of anti-dumping duties.
7.3.1. Where Protective Measures are Unnecessary
If, after consultation it becomes apparent that protective measures
are unnecessary, and where the Advisory Committee does not object,
the proceedings shall be terminated322. This usually occurs where
there is no evidence of dumping (or where it is minimal) or where
there is no injury to Community industry323_ If the Advisory
Committee objects, the Commission can submit a proposal to the
Council that the proceedings be terminated. The proceedings will
stand terminated, if the Council acting by qualified majority has not
decided otherwise324.
7.3.2. The Acceptance of an Undertaking
The Commission may terminate proceedings if, after consultation, it
finds the offering of an undertaking acceptable325. An
undertaking may not be offered later than the end of the period
during which representations may be made under Article
7(4)(c)(iii). The Commission may continue the investigation, even
322 Article 9(1) Regulation 2423/88.
323 see footnotes 142 and 145 supra.
324 Article 9(1) Regulation 2423/88; see also Portland Cement
(GDR, Poland, Yugoslavia) O.J. 1986 L202/43.
325 Article 10(1) Regulation 2423/88.
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if it accepts the undertaking either after consultation or where it
is requested to do so by exporters representing a significant
percentage of the trade involved326< jn such a situation, if a no
injury determination is made the undertaking lapses-^''.
7.3.3. The Imposition of Anti-Dumping Duties





If, after the preliminary examination, the Commission determines
that, as a result of dumping, injury has been caused to Community
industry and where it is in the interests of the Community, it may
impose a provisional anti-dumping duty328_ It may do this either
by acting on a request of a Member State329 or alternatively on its
own initiative-^O.
Even though the Commission decides not to impose a duty, this does
not rule out the possibility of imposing one at a later date331.
Provisional duties are valid for four months332 but they can be
326 Article 10(A) Regulation 2423/88.
327 ibid.
328 Article 11(1) Regulation 2423/88.
329 Article ll(2)-(3) Regulation 2423/88.
330 Article 11(1) Regulation 2423/88.
331 Article 11(4) Regulation 2423/88.
332 Article 11(5) Regulation 2423/88.
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extended for a further two months333 by submitting a proposal to
the Council not later than one month before the expiry of the period
of validity of the provisional duty334# This also applies in the
case of a proposal for definitive action.
When a duty has been imposed, the product in question cannot enter
the Community unless a security for the amount of the duty has been
posted335- On the expiry of the period of validity, the security
shall be released only to the extent that the Council has not decided
to collect it definitively336.
7.3.3.2. Definitive Duties
When it is finally established that the injury has resulted from
dumping and where it is in the Community's interest a definitive duty
may be imposed-^ 7. Such duties are imposed by the Council and it
also decides the proportion of the provisional duty that is to be
definitively collected. It usually collects the amount secured by
way of provisional duties or those secured by way of provisional
duties to a maximum of the duty definitively imposed^^.
334 Article 11(6) Regulation 2423/88.
335 Article 11(1) Regulation 2423/88.
336 Article 11(7) Regulation 2423/88.
337 Article 12(1) Regulation 2423/88.
e.g. Electronic Typewriters (Japan) O.J. 1985 L163/1;
Ballbearings (Miniature) (Japan, Singapore) O.J. 1984
L193/1; Video Cassette Tapes (Hong Kong, South Korea) O.J.
1989 L174/1.
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7.4. The Review Procedure
Regulation 2423/88 provides that the Regulation imposing the
definitive duties and the decisions to accept undertakings are
subject to review-^9. Such a review may be initiated:
(a) at the request of a Member State;
(b) on the initiative of the Commission; or
(c) where an interested party so requests and submits
evidence of changed circumstances sufficient to
justify the need for such a review, provided that at
least a year has elapsed since the conclusion of the
investigation-^^ #
With regard to this last category, an important issue which remains
unanswered is whether or not the concept of "changed circumstances"
includes an increase in the prices of an exporter who previously
dumped or whether it only refers to the circumstances not under its
control. The wording of the Regulation seems to favour the former
since its aim is to bring about an increase in prices, thereby
eliminating dumping. On the other hand, if the latter was favoured,
it would imply that the exporter could not eliminate the dumping by
his own efforts. He would have to wait for five years or until the
circumstances altered. This would result in increased
administrative costs and the paying of refunds until the Commission
on its own initiative decides to end them. Until such a situation
arises the question remains open. It is hoped that when it does,
the former interpretation is chosen, i.e. an exporter can produce
evidence of changed circumstances as a result of its own efforts - an




In the majority of cases, it is the complainant industry that
requests a review^4!. Where after consultation it becomes
apparent that review is warranted, the investigation shall be
reopened in accordance with Article 7 where the circumstances so
require. The reopening of an investigation does not, however,
affect the operation of the measures in question^4^, as a
result of the review investigation, the measures are to be repealed,
annulled or amended, this is the task of the Community institution
which was responsible for their introduction^4^ #
7.5. The "Sunset" Procedure
Article 15 of Regulation 2423/88 provides that anti-dumping duties
and undertakings lapse after 5 years from the date on which they
entered into force or were last modified or confirmed^44.
It has also stipulated, however, that if an interested party shows
that such an expiry would lead again to injury or a threat thereof,
the Commission shall carry out a review of the measure^^. In
such a situation the measure shall remain in force pending the
outcome of the review^4^. The Regulation further provides that,
-341
e.g. Lithium Hydroxide (USA, USSR) O.J. 1980 C181/4;
Sodium Carbonate (Bulgaria) O.J. 1981 C220/2; Kraftliner
(USA, Austria, Canada, Finland, Portugal) O.J. 1982
C217/2; Herbicide (Romania) O.J. 1987 C142/4. But see
Saccharin & its Salts (China, S. Korea, USA) O.J. 1983
CI19/3 (here it was the American exporter who requested a
reivew of its undertaking).
^4^ Article 14(2) Regulation 2423/88.
^4^ Article 14(3) Regulation 2423/88.
344 This concept was introduced in 1984 under Regulation
2176/84.
-^5 Article 15(3). See Paracetamol (China) O.J. 1987 C236/2.
^4^ ibid.
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where the initiation of the review has not been published within six
months after the end of the relevant five year period, the measure
shall lapse at the end of that six month period-^^. Furthermore,
the new text of Article 15 states that, where anti-dumping duties and
undertakings lapse, the Commission shall publish a notice to that
effect in the Official Journal stating the date of expiry of the
measure^S #
The Commission has stated^^ that it will on its own initiative
review the position of individual exporters (but not all the
exporters of the product under consideration) who, because they had
been subject to an earlier review, are not eligible for one under the
"Sunset provisions".
7.6. Refunds
A definitive duty remains in force for a period of five years^O
unless, as a result of a review, it is amended^l. However,
during this period a refund can be obtained, if an importer can show
that the duty exceeds the actual dumping margin, i.e. the amount by
which the price of the consignment in question is less than the
normal value as calculated for the purposes of obtaining the
definitive duty-^^. The refund is merely a corrective factor
designed to enable the rate of duty fixed by the Regulation imposing
definitive duties to be adjusted in a particular case. It
ibid.
Article 15(6).
Statement to the Working Party on Commercial Questions of
the Council of Ministers of 14th June 1988.
See footnote 344 supra.
See Section 7.4 supra.








presupposes that the duty is lawfully collected^^-^. Furthermore,
Article 16 does not permit the validity of the Regulation to be
challenged or a review of the general findings made during the
previous investigations to be requested^54.
Prior to the new text in Article 16 of Regulation 2423/88 the
Commission published a set of guidelines for importers-^^ in order
to create a greater transparency in deciding whether or not refunds
were to be granted. The new text of Article 16 codifies the
existing practice outlined in the guidelines referred to above and in
particular, the practice of deducting anti-dumping duties as a cost
on the export side where the exports sales are made through a sales
subsidy^56,
The Regulation provides that all refund calculations shall be made in
accordance with the provisions of Articles 2 or 3 and shall be based,
as far as possible, on the same method applied in the original
investigation, in particular, with regard to any application of
averaging or sampling techniques-^''.
The importer has to submit an application to the Commission via the
Member State in which the products were released for free
circulation. This must be done within three months of the date when
the amount of the definitive duty was determined or the date on which
Opinion of Advocate-General Darmon in case 312/84
Continentale Produkten Gesellschaft v. Commission [1987]
ECR 841 at 860.
Case 312/84 ibid., at paragraph 12 of Judgment.
O.J. 1987 C266/2. "Commission notice concerning the
reimbursement of anti-dumping duties".
Such a deduction is being challenged in case 188/88 NMB








the decision was made to definitively collect the provisional
duties358# This application has to be forwarded to the Commission
who then informs the other Member States and produces an opinion on
the matter359. pf the Member States do not object within one
month, the Commission may act in accordance with the opinion350-
In all other cases, it shall, after consultation, decide whether and
to what extent the application should be granted^l. If it is
granted the excess amount shall be reimbursed. To date the
Commission has only published a small number of decisions on the
question of refunds352>
8. THE DIFFERENCES BETWEEN THE
EEC AND ECSC A.NTI—DUMFING RULES
The Treaty establishing the European Coal and Steel Community, as
its name suggests, covers coal and steel products353_
Anti-dumping investigations concerning these two products are
governed by Commission Decision 2424/88354 an(i the rules relating




352 gee Cotton Yarns (Turkey) O.J. 1985 L 11/34; Glass Textile
Fibres (Czechoslovakia, Japan) O.J. 1985 L63/29; Acrylic
Fibres (USA) O.J. 1985 L125/32; Ballbearings (Singapore)
O.J. 1988 L148/26.
The Treaty of Paris - the Treaty establishing the European
Coal and Steel Community - was signed in 1951. It should
be noted that steel products which are the result of
manufacturing basic steel products, such as tubes and
pipes, are subject to the anti-dumping rules governed by
Regulation 2423/88.
364 O.J. 1988 L201/18.
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to the substance and procedure of such investigations are by and
large the same as those under Regulation 2423/88.
There are, however, two major differences. First, Decision 2424/88
allows the Commission to determine normal value by using basic
prices. Second, because of the institutional framework under the
ECSC Treaty, the Commission's powers are much broader than those
under the EEC Treaty.
8.1. The Basic Price System
Apart from the methods described earlier for determining normal
value-^5, Decision 2424/88 allows for the determination of normal
value on the basis of "Basic Prices". It states that
where several suppliers from one or more countries are
involved and it is deemed appropriate to establish a basic
price system the normal value may be derived from the basic
price; however, normal value shall be determined in
accordance with the preceding provisions of this article
where it becomes apparent that such a method of
determination would produce a significantly different
result366.
Originally, a list of basic prices were compiled by reference to the
lowest normal costs in the supplying country or countries where
normal conditions of competition prevail-^^. This list is
->0-> See the methods for determining normal value under
Regulation 2423/88, Section 1.2. supra.
366 Article 6(2)(b) Decision 2424/88.
367 gee Recommendation 3004/77 O.J. 1977 L352/1. Article 14
ECSC Treaty defines recommendation thus:
"[Recommendations] shall be binding as to the aims to be
pursued but shall leave the choice of the appropriate
methods for achieving these aims to those to whom the
recommendations are addressed."
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regularly revised by the Commission3^*8. Generally speaking, in
anti-dumping proceedings under Decision 2424/88, basic prices are
used by the Commission to determine normal value.
8.2. The Powers of the Commission
The institutional framework under the ECSC Treaty is different from
that under the EEC Treaty3*^. Under the ECSC Treaty the
Commission has the power to take action which, under the EEC Treaty,
is within the exclusive competence of the Council of Ministers. The
reason for this is that the Commission, when it deals with matters
relating to coal and steel, does so with the decision making powers
that were vested in the High Authority under the ECSC Treaty3^.
With regard to anti-dumping proceedings, the Commission has the power
not only to impose provisional duties but also definitive
duties3 , and to order the definitive collection of provisional
duties3''3. Even though the Commission has to consult the Advisory
Committee in all instances, it can take decisions without the
Committee being able to veto them.
368
e.g. O.J. 1982 L321/1. .
3^9 See Chapter 1 supra which sets out the institutional
framework under both Treaties.
33® As a result of the 1965 Merger Treaty, since 1967 the three
Communities (EEC, ECSC, Euratom) have been represented by
the one Commission.
3^1 Article 12(1) Decision 2424/88.
333 Article 12(2)(a) Decision 2424/88.
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8.3. Other Minor Differences
First, with regard to the question of judicial review373j appeals
can only be made to the Court by Community producers-^74 and not by
exporters375. Secondly, representatives of Directorate General
III which supervises the Community's steel industry, are actively
involved in ECSC anti-dumping actions.
PART 2 : COT Tl\rrTtT-?\/A.XLTMC MEASURES
INTRODUCTION
Countervailing duties provide a defence to the introduction of
unfairly low priced imports which take the form of subsidies granted
to an exporter by its government. Regulation 2423/88376 provides
that the Community authorities can impose countervailing duties on
subsidised imports whose release for free circulation causes
injury. This Regulation governs anti-subsidy actions for all
products except those covered by the ECSC Treaty377>
The rules with respect to the substance and procedure in anti-subsidy
actions are for the most part the same as those for anti-dumping
actions. The one major exception, however, is that the Community
-i'-' See Chapters 4, 5 and 6 infra.
374 See Articles 33 and 80 ECSC Treaty.
375 see Joined cases 239/82 and 275/82 Allied Corpn. v.
Commission [1984] ECR 1005.
376 o.J. 1988 L209/1.
377 Decision 2424/88 (O.J. 1988 L209/18) governs those goods
covered by the ECSC Treaty.
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authorities are not required to determine the normal value and the
export price. It is only necessary to establish that there is a
subsidy which is causing injury and to determine the amount of that
subsidy.
Unlike anti-dumping actions which are a common occurrence, there have
been only a small number of anti-subsidy cases^^. Various
reasons for this state of affairs have been cited by writers who
specialise in the field. For example, subsidies are granted by
governments whereas dumping is practised by individual undertakings,
with the result that this involves accusing foreign governments of
unfair trading practices. Furthermore, anti-subsidy actions are
usually initiated at the same time as anti-dumping actions.
Normally this results in the imposition of anti-dumping rather than
countervailing duties-^^.
Since the rules relating to anti-subsidy actions are virtually the
same as those in the anti-dumping actions only the major differences
between the two will be considered here^O.
See Davey op. cit. at pp. 114-115.
' ' See Article 13(9) Regulation 2423/88 which states that:
"no product shall be subject to both anti-dumping and
countervailing duties for the purpose of dealing with one
and the same situation arising from dumping or from the
granting of any subsidy".
0 ; For an analysis of the rules relating to the substance and
procedure see the preceding section on the anti-dumping
rules.
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1. THE EXISTENCE OF A SUBSIDY
Article 3(1) states that:
A countervailing duty may be imposed for the purpose of
offsetting any subsidy bestowed, directly or indirectly, in
the country of orgin or export, upon the manufacture,
production, export or transport of any product whose release
for free circulation in the Community causes injury.
Unfortunately, the Regulation does not define what is meant by a
subsidy. Rather it lists a number of export subsidies in an annex
to the Regulation but stresses that subsidies bestowed on exports
include but are not limited to the practices listed^l.
In the majority of cases decided thus far, the subsidies held to be
subject to duties have been mainly export subsidies. The Commission
in Soya Meal identified two factors that are crucial in determining
whether a subsidy is subject to duties. There has to be government
intervention, in other words some charge on the public account and
there has to be a benefit to the recipient with a resultant cost to
the exchequer-^^.
Some of the export subsidies held by the Commission to give rise to
countervailing duties are as follows:
1. Credit premiums, e.g. in a number of cases the
Commission held that the excessive remission of tax on
industrial products (IPI), where the tax credit which
was granted exceeded the amount of tax actually
Article 3(2).
O.J. 1985 L106/19; see generally Cuanne & Stanbrook op.
cit. at pp. 51-54. In the Second Fediol Case (case 188/85
[1988] ECR 4193) the Court has held that Article 3 of
Regulation 2176/84 presupposed the grant of an economic
advantage through a charge on the public account.
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collected at the production stage constituted an export
subsidy383.
2. Access to working capital at lower rates of interest
than those obtained on the commercial market384 or
the availability of government loans to obtain working
capital385 were held to be export subsidies.
3. Concessionary financing for exports. This occurred
where the Banks who offered the finance facility
obtained the re-financing at rates lower than the rate
of increase in the value of variable treasury
bonds386.
A. Exemption from Income Tax. Where the government
exempted from income tax, profits made by the soya bean
crushers from forward exchange (hedging) transactions
on foreign markets. This was held to constitute an
007
export subsidy-50' .
5. Tax rebate. This was held to constitute an export
subsidy where the exporters received a tax rebate on
the export of the finished product designed to offset
indirect taxes levied on the finished product and on
all prior transactions of the raw material involved in
its production-^^.
The Regulation is not limited solely to export subsidies. It does
not rule out the possibility of a domestic subsidy giving rise to the
383 Stainless Steel Bars (Brazil) O.J. 1980 L139/30; Sheets
and Plates of Iron & Steel (Brazil) O.J. 1983 LA5/11
(ECSC); Binder and Baler Twine (Mexico, Brazil) O.J. 1987
L3A/55.
384 ibid.
383 Soya Meal (Brazil) O.J. 1985 L106/19.
386 ibid. See also Binder and Baler Twine (Mexico, Brazil)
O.J. 1987 L3A/55.
38' ibid. See also Binder and Baler Twine (Mexico, Brazil)
O.J. 1987 L34/55.
388 Tube and pipe fittings (Spain) O.J. 1983 L322/13.
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imposition of duties-^^. jn Soya Meal the Commission stipulated
that two factors had to be present before such a subsidy could give
rise to duties. It has to distort competition. Therefore, as long
as the impact of such interventions is "general" they do not distort
competition. Second, the advantages must be conferred selectively,
i.e. with the aim of helping specific firms^^®.
Measures which are regarded as being in the public interest, e.g.
improving the infrastructure, health, education, etc., do not have a
distorting effect on competition. Any attempt to call a measure of
general nature a subsidy would be absurd , because by ignoring the
fact that policies of all modern states imply to varying degrees some
financial intervention of government, it would make large sections of
social and economic policy subject to countervailing duties391.
So far, the Commission has imposed a duty on a domestic subsidy in
only one case. In Sheets & Plates of Iron or Steel it held that an
investment programme which granted duty free treatment and exemption
from tax on imported machinery warranted a countervailing
duty392. jn Soya Meal the Commission held that the provision of a
flat rate finance for the preparation and storage of soya beans
constituted a domestic subsidy but not such as to give rise to the
imposition of a duty since the loans were generally available^^^.
3^9 Article 3(1). See also Article 11(3) GATT Code on
"Subsidies and Countervailing Duties" (Reproduced in O.J.
1980 L71/72).
39® see o.J. 1985 L106/19; see generally Cuanne & Stanbrook
op. cit. at pp. 51-4.
391 ibid.
392 o.J. 1983 L45/11 (ECSC).
393 o.J. 1985 L106/19.
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Article 3(4) governs the valuation of the subsidy in question.
First, the Regulation provides that the exemption of a product from
indirect taxes does not constitute a subsidy394> Second, the
amount of the subsidy is to be determined per unit of the subsidised
product exported to the Community395 but; the Regulation allows for
the following deductions to be made, if they are justified:
(a) application fees or other costs incurred in order to
qualify for the subsidy396_
(b) export taxes, duties or other charges intended to
offset the subsidy397,
TQQ
The burden of proving these rests on the party making the claimJ^°.
Where the subsidy is not granted by reference to quantities
manufactured, produced, exported or transported, the amount shall be
determined by allocating the value of the subsidy over the
appropriate level of production and over a suitable period of
time399< However, where the subsidy is based upon the acquisition
or future acquisition of fixed assets, the value of the subsidy shall
be calculated by spreading the subsidy across a period which reflects
the normal depreciation of such assets in the industry
concerned^®®.
394 Article 3(3); see also Tube & Pipe Fittings (Spain) O.J.
1986 1.103/4.
395 Article 3(4)(a) Regulation 2423/88.
396 Article 3(4)(b)(i).
397 Article 3(4)(b)(ii).
398 Article 3(4)(b) Regulation 2423/88.
399 Article 3(4)(c) Regulation 2423/88.
490 ibid. Where the assets are non-depreciating the subsidy
shall be valued as an interest free loan - see Sheets and
Plates of Iron or Steel (Brazil) O.J. 1983 L205/29.
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Finally, with respect to state trading countries the amount of the
subsidy is to be determined in an "appropriate and not unreasonable
manner". This is to be established using the same methods used to
determine dumping from state trading countries4^.
As in the case of dumping, where the authorities refuse to supply the
Commission with the relevant information, the Commission will proceed
on the basis of the facts available4^.
2 - COMMUNITY INTERESTS
Where the Community authorities conclude that, as a result of
subsidisation, Community industry has been injured, they may impose a
countervailing duty but only where it is in the interests of the
Community to do so^". The Commission has recently discussed this
concept in relation to anti-subsidy actions. In Soya Meal4^4 it
held that it was no longer in the interests of the Community to
require the collection of countervailing duty, since the Brazilian
Government had stopped granting concessionary financing for exports
of soya meal. It held that the position with regard to subsidies
can, in this respect, be distinguished from that faced in dumping
where it is essential that account is only taken of the facts and
elements which have occurred during the period covered by the
investigation. It referred to the fact that a subsidy is granted
not by an exporter but by a government and its introduction or
removal normally follows considerations which are different from
Article 3(4)(d) Regulation 2423/88. See also section
1.2.2.5. supra.
402 Article 7(7)(b) Regulation 2423/88. See also Seamless
Tubes (Spain) O.J. 1980 L196/34 (here information supplied
by one of the complainants was used).
4(^ Articles 11(1), 12(1) Regulation 2423/88.
404 O.J. 1985 L106/29.
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those which an exporter would take into account. It concluded that
the risk of having a subsidy which has been removed in the course of
an investigation and subsequently re-introduced is not the same as
the subsequent re-appearance of dumping which had stopped during the
investigation. This difference, it noted, is reflected in the
relevant international rules which distinguish in this respect
between anti-dumping and countervailing action.
3. PROTECTIVE MEASURES
The Community authorities can either impose a countervailing duty
(provisional49^ or definitive499) or it can accept an undertaking
from the exporter in question497.
3.1. The Imposition of a Countervailing Duty
For the most part the rules are the same as those applying to
anti-dumping actions49®, therefore only the differences will be
considered. First, the Regulation provides that the duty should be
less if such lesser duty would be adequate to remove the
injury499. qn Soya Meal the Commission held that where the
benefit to the recipient of the subsidy is less than the cost to the
exchequer, a countervailing duty could only reflect the lesser
amount4^9. Second, with regard to the question of retroactivity,
405 Article 11(1) Regulation 2423/88.
406 Article 12(1) Regulation 2423/88.
49^ Article 10 Regulation 2423/88.
49® See generally section 4 of Anti-Dumping Rules supra.
499 Article 13(3).
410 O.J. 1985 L106/29.
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like anti-dumping duties, a countervailing duty shall be neither
imposed nor increased with retroactive effect^^.
3.2. The Acceptance of an Undertaking
With respect to the acceptance of an undertaking the rules are
similar to those in anti-dumping actions^^. phe Regulation
states that the Commission may accept an undertaking in an
anti-subsidy action where:
(i) the subsidy is eliminated or limited, or other measures
concerning its injurious effects taken, by the
government of the country of origin or export^^; or
(ii) prices are revised or exports ceased to the extent that
the Commission is satisfied that the amount of the
subsidy or the injurious effects thereof, are
eliminated. In the case of subsidization the consent
of the country of origin or export shall be
obtained^l^.
Article 13(4)(a) Regulation 2423/88. Article 13(4)(b)
specifies a number of situations where a countervailing
duty may be imposed retroactively. They are as follows:
(i) in critical circumstances that injury which is
difficult to repair is caused by massive imports in a
relatively short period of a product benefiting from
export subsidies paid or bestowed inconsistently with
the provisions of the GATT and of the Agreement on
Interpretation and Application of Articles VI, XVI
and XXIII of the GATT, and
(ii) that it is necessary, in order to preclude the
recurrence of such injury, to assess countervailing
duties retroactively on these imports;
(iii) that an undertaking has been violated.
See generally section 4 of Anti-Dumping Rules supra.
Article 10(2)(a).
Article 10(2)(b) Regulation 2423/88.
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Thus far there has only been one case in which the Commission has
accepted an undertaking^-^.
PART 3i COMMON RULES FOR IMPORTS
INTRODUCTION
In situations where the importation of goods is not objectionable
either because it does not result from dumping or subsidisation, the
Community authorities are permitted to adopt protective measures, if
the goods in question are imported in such greatly increased
quantities and on such terms or conditions as to cause injury or the
threat thereof, to the Community producers of the like or directly
competing goods^^.
Imports into the European Community from third countries, except for
goods from state trading countries'^'', China^^ and Cuba^-^ are
Women's Shoes (Brazil) O.J. 1981 L327/39; in Tubes and
Pipe Fittings (Spain) O.J. 1983 L322/13, the Commission
rejected the undertakings offered.
Article 15(1) Regulation 288/82; see also the Preamble to
the Regulation.
Regulation 1765/82; O.J. 1982 L195/1. Amended by Act of
Spanish and Portuguese Accession and by Regulation 1243/86
(O.J. 1986 L113/1).
Regulation 1766/82; O.J. 1982 L195/21. Amended by Act of
Spanish and Portuguese Accession and by Regulation 35/83
(O.J. 1983 L5/12), Regulation 101/84 (O.J. 1984 L14/7),
Regulation 268/85 (O.J. 1985 L28/39) and Regulation 1243/86
(O.J. 1986 LI13/1).
Article 1(1) Regulation 288/82.
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governed by Regulation 288/8242^ (as amended by Regulation
3665/89421). This section of the chapter will deal largely with
the adoption of protective measures under Title V of Regulation
288/82. In order to complete the picture with regard to the common
rules for imports, it is important to note the following:
(a) Common rules for imports from state trading countries;
(b) Imports from state trading countries not liberalised
at Community level; and
(c) Surveillance measures under Title IV Regulation
288/82.
(a) Common Rules for Imports from State Trading Countries
Regulation 1765/82 governs imports from state trading countries422
and Regulation 1766/82 governs imports from China422. Both
Regulations provide a common liberalisation list for those goods not
subject to quantitative restrictions424. A product may be added
to the list by the Council and in certain cases by the Commission.
The Commission may add a product to the list where, by virtue of the
revocation of a quantitative restriction by a Member State, a product
has become liberalised in the Community. The Member State can,
however, request that the matter be sent to the Council422.
42^ O.J. 1982 L35/1. Successive Regulations have been in
effect since 1969. Regulation 288/82 concerns goods
covered by the EEC Treaty. As regards goods covered by
the ECSC Treaty the relevant legislation is Recommendation
77/328 ECSC.
421 O.J. 1989 L325/1.
422 Footnote 417 supra.
422 Footnote 418 supra.
424 Article 1 and Annex of Regulations 1765/82 and 1766/82.
422 Article 2(2) Regulations 1765/82 and 1766/82.
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(b) Imports from State Trading Countries not Liberalised at Community
Level
Regulation 3420/83 governs the products from state trading countries
which are not liberalised at Community level, i.e. those products
which are still subject to quantitative restrictions at national
level42*3. Even though this is a matter within the exclusive
competence of the Community, the Member States are by virtue of
specific authorisation from the Commission, permitted to maintain
national measures, with respect to goods that are economically or
politically sensitive422.
(c) Surveillance Measures under Title IV of Regulation 288/82
The Community authorities do not have to impose protective
measures. Instead, they can if they wish adopt surveillance
measures^®. The primary aim of such action is to gather
information on import trends, in that this may prove to be useful in
deciding whether protective measures should be adopted.
In the majority of cases it is the Commission which adopts
surveillance measures^^, but the Council can do so when the
imposition of such measures is taken simultaneously with the
liberalisation of the importation of the product in question43®.
Surveillance may be at Community level433 or at national level432
426 O.J. 1983 L346/6.
422 See Case 41/76 Donckerwolcke v. Procureur de la Republique
[1976] ECR 1921 at 1937.
428 Article 10 Regulation 288/82.
42^ Article 15(2) Regulation 288/82.
430 ibid.
433 Article 10 Regulation 288/82.
432 Article 12(2) Regulation 288/82.
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and, unlike the adoption of protective measures, it can be taken at
any time regardless of the Community investigation procedure under
Title In both cases, however, the products in question
can only be put into free circulation on the production of an import
document^-^.
SAFEGUARD MEASURES
Regulation 288/82 lays down the basic principle that importation of
goods from third countries into the Community shall be free and
therefore not subject to any quantitative restrictions without
prejudice to:
measures which may be taken under Title V (adoption of
protective measures);
measures maintained under Title IV (surveillance);
quantitative restrictions for products listed in
Annex 1 and maintained in the Member States indicated
opposite these products in that Annex"^-^.
1. THE SUBSTANTIVE RULES
Title V of Regulation 288/82 provides for the adoption of
protective measures where a product is imported in such greatly
increased quantities and/or on such terms or conditions as to cause,
or threaten to cause, substantial injury to Community producers of
like or directly competing products^-^. Before protective
^3 Article 7(A) Regulation 288/82.
^34 Articles 11(1) and 13 Regulation 288/82.
435 Article 1(2).
■^36 Article 15(1) and 16(l)(a).
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measures are adopted, the Community authorities carry out an
investigation with respect to the imported product that is allegedly
causing injury to Community industry^7.
1.1. Like or Directly Competing Products
In determining whether injury has been caused to Community
industry, Regulation 2423/88 governing anti-dumping and counter¬
vailing duties refers only to the Community producers of the like
product^-^. Regulation 288/82 on the other hand refers to
producers not only of the like product but also those of directly
competing products.
Since the term is not defined in the Regulation, it is therefore
necessary to consider the decided cases to date. This question
confronted the Commission in Quartz Watches^-^, when it had to
decide whether imported digital watches and Community mechanical and
analogue quartz watches, were directly competing products. The
Commission defined directly competing products as:
products which can essentially be substituted one for the
other, that is to say, which are suitable for the same
purposes and therefore are basically interchangeable.
It concluded that because of their high degree of interchangeability
for the user, the watches in question were directly competing
products. In coming to this conclusion, it took into account the
fact that as regards general aspect, all watches look similar, all
the watches in question possessed an essential function - that of
giving the time, and that once a consumer bought a digital watch, he
would not be concerned with buying another watch.
Title III Regulation 288/82.






In Glass44^, the Commission, having decided that drawn and float
glass were not like products, had to determine whether they were
directly competing products. It held that they could be substituted
for one another and were therefore directly competing products. In
arriving at this conclusion, the Commission noted that they used the
same raw material and their chemical composition was virtually the
same; they were the same shape and except for special uses were
precut in standard sizes and thicknesses; finally, when looked at
straight on, they were substantially the same and were both used for
the same purposes.
1.2. The Determination of Injury
The Regulation expressly stipulates that the injury resulting from
the imports in question must be "substantial" in order to permit the
imposition of protective measures^^. Because such imports are
not objectionable, in the sense that they are neither dumped or
subsidised, the use of the word "substantial" suggests that a higher
degree of injury is required, than the material injury requirement
under Regulation 2423/8844^.
Regulation 288/82 uses the same criteria used in anti-dumping and
anti-subsidy rules for determing injury. They are as follows:
1.2.1. The volume of imports, in particular where there has
been a significant increase, either in absolute
terms or relative to production or consumption in
the Community44^.
440 O.J. 1986 C128/7.
441 Article 15(1).
44^ See Section 2 Anti-Dumping Rules supra.
44^ Article 9(l)(a).
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1.2.2. The prices of the imports, in particular where there
has been a significant price undercutting as
compared with the price of a like product in the
Community444.
1.2.3. The consequent impact on the Community producers of
similar or directly competitive products as
indicated by actual or potential trends in the






prices (i.e. depression of prices or prevention






1.2.1. The Volume of Imports
As in the case of dumping and subsidisation, the Commission
examines the increase in the volume of the imports and their
consequent effect on the market share they attain in the Community.
In some cases, the Commission will not only look at the Community as
a whole, but will also take into account the Member States most
affected44^. In the decided cases to date, it has tended to rely
on a period of 3-5 years in order to determine the effect of the




e.g. Quartz Watches (Hong Kong, Japan, Macao, South Korea,
Taiwan) O.J. 1984 L106/31 (looked at the effect of imports
on the French and German market); Glass (Spain, Turkey,
Yugoslavia) O.J. 1986 C128/7 (looked at the Greek market
which was most affected); Slide Fasteners (Taiwan) O.J.
1987 L353/11 (looked at Spanish and Italian market).
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is normally represented in absolute terms, though sometimes the
Commission will also refer to the rate of import growth^^.
1.2.2. The Price of Imports
The wording of Article 15(1) and 16(1)(a) tends to suggest that a
finding of injury could be made with reference to an increase in the
volume of imports alone^"^. However, the Commission normally
considers the other criteria laid down in Article 9(1) when making a
determination of injury, and in all cases it usually makes a finding
of price undercutting. In the decided cases to date it has found
varying degrees of price undercutting, and in one case it noted that
the price differences ranged from 12.1 per cent to 77.4 per
cent"^9.
1.2.3. Impact on Community Industry
Article 9(l)(c) outlines a number of economic factors which may be
considered in determing whether or not such imports have had an
adverse impact on Community industry. In most cases, the Commission
has usually found that over a 3-4 year period, a decline in
production has resulted from an increase in the imports of the
product in question^®. A corollary of this, though not often
See Stoneware (South Korea, Taiwan) O.J. 1982 L369/27 - the
Commission held that the increase in the volume of imports
represented an average annual rate of import growth of
44.7% for the period 1977-81 and 31.2% for the period
1977-82.
See Van Bael & Bellis op. cit. at pp. 176-177 for a
discussion of the wording of the two sections, which they
see as being contrary to Article XIX of the GATT.
Quartz Watches (Hong Kong, Macao, Japan, South Korea,
Taiwan) O.J. 1984 L106/31.
pn Quartz Watches, (Hong Kong, Macao, Japan, South Korea,
Taiwan) O.J. 1984 L106/31 - German watch production fell
by 46.6 per cent.
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referred to by the Commission in its decided cases, is a decline in
the utilisation of capacity. However, the Commission noted in Glass
that this resulted in the closing down of the largest and most modern
furnace in the Community4^!. A fall in sales, with the resultant
increase in stocks has been noted, in some cases, by the Commission.
In one case, the increase in stocks had to be financed and buildings
had to be erected for storage, therefore leading to an increase in
costs4-^.
Two other factors that have a cumulative effect on each other are
prices and market shares. The Commission has noted that price
depression usually results in a fall in market share4^. A fall
in profits is not often expressly referred to by the Commission but
in Glass it concluded that the overall effect of the imports in
question had resulted in an erosion of profitability and financial
losses4^4.
Finally, a decline in employment has been mentioned in all decided
cases to date. In one case the Commission noted that employment had
fallen by 91 per cent4-^. Apart from a reduction in the workforce
the Commission has also referred to the fact that in one case, the
number of manufacturers fell from 82 to 654^6.
451 O.J. 1986 C128/7.
4-^ ibid.
4-^ Quartz Watches (Hong Kong, Macao, Japan, South Korea,
Taiwan) O.J. 1984 L106/31. The Commission noted that the
market share had dropped below 10% in 1983.
454 O.J. 1986 C128/7.
4^ Stoneware (South Korea, Taiwan) O.J. 1982 L369/27.
4-*^ Quartz Watches (Hong Kong, Taiwan, Macao, South Korea,
Japan) O.J. 1984 L106/31; see also Beach Slippers (China)
O.J. 1984 L340/30 where the number of producers dropped
from 24 firms and 14 craftsmen in 1979 to 16 firms and 10
craftsmen in 1983.
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1.3. Threat of Injury
As in anti-dumping and anti-subsidy actions, this can only be made
where the situation is likely to develop into actual injury4^2.
In order to determine whether or not there is a threat of injury the
Commission may take account of the following:
(a) the rate of increase of exports into the Community;
and
(b) the export capacity in the country of origin or
export, already in existence or which will be
operational in the foreseeable future, and the
likelihood that the resulting exports will be to the
Community4^.
1.4. Causality
The Regulation expressly provides that there has to be a causal
link between the import of the goods in question and the injury
caused to Community industry4^, Unlike Regulation 2423/88 it
does not expressly state that injury caused by other factors, such as
contraction in demand or competition, should be excluded4*^. The
Commission has discussed the question of causality in Quartz
Watches4*^ and also in Glass4^2.
4^2 Article 9(2) Regulation 288/82. The threat of injury was
found to exist in Beach Slippers O.J. 1984 L340/30.
Protective measures were therefore extended.
458 Article 9(2) Regulation 288/82.
4^9 Article 15(1).
460 Article 4(1) Regulation 2423/88.
461 O.J. 1984 L106/31.
462 O.J. 1986 C128/7.
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In Quartz Watches4^3 the Commission noted that the imports of
mechanical watches had never been in such quantities as to contribute
significantly to the creation of substantial injury. Furthermore,
it rejected the claim that the cause of economic difficulties was the
drop in demand for mechanical watches in favour of quartz watches for
reasons of consumer taste, and the fact that the digital watch had
created its own market. The Commission contended that consumer
preference would be reflected uniformly throughout the Community.
Therefore, it held that the increase in demand for quartz watches was
due to the low level of prices. Second, since the Community market
was stable, any influx of imports on such a marked scale as that of
the digital quartz watches would have led to a reduction in the
outlets for domestic production. It concluded, therefore, that the
imports of digital quartz watches, taken in isolation, caused
substantial injury to the Community producers. On the other hand,
the imports of analogue quartz watches contributed only to a minor
degree in causing injury due to the lack of significant price
undercutting.
In Glass4^4 the Commission considered whether the imports of wired
and figure glass on the one hand, and the imports of drawn and float
glass on the other caused substantial injury to Community industry.
With regard to the former, it concluded that the imports in question
were not in themselves the cause of any serious injury to Greek
industry, owing to the fact that its problems had occurred before the
increase in penetration of the imports in 1984. On the other hand,
the Commission held that the imports of drawn and float glass
contributed, to some extent, to the worsening of the difficulties
facing Greek industry. At the same time, however, it noted that
imports from the rest of the Community and from non-Community
countries not covered by the investigation also increased and these
463 O.J. 1984 L106/31.
464 O.J. 1986 C128/7.
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were at prices lower than the countries under investigation. It
referred to the fact that there had been a contraction in demand for
drawn glass and a corresponding increase for float glass. The Greek
industry it concluded, did not have the necessary technology for
producing float glass and, to add to its difficulties, the industry
had recently invested in a drawn glass production line.
1.5. No Injury Determination
To date there has been only one instance in which the Commission
has made a no-injury determination. In Stoneware4*^ concluded
that cheap imports into the Community of articles of common pottery
could not, taken in isolation, be considered as constituting
substantial injury. In coming to this conclusion, the Commission
referred to the fact that imports of common pottery increased only
slightly while the share of the Community market they held had
remained stable.
1.6. Community Interests
Even though it has been established that substantial injury has
been caused by the imports in question, protective measures will only
be taken if it is in the interests of the Community to do so4^6.
Since this term is not defined in the Regulation it is necessary to
look at the findings of the Commission in the decided cases to
date. The Commission has, in Quartz Watches4^7 discussed this
term at length. It considered the effect of the imports in question
on the Community industry in France and Germany. In the case of
France, it concluded that it was in the interest of the Community to
adopt protective measures. On reaching this conclusion it noted
465 O.J. 1982 L369/27.
4^6 Articles 15(1) and 16(1) Regulation 288/82.
467 O.J. 1984 L106/31.
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that the French industry was largely concerned with the production of
assembled watches. Secondly, the social consequences for the French
were much higher, since watchmaking in the Franche-Comte area was the
main source of employment. On the other hand, the Commission held
that in relation to Germany protective measures were not necessary
for the moment. This was due to the fact that the restructuring of
the German industry was geared mainly to large scale watchmaking.
1.7. Protective Measures which may be adopted
under Title V
Under Title V of Regulation 288/82, protective measures may be
taken both by the Commission and the Council^®. Also, if certain
conditions are satisfied, the Member States may adopt interim
protective measures^^.
To date, only quotas have been imposed by the Community authorities
under Title V, though in Stoneware^''® and in Footwear^^ the
Commission replaced the quota with an Export Restraint Agreement.
In order to gain an indication of how these quotas operate in
practice reference has to be made to the decided cases^^. First,
the Commission has the discretion either to make it an overall quota,
applicable to all Third Countries, or, within this, to make an
allocation of quantities among the main supplier countries'^^. As
Articles 15(l)(a) and(b) and Article 16(1).
Article 17 Regulation 288/82.
O.J. 1982 L369/27.
O.J. 1988 L54/59.
The Regulation lays down a few guidelines with reference to
quotas. See Article 15(2).
Quartz Watches (Hong Kong, Japan, Macao, South Korea,
Taiwan) O.J. 1984 L106/31; Slide Fasteners (Taiwan) O.J.









the Commission pointed out in Quartz Watches474, account had to be
taken not only with regard to direct imports but also with those in
free circulation. It must be noted, however, that Regulation 288/82
does not apply to goods already in free circulation. In order to
restrict such imports, the Member State in question has to seek
authorisation from the Commission under Article 115 of the EEC
Treaty. Second, the quota may be set in volume terms47^ or in
both volume and value terms47^. Third, the duration of the quota
should only be for as long as the injury remains477. The date on
which these measures are to expire should be fixed immediately and
the level of protection should be progressively reduced, by means of
an annual increase of the quotas in question47^. Last, and most
importantly, the protective measures taken, whether they be quotas or
some other measure, must be compatible with the Community's
international obligations47^. This means that they must apply to
474 O.J. 1984 L106/31.
47^ Quartz Watches (Hong Kong, Japan, Macao, South Korea,
Taiwan) O.J. 1984 L106/31; Footwear (South Korea, Taiwan)
O.J. 1988 L54/59.
47^ Stoneware (South Korea, Taiwan) O.J. 1982 L369/27.
477 Quartz Matches (Hong Kong, Japan, Macao, South Korea,
Taiwan) O.J. 1984 L106/31; Footwear (South Korea, Taiwan)
O.J. 1988 L54/59 (limited period of two and a half years).
47® ibid.
47^ Stoneware (South Korea, Taiwan) O.J. 1982 L369/27.
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all third countries covered by Regulation 288/82 who import the
product in question^^.
Unlike Regulation 2423/88, which expressly provides that the
Commission may accept undertakings^^, Regulation 288/82 contains
no similar provision. In Stoneware^2t however, the South Korean
government offered an export restraint agreement^^ with the result
that the Commission decided to replace the protective measures by a
system of automatic authorisation for the imports in question. It
indicated that it would not be prepared to accept an export restraint
agreement on an industry to industry basis, arguing that it
considered such action as tantamount to a deviation from the
procedure conducted under Regulation 288/82. In support of its
argument it contended that the appraisal of the injurious effects of
the imports on the Community industry, as well as the choice of any
defensive measures, were matters which may be undertaken only by the
Community authorities^^^.
The Commission has been prepared to apply the safeguard
measures on a mfn basis in line with the GATT rules (i.e.
on a non-discriminatory basis). This has been so even
though it was in favour of a code on safeguard measures
during the Tokyo Round of Multilateral Trade Negotiations
which would permit the imposition of such measures on a
discriminatory or selective basis. It has again raised
the question of selective safeguard measures during the
present round of trade negotiations. (See Section on GATT
Safeguard Measures in chapter 2, supra); The only
exception to this general rule, are those countries with
which the EEC has concluded a Free Trade Agreement. This
is permitted under Article XXIV(5)(b) GATT.
Article 10.
O.J. 1982 L369/27; see also Footwear (Taiwan, South Korea)
O.J. 1988 L54/59. '
On export restraint agreements see Section on GATT
Safeguard Measures in chapter 2 supra.
Footwear (Taiwan, South Korea) O.J. 1988 L54/59; the




The rules relating to procedure are laid out in Titles II and III
of Regulation 288/82. This is divided roughly into the following
four stages:
2.1. Information and Consultation
2.2. Investigation
2.3. Adoption of Protective Measures
2.4. Review Procedure.
2.1. Information and Consultation
Unlike the regime under Regulation 2423/88 where it is the
Community industry that makes the complaint^^^, under Regulation
288/82 it is the Member State which informs the Commission should
trends in imports appear to call for surveillance or protective
measures'1^.
Consultation takes place in an Advisory Committee, which is comprised
of representatives of each Member State presided over by a Commission
official^^. Consultation may be held either at the request of
the Member State or on the initiative of the Commission. It should
take place within eight working days following the receipt of
information provided by the Member State and in any event before the
adoption of any measure whether it be one of surveillance or
protection"^^.
It is provided that consultation should cover: terms and conditions
of importation, import trends and the various aspects of the economic
See footnote 291 supra.
Article 3. See Stoneware (South Korea, Taiwan) O.J. 1982
L369/72.
Article 5(1) Regulation 288/82.






and commercial situation as regards the product in question and the
measures, if any, to be taken^^.
2.2. Investigation
Where, after consultation, there is sufficient evidence to justify
an investigation, the Commission announces the opening of the
investigation in the Official Journal^®. Some information may be
confidential. The applicable rules are in Article 8 and they are
the same as those for anti-dumping and anti-subsidy
proceedings^^. Where information is generally not forthcoming the
Commission has the right to proceed on the basis of the facts
avai lable^2. To date, it has not had to revert to this
provision. The interested parties have a right to be heard, if they
can show that they are likely to be affected by the outcome of the
investigation and that there are special reasons for them to be heard
orally^3 _
At the end of the investigation, the Commission submits a report of
its findings to the Advisory Committee^^. If the Commission
considers that no Community surveillance or protective measures are
necessary, it publishes a notice of termination along with its
reasons in the Official Journal, after consulting with the Advisory
Committee^-'. Only on one occasion has the Commission held this
to be the case. In Glass the Commission held that, because of
489 Article 5(3) Regulation 288/82.
^0 Article 6(l)(a) Regulation 288/82.
See Section 7.2.1. Anti-Dumping Rules supra.
^2 Article 6(5) Regulation 288/82.
^3 Article 6(4) Regulation 288/82.
^94 Article 7(1) Regulation 288/82.
Article 7(2) Regulation 288/82.
- 186 -
anti-dumping measures and protective measures under Article 108(3) of
the EEC Treaty already in force, the Greek glass industry enjoyed a
degree of protection which was likely to obviate the effect of
imports from non-EEC countries49^.
2.3. Protective Measures
The Regulation provides for the adoption of protective measures by
the Commission and the Council and for the adoption of interim
protective measures by the Member States.
Where intervention is requested of the Commission by a Member
State, then it has to take a decision within five working days of
receipt of such a request49^. Such a decision has to be
communicated to the Council and the Member State whereupon any Member
State may, within one month, refer such a decision to the
Council49^. The Council then has the power to amend, confirm or
revoke the decision of the Commission499. If it has not given a
decision within three months, the measure taken by the Commission is
deemed to be revoked^99. gy virtue of Article 16, the Council may
adopt appropriate measures. Such a decision is final, subject only
to judicial review. Before a Member State adopts interim protective
measures it has to inform the Commission and the other Member States
of the reasons for and the details of the proposed measures. After
the Advisory Committee has been consulted the Member State may adopt
these measures^^. Where the matter is urgent, consultation shall
496 O.J. 1986 C128/7.
49^ Article 15(A) Regulation 288/82.
A98 Article 15(5) Regulation 288/82.
499 Article 15(6) Regulation 288/82.
500 ibid.
Article 17(2)(a) Regulation 288/82.
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take place within five working days after the information has been
given to the Commission. At the end of the period, the Member State
may adopt the measures. During that period, it may make imports of
the product subject to the production of an import authorisation
which is to be granted at the end of the period^^. >phe
Commission has to be notified of the measures immediately following
their adoption and such measures will operate until the adoption of a
decision by the Commission^^-^.
2.A. Review Procedure
Article 18(1) allows for consultations with the Advisory Committee
either at the request of a Member State or on the initiative of the
Commission while any surveillance or protective measure is in
operation in order to examine the effects of the measure; and to
acertain whether its application is still necessary.
PART A: THE NEW COMMERCIAL POLICY
INSTRUMENT
INTRODUCTION
In 198A, the Council adopted Regulation 2641/84 "on the
strengthening of the Common Commercial Policy with regard, in
particular to the protection against illicit commercial
practices"504. This was justified by the need to defend
502 Article 17(2)(b) Regulation 288/82.
503 Article 17(3) Regulation 288/82.
504 O.J. 1984 L252/1. For a detailed analysis of the new
instrument see Bourgeois and Laurent "Le "nouvel instrument
de politique commerciale1: un pas en avant vers
11 elimination des obstacles aux echanges internationaux"
1985 RTDE 41; Steenbergen "The New Commercial Policy
Instrument" 1985 CMLRev. 421; Van Bael & Bellis op. cit.
pp. 197 et seq.
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vigorously the legitimate interests of the Community in the
appropriate bodies, in particular the GATT, and to make sure that the
Community, in managing trade policy, acts with as much speed and
efficiency as its trading partners^^.
The Regulation, therefore, provides the Community authorities with
procedures enabling it:
(a) to respond to any illicit commercial practices with a
view to removing the injury resulting therefrom; and
(b) to ensure full exercise of the Community's rights with
regard to the commercial practices of Third
Countries506.
Because the rules relating to these procedures are different they
will be discussed separately.
1. ILLICIT COMMERCIAL PRACTICES
1.1. What Constitutes an Illicit Commercial Practice ?
The Regulation defines an illicit commercial practice as:
any international trade practice attributable to Third
Countries which are incompatible with international law or
with the generally accepted rules^^.




Except for the few cases to date^®, not clear what
constitutes an illicit commercial practice. In the explanatory
memorandum which accompanied the draft regulation, the Commission
gave the following examples:
restrictions on exports of raw materials contrary to
the GATT;
import restrictions and other charges that are
incompatible with the GATT^^^.
Some commentators have indicated that illicit commercial practices
are those trade practices which violate the rules laid down by
international trade agreements such as the GATT or the GATT
Codes^O and aiSo those laid down by the bilateral and multilateral
agreements to which the Community or the Member States are a
Notice of initiation of an examination procedure concerning
illicit commercial practices within the meaning of
Regulation (EEC) No. 2641/84, consisting of the exclusion
from the United States market of the unlicensed importation
of certain aramid fibres manufactured by AKZO'NV or its
affiliated companies outside the United States, O.J. 1986
C25/2; Notice of initiation of an "illicit commercial
practice" procedure concerning the unauthorised
reproduction o.f sound recordings in Indonesia, O.J. 1987
C136/3; Soy^liMeal (Argentina) unpublished Decision dated
22nd December"1986; Commission Decision rejecting the
complaint lodged by Smith Kline & French Laboratories Ltd.
against Jordan O.J. 1989 L30/67.
Com(83) 87 final p. 2 note 1.
Such violations under the GATT or the GATT Codes include:
export restrictions applied in an illicit manner,
export subsidies prohibited by the GATT which cause
injury to the Community exporters on a third country
market.
non respect for the rules relating to Customs
valuation of imported merchandise.
violation of code on Technical Barriers to Trade.
systematic eviction of Community enterprises from the
markets of States, contracting parties to the
Government Procurement Code.
violation of the Code on Import Licensing.





party33^ . In two Community complaints the Commission has given
an indication of the type of commercial practice that is to be
regarded as illicit. In Aramid Fibres332, the illicit commercial
practice complained of was the finding by the United States
International Trade Commission that Enka BV (the sole producer in the
Community of Aramid Fibre) had violated section 337 of the United
States Tariff Act 1930, by the unauthorised importation and sale of
aramid fibres manufactured abroad by a process that, if practised in
the United States, would infringe United States Patent Law. Enka BV
claimed that this constituted a denial of national treatment in
respect of the application of United States Patent Law which affected
their sale in the United States, i.e. breach of Article III (4) of
the GATT. Furthermore, such an exclusion order could not be
exempted under Article XX(d) of the GATT. After investigating the
matter, the Commission agreed with Enka BV's complaint that the
procedure under section 337 was less favourable to them than that
exercised by the American Courts in respect of American goods with
the result that there was a denial of national treatment contrary to
Article III 333. jn November 1989 the GATT Council adopted a
panel report finding Section 337 of the United States Tariff Act to
be inconsistent with Article III(4)334.
More recently, the International Federation of Phonogram and
Videogram Producers(lFPI), on behalf of the Community producers in
the sound recording industry, submitted a complaint to the Commission
that, by failing to provide Community industry with effective
-)i-L See generally Bourgeois & Laurent, op. cit. pp. 50-54; Van
Bael & Bellis, op. cit. p. 202; Bourgeois "EC Rules
against 'Illicit Trade Practices' Policy Cosmetics or
International Law Enforcement ?" (ed.) B. Hawk in North
American and Common Market Antitrust and Trade Laws (1988).
512 O.J. 1986 C25/2.
513 O.J. 1987 L117/18.
514 36th Supp. BISD (1990).
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protection against unauthorised reproduction of sound recordings,
Indonesia was in breach of both international law and of generally
accepted rules. The breach of international law to which it
referred was Article 10 bis and 10 ter of the Paris Convention for
the Protection of Intellectual Property, of which Indonesia was a
signatory. The unauthorised reproduction of phonograms in Indonesia
they argued was an "act of unfair competition" since it enabled
competitors to profit at no cost from major investments made by other
firms. Second, Indonesia provided no effective protection or
appropriate legal remedies to counter such unfair competition. The
breach of generally accepted international rules related to the Rules
of the Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic
Works and the Paris text of the Universal Copyright Convention, to
which Indonesia was not a signatory. They contended that these must
be regarded as generally accepted international rules, in view of the
large number and importance of countries adhering to them. More
specifically, it was argued that Indonesian copyright law failed to
respect the national treatment rules laid down in these
Conventions^-^.
In two other cases the Commission refused to initiate proceedings on
the ground that the measures complained of were not contrary to
international law or generally accepted rules^-^. pn Soya Meal it
held that the allegations of differential export taxes for soya
products and export restrictions were not contrary to Articles III
and XI of the GATT. They did not therefore constitute an illicit
commercial practice. The Commission's decision has been upheld by
ibid.
Soya Meal (Argentina) unpublished Commission Decision dated
22nd December 1986; Commission Decision rejecting the
complaint of Smith Kline & French Laboratories Ltd. against
Jordan O.J. 1989 L30/67.
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the Court in the Third Fediol case^®. In the complaint lodged by
Smith Kline & French Laboratories Limited against Jordan, the
allegation that an amendment to Jordan's intellectual property laws
was contrary to the Paris Convention for the protection of
intellectual property rights was rejected by the Commission, on the
basis that legislative acts of a signatory State could not amount to
"an act of unfair competition" as laid down in Article 10 bis(l) of
the Convention.
This new Regulation, unlike the other Trade Protection Laws, is aimed
at illicit commercial practices that affect not only imports into the
Community but Community exports to third countries^!?. This,
however, is subject to two qualifications. First, the scope of the
Regulation is limited to illicit commercial practices which are
"attributable" to third countries. This, in essence, means unfair
practices by foreign governments and not those carried out by private
undertakings^^. Second, it does not apply to cases covered by
the other existing rules in the field of trade regulation^^.
1.2. Injury
Before action can be taken by the Community authorities, the
illicit commercial practice has to cause injury to Community
Case 70/87 [1989] ECR 1781.
Article 2(4) Regulation 2641/84.
Cf. The Economic and Social Committee contended that the
practices do not refer solely to the practices of





519 Article 13 Regulation 2641/84.
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industry-*2®. "Injury" is defined in the Regulation as:
any material injury caused or threatened to Community
industry-^!.
1.2.1. What is Meant by the Term "Community Industry"
This is defined^22 Regulation to mean all Community
producers of products identical or similar to the product which is
the subject of illicit practices or of products competing directly
with that product^^, or who are consumers or processors of the
product which is the subject of illicit practices, or all those
producers whose combined output constitutes a major proportion of
total Community production of the products in question.
In Aramid Fibres the complaint was lodged on behalf of the AKZO Group
by ENKA BV, the sole producer of aramid fibre in the Community^2^,
and in Sound Recordings, it was submitted by the International
Federation of Phonogram and Videogram Producers (IFPI) on behalf of
the European producers said to represent virtually the whole
Community sound recording industry^2^, fact that consumers
and processors are covered by the term "Community industry" goes
further than Regulation 2423/88 and Regulation 288/82.
Article 1(a) Regulation 2641/84.
Article 2(3).
Article 2(4).
This is similar to Regulation 288/82 where consideration is
taken not only of producers of the like product but also







525 O.J. 1987 C136/3.
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There are, however, two exceptions to this basic principle. First,
when the producers are related to the exporters or the importers or
are themselves importers of the product alleged to be the subject of
an illicit practice, the term Community industry may be interpreted
as referring to the rest of the producers526. Second, a
particular region of the Community may be regarded as a Community
industry if their collective output constitutes a major proportion of
the output of the product in question in the Member State or States
where the region is located. However, they must show that the
effect of the illicit practice where it concerns imports is
concentrated in that Member State or States. Further, where the
illicit practice concerns Community exports to a third country, a
significant proportion of the output of those producers is exported
to the third country concerned527.
1.2.2. What is Meant by the Term "Material Injury" ?
The term itself is not defined in the Regulation but Article 8(1)
provides a list of criteria similar to those found in Regulation
2423/88 and 288/82 which are to be used in determining whether or not
injury has been caused. They are as follows:
(i) the volume of Community imports or exports concerned,
notably where there has been a significant increase or
decrease, either in absolute terms or relative to
production or consumption on the market in
question 528.
526 Article 2(4)(a) Regulation 2641/84.
5^7 Article 2(4)(b) Regulation 2641/84.
528 Unlike Regulation 2423/88, reference here is made not only
to the increase in the volume of the imports or exports but
also to their decrease.
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(ii) the prices of Community producers' competitors, in
particular in order to determine whether there has
been, either in the Community or in third country
markets, significant undercutting of the prices of
Community producers339 •
(iii) the consequent impact on Community industry as defined
in Article 2(4) and as indicated by trends in certain
economic factors such as:
- production




- prices (that is, depression of prices or
prevention of price increases which would normally
have occurred)
- profits
- return on capital
- investment
- employment
How these provisions will operate in practice is unclear in the
absence of decided cases. Unfortunately, the complaint in Aramid
Fibres was concerned with the threat of injury rather than material
injury33^. However, in Sound Recordings the complainant contended
that the unauthorised reproduction of phonograms was causing serious
injury to Community producers, in that it was restricting market
access to the Indonesian and, more importantly, to the Middle Eastern
countries with the result that there would be a significant loss of
sales33!.
529 Unlike Regulation 2423/88, reference here is made to the
prices of the Community producers' competitors.
530 O.J. 1987 L117/18.
531 O.J. 1987 C136/7.
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1.2.3. Threat of Injury
Where a threat of injury is alleged, it has to be clearly
foreseeable that a particular situation is likely to develop into
actual injury532_ jn order to determine this, the Commission may
take into account inter alia factors533 such as:
(a) the rate of increase of the exports to the market
where the competition with the Community products is
taking place;
(b) the export capacity in the country of origin or
export, already in existence or which will be
operational in the foreseeable future, and the
likelihood that the exports resulting from that
capacity will be to the market referred to in point
(a).
In Aramid Fibres, the Commission considered whether there was a
threat of injury as alleged by the complainant. It examined whether
of not any future injury was clearly foreseeable, and concluded that
the arguments of loss of direct sales to the United States and the
Community in the period up to 1990 and beyond were convincing534_
1.2.4. Community Interests
As in the case with the other trade protection laws, the interests
of the Community play a major part in determining whether protective
532 Article 8(2) Regulation 2641/84.
-^3 ibid.
534 O.J. 1987 L117/18. In the complaint ENKA BV contended
that prior to the exclusion order exports were to be some
1000 tonnes by 1990. O.J. 1986 C25/2.
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measures are to be adopted535 or whether the procedure is to be
terminated^-^^. In Aramid Fibres, the Commission noted that in the
light of the results of the investigation, it appeared that an
important question of the application of the GATT was at issue which
had serious economic implications. It concluded therefore that it
was in the Community interest to initiate international consultation
and dispute settlement procedures, with a view to achieving the
alignment of United States legislation with its international
obligations^''.
2. FULL EXERCISE OF THE
COMMUNITY'S RIGHTS
The Regulation defines "Community rights" as
those international trade rights of which it may avail
itself either under international law or under generally
COO
accepted rules->J°.
The major difference with regard to this procedure as compared with
that in Article 1(a) as outlined above is that action may be taken
without injury to Community industry being proved. As the
Commission explained in its memorandum which accompanied the Draft
Regulation, the practices covered by this procedure would be those
involving recourse to the GATT dispute settlement procedures, notably
Articles XXII and XXIII and those provisions of the GATT Codes that
Article 10(1) where it states that "where it is found as a
result of the examination procedure that action is
necessary in the interests of the Community ..."
536 Article 9(1) where it states that "when it is found as a
result of the examination procedure that the interests of
the Community do not require any action to be taken".
537 O.J. 1987 L117/18.
538 Article 2(2).
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specifically lay down rules governing dispute settlement, e.g. Title
II of the Subsidies Code^®®.
3. PROTECTIVE MEASURES
3.1. Acceptance of an Undertaking
The Council may accept an undertaking offered by a third country or
by the country concerned, if this is considered satisfactory^^®.
In Reproduction of Sound Recordings^! Indonesia undertook, pending
its eventual accession or adherence to the relevant international
Conventions, to provide for sound recordings by nationals of the
Community Member States the same protection on their territory as for
sound recordings by Indonesian nationals. The Commission concluded
that it was in the interests of the Community to accept the
undertaking and terminate the procedure without taking protective
measures pursuant to Article 10(3). If the measures proposed are
considered satisfactory, the procedure will be terminated^^. it
is the Commission which is entrusted with the task of supervising the
application of these measures^^. If they are rescinded,
suspended or improperly implemented, or where the Commission has
grounds for believing that this is the case, the Member States shall
be informed and protective measures may be adopted in accordance with
Article 11, where these are necessary and justified^^^.
See: Chapter 2, Section 2.3.2. supra.
Article 9(2)(a) Regulation 2641/84.
O.J. 1988 L123/50.
Article 9(2)(a) Regulation 2641/84.
Article 9(2)(b) Regulation 2641/84.








3.2. Adoption of Commercial Policy Measures
The adoption of commercial policy measures is subject to the prior
discharge of an international procedure for consultation or for the
settlement of disputes where the Community's international
obligations so require'1^'. Once this has been completed and
account has been taken of the results, commercial policy measures may
then be imposed'"^'. The Regulation provides that "any" commercial
policy measure may be taken'^ but stresses that such measures must
be compatible with existing international obligations and
procedures'"^. It then expressly refers to the following:
(a) suspension or withdrawal of any concession resulting
from commercial policy agreements;
(b) the raising of existing customs duties or the
introduction of any other charge on imports;
(c) the introduction of quantitative restrictions or any
other measure modifying import or export conditions or
otherwise affecting trade with the third country
concerned'"^.
A . PROCRIHIRK
For the most part, the procedural rules are the same for both
regimes under Article 1 - where there are differences these shall be
noted. The procedure to be followed can be divided into three main
stages:
Article 10(2) Regulation 2641/84.
ibid.
Article 10(3). The adoption of commercial policy measures









4.1. The complaint or referral
4.2. The examination
4.3. The adoption of measures.
4.1. The Complaint or Referral
The Regulation provides that:
any natural or legal person or any association not having
legal personality, acting on behalf of a Community industry
which considers that it has suffered injury as a result of
illicit commercial practices may lodge a written
complaint550.
This provision, however, does not apply in relation to the procedure
for ensuring the full exercise of the Community's rights. The
complaint must contain sufficient evidence of the existence of an
illicit commercial practice and the injury resulting therefrom^^.
The complaint may be withdrawn, in which case the procedure may be
terminated unless such termination would not be in the interests of
the Community552. jf becomes apparent after consultation (in
the Advisory Committee553) that there is insufficient evidence to
justify initiating an investigation, the complainant is
informed554. jn the complaint lodged by Smith Kline & French
Laboratories Limited against Jordan, the Commission rejected the
complaint on the basis that it did not contain sufficient evidence in
law of existence of an illicit commercial practice as required by
Article 3(2) of Regulation 2641/84555. q^g complainant had argued
550 Article 3(1).
551 Article 3(2) Regulation 2641/84.
552 Article 3(4) Regulation 2641/84.
553 Article 5 Regulation 2641/84.
554 Article 3(5) Regulation 2641/84.
555 o.j. 1989 L30/67.
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that new legislation in Jordan amending its patent laws, infringed
Articles lObis and lOter of the Paris Convention for the Protection
of Industrial Property by depriving it of the protection previously
afforded. The Commission concluded that "acts of unfair
competition" within the meaning of Article lObis could only cover
acts carried out by competitors and therefore could not include acts
of a signatory State, e.g. the adoption of a new law556_
As far as a referral by a Member State is concerned it may ask
the Commission to initiate the procedures referred to in
Article 1 557 # The Commission will have to be supplied with the
necessary evidence to support the requests and in the case of illicit
commercial practices, proof of these and the resultant injury must be
given^^. jf, after consultation, it is decided that an
investigation should be initiated, the Member State shall be
informed-*-^ _
4.2. The Examination
Where, after consultation, it is apparent that there is sufficient
evidence to justify the start of an investigation and where this is
in the interests of the Community, the Commission shall announce this
in the Official Journal^^. jt then notifies the representatives
of the country or countries involved^-'-.
-^6 ibid.
557 Article 4(1) Regulation 2641/84. This provision applies
to both Article 1(a) and 1(b).
558 Article 4(2) Regulation 2641/84.
559 Article 4(4) Regulation 2641/84.
560 Article 6(l)(a) Regulation 2641/84.
561 Article 6(l)(b) Regulation 2641/84.
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The Regulation gives the Commission the power to ingather all the
information necessary and to check this with the importers, traders,
agents, producers, trade associations and organisations, provided
that the undertakings or organisations give their consent^^. The
Commission can also carry out investigations in the territory of the
countries concerned provided that their governments have been
officially notified and raise no objection within a reasonable
period^^-^. Where such information is not supplied, the Commission
may proceed on the basis of the facts available^^. The
Commission shall be assisted in its investigation by officials of the
Member State in whose territory the checks are carried out, provided
that Member State so requests-^-*. Finally, the Member States,
when requested shall supply the Commission with all the information
necessary for the examination^^.
All interested parties may inspect the information available to the
Commission^^. This information is limited to all internal
documents for the use of the Commission and the administrations,
provided that it is relevant to the protection of their interests,
not confidential within the meaning of Article 7 and is used by the
Commission in its examination procedure-*^. With regard to the
rules relating to confidentiality, these are similar to those applied
562 Article 6(2)(a).
563 Article 6(2)(b) Regulation 2641/84.
564 Article 6(7) Regulation 2641/84.
565 Article 6(2)(c) Regulation 2641/84.
566 Article 6(3) Regulation 2641/84.
567 Article 6(4)(a) Regulation 2641/84.
568 ibid.
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in anti-dumping proceedings-^^# Finally, the interested parties
concerned may ask to be informed of the principal facts and
considerations resulting from the examination procedure-*^.
The interested parties concerned have a right to be heard by the
Commission provided the request is made in writing within the
prescribed period laid down in the Official Journal and they are a
party primarily concerned with the result of the procedure^-'-.
The Regulation also provides for a confrontation meeting. However,
no party is under any obligation to attend and failure to do so will
not be prejudicial to that party's case^^.
When it has concluded its examination, the Commission reports to
the Advisory Committee. The report should normally be presented
within five months (this can be extended to seven) of the
announcement of the initiation of the procedure^73.
The procedure can be terminated, without the adoption of protective
measures, in one of two ways. When it is found as a result of the
examination that it is in the interests of the Community that no
action need be taken the procedure shall be terminated in accordance
with Article 12574_ By virtue of Article 12 it is the Commission
who takes the decision, subject to a referral by the Member States to
the Council. In such a situation, if the Council has not given a
ruling within thirty days, the Commission's decision stands.
569 Article 7 Regulation 2641/84. See Section 7.2.1. under
the Anti-dumping Rules supra.
570 Article 6(4)(b) Regulation 2641/84.
571 Article 6(5) Regulation 2641/84.
572 Article 6(6).
573 Article 6(9) Regulation 2641/84.
574 Article 9(1) Regulation 2641/84.
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However, where the third country concerned has taken measures that
are satisfactory the procedure is terminated in accordance with
Article ll^7^. jn this case it is the Council on a proposal from
the Commission that takes the decision.
4.3. The Adoption of Measures
Where the Community has to fulfil the requirement of following
formal international consultation or dispute settlement procedures in
response to an illicit commercial practice within the meaning of
Article 1(a), any decisions relating to the initiation, conduct or
termination of such procedure shall be taken in accordance with
Article 12~>^. pn Aramid Fibres the Commission initiated the
procedure for consultation and dispute settlement referred to in
Article XXIII of the GATT577.
The Council has the power to take decisions in accordance with the
procedure in Article 11 where after the conclusion of formal
international consultation or dispute settlement in response to an
illicit commercial practice, measures of commercial policy are to be
adopted^7^ or where the full exercise of the Community's right
within the meaning of Article 1(b) is to be ensured^7^.
^75 Article 9(2)(a) Regulation 2641/84; see Reproduction of
Sound Recordings (Indonesia) O.J. 1988 L123/50.
^7^ Article ll(2)(a) Regulation 2641/84.
577 O.J. 1987 L117/18.
^7^ Article ll(2)(b) Regulation 2641/84.





PART 1: "LOCUS STANDI" - GENERAL
INTRODUCTION
In the legal systems of the Member States limits are laid down with
regard to the powers exercised by the Executive. In the Community
legal order the Executive institutions are the Commission and to some
extent the Council, though the latter's function is primarily
legislative.
The control of the Executive by the European Parliament is weaker
than that by the Parliaments in the Member States. The Court is
entrusted with the task of supervising the activities of the
Executive. It is only proper that the acts of the Council and
Commission are subject to review by the Court. By doing so, the
rule of law is seen to be applied in that not only do the Community
authorities enforce the law but they are also bound by it.
The Community authorities have considerable powers in the field of
external relations and no more so than in relation to the measures
designed to counteract unfair trade practices by Third Countries.
In these circumstances it is necessary to ensure that there are
"appropriate and corresponding judicial safeguards"^.
Bebr "Development of judicial control of the European
Communities" p. 19.
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This Chapter is concerned essentially with the question of 'locus
standi' or the right of an interested party to challenge an act of
the institutions imposing safeguard measures before the Court. This
will vary according to whether it is a direct action or an indirect
action. The former, for example an action for annulment, is where
the interested party can bring his case directly before the Court.
The object is to have the act declared void. The latter, for
example an Article 177 reference is, where an action is brought via
the national Court to the Court for a ruling on the validity of a
Community act. The effect of the ruling is to have the act declared
invalid in the particular case. The distinction between the effect
of the two actions is slowly being eroded away. This will be
considered in more detail below.
The Chapter will be divided into two parts. The first will deal
generally with the jurisprudence of the Court with respect to locus
standi in to both direct and indirect actions. The second part will
deal more specifically with the jurisprudence of the Court with
respect to safeguard measures. Emphasis will be placed on Article
173 of the EEC Treaty since by far the greatest number of actions
involving safeguard measures have been raised under Article 173 and
in particular judicial review of anti-dumping measures.
The system of judicial remedies in the European Community and in
particular Articles 173 and 184 on the one hand and Article 177 on
the other, according to the Court form a complete system designed to
permit it to review the legality of measures adopted by the
institutions^. As a result, natural and legal persons are
protected against the application to them of general measures which
they cannot contest directly before the Court by reason of the
criteria set down in Article 173(2) which will be considered below.
Case 294/83 Parti Ecologiste "Les Verts" v. European
Parliament [1986] ECR 1357 at 1365.
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Where the Community authorities are responsible for the
implementation of such measures, natural or legal persons may bring a
direct action against such measures which are addressed to them or
which are of direct and individual concern to them and, in support of
such an action, plead the illegality of the general measure on which
they are based. If implementation is a matter for the national
authorities, such parties may plead the invalidity of general
measures before the national courts and the latter may or must in
some situations request the Court for a preliminary ruling^. Each
of these actions will be considered in detail below together with an
analysis of Article 175 (action for failure to act) and Article
215(2) (action for damages).
1. ACTION TOR ANNULMENT -
ARTICLE 173 EEC TREATY
This is the procedure whereby a direct challenge may be made
against a Community measure which, it is claimed, is illegal. The
object of the procedure is to secure the annulment of the measure.
1.1. What Measures can be Reviewed by the Court ?
Article 173(1) states that:
The Court of Justice shall review the legality of acts of
the Council and the Commission other than recommendations or
opinions.
The Court has interpreted this provision liberally. In IBM v.
Commission the Court stated that:
Any measure the legal effects of which are binding on, and
capable of affecting the interest of, the applicant by
bringing about a distinct change in his legal position is an
ibid.
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act or decision which may be the subject of an action under
Article 173 for a declaration that it is void^.
More recently, in Gestetner Holdings pic, v. Council and Commission
the Court held that the rejection by the Commission of a proposed
undertaking was not a measure having binding legal effects of such a
kind as to affect the interests of the applicant. Such a rejection
was an intermediate measure whose purpose was to prepare for the
final decision^.
The Court has held that the form in which such acts are cast is
immaterial in determining whether they are open to challenge under
Article 173^. For example, in Cement Convention it held that a
"communication" issued by the Commission under Article 15 of
Regulation 17 did not constitute a decision'7. On the other hand
in the IBM Case^ it did not accept that a statement of objections
which, under Regulation 17, the Commission is required to issue to a
firm whose marketing practices are under investigation constituted a
decision. The Court has not restricted its interpretation to mean
those binding acts in Article 189^. In its ERTA judgment it held
that:
Case 60/81 [1981] ECR 2639 at 2651.
Case 156/87 [1990] 1 CMLR 820; see also Cases 133/87 and
150/87 Nashua Corpn. v. Council and Commission [1990] 2
CMLR 6.
Case 60/81 supra.
Case 8-11/66 [1967] ECR 75.
Case 60/81 supra.
9 The binding acts enumerated in Article 189 are Regulations,
directives and decisions. Recommendations and opinions
have no binding force.
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Article 173 treats as acts open to review by the Court all
measures adopted by the institutions which are intended to
have legal force^.
1.2. The Capacity to bring an Action
1.2.1. Privileged Applicants
By virtue of Article 173(1) the Council, Commission or the Member
States may contest the legality of a Community act so long as the
action is taken within the prescribed time limits provided for in the
Treaty^. In an action for annulment by a Member State or by a
Community institution there is no need to distinguish among the
various binding acts. It is perfectly possible for a privileged
plaintiff to challenge the legality of a Regulation under Article
173(1). In certain narrow circumstances which are not of concern in
this paper, the action may also be raised by the European
Parliament^.
1.2.2. Non-Privileged Applicants
Article 173(2) states that:
Any natural or legal person may, under the same conditions,
institute proceedings against a decision addressed to that
person or against a decision which, although in the form of
a Regulation or a decision addressed to another person is of
direct and individual concern to the former.
Case 22/70 Commission v. Council [1971] ECR 263 at 276.
Emphasis added. See also case 230/81 Luxembourg v.
European Parliament [1983] ECR 255.
Case 166/73 Italy v. Commission [1979] ECR 2575; the right
of action conferred upon Member States to seek the
annulment of a Community act is unconditional.
12 Case 70/88 European Parliament v. Council (Chernobyl)
judgment of 22 May 1990, not yet reported.
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The first thing one notices about Article 173(2) is that, on its
face, the only act a natural or legal person can challenge is a
decision.
A natural or legal person has little problem where a decision is
addressed to them^. A common example is where a natural or legal
person has been held to have infringed the Community's competition
law. In such a case the Commission will usually issue a decision to
that effect addressed to the individual concerned^.
In the second situation enumerated in Article 173(2), a natural or
legal person has to show that the decision, although addressed to
someone else, is of direct and individual concern to him. In the
last situation a natural or legal person has to show three things:
(i) the act in question, although in the form of a
Regulation is in essence a "decision";
(ii) it is of individual concern to him;
(iii) it is of direct concern to him.
The concepts 'direct' and 'individual' concern have been interpreted
narrowly so that it is difficult for a natural or legal person to
challenge a Community Regulation. The reasons for the Court's
restrictive interpretation of these concepts will be considered
later.
1.2.2.1. What is a 'Decision'?
The annulment of a Regulation can only be contested by a natural or
legal person where it is in essence a decision, irrespective of its
See for example, Case 789/79 Calpak [1980] ECR 1949.
e.g. Case 58/64 Consten & Grundig v. Commission [1966] ECR
299; Case 17/74 Transocean Marine Paint v. Commission
[1974] ECR 1063.
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form. In Alcan v. Commission the Court held quite generally with
regard to Article 173(2) that:
The aim of this provision is to ensure the legal protection
of individuals in all cases in which they are directly and
individually concerned by a Community measure - in whatever
form it appears which is not addressed to them*-5.
It reiterated this view in Hans-Otto Wagner GmbH & Ors. v. Commission
with specific reference to Regulations when it stated that the
purpose of Article 173(2) is:
to prevent the Community institutions from being able to bar
proceedings instituted by an individual against a decision
of direct and individual concern to him simply by choosing
the form of a Regulation*-^*.
In cases where a natural or legal person seeks to have a Regulation
annulled, that natural or legal person not only has to show that the
measure is of direct and individual concern to him but also that by
its nature it is a decision. The literal reading of Article 173(2)
points to the fact that this condition is important.
The case-law of the Court has at times however not helped in
reinforcing this point. There have developed two separate lines of
case-law. There are certain judgments of the Court notably CAM v.
Commission*^ and Societe pour 1'Exportation des Sucres v.
Commission*^ which are authority for the view that a natural or
legal person will have locus standi irrespective of the fact that the
Case 69/69 [1970] ECR 385 at 393.
Case 162/78 [1979] ECR 3467 at 3487.
Case 100/74 [1975] ECR 1393.






measure is a Regulation in form and substance if he satisfies the
conditions of direct and individual concern.
These decisions must however be put into the context of the earlier
and later judgments which stress the importance of establishing that
the Regulation is in essence a decision. In these cases, the Court
takes the view that if the act at issue was in the nature of a
Regulation then it is immaterial that the measure was of direct and
individual concern to the individual^^. In Compagnie Francaise
Commerciale et Financiere S.A. v. Commission the Court held that the
Regulation's legislative nature was not detracted from by the fact
that the persons that it affected might be more or less ascertainable
i.e. individually concerned^.
The test for determining whether the Regulation in question is in
essence a decision is analagous but not always the same as that for
determining whether a measure is of individual concern to a
particular personal.
The starting point is to decide whether the measure in question is a
Regulation or a decision. In so doing, the Court will invariably
revert to the definitions laid down in Article 189^. The Court
See Case 64/69 La Compagnie Frangaise Commerciale et
Financiere S.A. v. Commission [1970] ECR 221; Case 162/78
Hans Otto Wagner GmbH Agrarhandel KG & Ors. v. Commission
supra.
ibid.
See Opinion of Advocate General Warner in case 100/74 Cam
v. Commission [1975] ECR 1393 at 1411.
A Regulation is defined thus:
"[A Regulation] shall have general application. It shall






A decision is defined thus:
"[A decision] shall be binding in its entirety upon those
to whom it is addressed.
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was faced with such a situation in Confederation Nationale des
Producteurs de Fruits et Legumes v. Council*^. it referred to
Article 189 and then stated that the criterion for the distinction
must be sought in the "general application" or otherwise of the
measure in question^. In other words, where the applicant is
affected as a member of a general class then the measure will be
regarded as a Regulation. If, however, he is affected as an
individual the measure will be regarded as a decision. The Court
reiterated the point in Koninklijke Scholten Honig NV v. Council and
Commission^ when it stated that if the measure is applicable to
objectively determined situations and involves legal consequences for
categories of persons viewed in a general and abstract manner then it
is a Regulation. If on the other hand it is applicable to a limited
number of persons defined or identifiable it will be a decision.
A number of authors^ have pointed to the fact that this
distinction is difficult to apply where, although the number of
persons is small they are designated as a general class, even though
their identity is fixed and ascertainable at the time when the
measure is adopted. The Court has on a number of occasions
attempted to clarify this point^. In Zuckerfabrik Watenstedt v.
Council it held that:
a measure does not lose its character as a Regulation simply
because it may be possible to ascertain with a greater or
lesser degree of accuracy the number or even the identity of
the persons to which it applies at any given time as long as
Cases 16 & 17/62 [1962] ECR 471 at 478.
ibid, at 478.
Case 101/76 [1977] ECR 797 at 808.
See for example, Vaughan, "Law of European Communities"
p. 200; Hartley, "The Foundation of EEC Law", pp. 357 et
seq.
27 Case 6/68 Zuckerfabrik Watenstedt v. Council [1968] ECR
409; case 101/76 Koninklijke Scholten Honig NV v. Council
& Commission supra.
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there is no doubt that the measure is applicable as the
result of an objective situation of law or of fact which it
specifies and which is in harmony with its ultimate
objective^.
As Hartley points out, the effect of this formulation makes it almost
impossible to prove that an ostensible Regulation was actually a
decision unless the persons affected by it were individually
identified in the measure itself
1.2.2.2. Individual Concern
The test of individual concern was first formulated in Plaumann &
Co. v. Commission^. Plaumann was an importer of Clementines.
The Court held that:
The applicant is affected by the disputed Decision as an
importer of Clementines, that is to say, by reason of a
commercial activity which may at any time be practised by
any person and is not therefore such as to distinguish the
applicant in relation to the contested Decision as in the
case of the addressee-^.
In order to be individually concerned the Court stressed that the
decision must affect them "by reason of certain attributes which are
peculiar to them or by reason of circumstances in which they are
differentiated from all other persons and by virtue of these factors
distinguishes them individually just as in the case of the person
addressed"^. Advocate-General Roemer noted that "concern"
Case 6/68 ibid. at p. 415.
"Article 173: Locus Standi to Challenge Regulations"
1 ELRev. (1975/6) 214.
Case 25/62 [1963] ECR 95.








does not arise from the individuality of particular persons but from
the membership of the abstractly defined group of all those who
wished to import Clementines during the period in question. This
group he considered was not ascertainable when the decision was
issued since it was constantly changing even though this in practice
was only to a limited degree^.
The Court also noted in Plaumann that it was appropriate to consider
the question of individual concern first because if the applicant did
not satisfy this criterion then it became unnecessary to consider the
question of direct concern^. The Court, it can be argued was
concerned with the "economy of judicial reasoning". There is
nothing, however, to prevent it considering direct concern first if
it so chooses.
From the case-law of the Court 'individual concern' will be satisfied
when the applicant can show that he belongs to a group of interested
persons who can be identified and ascertained at the time when the
decision was made. In such a case, as the Court has held, the
applicant would be in position "similar to the persons to whom the
decision was addressed"^. At this point there is really no
distinction between the notion of individual concern and the criteria
necessary to establish that the measure in question is a decision as
opposed to a Regulation.
1.2.2.3. Direct Concern
On the question of direct concern the Court has adopted the
attitude that a measure will be of "direct concern" to a natural or






Cases 106 and 107/63 Toepfer v. Commission [1965] ECR 405.
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need for any further implementing action. As Advocate-General
Roemer stated in Plaumann & Co. v. Commission:
Only when the Member State avails itself of the
authorisation, which is left to its discretion, are legal
effects created for the individual. The decision of the
Member State is therefore an essential link inserted in the
chain of various legal measures between the decision of the
Commission and the concrete legal effect falling on the
individual-^.
The Court did not rule on the question of direct concern, because it
was of the opinion that if an applicant was not individually
concerned there was no need to consider whether direct concern was
satisfied-^.
In the Toepfer case, the Court considered the question of direct
concern first. It held that the applicant was directly concerned by
the measure in question. The measure provided that the Commission's
decision "shall" come into force immediately. The Court held that
the decision therefore to amend or abolish protective measures was
directly applicable and concerned the interested parties subject to
it as directly as the measures it replaced^.
In many ways, the Court's ruling was similar to Advocate- General
Gand's finding in the Getreide-Import case when he held that:
Where the intervention of a Member State is a purely
technical implementation the Community decision is of direct
concern to the individual^.
Case 25/62 supra, at 115.
See footnote 34 supra.
Case 106 and 107/63 supra at 411.
Case 38/64 [1965] ECR 203 at 211.
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On the whole, because Regulations are by their nature directly
applicable, there will be little difficulty in showing that the
natural or legal person caught by their provisions is directly
concerned. Only in cases where the Regulations require or allow the
authorities in the Member States to adopt implementing measures will
the link between the authority adopting the measure and the
individual affected by it be broken^®.
1.3. Why is Article 173(2) Interpreted so Restrictively ?
Smit and Herzog^ in their Commentary on the EEC Treaty are of
the opinion that the restrictive interpretation of Article 173(2) is
to be regretted. They contend that the rule of law would have been
better served if each citizen were given the opportunity to take an
action directly before the Court where their legal rights had been
prejudiced by a Community measure. Why then has the Court
interpreted Article 173(2) against individuals ?^.
Advocate-General Lagrange considered this question in Confederation
Nationale des Producteurs de Fruits et Legumes v. Council^. He
noted that there existed two indirect remedies for individuals to
challenge a Community Regulation, namely a plea of illegality under
Article 184 and a ruling on validity under Article 177(l)(b). More
importantly he emphasised the quasi-legislative character which
Regulations normally assume and the fact that extremely grave
See Case 123/77 UNICME v. Council [1978] ECR 845 where the
Court ruled that even though the persons affected by the
Council measure could be determined more or less precisely
the measure was not of "direct concern" to them as long as
no application for an import permit had been denied by the
national authorities.
Volume 5 at p. 379.
See generally Rasmussen "Why is Article 173 interpreted
against Private Plaintiffs" 5 ELRev. (1980) 112;
J. Dinnage "Locus Standi and Article 173" ELRev. (1979) 15.





consequences would follow from even a partial annulment of the
Regulations. Rasmussen"^ rejects this argument on the basis that
the Court has annulled Regulations where their validity has been
called into question under Article 177(1)(b) as well as under Article
173(2)^. He points to the fact that the Court will take into
account the instability that may occur as a result of the annulment
when dealing with the merits of the case.
Stein and Vining^ advance the argument that political
considerations are buttressed by the inherent aversion of
administrators to judicial control. Rasmussen^ rejects this
argument, since he believes there is little evidence that it has any
bearing on the Court's rationale. There is also the argument by
some^ that the Court's attitude to Article 173(2) is aimed at
trying to maintain a balance between allowing individuals an
opportunity to seek annulment of acts of the Council and Commission,
and a fear of opening itself up to a flood of such actions.
op. cit. at p. 120.
See for example Case 114/76 Bele-Miihle Joseph Bergman v.
Grows-Farm GmbH [1977] ECR 1211; Japanese Ballbearing
Cases - Case 113/177 NTN Toyo Bearing Co. Ltd. & Ors. v.
Council and Commission; Case 118/77 Import Standard Office
(ISO) v. Council; Case 119/77 Nippon Seiko KK & Ors. v.
Council; Case 120/77 Koyo Seiko Co. Ltd. & Others v.
Council and Commission and Case 121/77 Nachi Fujikoshi v.
Council [1979] ECR 1185 et seq.
"Citizen Access to Judicial Review of Administrative Action
in Transnational and Federal Context" in (ed.) Jacobs
'European Law and the Individual' 116 at 123.
op. cit. at p. 121.
See for example Stein & Vining op. cit. at p. 123; Brown &_








Finally, and possibly the most convincing reason for the Court's
restrictive interpretation of Article 173(2), is the "Appellate
Court" argument put forward by Rasmussen^. He contends that not
only the Court's interpretation of Article 173 but also of Articles
175 and 215(2), is evidence of the Court's policy to establish itself
as an Appellate Court. This argument has gained weight with the
establishment of the Court of First Instance^.
1.4. The Position under the ECSC Treaty
In order to understand the reasoning for the Court's restrictive
interpretation of Article 173 it is important to note the main
differences under the ECSC Treaty.
Article 33, the provision which covers an action for annulment
differs from Article 173 in several respects. First and foremost,
only undertakings engaged in the production of coal and steel may
sue. Second, an undertaking may challenge a decision or a
recommendation-'!. must show, however, that either the decision
or recommendation "is individual in character" or, if it is general
in character, that it involves a misuse of powers affecting that
undertaking. Finally, there is no need to show direct concern.
This invariably stems from the fact that it is the High Authority and
not the Member States that has the power to adopt legally binding
op. cit. p. 124.
Council Decision 88/591 O.J. 1988 L319/1; amended text in
O.J. 1989 C215/1.
Decisions are defined in Article 14 thus:
[Decisions] shall be binding in their entirety.
Recommendations are defined in Article 14 thus:
[Recommendations] shall be binding as to the aims to be
pursued but shall leave the choice of the appropriate
methods for achieving these aims to those to whom the
recommendations are addressed.
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measures. In these circumstances the High Authority's relationship
with coal and steel undertakings is assumed to be direct.
Because Article 33 is limited to a small number of undertakings the
Court has interpreted the provision in a very liberal manner. For
example, where an undertaking challenges a decision addressed to
someone else, it does not have to show that the decision concerns
them individually or directly. In the Second Limburg Coalmines Case
the Court stated that:
... to enable an undertaking to institute proceedings
against a decision concerning it which is individual in
character, it is not necessary that it should be the only,
or almost the only, party concerned by the decision^.
1.5. Is There a Time Limit ?
Article 173(3) states that there is a period of two months within
which an interested party can bring proceedings to have a measure
annulled. This period is calculated from the date of publication of
the measure or from its notification or in the absence of both, from
the date when it first came to the knowledge of the applicant-".
2. ACTION FOR FAILURE TO ACT -
ARTICLE 175 EEC TREATY
This action provides a remedy when the Council or Commission fail
to act where they are obliged to do so under the Treaties. The
Court has indicated that it regards an action for annulment and an
action for failure to act as "one and the same procedure"-^
Case 30/59 [1961] ECR 16 at 17.
Under the ECSC Treaty the time limit is only one month.
For the method of computing time limits see Case 152/85
Misset v. Council [1987] ECR 223.
Case 15/70 Chevalley v. Commission [1970] ECR 975 at 979.
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though the latter should not be used simply for purposes of evading
the conditions for the former-^.
2.1. Capacity to Bring an Action
2.1.1. Privileged Applicants
The Member States and the other institutions of the Community can
bring an action against the Council or Commission where they have
failed to act, in infringement of the Treaty^.
2.1.2. Non-Privileged Applicants
Article 175(3) provides that:
Any natural or legal person ... may complain to the Court of
Justice that an institution of the Community has failed to
address to that person any act other than a recommendation
or an opinion.
The term "act" should be given the same meaning as that under
Article 173 and as a result is not limited solely to those binding
acts enumerated in Article 189^. Article 175(3) should be
interpreted to allow any natural or legal person to raise any action
against the Commission or Council for failure to perform any act
that would have been of direct and individual concern to him. Only
this interpretation would as the Court pointed out in Chevalley,
permit Articles 173 and 175 to be viewed as one and the same
procedure-^.
Joined Cases 10&18/68 "Eridania" [1969] ECR 459 at 483.
56 Article 175(1).
57 Case 15/70 Chevalley v. Commission, supra.
CO
ibid.; see also the Opinion of Advocate General Dutheillet
de Lamothe in Case 15/71 Mackprang v. Commission [1971]
ECR 797.
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2.2. Preconditions of an Action
An action under Article 175 involves two separate stages. First,
the institution must be called upon to act as required by Community
law^. There is no time limit within which this must take place
though it should be within a reasonable time of the institution
having shown its intention not to act^O. Within two months of
being called upon to act the institution concerned must define its
position. Second, if at the end of the two months, the institution
has not defined its position, Article 175(2) states that the
applicant may bring proceedings within a further period of two
months.
The grounds of review must be the same as those enumerated in
Article 173 if the two Articles are to be of a mutually
complementary nature. The effect of a successful Article 175
action is that the institution whose failure to act has been
declared contrary to the Treaty must take the necessary measures to
comply with the Court's judgmental. There has been to date only
one successful action^.
2.3. Proceedings under the ECSC Treaty
Under Article 35 of ECSC Treaty, the procedure is similar in most
respects in that the object and the effect of the judgment are the
same. There are, however, a number of minor differences.
Article 175(2).
Case 59/70 Netherlands v. Commission [1971] ECR 639.
Article 176(1).
Case 13/83 European Parliament v. Council [1985] ECR 1513;
there have also been two successful actions under the ECSC
Treaty.
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First, the only possible defendant is the Commission while the only
applicants entitled to bring an action are the Council, the Member
States and undertakings or associations^; second, undertakings
or associations may only challenge decisions which are individual in
character*^; third, the only acts which the institution can be
required to take are recommendations or decisions^; fourth, a
request for action under the ECSC Treaty can only be satisfied by a
binding act, this may be subject to an action for annulment under
Article 33 ECSC; fifth, the time limits are different in that
proceedings have to be initiated within one month of a failure to
take any decision or make any recommendation^; and lastly,
proceedings are initiated against the implied decision of a refusal
which is in essence an annulment of that decision*^.
3. PLEA. OF ILLEGALITY:
ARTICLE 18A OF EEC TREATY
Article 184 is designed to overcome the limitations of an action
for annulment under Article 173 namely the restrictions on locus
standi.
The plea of illegality permits a natural or legal person who cannot
challenge a true Regulation, i.e. a general legislative act, to do
63 Article 35(1).
6"1 Action for failure to act must have the same
characteristics as an action for annulment. Joined Case
7&9/54 Groupement des Industries Siderurgiques






so indirectly when it is applied to him by a subsequent individual
act in order that the underlying "general measure" is declared
inapplicable to him. The term "general measure" is used even
though Article 184 specifically refers to a Regulation. The reason
for this is that the Court in Simmenthal held that:
The field of application of [Article 184] must therefore
include acts of the institutions which, although they are
not in the form of a Regulation, nevertheless produce
similar effects and on those grounds may not be challenged
under Article 173 by natural or legal persons other than the
Community institutions and Member States^.
The plea cannot be brought independently but must arise in another
action hence its description by one commentator - "it forms a shield
not a sword"^. Because it is an ancillary action the plea will
fail if the other action is unsuccessful. Furthermore, a plea of
illegality is applicable only in the context of proceedings brought
before the Court under some other provision of the Treaty
The grounds upon which the plea may be raised are the same as those
laid down in Article 173. The effect of a successful plea is that
the general act in question will be declared inapplicable to the
party challenging it and the individual act, deprived of its legal
basis, annulled. Unlike an action for annulment the act would not
be declared void, though in practical terms the institution
responsible for it will replace it in order to avoid a multiplicity
of actions.
Case 92/78 [1979] ECR 111 at 800.
Paisley "Guide to EEC Law in Northern Ireland" (1986).
Cases 31&33/62 Milchwerke Heinz Wohrmann & Sohn KG and
Alfons Liitticke GmbH v. Commission [1962] ECR 501 at 507.
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A. ACTION FOR DAMAGES -
ARTICLE 215(2) EEC TREATY
Article 215(2) states that:
The Community shall in accordance with the general
principles common to the laws of the Member States make good
any damage caused by its institutions or by its servants in
the performance of its duties.
The action for damages is a distinct and separate form of legal
recourse from Articles 173 and 175'7^. In Liitticke v. Commission
the Court held that:
The action for damages provided for by Article 178 and the
second paragraph of Article 215 was established by the
Treaty as an independent form of action with a particular
purpose to fulfil within the system of actions and subject
to conditions for its use, conceived with a view to its
specific purpose^.
As Vaughan^ stresses, the Court in developing its case-law has
proceeded cautiously in order to avoid extending the non-contractual
liability of the institutions. The result has been that a number of
limitations have been placed on the liability of the Community.
This is especially so in relation to liability for legislative
measures. Undoubtedly, this restrictiveness does have consequences
in the field of external relations where safeguard measures adopted
to counteract unfair trade practices invariably take the form of
Regulations.
Originally the Court treated an action for damages under
Article 215(2) as a subsidiary form of action in that it
had to be coupled with an action for annulment under
Article 173 or an action under Article 175 for failure to
act. If these failed so also did the action for damages;




Case 4/69 [1971] ECR 325 at 336.
op. cit.
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The aim of an action for damages is not to bring about the annulment
of an act or measure but to establish subjective rights to financial
compensation for actual loss sustained. The Court held in
differs from an application for annulment in that its end is
not the abolition of a particular measure, but compensation
for damages caused by an institution in the performance of
its duties^.
While an action for damages can and often does result from the
illegality of Community behaviour or the lack of it, it can in fact
occur without that precondition. The law relating to an action for
damages does not require the prior formal declaration of annulment of
a Community act or the declaration of failure to act as a
prerequisite for the admissibility of a damages action^.
Even though a claim for damages and an action for annulment are
conceptually different this does not mean that they need be the
subject of separate proceedings. Tor instance, it is possible to
make them both the subject of the same proceedings. In such a case
the admissibility and the merits of each will be judged separately
according to their own different rules.
Article 215(2) does not define the conditions or limits to Community
liability. It refers simply to the "non-contractual liability of
the Community which has to be determined in accordance with the
general principles" common to the laws of the Member States.
damages:
Schoppenstedt v. Council that a claim for
Case 5/71 [1971] ECR 975 at 983. See also case 43/72
Merkur v. Commission [1973] ECR 1055 at 1069.
75 Conditions for the admissibility of an action for damages
are autonomous of any annulment procedure. See generally
Case 43/72 Merkur v. Commission ibid.
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Four basic conditions have to be established in order to establish
liability. They are as follows:
4.1. The conduct of the institutions is illegal.
4.2. There must be a causal connection between the alleged
injury and the conduct with which the institutions are
charged.
4.3. There must be injury.
4.4. The conduct of the institutions must be culpable i.e.
the act or omission must constitute an official fault
or a misconduct on the part of its author.
4.1. Illegality of the Institutions Conduct
The non-contractual liability of the Community arises from the
existence of a wrongful act or omission on the part of the Community
institutions or its servants in the performance of their duties.
There are basically two main activities associated with the
performance of their duties, namely, in their capacity as law makers
and in carrying out their administrative duties.
Under the first category, the Court will be required to consider the
illegality of the Community measure itself, whereas the second
category is concerned mainly with the question of administrative
fault.
One of the most important questions to be answered definitively by
the Court is whether illegality of a Community measure is a
pre-condition for liability. Generally speaking the non-contractual
liability of the Community requires that the measure or omission be
illegal. In most cases a failure to establish illegality under
Article 173 would be sufficient evidence that there had not been a
breach of official duty and would lead to the action being
dismissed. For example in Kampffmeyer v. Commission the Court held
that:
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The Commission applied Article 22(2) of Regulation 19
[safeguard measures] in circumstances which did not justify
protective measures ... As it was aware of the existence of
applications for licences, it caused damage to the interests
of importers who had acted in reliance on the information
provided in accordance with Community Rules. The
Commission's conduct constituted a wrongful act or omission
capable of giving rise to liability on the part of the
Community^.
More recently there have been indications that the Court might under
exceptional circumstances rule that Community liability arises
irrespective of illegality. Applicants have sought to rely on the
German legal concept of Sonderopfer (special sacrifice) and the
equivalent French concept of egalite devant les charges publiques
(equality of all citizens in sharing public burdens) in order to
found a claim for compensation in respect of lawful Community acts.
Where a lawful act is involved, the applicant would have to show the
following:
(i) the damage is particular to one or several persons;
(ii) the loss is abnormally severe; and
(iii) the source of damage must be shown not to have been
made in the interest of public order'7''.
As is the case under Article 173(2), the Court in applying Article
215(2) considers whether the applicant was affected in a special and
individual way. It would contravene the logic of the system for the
direct challenge by individuals of the legality of Community measures
if an individual were allowed an unqualified right to challenge
normative measures under the guise of seeking compensation for
Case 5, 7, 13-24/66 [1967] ECR 245 at 262.
See Opinion of Advocate-General Verloren van Themaat in
Case 26/81 Oleifici Mediterranei S.A. v. EEC [1982] ECR
3057 at 3089-90 and Opinion of Advocate-General Slynn in
Case 59/83 S.A. Biovilac NV v. EEC [1984] ECR 4057 at 4082
et seq.
- 229 -
alleged damage resulting from them. As the Court held in
Koninklijke Scholten Honig v. Commission and Council:
Even though an action for damages under Article 178 and
215(2) constitutes an independent action, it must
nevertheless be assessed having regard to the whole of the
system of legal protection of individuals set up by the
Treaty. If an individual takes the view that he is injured
by a Community legislative measure which he regards as
illegal he has an opportunity, when the implementation of
the measure is entrusted to national authorities, to contest
the validity of the measure at the time of its
implementation, before the national court in an action
against the national authority. Such a court may, or even
must, in pursuance of Article 177, refer to the Court of
Justice a question on the validity of the Community measure
in question.
The existence of such an action is by itself of such a
nature as to ensure the efficient protection of the
70individuals concerned'0.
However, where legislative action involving measures of economic
policy are concerned, illegality on its own is not sufficient to give
rise to liability even though it may give rise to annulment in the
context of Article 173 or invalidity in the context of Article 177.
Two further criteria have to be fulfilled. There must be a breach
of a superior rule of law for the protection of the individual^
and the institution in question must have "manifestly and gravely
disregarded the limits on the exercise of its powers^.
Community liability is limited by insisting that there has to be a
breach of a superior rule for the protection of the individual
because in the view of the Commission, if this were not the case:
Case 143/77 [1979] ECR 3583 at 3626.
e.g. Case 5/71 Atkien-Zuckerfabrik Schoppenstedt v. Council
supra at p. 984.
Joined Cases 83 & 94/76 and 4, 15, 40/77 Bayerische HNL v.
Council and Commission [1978] ECR 1209 at 1224-5.
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the institutions would be submerged in a spate of actions
entailing considerable interference with their proper
working^.
The Court has equated the idea of breach of a superior rule for the
protection of the individual with breach of general principles common
to the laws of the Member States. For example, in the CNTA case the
general principle concerned was legitimate expectation. It held:
the Commission has violated a superior rule of law, thus
rendering the Community liable, by failing to include in
Regulation No. 189/72 transitional measures for the
protection of confidence which a trader might legitimately
have had in the Community rules^.
In Ireks-Arkady the Court ruled that there was a breach of the
principle of equality in that the provisions of the Regulation
provided for Quellmehl and Pre-Glutinised Starch to receive different
treatment in respect of production refunds^. Advocate-General
Capotorti in the Bayerische HNL Case identified three elements which
he considered would be sufficient to make unlawfulness serious to
qualify as a breach of a superior rule of law. First, the level of
importance of the infringed rule; second the degree of blame to be
attached to the author of the measure; and third, the extent of the
loss suffered^.
In determining whether the institutions have manifestly and gravely
disregarded the limits on the exercise of their powers the Court
7th General Report of Commission (1973) point 596.
Case 74/74 [1975] ECR 533 at 550; in Case 5/71 Atkien
Zuckerfabrik Schoppenstedt v. Council supra, it was the
principle of non-discrimination.
Case 238/78 [1979] ECR 2955 at 2973.
Joined cases 83&94/76 and 4,5,40/77 supra at 1232.
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takes into account the extent to which the harm is concentrated on a
small number of victims and the degree of that harm^^.
4.2. Causal Connection
The applicant must show that injury was caused by an act or
omission on the part of the Community institutions. In other words,
injury must result from Community conduct and it must result from
that conduct directly, immediately and exclusively^. in
Kampffmeyer^ the act that had been committed by the German
Government and expressly approved by the Commission was held by the
Court to constitute the causal link between the act of approval and
the damage suffered.
4.3. There must be Injury
There must exist an actual and certain damage which is both
appreciable and definitive. The damage must have crystallised by
the time the claim for compensation is made, since an action under
Article 215(2) which concerns only future or potential loss will
generally be dismissed as premature^. An applicant will
generally have to show that he has been affected in a special and
individual manner.
The burden of proof rests with the party bringing the action. The
applicant must provide satisfactory evidence as to the existence and
precise amount of damage to enable the Court to determine the
Case 238/78 Ireks-Arkady supra; and Joined Cases 83 &
94/76 & 4, 15, 40/77 Bayerische HNL v. Council and
Commission supra.
See Smit & Herzog op. cit. Volume 6 p. 95.
Case 5,7,13-24/66 supra.
See for example, Joined cases 9 & 25/64 Third Ferma Case
[1965] ECR 311 at 320. " ~~
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appropriate compensation. The damage must be certain and
specific. It must be quantifiable in that it is capable of being
expressed as a specified sum of money.
In deciding on quantum, the Court will allow for direct loss and
other additional expenses necessarily and reasonably incurred as a
direct consequence of the Community act, for example indemnity
payments for failure to honour contracts. As regards loss of
profits, the Court is not quite as generous owing to the speculative
nature of assessing them^.
4.4. Culpability of the Institution's Conduct
Culpability is taken to mean that the illegal act or omission must
constitute an official fault or misconduct on the part of its
author. For example such conduct may consist of the enactment of an
improper Community measure. In this case, liability may arise if it
can be shown that the institutions were negligent. Other types of
conduct may include grave misjudgment of market relations, or
inexcusable forecasting errors^.
4.5. Time Limit
An action must be brought within five years from the occurence of
the event.
See Case 5,7,13-24/66 Kampffmeyer v. Commission supra;
Case 74/74 CNTA supra.
See for example, Joined cases 116 & 124/77 Isoglucose Cases
[1979] ECR 3497.
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5. A PRELIMINARY RULING ON THE
VALIDITY OF ACTS OF THE
INSTITUTIONS - ARTICLE 177(l)(b
EEC TREATY
The Court has the duty to ensure the uniform interpretation and
application of Community law in the courts of the Member States.
For this purpose, the EEC Treaty confers on all courts the power -
Article 177(2) - and on some the duty - Article 177(3) - to refer
questions of Community law to the Court for its ruling. By virtue
of Article 177(l)(b) the Court has jurisdiction to give a preliminary
ruling concerning the validity of acts of the institutions of the
Community.
5.1. The Acts whose Validity may be the
Subject of a Preliminary Ruling
Article 177 is broadly drafted and makes no reference to Article
189 which enumerates Community acts which are binding and those which
are non-binding. As a result it may be assumed that any act
originating with the Community institutions and forming part of the
Community legal order comes within the ambit of Article 177^1.
Just because an action for the annulment of a Regulation is held
inadmissible by the Court does not mean that the applicant can no
longer challenge the validity of that Regulation. In Koninklijke
Scholten Honig v. Commission and Council the applicant's action for
annulment was held to be inadmissible but they were able to have the
Regulation declared invalid under Article 177(l)(b)^.
Case C-322/88 Grimaldi v. fonds des Maladies
Professionnelles Bruxelles, judgment of 13th December 1989
(not yet reported) at paragraph 8 of judgment.
Case 143/77 supra.
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5.2. The Questions to be Referred
The formulation of the question(s) referred is a matter for the
national court alone to decide. The role of the Court is to rule on
its validity, not to apply Community law to the facts of the case
facing the national court.
5.3. The Courts which may make a Reference
Article 177(2) grants a discretion to courts or tribunals of the
Member States to refer a question as laid down in Article 177(1) to
the Court on condition that a decision on the question is necessary
for the court or tribunal to give judgment. Article 177(2)
attributes the right to request a preliminary ruling to any court or
tribunal of the Member States. In the Second Rheinmiihlen case the
Court held that no rule of national law may deprive the national
courts of this right^. In BRT v. SABAM the Court further held
that this right cannot be fettered by Regulation of the
Communities^.
5.3.1. What Constitutes a Court or Tribunal
This is answered by reference to Community law. The concept of
judicial function is difficult to define but normally a body is
regarded as being judicial if it has power to give binding
determinations of legal rights and obligations of individuals. One
commentator has argued that three criteria have to be fulfilled




Case 166/73 [1974] ECR 33 at 38-39.
Case 127/73 [1974] ECR 51 at 63.
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(i) the requirement to solve a dispute between the parties
(ii) existence of various institutional factors
(iii) the involvement of public authorities^^.
5.3.2. Necessity
A decision on the question raised before the Court must be
"necessary" to enable the national court to give judgment. It is
not the reference to the Court which must be necessary but a decision
on the question. Furthermore, the Treaty makes it clear that this
is a question for the national court to decide.
When is a decision necessary in order to give judgment ? Bebr has
noted that this should be understood in the sense of a question being
relevant for pending litigation rather than as one being
indispensable^^.
5.4. The Courts which must make a reference
Article 177(3) states that:
Where any such question [in sense of Article 177(1)] is
raised in a case pending before a court or tribunal of a
Member State against whose decisions there is no judicial
remedy under national law that court or tribunal shall bring
the matter before the Court of Justice.
The question to be considered is what constitutes a court or tribunal
against whose decisions there is no judicial remedy ?
W. Alexander and E. Grabandt "National Courts entitled to
ask Preliminary Rulings under Article 177 of the EEC




In an attempt to answer this question, two distinct theories have
developed. The first theory, the so-called "abstract theory", is
that the only courts within the scope of the provision are those
whose decisions are never subject to appeal. Arguments in favour of
this theory include considerations of national legal policy from the
viewpoint of the costs involved and the prevention of long drawn out
proceedings. The second theory, the so-called "concrete" theory, is
that the courts or tribunals within the scope of the provision are
those against whose decisions there is no judicial remedy. If the
courts against whose decision there is no judicial remedy were
identical with the highest courts of the Member States an abstract
theory presumes that the notion of judicial remedy would be
irrelevant. The abstract theory also assumes that only cases
brought before the highest courts are of the greatest importance for
the interpretation and validity of Community law^^.
Article 177(3) does not reiterate the qualification that a decision
on the question must be necessary. Does this mean that the courts
within the scope of Article 177(3) are always compelled to ask for a
preliminary ruling even if they do not consider a ruling to be
necessary ? In CILFIT v. Ministero delle Sanita the Court held that
it:
follows from the relationship between the second and third
paragraphs of Article 177 that the courts or tribunals
referred to in the third paragraph have the same discretion
as any other national court or tribunal to ascertain whether
a decision on a question of Community law is necessary to
enable them to give judgment^.
Hartley op. cit. at pp. 261 et seq.
Case 283/81 [1982] ECR 3415 at 3429 paragraph 10 of
Judgment.
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5.5. The Effect of a Ruling as to the
Validity of the Measure under Article 177(1)(b)
At strict law the effect of a ruling of invalidity (under Article
177(l)(b)) is that it is binding only on the court which requested
the ruling. This is similar to the effect of a plea of illegality
under Article 184. Technically the measure remains in force but
because of its invalidity it cannot be applied in the instant case.
There is, however, judicial authority from the Court which now infers
that a ruling under Article 177(1)(b) may have general effect. In
International Chemical Corporation v. Amministrazione delle Finanze
dello Stato the Court held that:
... Although a judgment of the Court given under Article 177
of the Treaty declaring an act of an institution, in
particular a Council or Commission Regulation, to be void is
directly addressed only to the national court which brought
the matter before the Court, it is sufficient reason for any
other national court to regard that act as void for the
purposes of a judgment which it has to give^.
The general effect of an Article 177(1)(b) ruling may also stem from
the subsequent behaviour of the Community institutions. The
institution responsible for the measure may repeal it and replace it
with a valid measure. In Providence Agricole de la Champagne v.
ONIC the Court held that:
Although the Treaty does not expressly lay down the
consequences which flow from a declaration of invalidity
within the framework of a reference to the Court for a
preliminary ruling, Articles 174 and 176 contain clear rules
as to the effects of the annulment of a Regulation within
the framework of a direct action. Thus Article 176
provides that the institution whose act has been declared
void shall be required to take the necessary measures to
comply with the judgment of the Court of Justice. In its
judgments of 19 October 1977 in Joined Cases 117/76 and
Case 66/80 [1981] ECR 1191 at 1216 paragraph 18(a) of
Judgment.
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It 111 (Ruckdeschel and Hansa-Lagerheus Stroh (Quellmehl)
[1977] ECR 1753) and in Joined Cases 124/76 and 20/77
(Moulins et Huileries de Pont-a-Mousson and Providence
Agricole de la Champagne (Maize Groats and meal) [1977] ECR
1975) the Court has already referred to that rule within the
context of a reference to it for a preliminary ruling-'-®®.
PART 2: "LOCUS STANDI" -
SAFEGUARD MEASURES
1. ACTION FOR ANNULMENT : ARTICLE 173
Introduction
Generally speaking protective measures adopted by the Community
authorities are in the form of a Regulation. To date, where such
measures have been challenged, proceedings have been raised under
Article 173. For this reason, the analysis of judicial review of
safeguard measures will concentrate largely on Article 173. Unlike
Community acts relating to the implementation of competition rules
which are now subject to the jurisdiction of the Court of First
Instance'-®-'-, Community acts imposing protective measures and in
particular anti-dumping and countervailing duties are solely subject
to the jurisdiction of the Court. By virtue of Article 3(3) of the
Decision establishing the Court of First Instance'®^, it was
envisaged that it would have at a later date (the matter is to be
reviewed in two years time) the competence to exercise jurisdiction
in such matters subject to a right of appeal to the Court on a point
of law.
100 Case 4/79 [1980] ECR 2823 at 2853 paragraph 44.




The attitude of the Court to the admissibility of actions where
safeguard measures are concerned varies according to the parties who
seek to have the measures annulled. In these circumstances, the
analysis will proceed on the basis of considering separately the
position of those interested parties which are most likely to
challenge safeguard measures. As stated above, where a natural or
legal person wishes to challenge the legality of a Regulation under
Article 173(2) they will have to show three things: that the
Regulation in question is in essence a Decision, that it concerns
them directly and that it concerns them individually.
From what has been stated above, the Court's attitude to the
interpretation of Article 173(2) is very restrictive. The Court
will only in very exceptional circumstances annul a Community
Regulation where it is an individual who challenges the legality of
that Regulation. The Court adopts a much more liberal approach to
the admissibility of an action under Article 173(2) where safeguard
measures are concerned otherwise virtually all those parties most
affected by the Regulation in question would have little prospect of
challenging the legality of the Regulation. As a general rule of
thumb the Court will, in determining whether an interested party has
locus standi, consider whether it has been named specifically in the





Anti-dumping Regulations are peculiar in that they apply to all
products of a certain type from a particular country but which are
based on the findings of the prices charged by a small number of
- 240 -
exporters. In these circumstances, a Regulation imposing
anti-dumping duties does not fall neatly into the definition of a
Regulation or a Decision for that matter, in terms of Article 189.
This peculiarity may have been the reason why Advocate-General Warner
in the Japanese Ballbearing cases^^ was of the opinion that the
Regulation imposing the anti-dumping duties was a "hybrid
instrument". He referred to this "hybrid instrument" as a kind that
the Court has not had to consider before and may seldom have to
consider. In other words, for everyone except the four named
exporters in the Regulation, it was a measure of general
application. However, Quoad each of the exporters it constituted a
Decision of direct and individual concern^\
The Court did not follow the Advocate-General's approach nor did it
adopt his idea of a "hybrid instrument". It held that the
Regulation imposing definitive duties was of direct and individual
concern, not only to the named exporters, but also to those importers
specifically named in the operative part of the Regulation which were
subsidiaries of the exporters. As there was no need to make a
distinction between the producers/exporters on the one hand and the
importers on the other, all the applicants had locus standi-*-^.
The reason put forward by the Court for not making the distinction
was that the Commission in its investigations applied the special
provisions concerning export prices where the exporters and importers
were associated!^.
Case 113/77 NTN Toyo Bearing Co. Ltd. & Ors. v. Council
[1979] ECR 1185, Advocate-General Warner's opinion at 1212.
ibid, at 1246.
105 ibid, at 1204-5.
ibid, at 1204, paragraph 9 of judgment.
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A much broader approach to the question of whether exporters had
locus standi to challenge Regulations imposing anti-dumping duties
was adopted by the Court in the First Allied case^'7. The Court
held that the question of locus standi must be resolved in the light
of the system established by the parent Regulation (now Regulation
2423/88) and, more particularly, of the nature of the anti-dumping
measures provided for by that Regulation, regard being had to the
provisions of the second paragraph of Article 173^8 #
It then stated that although Regulations imposing anti-dumping
duties, and for that matter countervailing duties, are legislative in
character since they apply to all the traders concerned, taken as a
whole the provisions may nonetheless be of direct and individual
concern to those exporters charged with dumping. Anti-dumping
duties can only be imposed on the basis of the findings resulting
from investigations concerning the production prices and export
prices of undertakings which have been individually
identified^^. In these circumstances the Court held that the
measures imposing anti-dumping duties are liable to be of direct and
individual concern to those producers and exporters who are able to
establish that they were identified in the measures adopted by the
Community institutions or that they were concerned by the preliminary
invest igat ions
In concluding that the exporters had locus standi the Court referred
to the fact that the Commission had during the oral procedure noted
Joined cases 239&275/82 [1984] ECR 1005.
ibid. at 1029, paragraph 10 of judgment.
ibid. at 1030, paragraph 11 of judgment.






that, on balance, it was in favour of the admissibility of direct
actions brought by undertakings from non-Member States*-3*-.
The decision in the First Allied case should not be seen as amounting
to a licence for all exporters to raise an action under Article
173(2). In Sermes S.A. v. Commission*-*-3 the Court in summarising
its case-law held that it was "generally" true that exporters and
producers would be directly and individually concerned on the basis
that they were able to establish that they were identified in the
measure adopted or that they had been concerned by the preliminary
investigations. It is submitted that as a result of this decision
identification in the measure in question or involvement in the
investigations will be regarded as prima facie evidence that the
exporter or producer in question has locus standi. Advocate-General
Mischo in Nashua Corporation v. Commission and Council-*-33
considered that the determining factor is that the exporter or
producer must have been charged with dumping on the basis of
information about their business activities. Identification or
involvement afforded a strong presumption but not proof that this was
indeed the case*-^. The Court did not go as far as the
Advocate-General. As far as it was concerned the crucial factor was
whether the economic agent in question was concerned by the findings
relating to the existence of dumping complained of. The Court, on
the basis of the principles enunciated in the First Allied case, held
that this was generally true in relation to exporters and
producers3 33.
-1--1--1- ibid, at 1029, paragraph 9 of judgment.
-*-*-2 Case 279/86 [1987] ECR 3109 at paragraph 15 of Order.
113 Joined cases 133&150/87 [1990] 2 CMLR 6 at 14.
33^ ibid, at 21.
333 ibid, at 42-43.
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Temple Lang was of the opinion that a rejection of a request by a
potential exporter to be exempted from an anti-dumping duty or the
refusal of an offer of an undertaking would be a decision addressed
to the undertaking in question, with the result that it would have
locus standi under Article 173(2)^®. The Court, however, has
taken a different view. In a number of the Photocopier cases it
held that such a rejection is an intermediate measure whose purpose
was to prepare for the final decision and was not therefore a measure
which may be challenged before the Court. It is only at the stage
of the imposition of definitive duties that traders can, by
challenging the Regulation imposing the duties, raise an irregularity
associated with the rejection of their proposed undertaking^^.
1.1.1.2. Countervailing Duties
Countervailing duties are used to offset subsidies which are found
to be causing injury to Community industry. The rules governing the
imposition of such duties are similar in most respects to those
relating to anti-dumping duties. They are both governed by the same
parent Regulation, namely Regulation 2423/88. In these
circumstances the principles enunciated in the First Allied case
would extend by implication to countervailing duties. This,
however, has to be put into its proper context.
"Judicial Review of Trade Safeguard Measures in the
European Community" in 1985 (ed.) Hawk 'Antitrust and Trade
Policy in the United States and the European Community1
Fordham University School of Law, at p. 644.
See Joined cases 133/87 & 150/87 Nashua Corporation v.
Commission and Council supra, paragraph 9 and 10 of
judgment; Case 156/87 Gestetner Holdings pic v. Commission
and Council [1990] 1 CMLR 813 at paragraphs 8-9 of
judgment.
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Unlike in the anti-dumping cases where it is the export or production
prices of undertakings individually identified that are considered,
in anti-subsidy cases it is the activities of governmental or state
bodies that are important. It is not an uncommon occurrence in
anti-subsidy cases for countervailing duties to be imposed without
any finding being made about the exporters. Such a situation would
exist if a subsidy was given simply as a payment of so much per tonne
exported as no investigation as to the activities of the exporters in
question need be carried outH®. In this case the exporters would
have no locus standi.
In Alusuisse the Court in considering the distinction between a
Regulation and a decision held that this distinction:
may be based only on the nature of the measure itself and
the legal effect which it produces and not on the procedures
for its adoption119.
Alusuisse was concerned with anti-dumping duties and the question of
whether independent importers had locus standi. Notwithstanding
this, the decision of the Court is applicable to all other safeguard
measures. As a consequence of the ruling in Alusuisse most
exporters would have difficulty in challenging anti-subsidy
Regulations. The question, however, is the extent to which this
judgment is law in the light of the Court's rulings in the First
Allied, Fediol and Sermes cases^O.
118 Only when the giving of a subsidy requires an investigation
to be carried out will an exporter be able to show that
they are directly and individually concerned.
Case 307/81 [1982] ECR 3463 at 3473, paragraph 13 of
judgment.
129 Joined cases 239 & 275/82 supra; Case 191/82 [1983] ECR
2913; Case 279/86 supra.
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In the First Allied case^l the Court held that an exporter would
have locus standi if he could show either that he was individually
identified in the measure or that he was involved in the preliminary
investigations. In order to fulfil the second criterion, the
exporter would have to show that it was concerned to a sufficient
extent in the investigation. This is so given the Court's ruling in
the Sermes case. Hence the crucial factor in many anti-subsidy
cases will be the extent to which an exporter was subject to an
investigation by the Commission. The Court's ruling in the Fediol
case confirms its interpretation in the First Allied case. The
Court held that an interested party may derive locus standi from the
procedural rights laid down in the parent Regulation, where those
interested parties have exercised them during the investigation122.
Notwithstanding the Court's previous ruling in the Alusuisse case, it
is now the case that an exporter may have standing to challenge a
measure imposing countervailing duties merely because of its
involvement in the investigations. This involvement has, however,
to be substantial. An exporter in an anti-subsidy action should
therefore seek to involve itself as much as possible in the
Commission's investigation so that if necessary, they may have the
locus standi to challenge the measure.
1.1.2. Regulation 288/82
As stated above, protective measures under Regulation 288/82 are
imposed if the Commission concludes that serious injury is being
caused to Community industry and that it is in the interests of that
industry that protective measures be adopted. These measures
usually take the form of quotas which may be applied to imports from
121 Joined cases 239 & 275/82 respectively ibid, at 1030,
paragraph 12 of judgment.
122 Case 191/82 supra at 2935.
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all countries or in some situations to specific countries. In these
circumstances it would be unlikely that the imposition of such
measures would be based on the findings of individually identified
exporters.
The only circumstances in which an exporter could derive standing to
challenge measures adopted under Regulation 288/82 is where it has
exercised the procedural rights laid down by the parent Regulation
during the investigation. Article 6 of Regulation 288/82 states
that the announcement of the opening of an investigation must specify
a period within which interested parties make their views known in
writing. By virtue of Article 6(2) the Commission is empowered to
collect all information it deems necessary and to endeavour to check
this information with importers, traders, agents, producers, trade
associations and organisations. More importantly, however, Article
6(4) allows the Commission to hear interested natural or legal
persons. Such parties, where they have applied in writing, must be
heard.
Applying the principles in the First Allied and Fediol cases, an
exporter who has exercised his procedural rights during the
investigation may have locus standi to challenge measures imposing
protective measures. Temple Lang has argued that the Court's
judgment in the Piraiki case^^ has given exporters more scope to
challenge quantitative restrictions adopted under Regulation 288/82.
In this case, which is discussed below, the Court held that where the
performance of identifiable contracts were made impossible by the
imposition of quantitative restrictions and where the exporters had
entered into these contracts they would have locus standi32^.
123 Case 11/82 [1985] ECR 207.
32^ ibid, at 246.
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1.1.3. Regulation 2641/84
Regulation 2641/84 deals with situations more akin to anti-subsidy
cases in that it attempts to curtail the illicit trade practices of
third countries and not individual firms.
The Regulation is based largely on Regulation 2423/88 and for this
reason the procedural rules are similar. As discussed above, the
types of measures that are likely to be imposed under Regulation
2641/84 namely quantitative restrictions, suspension of tariff
concessions, the raising of tariffs, etc. would be general and
legislative in nature. In these circumstances exporters would face
the same difficulties confronting exporters in anti-subsidy cases.
In order to convince the Court that they have sufficient locus standi
to challenge the acts imposing protective measures, exporters would
have to show that they have had specific findings made about them or
that they have been involved in the investigation to a significant
degree.
Regulation 2641/84 is unique in that it allows or permits protective
measures to be imposed in order to counteract the illicit trade
practices in a third country which affect Community exports. This
may have the effect of affecting many exporters because such
protective measures will have the consequence of limiting imports
from that country. As they are not involved in the investigation
leading to the adoption of such measures nor are they individually
identified in the measure in question, it will usually be the case
that they will not have locus standi.
Temple Langl25 identifies one possible situation in which exporters
would have locus standi. This is where a non-Member State
encourages certain undertakings to become parties to a restrictive





The position of complainants in the context of trade measures first
arose in the Fediol case^^. Fediol was a trade association. It
had lodged a complaint pursuant to Regulation 3017/79 requesting the
initiation of anti-subsidy proceedings against the importation of
soya bean oil cake from Brazil. The Commission informed Fediol by
letter that it did not intend to initiate proceedings. As a result
Fediol brought an action under Article 173(2) of the EEC Treaty
seeking a declaration that the decision contained in the letter was
void.
The Court began as it did in the First Allied case, by stating that
the question of admissibility must be assessed in the light of the
whole scheme of investigation and protection created by the parent
Regulation^''. The Court proceeded to analyse the provisions of
the parent Regulation which related to anti-subsidy cases. It then
in some detail concluded that complainants could bring proceedings
before the Court alleging that the Commission had disregarded
specific rights granted to them under the parent Regulation. It
held that:
It appears from a comparison of the provisions governing the
successive procedural stages described above that the
Regulation recognizes the existence of a legitimate interest
on the part of Community producers in the adoption of
anti-subsidy measures and that it defines certain specific
rights in their favour, namely the right to submit to the
Commission all evidence which they consider appropriate, the
right to see all information obtained by the Commission
subject to certain exceptions, the right to be heard at
their request and to have the opportunity of meeting the
126 Case 191/82 supra.
127 ibid, at 2932, paragraph 15 of judgment.
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other parties concerned in the same proceeding and finally
the right to be informed if the Commission decides not to
pursue a complaint. In the case of the proceedings being
terminated on the completion of the stage of preliminary
investigation provided for in Article 5 that information
must comprise at least a statement of the Commission's basic
conclusions and a summary of the reasons therefor as is
required by Article 9 in the event of the termination of
formal investigations
It noted that whilst the Commission had a duty to establish
objectively the facts concerning the existence of subsidisation
practices and of the injury caused as a result to Community industry,
it had nevertheless a very wide discretion in deciding what measures
were necessary taking into account the interests of the Community.
It was in the light of these considerations that it was necessary to
consider whether complainants have a right to bring an action. It
held that:
It seems clear, first, in that respect - and the point is
not disputed by the Commission - that complainants must be
acknowledged to have a right to bring an action where it is
alleged that the Community authorities have disregarded
rights which have been recognized specifically in the
Regulation, namely the right to lodge a complaint, the
right, which is inherent in the aforementioned right, to
have that complaint considered by the Commission with proper
care and according to the procedure provided for, the right
to receive information within the limits set by the
Regulation and finally, if the Commission decides not to
proceed with the complaint, the right to receive information
comprising at the least the explanations guaranteed by
Article 9(2) of the Regulation.
Furthermore it must be acknowledged that, in the spirit of
the principles which lie behind Articles 164 and 173 of the
Treaty, complainants have the right to avail themselves,
with regard both to the assessment of the facts and to the
adoption of protective measures provided for by the
Regulation of a review by the Court appropriate to the
nature of the powers reserved to the Community institutions
on the subject.
ibid. at 2934, paragraph 25 of judgment.
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It follows that complainants may not be refused the right to
put before the Court any matters which would facilitate a
review as to whether the Commission has observed the
procedural guarantees granted to complainants by Regulation
3017/79 and whether or not it has committed manifest errors
in its assessment of the facts, has omitted to take into
consideration any essential matters of such a nature as to
give rise to a belief in the existence of subsidization or
has based the reasons for its decision on considerations
amounting to a misuse of powers. In that respect, the
Court is required to exercise its normal powers of review
over a discretion granted to a public authority, even though
it has no jurisdiction to intervene in the exercise of the
discretion reserved to the Community authorities by the
aforementioned Regulation,
The Court concluded by stating that the parent Regulation
acknowledged that undertakings and associations of undertakings
injured by subsidisation practices on the part of non Member
countries have a legitimate interest in the initiation of protective
action by the Community. In these circumstances they have a right
of action within the framework of the legal status which the
Regulation confers on them^O.
The question of locus standi of complainants came before the Court
again in the Timex case^l shortly after its decision in Fediol.
This was an anti-dumping case. Timex, who, as it happened, was the
leading manufacturer of mechanical wrist watches and watch movements
in the Community had lodged a complaint with the Commission. The
result of the subsequent investigation was a finding that dumping had
taken place and that this dumping had caused injury to Community
industry. An anti-dumping duty was therefore imposed on watches
originating in the Soviet Union. Timex challenged this duty on the
grounds that it was insufficient quoad watches and furthermore no




ibid, at 2935-6, paragraphs 28-30 of judgment.
ibid. at 2936, paragraph 31 of judgment.
Case 264/82 [1985] ECR 849.
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that this breached the procedural and substantive rules laid down by
the parent Regulation.
Advocate-General Darmon in his opinion for the Court reiterated the
principles enunciated in Fediol. He stated that:
Complainants may apply to the Court for a review of the
procedural guarantees laid down by that Regulation
[Regulation 3017/79] and of the substantive question whether
any manifest errors of assessment and misuse of power have
been committed. This is a principle derived from the
scheme of Regulation 3017/79 and from the general principles
of the Treaty. As such, it applies to all measures adopted
by the institutions in anti-dumping and anti-subsidy
proceedings, and in particular to the regulations imposing
duties^32.
The Advocate-General then proceeded to consider whether the
Regulation was in essence a decision and if so whether Timex was
directly and individually concerned. He concluded by stating that
as the Community's production was practically Timex alone and the
procedure was determined exclusively on the basis of the effect on
Timex, it was directly and individually concerned. The Court agreed
with him. On the question of standing it held that:
It should be pointed out first of all that the complaint
under Article 5 of Regulation No. 3017/79 which led to the
adoption of Regulation No. 1882/82 was lodged by the British
Clock and Watch Manufacturers' Association Limited on behalf
of manufacturers of mechanical watches in France and the
United Kingdom, including Timex. According to the
documents before the Court, that association took action
because a complaint which Timex had itself lodged in April
1979 had been rejected by the Commission on the ground that
it came from only one Community manufacturer.
The complaint which led to the opening of the investigation
procedure therefore owes its origin to the complaints
originally made by Timex. Moreover, it is clear from the
preamble to Commission Regulation No. 84/82 and the preamble
to Council Regulation No. 1882/82 that Timex's views were
heard during that procedure.
132 ibid, p. 851 at 853.
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It must also be remembered that Timex is the leading
manufacturer of mechanical watches and watch movements in
the Community and the only remaining manufacturer of those
products in the United Kingdom. Furthermore, as is also
clear from the preambles to Regulations Nos. 84/82 and
1882/82, the conduct of the investigation procedure was
largely determined by Timex"s observations and the
anti-dumping duty was fixed in the light of the effect of
the dumping on Timex. More specifically, the preamble to
Regulation 1882/82 makes it clear that the definitive
anti-dumping duty was made equal to the dumping margin which
was found to exist "taking into account the extent of the
injury caused to Timex by the dumped imports". The
contested Regulation is therefore based on the applicant's
own situation.
It follows that the contested Regulation constitutes a
decision which is of direct and individual concern to Timex
within the meaning of the second paragraph of Article 173 of
the EEC Treaty 1
As in the Fediol case the Court based its judgment quoad complainants
on their procedural rights as laid down in the parent Regulation.
This will be the situation whether or not injury findings have been
made about them. These decisions run contrary to the Court's
judgment in Alusuisse where it held that locus standi to challenge is
based on the legal nature of the Regulation imposing the duty and the
legal effects it produces!^.
The effect of the Court's rulings is that the number of interested
parties who may claim locus standi to challenge Community acts
imposing safeguard measures has been extended to cover those parties








Unlike Regulation 2423/88 the right to complain under Regulation
288/82 is given formally to Member States and not to private
persons. For this reason complainants are less likely, if at all,
to have locus standi to challenge protective measures.
In certain limited circumstances they may, however, have locus standi
by virtue of a number of other procedural rights. Like any other
interested party, an individual producer by reason of Article 6(4) of
Regulation 288/82 has a right to be heard. Individual producers may
have locus standi if they can show that the protective measures
adopted are inadequate to them in relation to the findings of
"substantial injury" or threat thereof. Apart from these few
limited situations, complainants would have no locus standi.
1.2.3. Regulation 2641/84
Regulation 2641/84 endows complainants with much greater procedural
rights. This is due to the fact that the Regulation, as far as
procedure was concerned, was based on the anti-dumping rules. By
virtue of Article 3, private individuals are given a right to
complain and a right to be informed if the complaint does not provide
sufficient evidence to justify initiating an investigation.
Furthermore, Article 6 gives complainants a right to make submissions
and to inspect non-confidential information in the possession of the
Commission. They also have a right to be heard and to oppose
parties having adverse interests. Complainants would therefore as a
result of the Court's judgments in Fediol and Timex discussed above
have locus standi to challenge protective measures to counteract
illicit commercial practices or the institutions' refusal to adopt
such measures.
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1.3. Independent and Associated Importers
1.3.1. Regulation 2423/88
1.3.1.1. Anti-Dumping Duties
Generally speaking importers are not referred to in Regulations
imposing anti-dumping duties. In the normal case, dumping will be
determined on the basis of the export prices of non-Community
producers. In certain situations, however, the importers are
subsidiaries of the exporters and as such the sales between them are
not at arms length. In these circumstances the Community
institutions may determine dumping by reference to the prices charged
to independent importers.
Where the export price is determined by reference to resale prices
associated importers as such will have had findings made about
them. In such circumstances they will be identified and would
therefore have locus standi. This was the situation in the Japanese
Ballbearing cases 135. would, however, be wrong to hold that
the status of association is sufficient for an importer of the
product in question to be individually concerned by a Regulation
imposing anti-dumping duties. It may be that the export price is
determined by reference to the prices paid or payable on
exportation. This would mean that no findings would be made about
associated importers^. In such a case they would have no locus
standi. However, now that exporters have locus standi to challenge
Regulations imposing anti-dumping duties before the Court as a result
of the decision in the First Allied case, there is less importance
and less need to show that associated importers have locus standi.
1^5 Case 113/77 NTN Toyo Bearing Co. Ltd. & Ors. v. Council
supra, 1204-5.
136 gee Case 279/86 Sermes SA v. Commission supra at paragraph
16 of Order.
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The position of independent importers is less straightforward. This
was discussed at great length by the Court in the Alusuisse
case^''. Alusuisse was an importer of orthoxylene. It did not
manufacture the product itself nor did it belong to a group of
undertakings which included a manufacturer. It was basically an
independent importer. Alusuisse brought proceedings under Article
173(2) of the EEC Treaty seeking a declaration that the Council and
Commission Regulations were void.
Advocate-General Rozes distinguished the position of Alusuisse from
the importers in the Japanese Ballbearing cases. She held that
unlike the importers in the Japanese Ballbearing cases, Alusuisse was
not specifically referred to in the Regulation-'-38. Alusuisse had
argued that owing to the special nature of the procedure leading to
the adoption of anti-dumping regulations, they could not be regarded
as measures of general application339. The Advocate-General,
referring to the previous decisions of the Court, was of the opinion
that such a line of argument could not be upheld. In her view, the
argument wrongly assimilated the position preparatory to the adoption
of the Regulation to the adoption itself. In other words it
confused the nature of the investigation with the nature of the
measure'^, She further noted that the distinction in the Court's
case law between a Regulation and a Decision was founded on the
nature and effects of the measure and not on the manner of its
adoption3^3.
33^ Case 307/81, supra.
138 ibid. 3474 at 3475-6.




The Court emphasised the fact that the Regulations at issue had as
their object the imposition of anti-dumping duty on all imports of
orthoxylene originating in the United States and Puerto Rico. In
these circumstances, such measures as regards independent importers
who, in contrast to exporters, were not expressly named in the
Regulations, were measures having general application within the
meaning of the second paragraph of Article 189 of the Treaty because
they applied to objectively determined situations and entailed legal
effects for categories of persons regarded generally and in the
abstractly _
The Court agreed with Advocate-General Rozes in holding that the
distinction between a Regulation and a Decision could be based only
on the nature of the measure itself and the legal effects which it
produces and not on the procedures for its adoption^^. In doing
so it rejected Alusuisse's argument that the particular features of
the procedure leading to the adoption of the anti-dumping
Regulations, in particular the participation of the various
interested parties in the successive stages of that procedure, led to
the conclusion that the measures in question constituted individual
administrative acts which could be contested under Article
173(2)144.
The position of independent importers was also considered by the
Court in the First Allied case. The Court noted that Demufert, one
of the applicants, was an importer established in one of the Member
States and was not referred to in any of the measures which were
contested in the applications before the Courtis. It contrasted
the position of the importers in the present case with the importers
ibid. 3463 at 3472, paragraph 9 of judgment.
ibid, at 3473, paragraph 13 of judgment.
ibid. at 3473, paragraph 12 of judgment.







in the Japanese Ballbearing cases. It noted that in the former, the
existence of dumping was established by reference to the export
prices of the American producers and not by reference to the retail
prices charged by European importers. In such circumstances the
findings relating to the existence of dumping were not of direct
concern to Demufert whereas they were of direct concern to the
producers and exporters^^. The Court stressed, however, that in
so far as the importer was compelled to pay anti-dumping duties it
was open for it to bring an action in the national court to challenge
the validity of the Regulation!^.
\
\
On the other hand, where an independent importer has given a bond or
a guarantee for payment of provisional duties, it may have locus
standi if the Regulation imposing the definitive duties orders the
definitive collection of provisional duties. In such a situation
the importers would be part of an identifiable and ascertainable
group.
As a result of the Court's ruling in Piraikj!^ an independent
importer may in certain limited circumstances have locus standi to
challenge a measure imposing anti-dumping duties. It would have to
show on the one hand that it had entered into a contract to buy goods
which would be subject to a duty and on the other that it would be
responsible for the payment of the duty rather than the exporter.
1.3.1.2. Countervailing Duties
It is only in very exceptional circumstances that importers whether
associated or independent will have locus standi in anti-subsidy








Community authorities will look at the prices charged by importers to
their customers in the Community.
The most likely situation where an importer will have locus standi is
where the Regulation orders the definitive collection of the
provisional duties or where the importer has entered into a contract
before the protective measures were adopted i.e. the situation in the
Piraiki case.
1.3.2. Regulation 288/82
Importers whether associated or independent are unlikely to have
locus standi to challenge measures imposing protective measures under
Regulation 288/82. Where an importer, however, can prove that it
fulfils the criteria laid down in Piraiki case^^ it may then have
locus standi. Importers on the whole, unlike exporters, are less
likely to be affected by quantitative restrictions or be the subject
of specific findings.
Piraiki concerned an application by a number of Greek undertakings
that a Commission decision authorising France to impose quotas on
imports of cotton yarns from Greece was void. The Commission argued
that the decision was addressed to the French Republic and the
Hellenic Republic and although the applicants were touched by the
effects of the protective measures authorised, the decision in
question was not of direct or individual concern to them^^. The
applicants argued, however, that their situation could be
distinguished from that of any other exporter to France of cotton
yarn of Greek origin in as much as they had entered into a series of
contracts of sales with French customers, to be performed during the




ibid. at 241, paragraph 3 of judgment.
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cotton yarn in excess of the quotas authorised by the Commission.
According to the applicants the Commission was in a position and even
under the obligation to identify the traders who, like the
applicants, were individually concerned^^.
The Court then held:
It must be concluded that the Commission was in a position
to obtain sufficiently exact information on the contracts
already entered into which were to be performed during the
period of application of the decision at issue. It follows
that the undertakings which were party to contracts meeting
that description must be considered as individually
concerned for the purpose of the admissibility of this
action, as members of a limited class of traders identified
or identifiable by the Commission and by reason of those
contracts particularly affected by the decision at
issue^2.
Therefore, in circumstances where an importer has entered into a
contract before the imposition of protective measures under
Regulation 288/82 it may have locus standi to challenge those
measures.
1.3.3. Regulation 2641/84
An importer is in a similar position to an importer under an
anti-subsidy action. For this reason it is unlikely that an
importer would have locus standi except in exceptional cases.
1.4. Original Equipment Manufacturers (OEMs)
Original Equipment Manufacturers (hereinafter referred to as OEMs)
may be defined as importers who sell in the Community, under their
ibid, at 242-3, paragraphs 12-15 of judgment.
ibid. at 246, paragraph 31 of judgment.
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own brand names, products which they neither sell nor produce in the
country of origin but which are purchased from exporters of the
products to the Community.
The admissibility of an Article 173 action by OEMs has arisen
recently in some of the Photocopiers cases^^. In Nashua
Corporation v. Commission and Council^-^ the applicant was defined
as "the supplier of Nashua brand photocopiers which it sells in the
Community and numerous other countries". It was not disputed and
was certain that Nashua bought most of its photocopiers from Rioch
Co. Limited of Japan which manufactured Nashua brand machines at its
production facilities in Japan.
The Council relying on the decision of the Court in Sermes S.A. v.
Council^^ which reiterated those categories of economic agent who
had locus standi to challenge Community measures imposing
anti-dumping duties, considered that the application was
15-* See Joined cases 133/87 & 150/87 Nashua Corporation v.
Commission and Council and Case 156/87 Gestetner Holdings
pic v. Commission and Council, supra.
Joined cases 133 & 150/87 ibid. at 20-21.
155 Case 279/86, supra.
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inadmissible^^. It argued that the applicant was neither a
producer/exporter nor an associated importer and therefore not
individually concerned. The Council was of the view that Nashua if
it was to be categorised would be regarded as an independent importer
i.e. importers not associated to an exporter or producer. Such
economic agents have been held by the Court not to be individually
concerned by an anti-dumping regulation!^.
In reaching this conclusion, the Council argued that Nashua had not
been singled out by the contested Regulation. This view was based
on two grounds. First, the export price was established on the
basis of sales to Nashua by Rioch who was a producer and exporter and
not on Nashua's resale price. Second, the construction of normal
value for sales to OEMs was based not on information from Nashua but
from Rioch.
The Court summarised the case-law as follows:-
"However, the Court has held that certain provisions of
such regulations may nevertheless be of direct and
individual concern to those producers and exporters who are
charged, on the basis of information derived from their
business activities, with practising dumping. That is
'generally' true of producers and exporters who are able to
establish that they were identified in the measues adopted
by the Commission or the Council or were concerned by the
preliminary investigations (see the judgments of
21 February 1984, Allied Corporation v. Commission, cited
above, and of 23 May 1985 in case 53/85, Allied Corporation
v. Council, [1985] ECR 1621).
It is also true of those importers who are directly
concerned by findings of dumping inasmuch as export prices
have been determined by reference to those importers'
resale prices and not to the export prices charged by the
producers or exporters in question (see the judgments of 29
March 1979 in case 118/77, I.S.0. v. Council, [1979] ECR
1277, and of 21 February 1984, Allied Corporation v.
Commission, cited above). Under Article 2 (8) (b) of
Regulation 2176/84 export prices may be constructed in that
way inter alia where there is an association between
exporter and importer", (paragraphs 15 and 16)
157 Case 307/81 Alusuisse Italia v. Commission supra.
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In his opinion, Advocate-General Mischo agreed that the Council's
application of the principles in the Sermes case was correct. He
disagreed, however, with their conclusion, holding that Nashua was
directly and individually concerned by the contested Regulation. He
was of the opinion that the determining factor in deciding whether
the applicant had locus standi was not its status, i.e. whether it
was an exporter/producer or associated importer, but the manner in
which its actual situation was taken into account^-^.
He noted that the anti-dumping duty imposed on Nashua photocopiers
did not apply indiscriminately to all OEMs. Rather, Nashua was not
only affected by the Regulation on account of its status as an OEM
but more importantly in its capacity as an OEM selling products
manufactured by Rioch. (Rioch being one of the exporters whose
products were dumped and which were subject to a definitive duty).
As a result, Nashua's products were also subject to the same
anti-dumping duty as Rioch. In such circumstances, it was correct
to hold that Nashua was affected by those findings and by the
imposition of duties in the same was as Rioch-'--^.
On the assumption that Rioch was individually concerned by the
contested Regulation it would be illogical not to treat Nashua as
being in the same position in respect of products sold under its own
brand name. It would have been wrong to treat Nashua as if it were
Rioch, as the photocopiers imported by Nashua had a distinctive
"logo" which characterised them to Nashua products. Advocate-
General Mischo was of the opinion that:
Once a product imported under a given brand name is subject,
on entry into the Community, to special customs
arrangements, the act which established those arrangements
is of direct and individual concern to the business whose
15° Joined cases 133/87 & 150/87 Nashua Corporation v.
Commission and Council supra, 14 at 21.
159 ibid, at 22.
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product bears the distinctive brand name (or which is the
holder or owner of that brand name), even if it is not
considered to be an exporter for the purpose of the
anti-dumping legislation-^0.
The brand name was a distinctive badge, he argued, which identified
the owner and placed him in a situation which distinguished him from
any other person.
He noted further that the application of the contested Regulation,
in particular, to Gestetner was a perfect example of the argument
that the brand name distinguishes the product and its owner - in
particular an OEM - from any other person. The Customs authorities
would naturally impose on Gestetner products entering the Member
States a general duty of 20 per cent, since its name was not
included in the list of exporters in the contested Regulation which
were subject to different duties. At the hearing, however, the
Council confirmed that Gestetner photocopiers which were
manufactured by Mita, should only be subject to a duty of 12.6 per
cent. There was nothing in the Regulation to this effect with the
result that the customs officials would have to have had the
position clarified by the national authorities or the Commission in
order to obtain confirmation of that fact. Customs officials in
the Member States subsequently received an explanatory memorandum
setting out the position. It was, therefore, the case that during
customs clearance, Gestetner brand products were distinguished from
all other products. It could not be denied that they were directly
and more importantly individually concerned in the same way as
Mital^l.
Further, Nashua had in its submissions contended that the Council
had failed to treat it as an exporter of its own products. Rather,
160 ibid, at 23.
ibid.; see also: Case 156/87 Gestetner Holdings pic, v.
Commission and Council, supra.
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the Council had treated it as an importer of the products which
although bearing Nashua's brand name were in actual fact Rioch
products. The Advocate-General took the view that if the Council
were allowed to determine the admissibility of such claims by OEMs
by how it perceived the functions and role of a particular OEM, then
such a decision would be removed from direct review by the Court.
He held that, reiterating the decision of the Court in the Mini
Ballbearing cases, the exercise of discretion by the Community
authorities was still subject to review by the Court in determining
whether procedural rules had been complied with, whether facts on
which a decision was based were accurately stated and whether there
had been a manifest error of appraisal or misuse of powersl62.
The Advocate-General also relied on a further ground for holding
that Nashua was directly and individually concerned by the contested
Regulation. As stated above, the refusal to accept an undertaking
and the subsequent imposition of definitive duties amounted to a
decision of direct and individual concern to the applicant in
question. Such circumstances, the Advocate-General contended,
existed in the present case thereby conferring on Nashua locus
standard _
The Court concurred with the Advocate-General that Nashua had locus
standi. In reaching this conclusion the Court's reasoning differed
from that of the Advocate-General. It restated the principles
enunciated by the Court in the First Allied case and considered that
it was necessary to establish whether Nashua was concerned by the
findings relating to the existence of dumping complained of!64.
It noted that it was by reference to the particular features of
162 ibid. at 24. See for example, Case 240/84 NTN Toyo
Bearing Co. Ltd. v. Council [1987] ECR 1809.
163 ibid, at 25.
ibid, at 43, paragraphs 14-16 of judgment.
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Rioch's sales to OEMs as compared with its costs in sales of the
product under its own brand name that the Council in constructing
the normal value used a profit margin of 5 per cent. This was
lower than the average profit margin which was estimated at 14.6 per
cent. Proceeding on the basis of the normal value thus constructed
for sales by Rioch to OEMs the Community authorities arrived at a
dumping margin lower than that determined for the sales of the
products bearing Rioch's own brand name. For these reasons the
Court concluded that Nashua was concerned by the findings relating
to the existence of dumping complained of and the provisions of the
Regulation regarding Rioch's dumping practices were therefore of
direct concern to it^^.
In conclusion, the category of persons which have locus standi to
challenge Community measures imposing anti-dumping duties has been
extended to include OEMs. This, however, does not amount to a
licence for all OEMs to challenge such measures. Locus standi will
only be conferred on those OEMs who can show that they are concerned
by a finding relating to the dumping complained of.
1.5. Trade Associations
In Confederation Nationale des Producteurs de Fruits et Legumes v.
Councilthe Court held that an Association in its capacity as
the representative of a category of businessmen was not individually
concerned by a measure such as a Regulation which affected the
general interests of that category.
The position of Trade Associations with reference to safeguard
measures is likely only to arise in relation to anti-dumping and
countervailing measures and to illicit commercial practices. The
ibid., paragraphs 17-20 of judgment.




major reason for this is that Trade Associations are specifically
mentioned in Regulation 2423/88 and Regulation 2641/84 as having a
right to lodge a complaint .
The position of a Trade Association was considered by the Court in
Fediol. The Commission observed that on a strict interpretation of
Article 173(2) a Trade Association had no right to institute
proceedings or to appear in Court. However, taking account of the
powers of a procedural nature given by the parent Regulation to
Associations lacking legal personality, it would be illogical to
refuse such an Association the right to bring an action. It was
therefore appropriate to give a broad interpretation of the concept
"legal person" within the meaning of Article 173(2) of the EEC
Treaty-^ 7.
Advocate-General Rozes noted with regard to Trade Associations that
it was not formal legal personality that mattered but whether the
Association in question was recognised by the law and given certain
powers to fulfil the duties given to it. In this respect she noted
that the Anti-dumping Regulation endowed Associations with
procedural powers. She proceeded to hold that Associations:-
while not possessing legal personality, operate in the
context of one economic sector of the Community; it must
therefore be concluded that such associations do have the
capacity to institute proceedings in order to protect such
procedural interests^.
-^7 Case 191/81, supra at 2918.
168 ibid, at 2940.
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The Court agreed with the Advocate-General. It held that
Associations have "a right of action within the framework of the
legal status which the Regulation confers on them"^®^.
Under Regulation 288/82 the interests of Trade Associations could
only be protected by means of intervention before the Court. This
will only come about when the Trade Association can show to the
satisfaction of the Court that it has an interest in the result of
the case. The right of intervention is discussed below in relation
to the position of users and processors.
1.6. Users and Processors
Users and processors who are neither importers nor complainants are
unlikely to have locus standi. In most instances their interests
can only be protected by intervention in proceedings before the
Court.
The rules governing intervention in the Court are laid down in the
Court's statute. Article 37 states that:
Member States and institutions of the Community may
intervene in cases before the Court.
The same right shall be open to any other person
establishing an interest in the result of any case submitted
to the Court, save in cases between Member States, between
institutions of the Community or between Member States and
institutions of the Community.
Submissions made in an application to intervene shall be
limited to supporting the submissions of one of the
1 7D
partiesxu.
ibid, at 2936, paragraph 31 of judgment.
Protocol on Statute of Court of Justice of the EEC. See
also Rules of the Single Court of the Three Communities, OJ
1974 L350/1; as Temple Lang op.cit. states 'submissions
should be seen more as conclusions rather than
arguments'. See also Rule 93 Rules of Procedure of the
Court.
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The right of an entity other than a Member State or a Community
institution to intervene depends upon that entity being able to
establish that it comes within the term "any other person" and it has
established an interest in the result of proceedings before the
Court.
The case-law of the Court to date tends to suggest that these
questions are treated quite liberally. For example, in Chris
International Foods the Court was prepared to allow several non-
Member States, namely Granada, Dominica, St. Lucia and St. Vincent to
intervene. It also allowed the Banana Growers Association to
intervene17 ^.
It is difficult to guage why an intervention is justified due to the
fact that the Court's reasons for allowing an intervention are very
short. It is, suffice to say, that intervention will usually be
permitted where the intervener can show that they have an economic
interest in the outcome of the case.
1.7. Non-Member States
As stated above, Member States of the Community have by virtue of
Article 173(1) locus standi to challenge any binding legal act
whatever its form. The position of a non-Member State vis-a-vis its
right to challenge safeguard measures may in some situations be of
the utmost importance and in particular in relation to illicit
commercial practices and anti-subsidy actions. Non-Member States
are specifically referred to in Article 7(1) of Regulation 2423/88
and Article 6(1) of Regulation 2641/84.
171 Joined Cases 91 & 200/82 [1983] ECR 417.
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Circumstances may arise where an exporter cannot challenge an act
imposing safeguard measures and for this reason it may be important
that non-Member States should have the right to intervene on their
behalf. As stated above the Court considered the question of the
right of non-Member States to intervene in the Chris International
Foods case^^. In that case the Court held that non-Member States
had a right to intervene. The non-Member States put forward three
reasons why they considered they had sufficient interest for
intervention'-^. They contended that they were entitled to
preferential treatment for their bananas in part of the Community
market; they were dependent on bananas for their export earnings and
if the application by Chris International Foods succeeded the rights
of non-Member States concerned under the Fourth Protocol of the Lome
II Convention would be seriously affected.
The Court held in the light of these arguments that Granada,
Dominica, St. Lucia and St. Vincent had shown sufficient interest in
the outcome of the case before it'^. In doing so the Court had
by implication held that non-Member States constituted "any other
person" for the purposes of Article 37 of the Statute of the Court.
Apart from having a right to intervene a more important question is
whether it is possible for a non-Member State to be directly and
individually concerned by an act imposing safeguard measures'^.
Naturally, direct and individual concern relates to something more
than "interest" in the context of a right to intervene under Article




In some cases involving state trading countries the trader
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which is operating a subsidy or illicit commercial practice is
directly and individually concerned by a Community measure designed
to counteract such practices. It is perfectly feasible for
non-Member States to put forward the arguments detailed in the Chris
International Foods case in order to show that they have locus standi
under Article 173.
It is unlikely that a non-Member State would have standing under
Regulation 288/82 on the ground that it is not a material factor
where the product originates. What is important is that the product
is being imported into the Community in substantial quantities which
are causing serious injury to Community producers and that it is in
the interest of the Community to take action. Only in a situation
where it specifically relates to a product from the non-Member State
in question and only when other factors are in existence could the
non-Member State have locus standi.
1.8. Refusal to Accept an Undertaking
As discussed earlier, the Commission has the power under Regulation
2423/88 to accept an undertaking. Its reasons for doing so will be
practical and non-legal. Likewise, it will have similar reasons for
refusing to accept an undertaking. The Court in a number of the
Photocopier caseshas discussed the question of whether the
rejection of an undertaking constituted a measure having binding
legal effects so that it could be challenged before the Court. The
Council in its observations argued that a decision by the Commission
to refuse an undertaking was merely a stage in the process leading to
a further decision and therefore could not be challenged in a
separate action. Advocate-General Mischo was of the opinion that
See Joined cases 133/87 & 150/87 Nashua Corporation v.
Commission and Council, supra; Case 156/87 Gestetner
Holdings pic v. Commission and Council, supra.
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such a refusal of itself could not be regarded as an act liable to
affect an applicant's interests. This could only occur when the
Council imposed a definitive duty"^.
The Court agreed with the Advocate-General. It held that the
refusal by the Commission of a proposed undertaking could not be
considered as a measure having binding legal effects of such a kind
as to affect the interests of the applicant as the Commission may
revoke its decision or the Council may decide not to impose a duty.
Such a rejection is an intermediate measure and is not one capable of
being challenged"''^. It was clear, held the Court, that as a
result of the decisions in the Mini Ballbearing cases'^ it was by
challenging the Regulation introducing definitive duties that traders
could raise an irregularity associated with the rejection of their
proposed undertakings
Locus standi to challenge a decision rejecting an exporter's
exemption from a duty or the refusal to accept an undertaking will
only be conferred on an exporter if that exporter initiates
proceedings to challenge the Regulation imposing the definitive
duties.
See Advocate-General's opinion in Joined cases 133/87 &
150/87, ibid, at 17.
Joined cases 133/87 & 150/87 Nashua Corporation v.
Commission and Council supra at paragraphs 9-10 of
judgment; Case 156/87 Gestetner Holdings pic, v.
Commission and Council supra, at paragraphs 8-9 of
judgment.
Cases 240/84 NTN Toyo Bearing Co. Ltd. v. Council [1987]
ECR 1809, 255/84 Nachi Fujikoshi Corporation v. Council
[1987] ECR 1861 and 256/84Koyo Seiko Co. Ltd. v. Council
[1987] ECR 1899, infra. " ' " ~~
180 Joined cases 133/87 & 150/87 Nashua Corporation v.
Commission and Council supra at paragraph 10 of judgment
and Case 156/87 Gestetner Holdings pic, v. Commission and
Council supra, at paragraph 8 of judgment.
- 272 -
2 - ACTION FOR FAILURE TO ACT :
ARTICLE 175
Article 175 allows an interested party to call on the Community
institutions to act where they have failed to do so. In actual fact
the only interested party that would have a right to raise an action
under Article 175 is a complainant. This right will only arise
where the institution in question has a duty to adopt an act
addressed to the complainant. Inevitably, a complainant's right to
raise an action under Article 175 will depend on the procedural
rights it has under the Regulation in question.
2.1. Regulation 2423/88
There are at least three occasions in theory when a complainant
would consider raising an action under Article 175.
First, a complainant could arguably raise an action when the
Commission decides if the complaint in question provides sufficient
evidence to justify initiating an investigation. This decision,
however, is directed not at the complainant but rather at exporters
or foreign governments who are the subject of the complaint. For
this reason it does not constitute an act other than a recommendation
or opinion and in any case it is not addressed to the complainant.
Second, despite the request in the complaint the Commission fails to
communicate a decision to the complainant that it has decided not to
initiate anti-dumping or anti-subsidy proceedings. As the
applicants argued in Fediol^-®^ they would have raised an action
under Article 175 for failure to act if such a decision had not been
communicated to them. By either issuing a decision to refuse to
Case 191/82 supra at 2923.
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initiate proceedings or a decision to initiate them, the interests of
the complainant and as such its legal rights are affected in a
fundamental way. Without the communication of a formal decision
addressed to the complainant, it is barred from exercising its
procedural rights under Article 7 of Regulation 2423/88 during the
investigation. The Court concluded in Fediol that complainants have
a legitimate interest in having safeguard measures adopted and as a
result they have to be granted the right to challenge a decision of
the Commission to initiate or refuse to initiate an
investigation.
Lastly, a complainant could arguably raise an action where a decision
has been taken by the Commission to terminate the procedure. This
decision constitutes an act other than a recommendation or opinion
which has to be addressed to all parties known to be concerned.
This would include complainants. Failure to do so would mean that
they could raise an action under Article 175. As stated above
Article 175(3) has to be interpreted to allow any natural or legal
person to raise any action against the Commission or Council for
failure to perform an act that is of direct and individual concern to
it.
To conclude, it is submitted that it is possible in two cases for a
complainant to raise an action under Article 175. It can force the
Commission to address to it the decision not to open formal
anti-dumping or anti-subsidy investigations and second it can demand





From what has been said in connection with proceedings under
Article 173, natural or legal persons as such do not enjoy judicial
protection under Regulation 288/82. It is therefore inconceivable
that they should derive any right from Article 175.
2.3. Regulation 2641/84
Because Regulation 2641/84, and in particular the provisions
relating to procedure, are based largely on Anti-Dumping Rules
similar conclusions can be reached with regard to a complainant's
standing to challenge under Article 175.
3 . FLEA. OF ILLEGALITY :
ARTICLE 184
As stated above, Article 184 is a shield and not a sword in that it
is an ancillary action to other proceedings - normally an action for
annulment under Article 173. In order that the plea can be
considered, a party will have to show that it has the locus standi to
challenge the act imposing the safeguard measures.
Article 184 is aimed at the parent Regulation upon which the act
imposing safeguard measures is based. It should be emphasised that
a plea of illegality is the only means by which an applicant can
challenge these measures as they are true Regulations. They are
measures of general application and immune from challenge under
Article 173 by natural or legal process. To date there have been no
proceedings which have attempted to challenge any of the parent
Regulations governing the imposition of safeguard measures.
This state of affairs may change with the adoption of the recent
anti-dumping law relating to the dumping of components. The
Japanese have intimated that they considered this new Regulation to
be illegal in the light of the GATT Rules. As discussed earlier,
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the GATT panel set up to consider this law have ruled that it is
contrary to the GATT principles. It will be interesting to see the
Court's reaction if it is called upon to rule on the legality of that
provision.
It is perfectly feasible for an exporter to challenge duties adopted
under this parent Regulation in order that they may challenge the
validity of the Regulation itself. The effect of a successful
application under Article 184 is to have the Regulation in question
declared inapplicable in the particular case. The net practical
result is that the Community institutions would be forced into
amending the legislation.
By raising a plea of illegality, the Court would be forced into
considering the direct effect of the provisions of the GATT Code.
As regards locus standi, an interested party who has standing to
challenge the measures adopted under the parent Regulation will also
have standing to challenge the parent Regulation itself. However,
if that party's application is declared inadmissible, by its nature,
the plea of illegality of the parent Regulation will also fail.
A. PRELIMINARY RULING ON
VALIDITY : ARTICLE 177(l)(b)
It is possible to challenge the validity of safeguard measures
indirectly in the national courts under Article 177(l)(b) of the EEC
Treaty. In the usual situation, an importer may decide to raise
proceedings in the national courts following the collection of
anti-dumping duties or countervailing duties by the Customs
authorities. Such a duty is normally paid by the importer residing
within the Community.
The effect of a ruling on the validity of a measure by the Court
under Article 177(1)(b) is to have a measure declared inapplicable in
the particular case. However, as a result of the case-law of the
Court and in particular its ruling in the ICC case discussed
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above-*-^, the effect of a ruling under Article 177(l)(b) has the
same practical result as the annulment of a measure under Article
173. This method of challenging safeguard measures is less
satisfactory than bringing a direct action under Article 173.
In the first place and most importantly, the proceedings are raised
against the Customs authorities and not against the proper
defendants, the Council and the Commission. Inevitably, this will
have serious repercussions with respect to the discovery of
documents. Secondly, not all national courts are under an
obligation to make an Article 177 reference. Those that are, namely
courts from which there is no judicial remedy, do not have to refer
if the national court feels that a ruling on the validity of the
measure is not necessary in order to decide the case. Furthermore,
proceedings in the national court will undoubtedly take a substantial
amount of time and expense to follow through.
References under Article 177 are aimed primarily at ensuring that
Community law is applied in a uniform manner throughout the Member
States. Where a Member State decides the case without referring a
question to the Court, the decision will inevitably be less
predictable than if a reference had been made. This is due mainly
to the fact that the national court will be less familiar with
Community law than the Court. The finding by the national court is
binding only in that Member State and not in any other. The Court
has also recently held that only it can declare a Community measure
invalid-'-^^.
Unlike proceedings under Article 173 where a number of interested
parties may have standing to challenge safeguard measures, Article
See footnote 99 supra.
Case 314/85 Firma Foto-Frost v. Haupzollamt Liibeck-Qst
[1988] ECR 4199.
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177(1)(b) would in practice really only allow importers the right to
raise proceedings since it is from importers that the Customs
authorities collect the duties. As the Commission noted in the
First Allied case^^ it is impossible for exporters themselves to
contest the imposition of anti-dumping duties in the national
courts. At the very most, they can intervene alongside importers.
It is therefore in their interests to be able to raise an action
directly before the Court in order to protect their interests. As
stated above, the Court rules on the validity of the Community
measure, but it is outwith the ambit of the Court to apply it to the
facts or for that matter to make findings of fact. In practical
terms, however, the Court's ruling will very often be worded in such
a manner that it can be easily applied by the national courts.
5. ACTION TOR DAMAGES:
ARTICLE 215(2)
In theory it is possible for an undertaking to bring an action for
damages under Article 215(2) before the Court where it can be
established that the Community authorities have acted unlawfully in
adopting the measure in question. It may only be in limited
circumstances that an applicant would consider this course of
action. In such circumstances the proper Court would be the
national court186.
The preconditions of an action for damages are difficult to
establish, in that the applicant would have to show that the
institutions have acted in a reckless manner in adopting the disputed
measures. More importantly in practical terms, duties are refunded
when the Regulation imposing them has been annulled.
185 Case 275/82, supra.
Case 26/74 Roquette Freres v. Commission [1976] ECR 677.
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What is uncertain, however, is whether an applicant could
successfully bring an Article 215(2) action to recover the interest
paid on these duties. This has yet to be resolved by the Court.
It would probably be the case that the Court would decline
jurisdiction on the basis that the duties were collected by the
Customs authorities.
Claims for compensation for damages has been raised only twice to
date in the proceedings involving safeguard measures. In Nippon
Seiko KK v. Council-^87 claims were made by NSK-UK, NSK Germany and
NSK-France. The claims were divided into four categories:-
(a) Damages equal to the amount of the provisional duty
actually paid to the Customs authorities on
importations effected before it was possible to
arrange a bank guarantee. The amounts paid in each
country were specified.
(b) Damages equal to the interest on the money which
applicants had been deprived of as result of making
these payments.
(c) Damages equal to cost of the bank guarantees.
(d) Damages equal to loss of profits resulting from the
applicants having to raise their prices for bearings
manufactured by NSK-UK.
The Court did not address the question of damages. Advocate-General
Warner did^-88. He held that the claims under category (a) were
inadmissible. It was well established that an action for damages
did not lie against a Community institution where the claim was for
the restitution of specific sums paid to national authorities. The
proper court in which to raise the action was the national
court-^9. Likewise, he held the claim under category (b) was
187 Case 119/77 [1979] ECR 1303.
188 ibid, at 1272.
18^ See case 96/71 Haegeman v. Commission [1972] ECR 1005.
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inadmissible for the same reasons. With respect to categories (c)
and (d) the Advocate-General was of the opinion that these claims
were properly brought before the Court. He considered, however,
that the claims did not appear to rest on any general principle of a
kind mentioned in Article 215(2). He therefore rejected the
applicants' submissions.
In the First Allied case^99 the applicants sought to claim damages
under Article 215(2). They contended that there had been a breach
of a superior rule for the protection of the individual without
specifying which rule. As a result they argued substantial loss of
profits were incurred. The Court again did not address the
matter. Advocate-General VerLoren van Theemat held that as the
measure imposing provisional duties was not unlawful the application
for damages must also be dismissed. He considered that it was
impossible for a claim to succeed where loss was sustained as a
result of a lawfully adopted measure^^.
CONCLUSION
The system of judicial remedies in the European Communities, and
Article 173 in particular, provide the Court with the power to review
the legality of acts of the institutions. The right of an
individual to challenge acts of the institutions and, in particular,
acts of general application depends largely on whether they have the
necessary locus standi to do so.
As discussed above in the first part of the chapter, the
preconditions laid down by Article 173(2) are very restrictive.
Generally speaking, the Court has not in its jurisprudence adopted a
190 Joined cases 239 & 275/82 [1984] ECR 1005.
191 ibid, at 1048-9.
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liberal interpretation of Article 173(2) and in particular with
respect to the concepts of "direct and individual" concern. It is
submitted that probably the most compelling reason for the Court's
attitude is that it regards itself more as an Appellate Court rather
than a Court of First Instance. This argument has gained more
weight with the creation of a Court of First Instance.
The Court's attitude to an individual's right to challenge safeguard
measures is much more liberal. The major reason for this difference
in attitude is that a restrictive interpretation would result in
virtually all interested parties being unable to challenge the
legality of safeguard measures imposed. Generally speaking, where
appropriate, exporters, or producers, associated importers, and in
limited circumstances OEMs will have standing to challenge safeguard
measures. The test to be applied by the Court is whether the
economic agent in question is concerned by the findings relating to
the existence of dumping complained of. This situation will arise
where the economic agent in question can establish that it is
identified in the measures adopted or that it is concerned to a
significant degree by the preliminary investigations. If this is
the case it will have the necessary locus standi to challenge the
measure in question.
The Court has extended further the concept of locus standi in
relation to safeguard measures. In a number of decisions it was
prepared to confer on other interested parties, and complainants in
particular, locus standi to challenge the measure in question because
they had certain procedural rights under the legislation governing
the imposition of the protective measures which had been applied,
notwithstanding the fact that those parties would not otherwise have
had such locus standi.
Independent importers as a general rule will not have standing to
challenge the measure in question, as they will neither be identified
in the measure or have specific findings made about them. They will
however, be able to challenge the definitive collection of
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provisional anti-dumping and countervailing duties. Furthermore,
they will have standing to challenge quantitative restrictions where
they can establish that they had entered into binding contracts prior
to the imposition of the duties.
The Commission and Council have now recognised the fact that private
parties should have locus standi to challenge safeguard measures.
The major alternative to Article 173 actions is for a natural or
legal person to go to his national court in the hope that it will
make a reference to the Court for a preliminary ruling on validity
under Article 177(l)(b). As discussed above, such an action does
not offer the same advantages as direct action before the Court.
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CHAPTER 5




By virtue of Article 185 of the EEC Treaty, actions brought before
the Court do not have suspensory effect. The Court may if the
circumstances so require order that the application of the contested
act be suspended. Under Article 186 of EEC Treaty, it may prescribe
any necessary interim measures-'-.
Generally speaking the cases concerning interim measures are decided
by the President of the Court. It is possible, however, for the
full Court to decide the question of interim measures following an
opinion of the Advocate-General^. In the majority of cases an
order will be made within one month from the application.
By virtue of Articles 36 of the Statute of the Court and 83 to 89 of
the Rules of Procedure, certain conditions have to be fulfilled in an
action for interim measures. First, there must be a main procedure
before the Court in the context in which an application for interim
measures is made^. Article 83(1)(2) of the Rules of Procedure
further provides that an application under Article 186 for the
See Article 39 ECSC Treaty; Articles 157 and 158 Euratom
Treaty.
e.g. Case 18/57 Nold v. High Authority [1959] ECR 41;
Case 792/79R Camera Care Ltd. v. Commission [1980] ECR 119.
Article 83(1) Rules of Procedure.
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adoption of interim measures is admissible only if it is made by a
party to a case before the Court and relates to that case. In
Nashua Corporation v. Commission^ the applicant sought suspension
of the effects of Council Regulation 535/87 imposing definitive
duties. The Commission, the sole defendant, argued that the
application for interim measures was inadmissible on the ground that
the Council was not a party to the action. It took the view that
the application could not be admissible merely because, as the
applicant claimed, the Council Regulation imposing definitive duties
was the direct consequence of the Commission's decision rejecting the
undertaking offered by Nashua. The Court held that:
In this case the decision under challenge in the main
proceedings was adopted by the Commission, whereas the
Regulation establishing definitive anti-dumping duties,
the operation of which the applicant wishes to have
suspended by way of an interim measure, is the act of
the Council. It follows that the Judge hearing the
interlocutory proceedings is not empowered to allow
such an application for an interim measure, since to do
so would have the effect of suspending an act of a
legislative nature, emanating from an institution which
is not party to the proceedings^.
Second, a prima facie case on the factual and legal grounds has to be
established and further an award of interim measures must be a matter
of urgency^. It follows from a consistent line of decisions of
the Court that the urgency required by Article 83(2) of the Rules of
Procedure, in regard to an application for interim measures, must be
considered in relation to the need to adopt such measures in order to




Case 133/87R [1987] ECR 2883 at 2886, paragraph 6 of Order.
ibid. at 2887, paragraph 8 of the Order.
Article 83(2) Rules of Procedure.
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party requesting those measures. Third, the interim measures must
be provisional^. Four, they must not prejudge the decision of the
Court on the substance of the main application^ and finally, no
appeal is possible^.
The purpose of interim measures is to preserve the status quo pending
a decision on the substance of the case. The Court has consistently
held that interim measures may only be granted if they do not
prejudge the decision on the substance of the case^. In the
Arbed case the Court explained the objects and limits of interim
measures. The Court held that if:
their adoption is prima facie justified in fact and law, if
they are urgent in the sense that it is necessary, in order
to avoid serious and irreparable damage, that they should be
laid down, and should take effect, before the decision of
the Court on the substance of the action and if they are
provisional in the sense that they do not prejudge the
decision on the substance of the case, that is to say that
they do not at this stage decide disputed points of law or
of fact or neutralise in advance the consequences of a
decision to be given subsequently on the substance of the
action-'' ^.
Article 86(3), (4) Rules of Procedure.
Article 86(4) Rules of Procedure.
Article 86(1) Rules of Procedure.
Cases 60 and 190/81R, IBM v. Commission [1981] ECR 1857 at
1862. ~ ~~ ~
Case 20/81R [1981] ECR 721 at 731, paragraph 13 of Order.
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There have been recently a number of applications for interim orders
for the recovery of documents and measures of inquiry-^. Although
the Court admitted the applications, it concluded that the applicants
had not shown "serious and irreparable" damage and further it held
that:
in the absence of exceptional circumstances which must be
proved and which do not exist in this case, an application
for the adoption of interim measures is not in principle an
appropriate procedure for obtaining the production of
documents of the kind applied for in this case. Such a
measure is similar to a measure of inquiry of the kind which
the Court may order under Article 21 of the Statute of the
Court of Justice in the context of the procedure dealing
with the substance of the case^.
1. INTERIM MEASURES AND
ANTI-DUMEING ACTIONS
Article 83(2) of the Court's Rules of Procedure provides the
conditions governing the award of interim measures. First, there
must be a prima facie case. Second, there must be urgency in the
sense that the measures are necessary in order to avoid "serious and
irreparable" harm before the decision of the Court on the main
case. The concept of "serious and irreparable" damage has been
further defined by the Court. In Technointorg v. Council^ it
held that in establishing serious and irreparable damage a party must
at least adduce evidence showing that the damage suffered by the
applicant as a result of the imposition of the anti-dumping duty is
special to it^; and the balance of interests at stake
Cases 121/86R Anonimos Eteria Epichiriseon Metalleftikon
Viomichanikon Kai Naftiliakon A.E. & ors. v. Council &
Commission [1986] ECR 2063; Case 129/86 Hellenic Republic
v. Council & Commission [1986] ECR 2071.
Case 129/86 ibid, at 2076, paragraph 17 of Order.
Case 77/87R [1987] ECR 1793 at 1799, paragraph 17 of Order.
See in particular, Case 258/84R, Nippon Seiko v. Council
[1984] ECR 4357.
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points in its favour in the sense that the grant of the interim
measures requested would not cause appreciable injury to the
Community industry^."
These criteria are normally referred to by the Court in cases which
involve measures of general application. For this reason it is
important in any analysis of interim measures where safeguard
measures are concerned.
The Court will usually first consider whether the applicant has
established a prima facie case before considering the question of
urgency. For example in TEC Co. Ltd. v. Council the Court, having
determined that no prima facie case existed, did not discuss whether
the other conditions had been fulfilled-''''. However, in some cases
the Court has declared that as the applicants had not succeeded in
proving urgency, it was not necessary to consider whether the factual
and legal grounds advanced by them established a prima facie
case'-®.
1.1. Prima Facie Case
As stated above, the adoption of interim measures cannot be
considered by the Court unless the factual and legal circumstances
relied upon establish a prima facie case for granting interim
See Case 250/85R Brother Industries Ltd. v. Council &
Commission [1985] ECR 3459; Case 260/85R TEC v. Council &
Commission [1985] ECR 3467; Case 273/85R Silver Seiko Ltd.
v. Council & Commission [1985] ECR 3475; Joined Cases 277
and 300/85R Canon Inc. v. Council & Commission [1985] ECR
3491; Case 297/85R Towa Sankiden Corpn. v. Council &
Commission [1985] ECR 3483.
17
18
Case 260/85R TEC v. Council and Commiss ion ibid.
See Case 121/86R supra.
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measures. In some orders this criterion is not mentioned at all and
in others in only a vague way. This seems to be the position in the
cases in which interim measures have been sought where anti-dumping
regulations are in issue^. The overriding principle for the
Court seems to be that the applicant must satisfy it that there is a
serious question to be tried^O.
With respect to cases involving safeguard measures, the Court is
willing to accept as a minimum requirement that the applicant shows
to its satisfaction that there are sufficiently serious doubts about
the legality of the challenged measures. In Raznoimport v.
Commission*^ the Court was of the view that the applicant had
established a prima facie case. It expressed serious doubts about
the way in which the Commission adopted a constructed value as a
basis of reference when prices were apparently determined by market
mechanisms and secondly, in calculating the constructed value on the
basis of production costs in a non-member country^. it also
raised doubts in respect of the circumstances in which the Commission
fixed the rate of provisional duty at 7 per cent^.
In the majority of cases the applicant will use the same arguments
for the application of interim measures as for the main case, in
order to establish to the Court's satisfaction that the case is well
founded. In Nippon Seiko v. Commission the Court noted that, as
See for example Case 304/86R Enital S.p.A. v. Council and
Commission [1987] ECR 267.
In Case 792/79R Camera Care Limited v. Commission supra,
Advocate-General Warner pointed to the fact that the
applicant must have "at least an arguable case, in the main
proceedings".
Case 120/83R [1983] ECR 2573.
ibid, at 2578-9.
23 ibid, at 2579.
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regards the factors establishing a prima facie case, the applicant
expressly referred to its main application which set out the numerous
grounds of annulment^.
The case of TEC Co. Ltd. v. Council^ is an example of a decision
where the Court decided a prima facie case had not been established.
In its submission the applicant alleged that it was discriminated
against, as compared with Nakajima All, which was the only Japanese
producer of electronic typewriters on whom no provisional or
definitive anti-dumping duty was imposed. Before the hearing the
Commission did in fact impose a provisional duty on the imports of
electronic typewriters manufactured by Nakajima All. It was held by
the Court that the imposition of this duty, although only
provisional, would have substantially the same economic effect as a
definitive duty. For this reason it concluded that there was no
longer any difference in treatment between TEC and Nakajima All at
the date of the order. This argument had no longer any purpose and
therefore the applicant had not established a prima facie case for
interim measures.
1.2. Urgency
Once an applicant has established a prima facie case, the Court
must also assess the urgency of the interim measures. In
particular, the applicant must satisfy the Court that the interim
measures requested are necessary for the purposes of avoiding
"serious and irreparable" damage to itself. This is a question of
fact to be decided in every case. It must be shown to the
satisfaction of the Court that the damage suffered by the applicant
is special to it^. Furthermore, the applicant must adduce
Case 258/84R supra.
Case 260/85R supra.
Case 258/84R Nippon Seiko v. Council supra at 4362; Case
77/87R Technointorg v. Council supra at 1973.
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evidence that the balance of the interests at stake weighs in its
favour, in the sense that the grant of the interim measures requested
would not cause appreciable injury to the Community industry^.
1.2.1. The Damage Suffered must be Special
to the Applicant
In analysing this criterion, a distinction has to be drawn between
interim measures aimed at suspending provisional anti-dumping
duties; suspending definitive anti-dumping duties; and suspending
the definitive collection of provisional anti-dumping duties.
1.2.1.1. Provisional Duties
In Raznoimport v. Commission^ the applicant sought the
suspension of an anti-dumping Regulation imposing a provisional
duty. It contended that the damage to it consisted of the risk that
the patterns of trade established by it may be disrupted as a result
of the obligation during the validity of the provisional duty to
provide security at the time of entry of the imported nickel.
The problem facing Raznoimport was that the duty was only
provisional. It did not need to be paid until it was made
definitive. All that required to be done was to provide security
which would be reimbursed if the applicant was successful in the main
application. In considering whether the damage suffered by the
applicant was special to it, the Court pointed to the fact that it
must have regard to the specific features of the procedure in
question. It held that:
It must be emphasised that, under the procedure established
by Regulation (EEC) No. 3017/79, the Council will shortly
have to decide both whether to impose a definitive duty and
whether to collect definitively the provisional duty.
e.g. Case 250/85R Brother Industries v. Council supra.
Case 120/83R supra.
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Although that does not in itself exclude the possibility of
suspending the operation of the contested measures, the
Court must, however, in proceedings for the adoption of
interim measures, take account of the specific features of
the procedure in question and of the powers which the
Council will have to exercise within the prescribed period,
after it has been given full information, in particular in
the light of what has emerged during these proceedings for
the adoption of interim measures^.
Because it was a provisional duty, the Court ruled that the
Commission was under an obligation not only to continue its
investigation but to monitor from day to day any change in prices on
the market of the product which was subject to the provisional duty,
in order to determine whether it was necessary to maintain that duty
or the rate thereof. The Court noted that:-
in view of the characteristic features of the market of the
product in question, the risk of any lasting disruption of
the patterns of trade as a result of the maintenance of the
provisional duty is small. It has not been established
that the applicant will be unable to avoid such damage by
adopting measures consistent with the obligation to
cooperate which is incumbent upon it in order to mitigate
the alleged damage^.
The Court concluded by stating that the damage facing the applicant
was limited to the burden constituted by the provision of security
for the payment of provisional duties. This cost was estimated at
1-2 per cent of the amount of the provisional duty. The Court in
this respect held that this:
disadvantage cannot constitute serious and irreparable
damage such as would permit the suspension of a decision
adopted in the context of a complex economic situation.
Any damage which may occur can, if appropriate, be made good





ibid. at 2579, paragraph 12 of Order.
ibid. at 2580, paragraph 14 of Order.
ibid., paragraph 15 of Order.
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In essence, the damage which the applicant claimed to have suffered is
of a kind which may generally occur whenever a provisional duty is
imposed.
The Court was again faced with an application in Technointorg v.
Commission for the suspension of a Regulation imposing provisional
anti-dumping duties^. It began by stating that, as the contested
Regulation in the main action was itself a provisional measure forming
part of the procedure laid down by Regulation 2176/84, the application
for interim measures must be examined in the light of the procedure
laid down in that Regulation^. The Court then proceeded to
examine Articles 11 and 12 of the aforesaid Regulation which governed
the imposition of provisional duties^ and held that:
The procedure laid down by the Regulation therefore implies
that the Council will shortly have to decide both whether a
definitive duty is to be imposed and whether the provisional
duty is to be definitively collected. It must therefore be
stated that to grant the applicant's request that the
payment of the provisional duty should be suspended until
the Court has given judgment on the main application, on
condition that it provides a guarantee equivalent to the
amount of the duty, would be tantamount to depriving the
Council of the power conferred upon it by the aforesaid
Article 12 to decide whether the provisional duty should be
definitively collected and to depriving that decision of any
practical effect-^.
The Court came to the view that the damage suffered by the applicant
was limited to the cost of providing a guarantee for a period of four
months. It held that this could not constitute serious and
Case 294/86R [1986] ECR 3979.
ibid, at 3986, paragraph 21 of Order.
See Chapter 3, Section 7.3.3. of anti-dumping rules, supra.
Case 294/86R supra at 3987, paragraph 25 of Order.
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irreparable damage. In this respect it referred to its decision in
Raznoimport.
In Enital v. Council and Commission the Commission imposed
provisional anti-dumping duties following a review by it of the price
undertakings. The applicant sought to have the effect of this
Regulation suspended. It claimed inter alia that the Community
institutions' decision to fix the date of entry for the coming into
force of the contested measures at their date of publication amounted
in fact to giving them retroactive effect, and that it caused them
serious and irreparable damage because it had already determined its
commercial policy on the basis of price undertakings already
accepted-^. The Court held that, by virtue of Article 191, the
Treaty permitted the institutions adopting the Regulation to lay down
therein the date on which it was to enter into force^?. The Court
further held:
That provisional anti-dumping duties should enter into force
immediately would appear to follow from the provisional and
protective nature of such duties which, in the terms of
Article 11 of Council Regulation No. 2176/84, are imposed in
order to prevent injury being caused to the Community during
the anti-dumping proceeding. It does not appear likely to
cause serious and irreparable damage to the applicant-^.
The applicant had therefore failed to show to the satisfaction of the
Court that it would suffer serious and irreparable damage.
It is submitted that, having regard to recent case-law of the Court,
if the application for interim measures involves the suspension of a
Regulation imposing provisional duties, the Court is unlikely to
grant them. This is even more so the case where the damage




Case 304/86R supra, at 271, paragraph 14 of Order.
ibid, at 272, paragraph 16 of Order.
ibid. at 272-3, paragraph 16 of Order.
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providing a guarantee or security for the duration of the validity of
the provisional duties.
1.2.1.2. Definitive Duties
In Nippon Seiko v. Council-^ the applicants sought to have a
Regulation imposing definitive anti-dumping duties suspended until
the main application was heard with the result that only a security
for later payment would be required.
The applicant contended that it was suffering serious and irreparable
damage on the ground that it was losing substantial sums by way of
interest on the duty. This interest could not be recouped on the
grounds that there was no specific Community legislation providing
for the payment of interest on the repayment of anti-dumping
duties'^. The Council on the other hand argued that this damage
could not be regarded as serious. The effect of a definitive
anti-dumping duty was to bring about an increase in prices. This
would not occur if the definitive duties were suspended. The Court
concluded that the Council and the Commission had demonstrated that
the:
adoption of the interim measures applied for would cause
substantial harm to the European Economic Community, in that
merely to require the lodging of a security as proposed by
the applicant would have considerably less protective effect
than the levying of the anti-dumping duty itself. Such a
Case 258/84R supra.
It has been suggested that Court might have the power under
Article 176 or Article 215(2) to order the payment of
interest when duties under a Regulation which has been
annulled are refunded. If this is the case then an
important argument for the suspension of duties is deprived
of its basis. See Temple Lang "Judicial Review of Trade
Safeguard Measures in the European Community" in (ed.) B.
Hawk 'Antitrust and Trade Policy in the United States and
the European Community', Fordham University School of Law
at 669.
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step would not take the interests of the Community's own
industry sufficiently into account and would be apt to
frustrate the purpose of the Regulation itself. Further¬
more the damage allegedly suffered by the applicant is not
special to it but, on the contrary, is likely to arise in
every case where anti-dumping duties are imposed. There is
therefore no special feature of this case which would
justify the interim measures requested^.
In the Electronic Typewriter Cases'^ the Court noted that the
parties had taken opposing views and submitted different figures on
the level of prices and market shares of the European industry and
its Japanese competitors. It held that:
In interim proceedings it is impossible for the President of
the Court, without prejudging the substance of the case, to
accept figures submitted by one party in preference to those
submitted by the other, unless, as is not the case here,
there are other factors weighing in favour of one party's
view^.
The Court also noted that it had a similar dilemma when determining
whether the export price and normal value were compared at the same
level of trade. In these circumstances and on the basis of the
principle that, in case of doubt an applicant must prove that his
allegations are well founded, the Court concluded that they had not
adduced sufficient evidence establishing that they would suffer
serious and irreparable damage.
In Technointorg v. Council^ the applicant sought to have the
definitive duties suspended pending the Court's judgment in the main
proceedings, on condition that it continued to provide security for
Case 258/84R supra at 4361-2, paragraphs 19-20 of Order.
supra, footnote 16.
e.g. Case 273/85R Silver Seiko Ltd. v. Council & Commission
[1985] ECR 3475 at paragraph 17 of Order.
Case 77/87R [1987] ECR 1793.
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the performance of its obligation in the amount it was required to
pay under Council Regulation 29/87.
As stated above, the applicant had already sought to have the
provisional anti-dumping duties suspended on condition that it
provided a security. The Court dismissed that application on two
grounds. First, to grant the applicant's request to suspend the
provisional duties until the main application had been determined
would have been tantamount to depriving the Council of the power
conferred on it by Article 12 of Regulation 2176/84. Second, the
President also came to the conclusion that the damage suffered by the
applicant was limited to the cost of providing security for a period
of four months, and that such a disadvantage could not constitute
serious and irreparable damage to it^-*. In the present case the
applicant, in demonstrating the urgency of the application, sought to
describe the effects which were inherent in the imposition of
anti-dumping duties, namely a rise in the price of its products and a
diminution of its market share.
The Court concluded that the applicant had not shown that the damage
suffered by it as a result of the imposition of the anti-dumping duty
was special to it. It held that:
It is in the very nature of anti-dumping duties that they
should result in an increase in the price of the product in
question because their purpose is to counterbalance the
dumping margin which has been established and to protect the
Community industry against the injury caused by dumping"^.
The Court concluded by stating that:
The damage which [the applicant] claims to suffer is of a
kind which may generally occur whenever a definitive




Case 294/86R Technointorg v. Commission [1986] ECR 3979.
Case 77/87R supra at 1799 at paragraph 16 of Order.
ibid. at 1800 paragraph 19 of Order.
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It is submitted that definitive anti-dumping duties are unlikely to
be suspended by the Court as an interim measure, even if future
payment in the shape of bank guarantees are offered, given the recent
pronouncements of the Court.
1.2.1.3. Definitive Collection of Provisional Duties
In the very first dumping case to come before the Court, a number
of Japanese manufacturers of ballbearings lodged applications to have
Article 3 of Council Regulation 1778/77, ordering the definitive
collection of provisional duties, suspended^.
In NTN Toyo Bearing Co. Ltd. v. Council the applicants were prepared
to maintain bank guarantees in force and for this reason did not see
why it was necessary to insist on the immediate implementation of
Article 3 of Regulation 1778/77. They argued that the immediate
payment of the sums demanded would lead to additional financing
costs, with the result that they could not be sure of recovering
interest on the sum paid in the event of being successful in the main
action^®. The Court held that:
It has not been possible to establish conclusively within
the context of the present proceedings whether, in the event
of NTN's being successful in the main action this
expenditure would be wholly recouped. Having regard to the
probable duration of the procedure in the main action,
charges at the rate quoted by the applicant cannot be
regarded as negligible^®.
Case 113/77R NTN Toyo Bearing Co. Ltd. v. Council [1977]
ECR 1721. See also Case 121/77R Nachi Fujikoshi v.
Council [1977] ECR 2107. " "
Case 113/77R ibid, at 1723.
ibid. at 1725, paragraphs 5-6 of Order.
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For these reasons it was prepared to order the suspension of the
obligation to pay the provisional duties, on condition that the bank
guarantees were maintained.
1.2.2. The Balance of Interests
In the most recent anti-dumping cases involving interim measures,
the Court has balanced the harm that would be caused to the applicant
if the interim measures applied for are refused against that to the
defendant if they are allowed.
In Nippon Seiko v. Council^ the applicant sought the suspension of
definitive duties on the ground that the loss of interest on the duty
would constitute irreparable damage, even though the duties would be
refunded if the applicant was successful in the main application.
The Council argued that the provision of a security would not
adequately protect the interests of the Community industry. It
argued that the purpose of an anti-dumping duty is to increase the
price of the imported products to eliminate the effects of dumping.
This purpose could not be achieved by means only of a security^.
On the question of balancing the interests involved, the Court held
that:
The Council and Commission have been able to demonstrate
that the adoption of the interim measures applied for would
cause substantial harm to the European Economic Community,
in that merely to require the lodging of security as
proposed by the applicant would have considerably less
protective effect than the levying of the anti-dumping duty
itself. Such a step would not take the interests of the
Community's own industry sufficiently into account and would





Case 258/84R [1984] ECR 4357.
ibid, at 4359-60.
ibid, at 4361, paragraph 19 of Order.
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In the Electronic Typewriter cases^ the Community authorities
argued that the damage suffered by Community industry as a result of
undercutting by the applicants in the prices of their electronic
typewriters was considerable, and that suspension of the definitive
duties would undoubtedly result in the destruction of a part of the
Community industry. The Court held that, in the absence of reliable
and uncontested evidence to the contrary, the adoption of the interim
measures applied for would cause appreciable damage to European
industry^.
Finally, in Technointorg v. Council^ the Court stressed that, in
proving "serious and irreparable damage", the applicant must adduce
evidence showing not only that the damage suffered is special to it
but also that the balance of interests points in their favour. The
applicant had adduced no such evidence. The Court stated, however,
that:
The Council and Commission, on the other hand, have shown that
the adoption of the interim measure requested would cause
appreciable injury to the interests of the European Economic
Community. The mere requirement of a security, for which the
applicant is arguing, would have considerably less protective
effect than the collection of the anti-dumping duty itself, and
hence such a measure would not take sufficient account of the
interests of the Community industry and would be liable to
nullify the effect intended by the imposition of a definitive
anti-dumping duty-^.
supra, at footnote 16.
e.g. Case 278/85R Silver Seiko Ltd. v. Council & Commission
supra at 3841, paragraph 18 of Order.
Case 77/87R supra at paragraph 17 of Order.
ibid, at 1799/1800 paragraph 18 of Order.
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2. INTERIM MEASURES AND
OTHER SAFEGUARD MEASURES
The principles expounded by the Court in the anti-dumping cases
where there has been an application to have those duties suspended
would apply equally to applications to have countervailing duties or
measures under Regulations 288/82 and 2641/84 suspended. This will
undoubtedly depend on whether the applicants have the requisite locus
standi to challenge these duties or measures. The applicants must
also adduce sufficient evidence to satisfy the Court that there is a
prima facie case for the granting of interim measures, and that those
measures are necessary and urgent, balancing the interests concerned
in order to avoid "serious and irreparable" damage being caused to
the applicant. It should be emphasised, however, that the Court may
be slow to suspend the operation of quantitative restrictions for to
do so would leave Community industry unprotected and would also
prejudge the ultimate result of the main application before it.
3. CONCLUSION
On the application of a natural or legal person who is seeking to
have a Community measure annulled, the Court may by virtue of
Articles 185 and 186 prescribe any necessary interim measures it
considers appropriate in the case, in order to preserve the status
quo pending the decision on the substance of the case. In order to
obtain an order for interim measures it is necessary for an
undertaking to show that it has fulfilled the following
pre-conditions:-
(1) a prima facie case; and
(2) that the measures requested are urgent in the sense
that there is a "serious and irreparable" damage being
caused to the applicant. "Serious and irreparable"
damage has been further defined by the Court in that
the applicant must show that:-
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(a) the damage suffered by it is special to it; and
(b) the balance of interests weigh in its favour in
the sense that the granting of the interim
measures requested would not cause appreciable
injury to the Community industry concerned.
The case-law of the Court with respect to safeguard measures has been
concerned with suspension of Regulations imposing anti-dumping
duties. However, the principles expounded by the Court in these
cases would be equally applicable to applications for interim
measures involving the other safeguard measures.
To date there have been very few successful cases. The case-law can
be divided into three potential categories where an applicant would
wish to have the effects of a Regulation imposing anti-dumping duties
suspended. First, it may wish to have the effects of a Regulation
imposing provisional anti-dumping duties suspended. The cases
however, indicate that an applicant would be unsuccessful in
attempting to have the Regulation suspended. Second, it may wish to
have the effects of a Regulation imposing definitive anti-dumping
even if it was prepared to offer bank guarantees as security pending
the outcome of the main application. Finally, an applicant would be
successful if it sought to have the effects of a Regulation ordering
the definitive collection of provisional anti-dumping duties
suspended.





DA.RT 1 : THE GROUNDS OF
ILLEGALITY: GENERAL
INTRODUCTION
Article 173 enumerates four grounds of illegality. They are:-
1 Lack of competence;
2 Infringement of an essential procedural requirement;
3 Infringement of the Treaty or any rule of law relating
to its application; and
4 Misuse of powers.
These same four grounds are recognised under all three Treaties^.
Some commentators^ have grouped them into two main categories of
illegality. The first category being formal illegality which
encompasses lack of competence and infringement of an essential
procedural requirement; the second category being material
illegality which encompasses infringement of the Treaty or any rule
of law relating to its application and misuse of powers.
Article 38 ECSC and Article 146 Euratom. Under the former
acts of the Council and European Parliament may only be
contested on two grounds i.e. lack of competence or
infringement of an essential procedural requirement.
e.g. Bebr, Development of Judicial Control of the European
Communities (1981) at p. 85.
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Historically, the grounds of illegality are derived from French
administrative law - the equivalent French terms being incompetence,
vice de forme, violation de la loi, and detournement de pouvoir.
The grounds can be defined separately but invariably these
definitions overlap with the result that one set of facts may fall
into more than one category. It will normally be the case that an
illegality falling into either category 1, 2 or 4 will also
constitute an infringement of the Treaty or any rule of law relating
to its application. It does not follow, however, that the converse
will be true.
1 . lack: of competence
This concept covers the situation where the Institution in question
did not have the power to do what it purported to do. The case of
Meroni v. High Authority^ is an example. The Court however
treated it as an infringement of the Treaty. Under Article 58 of
the ECSC Treaty delegation of powers in respect of financial
arrangements had to be precisely defined. The Court found that the
High Authority had delegated powers to a private body giving it a
"degree of latitude which implies a wide margin of discretion'"^.
Such a delegation the Court held could not be regarded as being
compatible with the requirements of the Treaty.
3
4
Case 9/56 [1957-58] ECR 133.
ibid, at 154.
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2 - INFRINGEMENT OF AJSJ ESSENTIAL
PROCEDURAL REQUIREMENT
Infringement of an essential procedural requirement can take many
forms and will often constitute a breach of a general principle such
as the right to be heard. Reference to a few decisions of the Court
will give the reader some idea of the sort of illegality which is
caught under this category. For example, in Roquette Freres v.
Council^ a Council Regulation was annulled by the Court because the
European Parliament had not been consulted.
Infringement of an essential procedural requirement will often come
about as a result of a failure on the part of the Community
authorities to provide an adequate statement of reasons as to why a
particular decision was taken. This is also infringement of the
Treaty (Article 190). In Commission v. Council^ the Commission
challenged two Council Regulations which under the Generalised System
of Preferences (GSP) granted favourable tariffs to developing
countries. The Commission complained that the Council failed to
specify the provisions of the Treaty on which the Regulations were
based as required by Article 190 of the EEC Treaty. The Court held
that it was essential in such a case to do so and that the resultant
failure infringed the requirement in Article 190 to state the reasons
on which the Regulations are based.
As stated above, breach of general principles with respect to the
protection of an individual's right of defence fall into this
category. For example in Transocean Marine Paint Association v.




Case 138/79 [1980] ECR 3333.
Case 45/86 [1987] ECR 1493.
Case 17/74 [1974] ECR 1063.
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a person whose interests are perceptibly affected by a
decision taken by a public authority must be given the
opportunity to make his point of view known^.
In this case conditions were imposed on the grant of exemptions to
undertakings under Article 85(3) without those undertakings having
been heard. The Court stated that an undertaking must be clearly
informed in good time of the conditions which the Commission intends
to be subject to the exemption and it must have the opportunity to
submit its observations to the Commission.
3. INFRINGEMENT OF THE TREATY
OR OF RULES OF LAW RELATING
TO XTS APPLICATION
This is by far the most important ground of illegality under
Article 173. It has been held to include breach of the general
principles common to the laws of the Member States which have been
recognised by the Court. The most important of these are considered
briefly below.
3.1. Fundamental Human Rights
In the Internationale Handelsgesellschaft case the Court held that
"respect for fundamental rights forms an integral part of the general
principles of law protected by the Court of Justice"^. Such
rights put constraints upon the legislative and executive action of
the Institutions when they are applying or are obliged to apply
Community rights and obligations.
ibid, p. 1080, paragraph 15 of Judgment.
Case 11/70 [1970] ECR 1125 at 1134, paragraph 4 of
Judgment.
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3.2. The Principle of Legal Certainty
This principle provides that the application of the law to a
specific situation should be predictable^. Certain other
principles will naturally follow on from this. A legal right once
required should not be withdrawn and more importantly a case should
be judged in the light of the law as it was at the time the event
took place-'-1.
The Court has also recognised the principle that a person is entitled
to act and carry on his business in the reasonable expectation that
the law as it exists will continue to apply^.
3.3. The Principle of Proportionality
This principle is aimed at ensuring that the means used in a given
situation are not disproportionate to the end to be achieved'-^.
3.4. The Principle of Non-Discrimination
In Ruckdeschel"-^ the Court held that the prohibition of
discrimination "is merely a specific enunciation of the general
principle of equality which is one of the fundamental principles of
Community law. This principle requires that similar situations
shall not be treated differently unless differentiation is
e.g. Case 78/74 Deuka [1975] ECR 421; Cases 66,
127&128/77; Salumi [1980] ECR 1237.
See Case 12/71 Giinther Henck v. Hauptzollamt Emmerich
[1971] ECR 743.
Case 112/77 Topfer v. Commission [1978] ECR 1019.
Case 9/73 Carl Schlulter v. Hauptzollamt Lorrach [1973]
ECR 1135.
Cases 117/76 & 16/77 [1977] ECR 1753.
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objectively justified"^. When the difference in treatment is
objectively justified no discrimination arises^.
3.5. Evaluation of Economic Facts and Circumstances
If the question is one which concerns the validity of Acts of the
Commission in the economic sphere the Court will not as a general
rule evaluate the Commission's findings or interfere with its
discretion except within limited spheres. The Court has held that
it will limit its review to examining whether those findings contain
a manifest error or a misuse of powers or clearly exceeds the bounds
of their discretion^.
A. MISUSE OE EOWERS
This ground of illegality relates to those situations where the
Community authorities had the power to do what they did but used that
power for wrongful purposes-^. This ground of illegality is often
alleged but rarely proved. An example of a case involving a misuse
of powers is Giuffrida v. Council-*-^. This case concerned the
internal competition for the post of principal administrator in the
Council's Directorate for Regional Policy. The Court was advised
that the competition had been held for the sole purpose of remedying
ibid. at 1769, paragraph 7 of Judgment.
Case 88/78 Hauptzollamt Hamburg-Jonas v. Hermann Kendermann
[1978] ECR 2477.
Case 29/77 Roquette Freres v. Administration des Douanes
[1977] ECR 1835.
See Joined Cases 3 and 4/64 Chambre Syndicale de la
Siderurgie Frangaise v. High Authority [1965] ECR 441 at
454/5.
Case 105/75 [1976] ECR 1395 at 1043.
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the anomalous administrative status of a specific official and of
appointing that same official to the post declared vacant. This was
contrary to recruitment procedure as well as internal competition
procedure. The Court held that this constituted a misuse of
powers.
PART 2: SAFEGUARD MEASURES
INTRODUCTION
Almost all the proceedings which have come before the Court to date
concerning safeguard measures involve the Community's anti-dumping
laws. In these circumstances, the analysis of the Court's review of
safeguard measures will concentrate on these laws and in particular
on the application by the Court of the general principles referred to
above and the extent to which it is prepared to review the exercise
of the Commission's discretion where this involves highly complex
economic facts and circumstances.
It will very often be the case that the Court will not consider all
the submissions put forward by the applicants but instead will decide
the case on one ground alone. For these reasons the following
analysis will include an examination of the Advocate-General's
opinion where relevant. Generally speaking the Advocate-General
will consider all the submissions of the parties in reaching his
decision.
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1. LACK OF COMPETENCE
In the Japanese Ballbearing cases, the very first set of
anti-dumping cases to come before the Court^O, a number of the
applicants^ relied on inter alia this ground of illegality in
their submissions.
After an investigation, the Commission adopted Regulation 261/77
imposing a provisional duty of 20 per cent on ballbearings and
tapered roller bearings originating in Japan. On the same date as
the Commission accepted price undertakings from the applicants the
Council adopted Regulation 1778/77 imposing a suspended definitive
duty of 15 per cent as a sanction for their observance. The
applicants sought to have this Regulation annulled.
The lack of competence argument was based on the premise that the
Commission did not have the necessary power to issue Regulation
261/77 imposing provisional duties given that the power to do so in
Article 15 of the parent Regulation, i.e. Regulation 459/68 (now
Regulation 2423/88), was ultra vires^. The applicants were in
actual fact pleading the illegality of the present Regulation namely
Regulation 459/68. The Council disagreed with this on the basis
that the economic objective to be achieved, by the adoption of
provisional duties, was to allow the necessary decisions to be made
within a short period of time and for this reason the Commission
should be allowed to attain this objective. Further, the imposition
Case 113/77 NTN Toyo Bearing Co. Ltd. v. Council [1979] ECR
1185; Case 118/77 Import Standard Office (I.S.O.) v.
Council [1979] ECR 1277; Case 119/77 Nippon Seiko KK &
Ors. v. Council [1979] ECR 1303; Case 120/77 Koyo Seiko
Co. Ltd. & Ors. v. Council and Commission [1979] ECR 1337;
Case 121/77 Nachi Fujikoshi Corpn. & Ors. v. Council [1979]
ECR 1363. ' ~ " ~ ~~ ~
Case 113/77 ibid.; Case 121/77 ibid.
ibid. at 1196 and 1371 respectively.
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of provisional measures by the Commission was in conformity with the
separation of powers laid down in the Treaty^. These submissions
were considered neither by the Court nor Advocate-General Warner.
Lack of competence was also relied upon by the applicants in the
Continentale Produkten Gesellschaft case^ which involved
proceedings in respect of the refund procedure under Article 15 of
Regulation 2176/84.
The applicants sought to show that the Commission had no power to
decide whether they were entitled to refunds as this was a matter for
the national authorities by virtue of Article 15 of Regulation
3017/79. The procedure had commenced under the old legislation,
namely Regulation 3017/79, but during proceedings a new Regulation -
Regulation 2176/84 - had entered into force.
The Commission argued that the new Regulation - Regulation 2176/84 -
applied to proceedings already initiated but not resolved by virtue
of Article 19(2) of said Regulation^. jt referred to the
decision of the Court in the case of Westzuclcer v. Einfuhr- und
Vorratsstelle Zucker*^ as an authority for the proposition that new
legislation applied to situations which arose under earlier
legislation but which as yet had not been resolved.
Advocate-General Darmon in his opinion^ held that the Commission
had obtained its powers from the general provisions in Article 15 of
Regulation 2176/84. Further, a change in the procedural rules
ibid. at 1372-3.
Case 312/84 [1987] ECR 841.
ibid, at 845.
Case 1/73 [1973] ECR 723 at 729.







relating to the decision on the application was merely a matter of
form. The Court agreed with the Advocate-General. It held that:
in general provisions amending an administrative procedure
and appointing the competent authorities are applicable to
pending proceedings and the persons concerned may not claim
to have a "vested right" to have their case dealt with by
the authorities upon whom competence was conferred by the
previous provisions'^.
Given that the role and functions of the institutions are now well
established under the various safeguard measures, this ground of
illegality is likely only to arise when and if new legislation comes
into existence, as seen by the decision of the Court in the
Continentale Produkten Gesellschaft case above.
2. INFRINGEMENT OF ESSENTIAL
PROCEDURAL REQUIREMENTS
In all the cases that have come before the Court involving a review
of the anti-dumping Regulations, the applicants have alleged in one
way or another that there has been an infringement of an essential
procedural requirement. This usually takes the form of an
allegation by the applicants that they have had no opportunity to see
all the information relevant to the defence of their interests or
that the Regulation in question or part of it has not been
sufficiently reasoned.
ibid. at p. 865, paragraph A of Judgment.
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2.1. Defence of Interests and Confidentiality
2.1.1. Defence of Interests
In the first Japanese Ballbearing cases^ some of the applicants
alleged that there had been an infringement of an essential
procedural requirement on the basis that inter alia the Commission
had failed to give them the opportunity to see all the information
which was relevant to the defence of their interests^. The
Council argued that there was no obligation on the part of the
Commission to produce all the evidence on which it had acted or how
it had used that material. The applicants they contended were only
entitled to be appraised of the factual material.
The Court having considered the case on other grounds did not
consider whether the institutions had indeed infringed an essential
procedural requirement. Advocate-General Warner, in his opinion-^
did consider the matter in greater detail. He began by enunciating
the following fundamental principle of Community law that:
before any individual measure or decision is taken, of such
a nature as directly to affect the interests of a particular
person, that person has a right to be heard by the
responsible authority; and it is part and parcel of that
principle that, in order to enable him effectively to
exercise that right, the person concerned is entitled to be
informed of the facts and considerations on the basis of
which the authority is minded to act. That principle,
which is enshrined in many a Judgment of this Court, and
which applies regardless of whether there is a specific
legislative text requiring its application, was reasserted
supra at footnote 20.
See e.g. Case 121/77 Nachi Fujikoshi Corpn. v. Council
[1979] ECR 1363 at p. 1371.
Case 113/77 & Ors. supra p. 1212 et seq.
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by the Court only yesterday in case 85/76 Hoffmann-La Roche
& Co. AG v. Commission-^.
The Advocate-General stated that the Commission's duty was to tell
the applicants, as clearly and as fully as the circumstances
permitted, what its case against them was^. He considered,
however, that the right to be heard was subject to the general
proviso that it must be compatible with the requirements of good
administration. This did not mean that the Commission were not
obliged to explain to the applicants in a satisfactory manner why so
restrictive an interpretation of the exporter's rights was
necessitated by practical considerations^. He agreed that regard
should be had to the provisions relating to confidential information
but did not see that this prevented each of the applicants making
representations on the question of their own alleged dumping^.
The Advocate-General concluded that there had been an infringement of
an essential procedural requirement within the meaning of that phrase
in Article 173 of the Treaty.
In the Second Allied case^ the applicants complained that they
were not informed of the main facts and considerations on the basis
of which it was intended to recommend to the Council the imposition
of definitive duties and the definitive collection of the amounts
secured by means of a provisional duty. They alleged that an
exporter should be allowed the opportunity to question the
Commission's interpretation of the information provided, even if that
information comes mainly from the exporter in question ^. The
32 ibid. at 1261.
33 ibid. at 1265.
34 ibid. at 1262-3.
35 ibid. at 1263.
36 Case 53/83 [1985] ECR 1621.
37 ibid. at 1645.
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Council contended that two of the three applicants did not request
information. Furthermore Allied was informed of the essential
factors taken into account and in particular the method of
determining normal value, as indeed were the other applicants. The
rights of defence afforded to applicants in competition matters they
argued could not be transposed to the anti-dumping field since the
Community authorities have no power to require the production of
information ^8. Information could only be provided in reply to a
request, the submission of which was subject to precise rules and
time limits.
Advocate-General VerLoren van Themaat held that in his opinion it was
sufficient that the information was provided to the applicants in
order to allow them to present argument on the decisive points at
issue. The applicants right of defence had not therefore been
infringed-^.
The rights of defence argument was also relied upon by the applicants
in Technointorg v. Commission and Council^. The Commission had
based its findings on the information available in view of the fact
that the exporters had failed to co-operate with their investigation.
The applicants denied that they had refused to co-operate with the
Commission stating that it had failed to request information or even
indicate the usefulness of providing such information, with the




Joined cases 294/86 and 77/87 [1988] ECR 6077.
ibid, at 6082.
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The Council in reply contended that the Commission was perfectly
entitled to base their findings on the information available
especially when the exporters had failed to complete the
questionnaire sent to them. They pointed to the fact that the
Commission did not have the power to carry out compulsory inspections
of the exporters premises outside the Community. For this reason
there was a need for full information and full co-operation
especially since the Commission had to consider whether undertakings
offered were acceptable^.
The Court concurred with Advocate-General Slynn who upheld the
Council's submission that the Commission were entitled to proceed on
the basis of the information available.
In conclusion, a number of propositions can be gleaned from the
jurisprudence of the Court to date. It is submitted that there is a
duty on the Community authorities to inform the applicants as clearly
and as fully, what the case against them is. In so doing it is
sufficient for the Community authorities to provide enough
information in order to enable the applicant to present an argument
on the decisive points at issue. It is a fundamental principle of
Community law that a person is entitled to a fair hearing. This
right to be heard, however, must be compatible with the requirements
of good administration. This, it should be emphasised, does not
mean that the Community authorities are freed from providing
sufficient explanation as to why such a restrictive interpretation of
an applicant's rights of defence are required by practical
considerations. Finally, an applicant's right of defence will not





The right to examine all information in order to defend one's
interests and the right to business confidentiality require to be
reconciled. These two conflicting objectives while giving rise to
an uncertain legal position have major implications when it comes to
the question of judicial review.
Interested parties have under each of the safeguard measures the
right to have information treated as confidential if certain
conditions are satisfied^ and the corresponding right to
information in order to defend their interests'^. Article 8(l)(a)
of Regulation 2423/88 provides that neither the Council, Commission
nor the Member States shall reveal any confidential information with
regard to an anti-dumping or anti-subsidy investigation without the
permission from the party submitting such information.
"Confidentiality" covers only information whose "disclosure is likely
to have a significantly adverse effect upon the supplier or the
source of such information'"^. To have information treated as
confidential it must be requested, justified and accompanied by a
"non-confidential summary of the information or a statement of the
reasons why the information is not susceptible of such summary"^.
If the information is not justified as confidential and the supplier
does not want it disclosed it can be disregarded but cannot be
disclosed"^. Likewise if a non-confidential summary can be made
and the supplier refuses, the information can be disregarded.
See generally, Chapter 3 Section 7.2.1. Anti-Dumping Rules.
Section 2.1.1. supra.
Article 8(3) Regulation 2423/88.
Article 8(2)(b) Regulation 2423/88.
Article 8(4) Regulation 2423/88.
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Regulation 2423/88 allows disclosure of the following information:
general information
the reasons on which decisions are based in terms of the
Regulation
the evidence relied on by the Community institutions to
the extent that this is required in order to explain
those reasons to the Court.
The Court first considered the question of confidentiality in
Celanese Chemical Company Inc. v. Council and Commission1^. The
applicant sought to claim confidentiality in relation to five
categories of information which it regarded as forming part of its
business secrets and which concerned sales prices; the structure of
production costs; the identity of certain customers; the quantities
sold; and market shares. They referred to the fact that as the
undertakings concerned were outwith the jurisdiction of the Community
authorities they could only be expected to co-operate on condition
that guarantees were given with respect to confidential information
where their business secrets were concerned.
The Court held that:
The request for confidential treatment put forward by the
applicant is accepted. Protection of the business secrets
of undertakings under investigation in anti-dumping
proceedings must take account of the special nature of such
investigations'^.
The Court also stated that, in the event of the Council and
Commission refusing to apply confidential treatment to the documents
to be examined, the applicant must have the chance to withdraw
48
49
Case 236/81 [1982] ECR 1183.
ibid. at 1186, paragraph 9 of Judgment.
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them^. Finally, the Court held that it reserved the right to
decide the use to which it makes of the confidential information
where it conflicts with its duty to state reasons for its judgment or
that imposed upon the Advocate-General to deliver his opinion in
public. If such an event does arise the Court can exclude from its
file any such document or part thereof. In so doing, however, the
Court will take into account, when deciding the case, the exclusion
of such material^.
The Court's most important pronouncement on the question of
confidentiality was its decision in Timex Corporation v. Council and
Commission-^. Timex argued that the Commission refused to supply
it with information gathered from Hong Kong undertakings which had
been selected as reference undertakings for the determination of
constructing the normal value. Such information it argued was
relevant in terms of Article 7(4)(a) of Regulation 3017/79 to the
defence of its interests^. The Community authorities in reply
contended that Article 7(4)(a) related only to the parties to the
investigation and in this respect the Hong Kong undertakings were
not-^.
Secondly, Timex alleged that the Commission had failed to supply
samples of watch dials and cases. The Community authorities argued
that Article 7(4)(c) only required them to supply information and not
samples. It further alleged in this respect such information was
ibid. at 1186-7, paragraph 11 of Judgment.
ibid, at 1187, paragraph 13 of Judgment.




not given with the result that it was impossible for it to obtain
useful samples^.
Thirdly, Timex claimed that the Commission merely sent it a list of
the items made and assembled in Hong Kong without prices. Article 8
of Regulation 3017/79, they argued, could not be invoked on the
grounds that the protection of business confidentiality should be
limited to what was strictly necessary. This was not the case here
since the information from the Hong Kong authorities could have been
disclosed to it in other ways without disclosing confidential
information^. qn reply to this submission the Community
authorities argued that in order to secure the co-operation of
undertakings in non-member countries it was necessary to respect
business confidentiality or their sources of information would dry
up. Whilst Article 8 attempted to reconcile the requirements of
information and business confidentiality it required nevertheless
strict observance of such confidentiality. They considered that the
alternatives proposed by Timex were impracticable given that the
prices of the reference undertakings were similar-*^.
The Court concluded that the Community authorities' interpretation of
Article 7(4)(a) of Regulation 3017/79 was too restrictive. It held
that:
the aim of Article 7(4)(a) of Regulation No. 3017/79 is to
ensure that the traders or manufacturers concerned may
inspect the information gathered by the Commission during
the investigation so that they may effectively put forward
their points of view. However, the protection of rights
guaranteed by that provision must where necessary be
reconciled with the principle of confidentiality, which is
given general recognition in Article 214 of the EEC Treaty,








No. 3017/79 concerned, specifically laid down in Article 8
of that Regulation^®.
The Court held further that:
The expression 'any party to the investigation1 in Article
7(4)(a) of Regulation No. 3017/79 must be interpreted as
meaning not only the parties which are the subject of the
investigation but also the parties whose information has
been used, as in this case, to calculate the normal value of
the relevant products, since such information is just as
relevant to the defence of the complainants' interests as
the information supplied by the undertakings carrying out
the dumping^.
With reference to the second argument the Court was of the view that
the Commission had a duty either to make samples available to the
applicant or, failing that, to provide the information requested to
enable the applicant to identify the items in question^.
Advocate-General Darmon in his opinion qualified the Community
authorities' argument that respecting business confidentiality was
necessary in order to secure the co-operation of undertakings in
non-member countries when he held that:
Nobody denies that the voluntary cooperation of undertakings
in non-member countries is indispensible for the conduct of
an investigation since their consent is needed in order to
obtain the information sought. Nevertheless, in securing
such cooperation, the rules governing the right to be heard
according to all the parties must be respected, otherwise
the Regulation would not have required them to request
confidential treatment beforehand^.
The Court concluded that there had been a breach of an essential
procedural requirement rejecting the Community authorities'
ibid, at 868-9, paragraph 24 of Judgment.
ibid, at 869, paragraph 25 of Judgment.
ibid. at 869, paragraph 27 of Judgment, emphasis added.
ibid, at 857.
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contention that the information concerning the prices of the items
assembled in Hong Kong were confidential. It held that:-
The Community institutions are bound by Article 214 of the
EEC Treaty to respect the principle of confidential
treatment of information about undertakings, particularly
about undertakings in non-member countries which have
expressed their readiness to cooperate with the Commission,
even if no express request for such treatment is received
under Article 8 of Regulation No. 3017/79. That
obligation, however, must be interpreted in such a way that
the rights provided by Article 7(4)(a) of that Regulation
are not deprived of their substance.
It follows that in the present case the Commission ought to
have made every effort, as far as was compatible with the
obligation not to disclose business secrets, to provide the
applicant with information relevant to the defence of its
interests, choosing, if necessary on its own initiative, the
appropriate means of providing such information. Mere
disclosure of the items referred to in the calculation of
the normal value without any figures does not satisfy those
imperative requirements. That conclusion is all the more
warranted in view of the fact that the normal value was
determined on the basis of the constructed value of the like
product, within the meaning of Article 2(5)(b) of Regulation
No. 3017/79, so that Timex was entirely dependent for the
defence of its interests on the factors on which the
Commission based its calculation^.
This meant that Article 1 of the Regulation in question was void.
The applicant sought not to have it declared void but to have a
higher duty substituted. The Court allowed the provision to be
maintained in terms of Article 174(2) of the EEC Treaty until the
Community authorities adopted the necessary measure needed to comply
with the judgment.
Article 13(3) of Regulation 2423/88 states that the amount of the
duty to be imposed should not exceed the dumping margin and therefore
should be less if such lesser duty would be adequate to remove
ibid. at 870-1, paragraphs 29-30 of Judgment.
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injury. In the Second Allied case^ the Court held that an
exporter or producer knows that he can reduce the duty if he can
prove to the satisfaction of the Court that the injury caused is less
than the margin of dumping. It will be the case, however, that its
access to such information is more often than not subject to
Article 8 of Regulation 2423/88 allowing confidential treatment of
such information if requested.
In concluding, it is submitted that the principle of confidential
treatment of information about undertakings and in particular
undertakings in non-member countries which have co-operated with the
Community authorities, must be respected. However, this principle
must always be reconciled with the right of an interested party to
examine all information relevant to the defence of their interests.
As discussed above, the Court suggested in Timex that more
information should be given though the duty of disclosure does not
reach the standard required in competition cases^. It may be
that in order to ensure that the defence of an applicant's interests
are fully protected a system of disclosing information to lawyers
under a form of confidentiality bond like the system that exists in
the United States, may be required.
2.2. The Statement of Reasons
In almost all the anti-dumping proceedings brought before the Court
the applicants have argued that the measure imposing either




Case 264/82 supra at 870, paragraph 30 of Judgment.
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in one way or another. In the Mini Ballbearing cases^ the Court
in rejecting the applicants submissions that the measure in question
was not sufficiently reasoned reiterated a principle it had
consistently followed and in particular had stated in Nicolet
Instrument v. Hauptzollamt Frankfurt am Main^ that:
The statement of reasons required by Article 190 of the
Treaty must disclose in a clear and unequivocal fashion the
reasoning followed by the Community authority which adopted
the measure in question in such a way as to make the persons
concerned aware of the reasons for the measure and thus
enable them to defend their rights and to enable the Court
A 1
to exercise its supervisory function0'.
In Gestetner Holdings pic v. Council & Commission^ the applicant
contended that by simply referring to its traditional practice of not
accepting undertakings from importers the Commission had failed to
comply with the requirements of Article 190. The Court reiterated
the above principle and held that the requirements of Article 190 had
been satisfied. The practice of not accepting undertakings offered
by importers was based on Article 10 of Regulation 2176/84 and
Article 7 of the GATT Anti-Dumping Code. Since the photocopiers
were purchased for importation, the reasons for justifying the
refusal for undertakings offered by importers were applicable*^.
Case 240/84 NTN Toyo Bearing Co. Ltd. & Ors. v. Council
[1987] ECR 1809; Case 255/84 Nachi Fujikoshi Corp. v.
Council [1987] ECR 1861; Case 256/84 Koyo Seiko Co. Ltd.
v. Council [1987] ECR 1899; Case 258/84 Nippon Seiko KK v.
Council [1987] ECR 1923; Case 260/84 Minebea Co. Ltd. v.
Council [1987] ECR 1975.
Case 203/85 [1986] ECR 2049.
See for example Case 240/84 supra at 1857, paragraph 31 of
Judgment; Case 256/84 supra at 1919, paragraph 29 of




Case 156/87 [1990] 1 CMLR 820.
ibid, at 851-852.
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In determining whether there are sufficient reasons, the Court will
invariably take into account the nature of the measure in question,
the power exercised, and the extent to which the applicants have
co-operated with the Community authorities. In the First Allied
case^ the Commission imposed a provisional duty on imports of
certain chemical fertilizers originating in the United States upon
the withdrawal of price undertakings by the applicants. The duty
was based on information available when the undertakings were
withdrawn.
The applicants alleged that the Commission had infringed an essential
procedural requirement in that the duty to state reasons on which the
measure was based was not discharged by the fact that it was taken as
a matter of urgency. It was, they argued, necessary to state the
reasons on which the condition of urgency itself was based. The
statement of reasons must be sufficient, consistent, relevant and
must be such as to allow the Court to exercise its power of
review'' ^.
The Commission replied by stating that the measure in question was
based on Article 10(6) of Regulation 3017/79 and therefore it was
permitted to apply the provisional measures on the basis of the
information available to it. The statement of reasons, it argued,
had to be consistent with the nature of the measure in question and
the power exercised. In fact, argued the Commission, it could refer
to the reasons stated in the earlier measures^.
The Court did not expressly deal with the question of whether there








preferring to base its decision on other grounds. By holding,
however, that the Commission was correct in proceeding on the basis
of information available to it when the price undertakings were
given, it could be argued that the Court agreed albeit impliedly with
the Commission that its statement of reasons were sufficient^.
It is submitted that the Court in determining whether the statement
of reasons given are adequate will take into consideration the
attitude of the applicants and their willingness to co-operate during
the investigation.
In the Second Allied case^ the applicants sought to have the
Regulations imposing definitive duties annulled on the ground that
inter alia insufficient reasons were given for the method of
determining normal value''-'. The Commission argued that the choice
of method for determining normal value was chosen as a result of the
applicants' failure to co-operate as a result of which they could not
claim that they did not know the reasons^.
The Advocate-General in his opinion suggested that the statement of
reasons was not adequate but considered that a more adequate
statement of reasons would not have led to a different result^.
The Court held that:
If a firm does not cooperate in an anti-dumping
investigation carried out by the Commission and the
information available does not enable it to establish the
normal value on one of the bases mentioned in Article 2 of







as a basis the prices which the firm undertakes to observe,
which may be considered to be closest to economic reality,
unless the Commission possesses information indicating that
those prices no longer correspond to economic reality'®.
The Court has also recognised that the duty to provide sufficient
reasons must be balanced with the duty not to disclose confidential
information. In Technointorg v. Commission and Council'"^ the
applicants alleged that Article 190 of the EEC Treaty had been
infringed in that there were insufficient reasons given as to why
Community interest should prevail and why a duty of 33 per cent was
required to remove injury^®. The Council contended that the
statement of reasons as to the rate of duty to be imposed was
sufficient. They argued that a more detailed explanation would have
resulted in their having to disclose confidential information
regarding individual Community producers' profitability^l.
The Advocate-General held and the Court concurred that the measure
was sufficiently reasoned to comply with Article 190. They
therefore did not have to consider whether a more detailed
explanation would result in disclosing confidential information.
In conclusion it is submitted that the Court will be satisfied that
Article 190 has been complied with if the statement of reasons
provided by the Community authorities discloses in a clear and
unequivocal manner the reasoning followed by them so as to enable the
affected parties to defend their interests and the Court to exercise
its supervisory jurisdiction. In deciding whether there is
sufficient reasoning the Court will take into account the nature of
the measure in question, the power exercised and the extent to which
ibid, at 1658, paragraph 13 of Judgment.




the applicant has co-operated with the Community authorities.
Further the duty to provide sufficient reasons will have to be
reconciled with the duty not to disclose confidential information.
3. INFRINGEMENT OF THE TREATY OR
RULES RELATING TO ITS APPLICATION
This is by far the most important ground relied on by interested
parties challenging Community acts imposing protective measures. As
stated above the Court has included within this category breaches of
general principles common to the laws of the Member States. The
first part of this Section will concentrate on the extent to which
the Court takes into account these general principles in reviewing
Community safeguard measures. An analysis of the extent to which
provisions of International Agreements such as the GATT can be
invoked by interested parties will also be considered.
Invariably, the adoption of safeguard measures are associated with
investigations of a very complex and technical nature. For this
reason the Community authorities, in exercising their powers, are
endowed with a wide discretion. The second part of this Section
will concentrate on the extent to which the Court is prepared to
review the exercise of such discretion.
3.1. General Principles
3.1.1. Non-Piscrimination
As stated above, the principle of non-discrimination is part of an
overall principle of equality, i.e. similar situations are not to be
treated differently. The applicants have in a number of
anti-dumping cases to date attempted to rely on the principle. It
usually arises as the result of the Commission treating one exporter
differently from another either by imposing a duty or imposing a
lower duty.
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A number of the applicants in the first Japanese Ballbearing
cases^ alleged that this principle had been infringed. In
particular, in Nippon Seiko KK v. Council and Commission*^ the
applicants argued that a provisional duty of 20 per cent was imposed
on products manufactured by themselves and NTN Toyo Bearing Company
Limited whereas only a rate of 10 per cent was imposed on products
manufactured by Koyo and Nachi.
The Regulation imposing definitive duties required the definitive
collection of provisional duties to the extent that they did not
exceed the rate of duty fixed in the definitive Regulation. As a
result of the difference in the provisional duties imposed this meant
collection at a rate of 15 per cent for NTN Toyo Bearing Company
Limited and Nippon Seiko KK on the one hand, and at a rate of 10 per
cent for Koyo and Nachi on the other. The applicants contended that
this was inter alia contrary to a general principle of Community law
namely, the principle of non-discrimination^. The Council in
reply argued that the more lenient treatment of Koyo and Nachi was as
a result of their good fortune on the basis that they could not order
collection of provisional duties on their products at a rate of more
than 10 per cent.
The Court did not consider these submissions, deciding the case on
other grounds. Advocate-General Warner was of the opinion, however,
that no discrimination had taken place. He noted that the principle
meant different treatment of persons in like situations. He
concluded that the situation of Koyo and Nachi differed from that of
Nippon Seiko KK and NTN Toyo Bearing Company Limited. It was clear,
he argued, that the Council would have collected provisional duties
supra at footnote 20.
See Case 119/77 supra; see also Case 113/77 NTN Toyo
Bearing Co. Ltd. supra.
Case 119/77 ibid, at 1316.
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at a rate of 15 per cent on the products of Koyo and Nachi if it had
been possible to do so^.
In Technointorg v. Council and Commission*^ the applicants alleged
that the Community authorities had breached the general principle of
non-discrimination by refusing to accept the undertakings offered by
them while at the same time accepting those from the Yugoslav and
East German exporters. The Council in reply contended that the
undertakings were defective. They argued that the price increases
were insufficient to eliminate injury. Further, full price
increases were not due to take place until 1989/90 when the
applicant's new factory was to go into production.
The Court held that:
the fact that the Commission refused to accept undertakings
offered by Technointorg although it did accept undertakings
offered by the exporters from the German Democratic Republic
and Yugoslavia does not constitute arbitrary discrimination.
As is stated in Recital 34 of the provisional regulation,
the undertakings offered by those exporters had the effect
of raising prices by an amount sufficient to eliminate the
injury, and it was possible to ensure that those under¬
takings were actually adhered to*^.
The Court, having noted the reasons put forward by the Commission for
refusing the undertakings agreed with the Council that the
undertakings were inadequate and the conditions necessary to enable
the Commission to verify whether they were adhered to were not
satisfied.
In deciding whether the Community authorities have treated an





Joined cases 294/86 and 77/87, supra.
ibid. at 6118, paragraph 49 of Judgment.
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other parties under investigation the Court will take into account
the degree of discretion accorded to them. In Silver Seiko v.
Council^ normal value for the applicants was established on the
basis of domestic prices as there were sufficient sales on the
domestic market. Silver Seiko argued that they had been
discriminated as against those undertakings which had insufficient
sales on the domestic market. For those undertakings, the lowest
profit margin, i.e. that established for Canon Inc. was used in
constructing a normal value.
The Court rejected this argument and held that:
the situation of Silver Seiko for which a real profit margin
was established, cannot be regarded as identical to that of
TEC and Sharp, with respect to which, in the absence of real
information, a degree of discretion had necessarily to be
accorded to the institutions^.
In two of the Electronic Typewriter cases - TEC v. Council^ and
Sharp v. Council^ - the applicants alleged that the Community
authorities had breached the principle of non-discrimination by
failing to impose a provisional duty on Nakajima All & Co. Ltd. In
TEC v. Council, they contended that in calculating the normal value
applicable to their products, the profit margin used was
discriminatory since it was much higher than that established for
Nakajima whose circumstances in Tec's opinion were wholly comparable
Q?
to its own^ . The Council in reply argued that Nakajima was
different from the other undertakings subject to the investigations.
It argued that it was basically a factory operation making a limited
Joined cases 273/85 and 107/86 [1988] ECR 5927.
ibid. at 5976, paragraph 18 of Judgment.
Joined cases 260/85 and 106/86 [1988] ECR 5855.
Case 301/85 [1988] ECR 5813.
Joined cases 260/85 and 106/86 supra at 5863.
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number of products which were sold to a limited number of
01
customers^.
In his opinion^ Advocate-General Slynn agreed with the Council in
concluding that there was no discrimination between the applicants
and Nakajima. He held that Nakajima was in essence a factory
without a conventional sales force or sales structure. It would be
unreasonable to apply the same profit margin for a company with
different characteristics^.
More importantly, in its judgment the Court held that:
discrimination in favour of Nakajima could not, even if it
were established, lead to the annulment of the Regulation
imposing a definitive anti-dumping duty on TEC, which was
adopted on the basis of findings correctly made in the
course of the anti-dumping investigation and in accordance
with the rules laid down by Regulation No. 2176/84^.
The principle cannot be invoked where the Community authorities are
not responsible for the difference in treatment of persons in like
situations. In Nashua Corporation v. Council & Commission^ the
applicant claimed that the Council had infringed the principle
prohibiting discrimination by applying anti-dumping duties at a
standard rate to all imports of plain paper photocopiers. This
resulted in it paying a higher duty in absolute terms than a related
manufacturer of a Japanese subsidiary. The Court held that the
difference resulted not from the imposition of anti-dumping duties
ibid, at 5865.
ibid. at 5884 et seq.
ibid. at 5893.
ibid. at 5918, paragraph 18 of Judgment. The Court
reached a similar conclusion in Case 301/85 Sharp v.
Council supra.
Cases 133 and 150/87 [1990] 2 CMLR 6.
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but from the exporter's sales policy of selling at lower prices to
its subsidiaries in the Community than the price it sold to
Nashua®^.
The principle of non-discrimination means that persons in like or
identical situations should not be treated differently. This is a
matter to be decided on facts of each case. In determining whether
there has been a breach of the principle, the Court will take into
account the discretion accorded to the Community authorities. Most
importantly, the Court has indicated that different treatment may not
necessarily lead to an annulment of a Regulation imposing definitive
anti-dumping duties where these duties have been imposed as a result
of findings correctly made.
3.1.2. Legal Certainty
The principle of legal certainty is aimed at ensuring that the law
to be applied to a given situation is predictable. There are a
number of other principles which flow from this, in particular that a
person should be able to act in the reasonable expectation that the
law as it exists will continue to apply.
In the first Japanese Ballbearing cases^ one of the applicants,
Import Standards Office^®®, sought to argue that the Community
authorities by definitively collecting provisional duties had
violated the principle of legal certainty of undertakings. The
collection of provisional duties was only competent where definitive
duties had been imposed. If undertakings had been accepted as they
ibid. at 47, paragraphs 40-41 of Judgment.
supra at footnote 20.
I®® Case 118/77 Import Standard Office (I.S.O.) v. Council
[1979] ECR 1277.
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were in the present case then such collection should have been
abandoned.
The Court, without making reference to whether the principle had been
breached or not, held that there was no need to order the collection
of provisional duties if the undertakings were acceptable, as they
were in the present case^^.
In the Mini Ballbearing cases^^, some of the applicants'-®®
contested the method by which the Commission had calculated the
dumping margin. In determining the dumping margin, normal value was
established on the weighted average method and export price on the
transaction-by-transaction method. This latter method was preferred
where export prices varied both above and below normal value, since
use of weighted averages would result in a finding that no dumping
was occurring at all®®^. The applicants argued that, by using the
transaction-by-transaction method to establish export price, the
Community authorities had breached the principle of legitimate
expectation, commercial certainty and sound administration in that
they had used the weighted average method on previous occasions'-®®.
In answering the applicants' submission, the Court held that Article
2(13)(b) of Regulation 3017/79 provided that the transaction-by-
transaction method was just one of the methods which could be used by
the Community authorities in calculating the dumping margin in
ibid, at 1298-9, paragraphs 49-55 of Judgment.
supra at footnote 65.
Case 256/84 Koyo Seiko Co. Ltd. v. Council supra; Case
258/84 Nippon Seiko KK v. Council, supra.
See Chapter 3, Section 1.6. Anti-Dumping Rules supra.
See the applicants' submissions in Case 256/84 supra at







situations where prices vary as they did in the present casein.
It concurred with Advocate-General Mancini that the charges raised by
the applicants had been answered by its previous decision in the case
of Faust v. Commission!97. It held that:
where the institutions enjoy a margin of discretion in the
choice of means needed to achieve their policies, traders
cannot claim to have a legitimate expectation that the means
originally chosen will be maintained, since these may be
altered by the institutions in the exercise of their
1 f|Qy
powers±uo.
In Brother Industries Ltd. v. Council!" the applicants argued that
the lack of detailed rules regarding the calculation of the dumping
margin prevented traders, even diligent and prudent ones, from taking
the appropriate action to avoid the imposition of an anti-dumping
duty. The Court held that:
... the rules laid down by Regulation 2176/84 leave a
measure of discretion to the Community institutions, in
particular the Commission in an anti-dumping investigation,
as regards fixing a provisional duty and proposing a
definitive duty to the Council, and the fact that the
Commission exercises that discretion without explaining in
detail and in advance the criteria which it intends to apply
in every specific situation does not constitute a breach of
the principle of legal certainty-*-10.
10° Case 256/84 ibid. at 1917, paragraph 19 of Judgment; Case
258/84 ibid. at 1967, paragraph 33 of Judgment.
107 Case 52/81 [1982] ECR 3745.
Case 256/84 supra 1917, at paragraph 20 of Judgment; Case
258/84 supra at 1967, paragraph 34 of Judgment.
109 Cases 56 and 250/85 [1988] ECR 5683 at 5698.
HO ibid. 5725 at paragraph 29 of Judgment.
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In two of the Electronic Typewriter cases the applicantsm argued
that the Community authorities had breached the principle on the
ground that the normal value as constructed was unpredictable and
arbitrary. This they alleged was due to the inclusion of an
excessive profit margin and the inclusion of selling expenses of
sales companies on the domestic market. Both TEC and Sharp had
insufficient sales on the domestic market with the result that normal
value was constructed in terms of Article 2(3)(b)(ii) of Regulation
2176/84. The profit margin used was based on the lowest margin
calculated for those undertakings which had sufficient domestic
sales, i.e. Canon Inc.
TEC, in particular, argued that this was arbitrary and unpredictable.
It was arbitrary because it was impossible for the applicants to
guage the profit margins of one company from those of another. It
was unpredictable in that they could not ascertain the profit margins
realised by another company. This meant that it was impossible to
know how to set prices in order to avoid dumping!^. The Council
replied by stating that it was legitimate for the Community
authorities to have regard to the profit margins realised by the
other manufacturers. It was not contrary to the principle of legal
certainty they contended, in that the objective of this principle had
to be reconciled with the requirements of the anti-dumping procedure.
It was a fact of life that the exporter would not have access to all
the information, in particular that which was confidential!I3.
This was in line with the law as laid down in the GATT rules and
Community legislation^-^. Further, the legislation allowed for
cases in which an undertaking could not calculate the dumping margin
HI Case 260/85 and 106/86 TEC v. Council supra; Case 301/85
Sharp v. Council supra.
H2 Case 260/85 and 106/86 ibid, at 5862.
II3 ibid, at 5863-5865.
11^ Case 301/85 Sharp v. Council supra at 5819.
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beforehand (i.e. non-market economies). Lastly, the methods
prescribed in Article 2(3) of Regulation 2176/84 depended on
circumstances which an undertaking could not have foreseen"".
Advocate-General Slynn rejected the submissions that legal certainty
had been violated. The profit figures he argued related only to
sales on the domestic market which exceeded 5 per cent volume of
exports to the Community. This threshold was introduced to
safeguard legal certainty-'-He also refuted the argument put
forward by TEC based on unpredictability, in that it was always
possible for an exporter to raise his prices and request a
review'-'-''. The principle of legal certainty, he argued, had to be
balanced with the principle of equal treatment. To use a
hypothetical margin for those companies who had no sales and a real
margin for those that had would result in inequality. Further,
there was no provision in the Regulation which stated that the
Commission must continue to use a hypothetical margin when normal
profit had been established'-'".
The Court in concurring with the Advocate-General held that a certain
degree of unforseeability did not constitute an infringement of the
principle of legal certainty where, as in the present case, it was
not possible to take real prices as a basis in calculating the normal
value'".
"" ibid. at 5820.
e.g. case 260/85 and 106/86
5889.
117 ibid, at 5890.
"" ibid.
'" ibid, at 5917, paragraph 15
TEC v. Council supra 5884 at
of Judgment.
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TEC again relied on the principle of legal certainty in arguing that
it was wrong in constructing normal value to include in the cost of
production selling expenses of TEC Electronics Company Limited, the
sales subsidiary of TEC Limited. It contested that such practice
was not consistent with the previous practice of the Community
authorities. Further, it was arbitrary in that it included in the
cost of production expenses of a company which had never sold
electronic typewriters^®.
The Court held that:-
the division of production and sales activities within a
group made up of legally distinct companies can in no way
alter the fact that the group is a single economic entity
which carries out in that way activities that, in other
cases, are carried out by what is in legal terms as well a
single entity. There would be discrimination if expenses
necessarily included in the selling price of a product when
it was sold by a sales department forming part of the
manufacturer's organization were not included when that
product was sold by a company which although financially
controlled by the manufacturer, was a legally distinct
entityl^l.
It agreed with the Advocate-General who held that irrespective of the
corporate structure of an undertaking, Article 2(3)(b)(ii) of
Regulation 2176/84 permitted the Community authorities to look beyond
the purely formal division and assess production cost on a reasonable
basis including selling expenses of the whole operation no
differently from the way they would if dealing with a single
corporation^^. Neither the Advocate-General nor the Court
See submissions Case 260/85 and 106/86 TEC v. Council ibid,
at 5984-5899.
121 ibid. at 5919, paragraphs 28-29 of Judgment.
I22 ibid, at 5897.
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considered it necessary to determine whether the principle of legal
certainty had been breached.
It is submitted that the Community authorities enjoy a large measure
of discretion in ensuring that their policies are effective and as
such traders cannot legitimately expect that the practice originally
adhered to will continue. This has allowed the Community
authorities to change their practice to cover situations not governed
by the legislation in existence at the time. A failure by the
authorities to explain in detail and in advance the criteria applied
in a given situation will not constitute a breach of legal certainty.
3.1.3. The Principle of Proportionality
The principle of proportionality is aimed at ensuring that the
means used must be proportionate to the end to be achieved in a given
situation. Article 13(3) of Regulation 2423/88 is an example of
this principle. It provides that "the amount of such duties
(definitive) shall not exceed the dumping margin provisionally
estimated or finally established ... it should be less if such lesser
duty would be adequate to remove the injury". In other words, a
lower duty should be imposed if such a duty would be sufficient to
eradicate the injury to Community industry.
This provision was considered at length by Advocate-General VerLoren
van Themaat in the Second Allied case^-^. The applicants in their
submissions argued that the interests of the Community could not
simply be equated with the interests of certain producers and
completely ignore the interests of consumers. Further, the
123 Case 53/88 supra.
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interests of the Community did not justify the definitive duties
imposed-*-^.
Advocate-General VerLoren van Themaat pointed out that the Council
had a wide discretion in defining what amounted to the "interests of
the Community". He, however, took objection to the reasoning of the
Community authorities which he considered did not justify the
imposition of duties equivalent to the dumping margin. The Council
gave the following as its reasons for imposing the duty it did:
The results of its [the Commission] investigation [i.e. into
the dumping margin] provided as accurate a basis for the
determination of the level of dumping as possible and that
lower levels would constitute a bonus for Allied
Corporation's withdrawal from its undertaking and subsequent
non-cooperation and the withdrawal from their undertakings
by Kaiser and Transcontinental-^^^.
He contended that the withdrawal from an undertaking should not on
its own affect the care and objectivity with which the fresh
investigation should be carried out. Likewise, the refusal to
co-operate could not in itself justify the above passage-*-^.
As far as the Advocate-General was concerned, this was the only
passage in the Regulation which could be regarded as an explanation
for the non-application of the last sentence of Article 13(3) of
Regulation 3017/79. It was, he noted, of decisive importance that
the Community authorities did not state any reasons regarding the
l2h ibid, at 1650-52.
125 see paragraph 24 of Regulation 101/83, OJ 1983 L15/1.
126 Case 53/88 supra at p. 1635.
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extent of injury found-*-^. The Advocate-General concluded that
the anti-dumping duty imposed on the applicants should not result in
a higher level of import prices than those which applied to their
American competitors at the time when the Regulation was adopted. A
considerably lower level than the one imposed would have been
sufficient to remove the injury caused by the dumping^®.
The Court in concurring with the Advocate-General's opinion began by
reiterating the general rule that the Council when adopting an
anti-dumping Regulation the Council is required to ascertain the
amount of duty which is necessary in order to remove the injury.
The Court noted that the Council in the preamble to Regulation 101/83
did not deal with this issue. It held that:
In the preamble to Regulation No. 101/83, the Council deals
in detail with the question whether the injury was caused by
imports from the United States or by sales on the French
market by producers established in other Member States. It
does not however discuss the question of the amount of duties
necessary in order to receive the injury; its only reference
in that connection is to the Commission's view that lower
levels would constitute a bonus for Allied Corporation's
withdrawal from its undertaking and subsequent non-
cooperation and the withdrawal from their undertakings by
Kaiser and Transcontinental. That consideration is not
relevant to the application of Article 13(3) of the
Regulation. Examination of the case has not disclosed any
other factors indicating that the Council took into account
that article in fixing the amount of the anti-dumping
duties. It must therefore be concluded that the regulation
was adopted in disregard of Article 13 and that it must






ibid. at 1659 paragraph 19 of Judgment.
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In the NTN Toyo Bearing Co. Ltd. v. Council the applicant^® like
those in the Allied case above argued that in fixing the rate of duty
the Community authorities did not comply with Article 13(3) of
Regulation 2176/84. In so doing they had contravened the principle
of proportionality by virtue of the fact that the duty imposed should
be proportionate to the injury suffered.
Advocate-General Mancini referred to the Court's judgment in the
Allied case and noted in particular that when the Council adopts an
anti-dumping Regulation "it is required to ascertain whether the
amount of the duties is necessary in order to remove the
injury"131. He then referred to the preamble of the contested
Regulation, concluding that in the light of the explanations the
rates of duty fully met the objectives pursued by the
legislature_
The Court concluded that the principle of proportionality had not
been infringed. It referred, in particular, to the fact that the
Community authorities had established that the overall sales of small
bearings produced by the Community industry decreased by 13.3 per
cent between 1979-83 and the market share fell from 72 to 60.9 per
cent. Further, substantial damage was caused to Community industry
both financially and with respect to employment133, pn such
Case 240/84 supra.
Case 240/84 ibid, at 1847.
ibid.






circumstances the imposition of anti-dumping duties could not be
regarded as contrary to the principle.
In Nachi Fujikoshi v. Council134 the applicants alleged that the
Community authorities by not accepting the undertakings offered had
breached the principle of proportionality. The Court concluded
however that the Community authorities' refusal was within their
discretion and that applicant had not established that their reasons
for rejecting the undertakings exceeded this discretion.
The principle of proportionality if breached by the Community
authorities will automatically lead to the measure or parts thereof
in question to be declared void. The principle it is submitted
unlike other general principles is one which cannot be qualified or
limited in any respect.
3.2. The Effect of International Agreements
in Community Law
The Community safeguard measures are based on provisions of the
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade ('the GATT')or on the GATT
codes negotiated at the Tokyo Round of Multilateral Trade
negotiations. This invariably raises the question - to what extent
can an interested party challenge a Community safeguard measure on
the ground that it was incompatible with the Community's Treaty
obligations ?
In answering this question the Court will have to consider the status
and effect of International agreements in question from two basic
standpoints:
Case 255/84 supra at 1893-4, paragraphs 37-43 of Judgment.
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(1) whether the agreement binds the Community; and
(2) whether it is capable of conferring rights on
individuals which they can invoke in the national
courts, i.e. can such provisions be directly
effective. Clearly, if an interested party could
rely on a directly effective provision in the national
courts then it could rely on such a provision in
proceedings brought before the Court under Article 173
of EEC Treaty.
The GATT and in particular its anti-dumping code is the most
important International agreement as far as safeguard measures are
concerned. It is an example of an International agreement entered
into by the Member States and third parties before the creation of
the European Communities. Under International law such agreements
have to be respected. This is reflected in Article 41 of the Vienna
Convention on the Law of Treatiesl35 and also in Article 234 of the
EEC Treaty. Article 234(1) states that the rights for third parties
arising from the Member States' pre-existing International agreements
and obligations for the Member States are not affected by the EEC
Treatyl36.
The Court has stated that its jurisdiction extends to considering all
those grounds capable of invalidating those measures. For this
reason it is obliged to examine whether their validity may be
affected by reason of the fact that they are contrary to a rule of
International lawl37.
1^5 g int. Leg. Materials (1969), 679.
136 see aiso Case 10/61 Commission v. Italian Republic [1962]
ECR 11. ' ~
13^ Case 21-24/72 International Fruit Co. [1972] ECR 1219 at
1226; see also Case 9/73 Schiilter v. Hauptzollamt Lorrach
[1973] ECR 1135 at 1157.
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More particularly, in the SPA case^® the Court was called upon to
deal precisely with its jurisdiction in relation to GATT. The
Italian Supreme Court of Cassation, when making its reference to the
Court questioned whether the latter had the jurisdiction to interpret
GATT in cases other than those where the interpretation or the
legality of the Community measure were at issue. In answer to this
question the Court held that:
it is important that the provisions of GATT should, like the
provisions of all other agreements binding the Community,
receive uniform application throughout the Community. Any
difference in the interpretation and application of
provisions binding the Community as regards non-member
countries would not only jeopardize the unity of the
commercial policy, which according to Article 113 of the
Treaty must be based on uniform principles, but also create
distortions in trade within the Community, as a result of
differences in the manner in which the agreements in force
between the Community and non-member countries were applied
in the various Member States^-^.
In order for the validity of a Community measure to be set aside
because it is contrary to Community law the Community has to be bound
by the particular rule of International law.
The Community is effectively the successor to the rights and
obligations of its Member States under GATT by virtue of the fact
that it has exclusive competence in the area of external trade and
commercial matters. In the International Fruit Co. case the Court
held that:
The Community has assumed the functions inherent in the
tariff and trade policy, progressively during the
transitional period and in their entirety on the expiry of




Joined cases 267-269/81 [1983] ECR 801.
ibid. at 828, paragraph 14 of Judgment.
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By conferring those powers on the Community, the Member
States showed their wish to bind it by obligations entered
into under the General Agreement. It therefore appears
that, in so far as under the EEC Treaty the Community has
assumed the powers previously exercised by the Member States
in the area governed by the General Agreement, the
provisions of that agreement have the effect of binding the
Community^®.
It would be fair to say that in recognising that an International
agreement is part of Community law, the Court does so to protect the
uniform application of that law as much as, if not more than, to
enforce the relevant provisions of that International agreement.
Given that the Court recognises that the Community is bound by GATT,
the next question which arises is the extent to which the provisions
of GATT are "directly effective". In other words, for an
individual to challenge the validity of a Community measure on the
basis that it is contrary to a provision of the GATT, the latter
provision must be capable of conferring rights on the individual
which he can enforce in the national court. To be directly
effective a provision must be clear and precise and must be
unconditional, i.e. leave no discretion on the authorities by whom
they are to be applied^^.
It is not clear the extent to which the Court has transposed these
criteria into its jurisprudence on the direct effect of International
agreements. Generally speaking the Court's reasoning relies heavily
on the special features of the International agreement in question in
establishing whether the provision is directly effective.
Case 21-24/72 supra at 1227, paragraphs 14, 15 & 18 of
Judgment.
See generally Bourgeois "The effect of International
Agreements in EEC Law: Are the Dice Cast" 82 Mich. L.
Rev.1250; Pescatore "The Doctrine of Direct Effect: An
Infant Disease of Community Law" 1983 ELRev. 155.
see for example Case 26/62 Van Gend en Loos [1963] ECR 1.
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In the Kupferberg case the Court was faced with the question of
whether a provision of the Free Trade agreement between the Community
and Portugal was directly effective343. The Court held that the
provision in question did confer rights on individuals which they
could invoke in the national courts. Its reasoning was as follows:
The governments which have submitted observations to the
Court do not deny the Community nature of the provisions of
agreements concluded by the Community. They contend,
however, that the generally recognized criteria for
determining the effects of provisions of a purely Community
origin may not be applied to provisions of a free-trade
agreement concluded by the Community with a non-member
country.
In that respect the governments base their arguments in
particular on the distribution of powers in regard to the
external relations of the Community, the principle of
reciprocity governing the application of free-trade
agreements, the institutional framework established by such
agreements in order to settle differences between the
contracting parties and safeguard clauses allowing the
parties to derogate from the agreements.
It is true that the effects within the Community of
provisions of an agreement concluded by the Community with a
non-member country may not be determined without taking
account of the international origin of the provisions in
question. In conformity with the principles of public
international law Community institutions which have power to
negotiate and conclude an agreement with a non-member
country are free to agree with that country what effect the
provisions of the agreement are to have in the internal
legal order of the contracting parties. Only if that
question has not been settled by the agreement does it fall
for decision by the courts having jurisdiction in the
matter, and in particular by the Court of Justice within the
framework of its jurisdiction under the Treaty, in the same
manner as any question of interpretation relating to the
application of the agreement in the Community.
According to the general rules of international law there
must be bona fide performance of every agreement. Although
each contracting party is responsible for executing fully
the commitments which it has undertaken it is nevertheless
free to determine the legal means appropriate for attaining
143 Case 104/82 [1982] ECR 3641.
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that end in its legal system unless the agreement,
interpreted in the light of its subject-matter and purpose,
itself specifies those means. Subject to that reservation
the fact that the courts of one of the parties consider that
certain of the stipulations in the agreement are of direct
application whereas the courts of the other party do not
recognize such direct application is not in itself such as
to constitute a lack of reciprocity in the implementation of
the agreement.
As the governments have emphasized, the free-trade
agreements provide for joint committees responsible for the
administration of the agreements and for their proper
implementation. To that end they may make recommendations
and, in the cases expressly provided for by the agreement in
question, take decisions.
The mere fact that the contracting parties have established
a special institutional framework for consultations and
negotiations inter se in relation to the implementaiton of
the agreement is not in itself sufficient to exclude all
judicial application of that agreement. The fact that a
court of one of the parties applies to a specific case
before it a provision of the agreement involving an
unconditional and precise obligation and therefore not
requiring any prior intervention on the part of the joint
committee does not adversely affect the powers that the
agreement confers on that committee.
As regards the safeguard clauses which enable the parties to
derogate from certain provisions of the agreement it should
be observed that they apply only in specific circumstances
and as a general rule after consideration within the joint
committee in the presence of both parties. Apart from
specific situations which may involve their application, the
existence of such clauses, which, moreover, do not affect
the provisions prohibiting tax discrimination, is not
sufficient in itself to affect the direct applicability
which may attach to certain stipulations in the agreement.
It follows from all the foregoing considerations that
neither the nature nor the structure of the Agreement
concluded with Portugal may prevent a trader from relying on
the provisions of the said Agreement before a court in the
Community.
Nevertheless the question whether such a stipulation is
unconditional and sufficiently precise to have direct effect
must be considered in the context of the Agreement of which
it forms part. In order to reply to the question on the
direct effect of the first paragraph of Article 21 of the
Agreement between the Community and Portugal it is necessary
to analyse the provision in the light of both the object and
purpose of the Agreement and of its context.
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The purpose of the Agreement is to create a system of free
trade in which rules restricting commerce are eliminated in
respect of virtually all trade in products originating in
the territory of the parties, in particular by abolishing
customs duties and charges having equivalent effect and
eliminating quantitative restrictions and measures having
equivalent effect.
Seen in that context the first paragraph of Article 21 of
the Agreement seeks to prevent the liberalization of the
trade in goods through the abolition of customs duties and
charges having equivalent effect and quantitative
restrictions and measures having equivalent effect from
being rendered nugatory by fiscal practices of the
Contracting Parties. That would be so if the product
imported of one party were taxed more heavily than the
similar domestic products which it encounters on the market
of the other party.
It appears from the foregoing that the first paragraph of
Article 21 of the Agreement imposes on the Contracting
Parties an unconditional rule against discrimination in
matters of taxation, which is dependent only on a finding
that the products affected by a particular system of
taxation are of like nature, and the limits of which are the
direct consequence of the purpose of the Agreement. As
such this provision may be applied by a court and thus
produce direct effects throughout the Community!"^.
The Court recognised that it was not sufficient to exclude the direct
effect of certain provisions on the basis that there existed a
special institutional framework for consultations and negotiations
nor the possibility that the contracting parties could derogate from
the Agreement by virtue of the safeguard clauses contained therein.
The decision in Kupferberg did not result in the Court having a
change of attitude towards the direct effect of GATT provisions,
which will be discussed below. There are a number of reasons why
this may be the case. First, the Free Trade Agreement with Portugal
was a Bilateral Treaty whereas the GATT is a multilateral Agreement
though it should be noted that the Court's decision in Bresciani
ibid, at 3663-3665, paragraphs 15-26 of Judgment.
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discussed below concerned a multilateral agreement, namely the
Yauonde Convention (now Lome Convention). The decision therefore,
by one party, to regard certain of its provisions as directly
effective has a greater chance of resulting in its efficacy in
general than would be the case of an agreement like the GATT.
Second and most important, the aim of the Free Trade Agreement with
Portugal was to create a free trade area which goes beyond the scheme
and objectives of the GATT.
Apart from the decision in Kupferberg the Court has in several other
cases held provisions of Association agreements to be directly
effective-'-^^. Such agreements create a close relationship between
the Community and the non-Member States involved.
In Bresciani the Court was confronted with the question of whether
Article 2(1) of the Yauonde Convention (now replaced by the Lome
Conventions) conferred rights upon individuals which they could
invoke in the national courts. The Court held that it was directly
effective, on the basis that Article 2(1) of the Convention expressly
referred to Article 13 of the EEC Treaty. As such the Community had
undertaken the same obligations towards the Associated States as the
Member States had with respect to one another.
In Pabst & Richarz which concerned a provision of the Association
Agreement with Greece the Court stated:
That provision [Article 53(1)], the wording of which is
similar to that of Article 95 of the Treaty, fulfils, within
the framework of the Association between the Community and
Greece, the same function as Article 95 ...It accordingly
follows from the wording of Article 53(1) cited above, and
from the objective and the nature of the Association
Agreement of which it forms part that that provision
Case 87/75 Bresciani [1976] ECR 129; Case 17/81 Pabst &
Richarz [1982] ECR 1331.
Case 87/75 ibid. at 141-2, paragraph 25 of Judgment.
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precludes a national system of relief from providing more
favourable tax treatment for domestic spirits than for those
imported from Greece. It contains a clear and precise
obligation which is not subject, in its implementation or
effects, to the adoption of any subsequent measure^-^.
The Court was first confronted with the question of whether a
provision of GATT was directly effective in the International Fruit
Company case^® and in particular Article XI thereof. The Court
held that in order to establish whether provisions of the GATT had
direct effect it was necessary to consider the spirit, the general
scheme and the terms of the General Agreement1^. It concluded
that Article XI was not capable of conferring on the citizens of the
Community rights which they could invoke before the national
courts. Its reasons for reaching this conclusion were as follows:
This Agreement [GATT] which, according to its preamble, is
based on the principle of negotiations undertaken on the
basis of 'reciprocal and mutually advantageous arrangements'
is characterised by the great flexibility of its provisions,
in particular those conferring the possibility of
derogation, the measures to be taken when confronted with
exceptional difficulties and the settlement of conflicts
between contracting parties^O.
Advocate-General Myras in his opinion reached the same conclusion.
He held that:
Article XI contains exceptions and derogations which in
practice have been shown to leave States and, mutatis
mutandis, the Community a discretion such as excludes
individuals from the principle established by that Article
subjective rights capable of being profitably invoked before
a Court^l,
Case 17/81 supra at 1350, paragraphs 26-27 of Judgment.
Case 21-24/72 supra.
1^® ibid, at 1227, paragraph 20 of Judgment.
ibid. at 1227, paragraph 21 of Judgment.
151 ibid, at 1239.
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A year later the Court again had to determine whether another
provision of the GATT - Article II(l) - was directly
effective!^. stated that this had to be answered in the light
of the meaning, structure and wording of the General
Agreement153. By applying its reasoning in the International
Fruit Company Case the Court concluded that Article II(1) did not
confer rights on individuals which they could invoke in the national
courts.
In a number of cases referred to the Court by the Italian Cour de
Cassation^4, it confirmed its reasoning in the International Fruit
Company case in holding that Article V of GATT did not confer rights
on individuals which they could enforce in the national courts. It
did, however, emphasise "the Community's obligation to ensure that
the provisions of the GATT are observed in its relations with
non-Member States which are parties to GATT"155. This was
reiterated by the Court in the Second Fediol case^^ when it
concluded that the concept of a subsidy in Article 3 of Regulation
2176/84 presupposed the grant of an economic advantage through a
charge on the public account. It held that:
The concept of a subsidy thus understood is not incompatible
with the Community's obligations under international law, in
particular under GATT and agreements concluded in the
framework thereof 157,
152 Case 9/73 Schiilter v. Hauptzollamt Lorrach supra.
153 ibid, at 1157, paragraph 29 of Judgment.
154 Case 266/81 SIOT [1983] ECR 731; Case 267-9/81 SpA (SPI
and SAMI) [1983] ECR 801; Joined cases 290 and 291/81
Singer & Geigy [1983] ECR 847.
155 Case 266/81 SIOT, ibid at 780, paragraphs 27 and 28 of
Judgment.
155 Case 188/85 Fediol v. Commission [1988] ECR 4193.
157 ibid at 4226, paragraph 13 of Judgment.
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The Court in the Third Fediol case^^ has gone one step further and
has held that for the purposes of the New Commercial Policy
Instrument - Regulation 2641/84 - individuals can rely directly on
the provisions of the GATT. It held that:
... le reglement No. 2641/84 confere aux operateurs
interesses le droit de se prevaloir des dispositions du GATT
dans la plainte qu'ils deposent devant la Commission, afin
d'etablir le caractere illicite des pratiques commerciales
par lesquelles ils s'estiment leses, ces memes operateurs
ont le droit de saisir la Cour en vue de soumettre a son
controle la legalite de la decision de la Commission
appliquant ces dispositions'--^.
In considering the merits of the case the Court went even further.
It was prepared to give its own interpretation on the GATT provisions
invoked by the applicant rather than restricting its review to
question whether the Commission's interpretation of the GATT
provisions was within its discretion'^0. Such a development is to
be welcomed and even more so given that the Court was prepared to
interpret the GATT provisions itself.
The decision re-opens the issue of whether the Commission's practices
and interpretation of the Anti-Dumping Regulation (Regulation
2423/88) are also in accordance with the GATT and the GATT
Anti-Dumping Code. It is arguable, however, that the Court would
distinguish its decision in the Third Fediol case if it was required
to rule on the direct effect of the GATT provisions so far as the
Anti-Dumping Rules are concerned. In the Third Fediol case the
Court noted that the GATT rules formed part of the rules of Public
International law of which specific mention is made in Article 2(1)
Affaire 70/87 [1989] REC 1781 (English text not yet
available).
ibid. at 1831 paragraph 22 of Judgment (English text not
yet available).





of Regulation 2641/84. The Regulation, however, does not set out
which of the GATT rules may be relied upon by an individual who is
attempting to establish that there is an illicit commercial
practice. The Anti-Dumping Rules, on the other hand, more or less
incorporate the rules laid down in GATT and the Anti-Dumping
Code^l. As a corollary to the above, reference is often made to
the Preamble of the basic Anti-Dumping Regulation where it states
that:
the Community is required to take account of their
interpretation [the rules] by the Community's major trading
partners as reflected in legislation or established
practice.
The Court has held, however, that the Community is not obliged to
follow the practice of one of its trading partners, even a major
partner (United States), in interpreting an element in the
determination of anti-dumping duties-*-^.
The recognition by the Court that the Community is bound by Treaties
like the GATT is more often aimed at protecting the uniform
application of Community law than enforcing International law.
However, it does not follow that just because an International
agreement is part of Community law that it is therefore enforceable
by individuals.
What is important, as a result of the Court's jurisprudence in the
GATT and Free Trade Association cases, is that a clause in an
agreement which bears a close relationship to the Community and
irrespective of whether it has been applied in a reciprocal manner by
the other party is enforceable by an individual, if such a provision
See generally Rabe & Schiitte "EC Anti Dumping Law: current
issues in the light of the jurisdiction of the Court" 26
CMLRev. 644.
Case 56 and 250/85 Brother Industries Ltd. v. Council
supra.
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is precise and unconditional. The Court's decision in the Third
Fediol case is a source of encouragement to interested parties
affected by Community acts imposing safeguard measures. It is
reassuring to know that the Court is prepared to recognise the direct
effect of GATT provisions albeit only in relation to the New
Commercial Policy Instrument to date.
A. THE EVALUATION OF ECONOMIC
FACTS AND CIRCUMSTANCES -
THE EXTENT TO WHICH THE COURT
WILL REVIEW THE EXERCISE
OF THE COMMUNITY AUTHORITIES'
DISCRETION
The imposition of safeguard measures involves investigations of a
highly technical and complex nature. Naturally, the legislation
which permits the Community authorities to impose such measures
confers on them a wide discretion in exercising the powers with which
they are endowed.
Advocate-General Roemer in Germany v. Commission-^3 was of the
opinion that the exercise of powers which confers a wide discretion
should be subject to judicial review by the Court to ensure effective
control. The crucial factor is the extent to which the Court may
exercise such review. As early as its decision in Consten & Grundig
the Court stated its position with respect to its review of the
Community authorities' discretion. It held that:
the exercise of the Commission's powers necessarily implies
complex evaluation of economic matters. A judicial review
of these evaluations must take account of their nature by
confining itself to an examination of relevance of the




Case 34/62 [1963] ECR 149 at 152.
Case 56 and 58/64 [1966] ECR 299 at 347.
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The Court's objective is to examine only the relevance and accuracy
of the facts and the legal consequences which according to the
Commission flow from them. However, in situations where the facts
are complex, it is much more difficult to avoid an evaluation of the
findings of the Community authorities.
In such situations the Court will not seek to substitute its own
evaluation of the facts for that of the competent institution.
Rather it will attempt to examine whether the evaluation of the
findings of that institution contains a patent error or constitutes a
misuse of powers. Inevitably the Court is placed in the dilemma of
respecting the legitimate limits of the institution's discretion
which is indispensible to the operation of the Community on the one
hand while on the other protecting the interests of the applicant and
respecting the rule of law.
The Court has on numerous occasions in its jurisprudence regarding
anti-dumping laws made reference to the extent to which it is
prepared to review the exercise of the discretion given to the
Community authorities under these laws. In Fediol the Court stated
the following general rule when it held that:
complainants may not be refused the right to put before the
Court any matters which would facilitate a review as to
whether the Commission has observed the procedural
guarantees to complainants by Regulation No. 3017/79 and
whether or not it has committed manifest errors in its
assessment of the facts, has omitted to take into
consideration any essential matters of such a nature as to
give rise to a belief in the existence of subsidization or
has based the reasons for its decision on considerations
amounting to a misuse of powers. In that respect, the
Court is required to exercise its normal powers of review
over a discretion granted to a public authority, even though
it has no jurisdiction to intervene in the exercise of the
discretion reserved to the Community authorities by the
aforementioned regulation!^.
165 Case 191/82 [1983] ECR 2913 at 2935-6, paragraph 30 of
Judgment.
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The Court reiterated this principle in the Mini Ballbearing cases
referring to its judgment in the Remia case^^. It noted that the
choice between the different methods of calculating the dumping
margin in Article 2(13)(b) of Regulation 3017/79 required an
appraisal of complex economic situations. In so doing it held that
it must:
limit its review of such an appraisal to verifying whether
the relevant procedural rules have been complied with,
whether the statement of reasons for the decision is
adequate, whether the facts on which the choice is based
have been accurately stated and whether there has been a
1 f*
manifest error of appraisal or a misuse of powers±D/.
An analysis of the Court's pronouncements regarding the exercise of
discretion by the Community authorities can best be understood by
considering the areas in which this discretion arises. They are as
follows:-
4.1. The calculation of dumping
4.2. The determination of injury
4.3. The determination of Community interests
4.4. The calculation of duties and the refusal to accept
undertakings
4.5. Evaluation.
The Calculation of Dumping
In the Continentale Produkten case^® the applicants had brought
an action before the Court, to annul a decision by the Commission
166 Case 42/84 [1985] ECR 2545.
167 See for example Case 240/84 NTN Toyo Bearing Co. Ltd. &
Ors. v. Council supra at 1854, paragraph 19 of Judgment.
168 Case 312/84 supra.
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refusing refund duties under Article 16 of Regulation 2176/84, on the
basis that they had not adduced sufficient evidence for their
claims. The applicants in their submissions contended that the
actual normal values for their Turkish suppliers were lower than
those originally established by Regulation 789/82 on the basis of
which definitive duties were imposed. Normal value was constructed
as there were insufficient sales on the domestic market. The
Commission contended that the refundable amount was merely the
difference between the duty collected and the "normal values" as
determined definitively in Regulation 789/82. The applicants
maintained, however, that the sums to be reimbursed should be
calculated on the basis of their suppliers' actual individual "normal
values".
Advocate-General Darmon concluded, and the Court concurred, that
Article 16 could not permit the method of calculating the normal
value to be changed by substituting real prices for constructed
value^^. This also applied to the export price. Article 16, he
argued, enabled an applicant to have the normal value etc.
recalculated if and only if special factors applied.
More importantly, the Advocate-General recognised that the Community
authorities had in this area a wide discretion. He noted that the
control exercised by the Court was limited to manifest error of
assessment and misuse of powers. In this respect he referred to the
Fediol decision. He concluded that no misuse of powers had been
alleged. As regards manifest error which the applicant had to
prove, no such error had been established-'-''^.
169 ibid, at 860-1.
1^0 ibid, at 861.
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In Technointorg v. Council & Commission-^^ the Court was of the
view that the Community authorities had a discretion in determining
how normal value was to be established in terms of Article 2(5) of
Regulation 2176/84. Article 2(5) was used to calculate normal value
as the USSR was a non-market economy. The purpose of Article 2(5)
was to avoid having to attempt to take account of prices and costs in
such economies as they did not reflect market forces. The
Commission chose Yugoslavia as the analogue country and established
normal value on the basis of domestic prices on the Yugoslav
market. The applicants were unhappy with Yugoslavia being chosen.
They argued that due to differences in income levels and
manufacturing processes in the two countries, normal value should
have been constructed. The Council was of the view that normal
value in Yugoslavia should only have been constructed if there were
circumstances which made it unreasonable to use domestic prices,
otherwise they were entitled to use these latter prices.
The Court held that:
it is unnecessary to have recourse to the constructed value
unless it would be unreasonable in the circumstances to use
the domestic price. That value must be calculated in such
a way that the results obtained are as close as possible to
the normal value based on the domestic price. In that
regard the institutions have a discretion and Technointorg
has not established that, by choosing to base the normal
value in this case on the prices on the Yugoslav market,
they have used it erroneously^.
In constructing normal value, Article 2(3)(b)(ii) of Regulation
2423/88 permits the Community authorities to include an amount for a
reasonable profit margin. What is reasonable is not defined in the
171
172
Case 294/86 and 77/87 supra.
ibid. at 6113, paragraph 30 of Judgment.
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Regulation thereby endowing the Commission with a discretion as to
what this amount should be.
In TEC v. Council the Commission in an attempt to arrive at a
constructed normal value as close as possible to that which would
have been established if there had been domestic sales, took into
account profit margins actually realised for sales of electronic
typewriters on the domestic market. This amounted to 47.92 per
cent. The applicants contended that this was contrary to existing
practice which never before resulted in a profit margin exceeding
10 per cent and was also incompatible with the rule in Article
2(3)(b)(ii) of Regulation 2176/84 that the profit should not exceed
that realised on sales of products in the same general category.
In his opinion Advocate-General Slynn relied on the Court's judgment
in Nippon Seiko-*-^ where the Court had held that where the
Community authorities were required to appraise complex economic
situations the Court was limited in its review of such appraisal to
verifying whether the relevant procedural rules had been complied
with, whether the facts had been accurately stated and whether there
had been a manifest error of appraisal or misuse of powers. He
noted that the purpose of the constructed normal value was to act as
a substitute for the domestic selling price where there were no
domestic sales or where these did not permit a proper comparison.
He concluded that Article 2(3)(b)(ii) did not require that the profit
had to be realised by the same company but only that it should be
realised by sales of goods of the same general category i.e.
electronic typewriters. This was, therefore, within the
Case 260/85 and 106/86 supra■
Case 258/84 supra at 1964, paragraph 21 of Judgment.
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Commission's power of appraisal^-^. The Court duly concurred with
the Advocate-General's opinion. It held that:-
there is nothing in Article 2(3)(b)(ii) of Regulation
No. 2176/84 to preclude the view that the profit margin
adopted by the institutions could, in the context of their
power of appraisal, be regarded as a reasonable margin^^.
In all the Electronic Typewriter cases, where there were sufficient
domestic sales, the products were sold through a sales subsidiary.
The Community authorities held that these were not independent from
the parent company but that they formed one economic entity. In
calculating normal value they therefore disregarded the sales price
from the parent company to the sales company as these did not
represent arm's length prices.
In Canon v. Council177 the applicants argued that these transfer
prices i.e. those from the parent to the sales company, were fair and
reliable and therefore could have been used as the basis for
calculating normal value. Failing that, normal value should have
been constructed on the basis of prices to third countries.
Advocate-General Slynn held that the Community authorities had a
discretion which they could exercise and did so by disregarding the
transfer prices from Canon Inc. to its subsidiary Canon Sales Ltd.
for the purposes of constructing normal value, on the basis that they
were associated. In this respect Canon had failed to show that the
discretion was exceeded or improperly used. Article 2(3)(a) of





ibid, at 5916-7, paragraph 13 of Judgment.
Case 277 and 300/85 [1988] ECR 5731.
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by its sales company to its customers. The prices charged by Canon
Sales Ltd. to its customers were plainly 'in the ordinary course of
trade' within the meaning of Article 2(3)(a), and the Community
authorities were entitled to use them for the purpose of establishing
normal value as they did-'-''®.
As to those models which were not sold on the domestic market or in
insufficient quantities, the Community authorities had a discretion
on the reading of Article 2(3)(b) to choose between either
constructing the normal value or using third country export prices.
The applicant had not shown that this discretion was wrongly
applied"''® whereas the Council had explained the reasons for the
Community authorities' choice in the definitive duty regulation.
The Court concurred with the Advocate-General. It held that:-
Article 2(3)(b) does not indicate that use of the price for
exportation to a third country is to take precedence over
construction of the normal value. The institutions
therefore enjoy a margin of discretion in that respect and
Canon has not shown that that discretion has been
abused"-®®.
Once the normal value and the export price have been established, the
Community authorities will then calculate the dumping margin. Prior
to Regulation 2423/88, where prices varied Article 2(13)(b) and (c)
allowed the Community authorities to assess the export price by
either establishing it on the basis of the transaction-by-transaction






ibid, at 5800, paragraph 17 of Judgment.
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In the Mini Ballbearing cases'-^ the charge was concerned with
whether in determining the dumping margin, the normal value and
export price must be assessed by the use of the same method or by
different methods when domestic prices and export prices fluctuated
appreciably. The normal value was assessed by reference to the
weighted average price for all transactions on the domestic market
and reduced to a single figure. The export price on the other hand
was assessed by reference to the transaction-by-transaction method.
This method sought to exclude exports whose prices were in excess of
the normal value, otherwise prices in excess of normal value and
prices below normal value could be offset against one another thereby
mathematically cancelling out any dumping margin, whilst leaving
intact the effects of injury to Community industry.
The applicants contended that the method of calculation involved a
manifest error of fact and law. They argued that Article 2(13) of
Regulation 2176/84 allowed for a choice to be made between the
different methods but did not allow them to be combined. Its effect
was to leave out of account the large number of export sales made at
non-dumping prices and to establish the existence of dumping even
where export prices did not differ on average from internal
consumption on the Japanese market.
Advocate-General Mancini concluded that this was an area in which the
Community authorities had been entrusted with the task of appraising
complex economic matters involving choices of a technical nature, and
as such the Court's powers of review would be limited to determining
whether that power of appraisal had been subject to manifest error or
See footnote 65 supra.
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misuse of powers^^. He noted that there was no obligation on the
Community authorities to use only one of the criteria in Article
2(13)(b), which he concluded was designed to prevent economic injury
resulting from selective dumping practices being concealed by
carefully orchestrated manipulation of higher and lower prices-'-^.
The Court agreed with the Advocate-General. It held that:
The fact that the methods of calculation [for normal value
and export price] which may be used are independent is
confirmed by provisions of Article 2(13)(b) and (c) of
Regulation No. 3017/79, which merely state the various
possibilities for calculating the dumping margin without
imposing any requirement that the methods chosen for
calculating the normal value and export price should be
similar or identical-'-®^.
The Court also concurred with the Advocate-General in concluding that
the choice between the different methods of calculation specified in
Article 2(13) required an appraisal of complex economic issues and,
as such, its review was limited to ensuring that the procedural rules
had been complied with, the facts accurately stated and whether there
had been a manifest error of appraisal or misuse of powers. The
Court was of the opinion that the applicants argument was almost
tantamount to alleging that the Community authorities had made a
manifestly incorrect appraisal of the facts in adopting a method of
assessing the dumping margin which took into account only a
proportion of the transactions on the export market^^.
182 see Case 240/84 NTN Toyo Bearing Co. Ltd. v. Council supra,
1833 at 1844. ~ " ' " '
ibid.
184 See Case 240/84 supra at 1853, paragraph 14 of Judgment.
185 See Case 255/84 Nachi Fujikashi v. Council supra at 1890,
paragraph 22 of Judgment.
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It was of the view that such a line of argument could not be
accepted. It held that:
the transaction-by-transaction method used by the
Commission, like the weighted average method, takes account
of all sales and quantities sold for export and involves
establishment or weighted average of export prices. This
method differs from weighted average method inasmuch as
prices above the normal value are artificially reduced to
the level of normal value and then included in the
calculation of the weighted average of all the prices
charged on the export market186^
The Court concluded that the Commission did not commit any manifest
error in its appraisal of the facts by applying the transaction-
by-transaction method to calculate the dumping margin. It agreed
with the Advocate-General that this was the only method applicable of
dealing with certain manouevres in which dumping was disguised by
charging different prices. It noted that the application of the
weighted average method in such a situation would not meet the
purpose of the anti-dumping proceedings, since that method would mask
sales at dumping prices by those at what were known as "negative"
dumping prices and would thus in no way eliminate the injury suffered
by the Community industry concerned^^.
4.2. The Determination of Injury
Generally speaking, the information regarding injury caused to
Community industry will be provided by the complainant industry. As
a result, this information will for the most part be subject to the
rules relating to confidential information in terms of Article 8 of
Regulation 2423/88. This was noted by Advocate-General Warner in
the First Japanese Ballbearing cases. He stated that the findings
of injury and of its cause were necessarily based in large part on
ibid., paragraph 23 of Judgment.
Case 240/84 NTN Toyo Bearing Co. Ltd. v. Council supra at
1855, paragraphs 23/24 of Judgment.
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the confidential information supplied by the European industry which
the Commission was precluded from disclosing. The findings of
injury like the determination of dumping was, according to the
Advocate-General, based on the assessment by institutions of complex
economic facts not readily open to judicial review. He implied that
judicial review would be limited to determining whether that
assessment was actuated by improper motives or on the basis of
manifest error188.
In such circumstances the Community authorities will have a wide
discretion in determining whether injury has been caused to Community
industry as a result of dumping. This was borne out by the decision
in the First Allied case^^. The applicants challenged a
Commission Regulation imposing a provisional duty after undertakings
had been withdrawn. They contended that this had been adopted on
the basis of incorrect information. In particular, the Commission
had failed to take into account three new facts namely, a decision of
the French Government on production and marketing of fertiliser, rise
in value of the dollar and decline in imports of nitrogen fertiliser
into the Community, which would have had a bearing on the assessment
of injury to Community industry.
The Court concluded that the arguments put forward by the applicants
were not of such a nature as to constitute proof that the Commission
committed a number of manifest errors in its assessment of whether
injury was caused to the European fertiliser industry as a result of
dumping. In particular, with regard to those arguments regarding
the rise in the value of the dollar and decline in imports, the Court
held that:
See footnote 20 supra.
189 Case 239 and 275/82 supra.
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although it is true that the volume of imports of nitrogen
solution fertilizer originating in the United States into
the Community fell in 1981-2, imports of that product
increased substantially in the first quarter of 1982, in
spite of the increase in the value of the dollar. It
follows that this factor has not had the effect of
compensating for injury caused to European producers^^.
By virtue of Article 4(5) of Regulation 2423/88 the Community
authorities, in considering whether injury has been caused to
Community industry, may exclude those producers who are related to
the exporter or importer or who are themselves importers of the
allegedly dumped or subsidised product. The Court has recently held
that it is for the Community authorities in the exercise of this
discretion to determine by reference to all the relevant facts
whether such producers should be excluded^l. It further held
that they will not exceed this discretion where they include
producers that have imported certain models of the allegedly dumped
product in order to present a full range of models to their
customers, which was rendered impossible by the depressed prices
imposed by the Japanese imports^^. The Community authorities
will also not have exceeded their discretion if they decide not to
exclude a producer which had imported the dumped product if the
volume of those imports were minimal in relation to the producer's
entire range of products and even if they had caused injury to the
other Community producers^^.
4.3. The Determination of Community Interests
Community legislation, unlike the GATT rules or the anti-dumping
laws of the Community's trading partners, permits the Community
ibid, at 1035, paragraph 29 of Judgment.
Case 156/87 Gestetner Holdings pic, v. Commission and
Council supra.
ibid. at 847/8, paragraphs 47-49 of Judgment.






authorities when imposing anti-dumping duties to take into account
Community interests. The term "interests of the Community" has not
been defined and it is therefore inevitable that the Community
authorities enjoy in this respect a very wide discretion.
Naturally, they have, when the matter has been queried by exporters,
claimed that this is an area not subject to review by the Court.
In Feddoll^A the applicant sought to have annulled the refusal of
the Commission to initiate anti-subsidy proceedings in respect of
soya imports from Brazil. The case was concerned generally with the
question of "Community interests" in relation to the initiation of
proceedings.
The Commission did not deny that the failure to institute an
anti-subsidy proceeding may affect the applicant's interests.
However, the interests must be significant in that there must be a
"distinct" change in the applicant's legal position. It argued that
there could be no such effect in this case because protective
measures were, according to their nature in law, "measures belonging
exclusively in the area of commercial policy ... adopted essentially
in the general economic interest". For this reason, an anti-subsidy
proceeding was not intended principally to protect individuals.
Furthermore, in view of the discretion vested in the Commission, the
applicant could not be acknowledged to have a right to require the
initiation of an investigation-'-^^.
The applicant was of the view that the Commission's arguments were
aimed at obtaining judicial recognition of a discretionary power free
from control by the Court, in relation to the initiation of a
compensatory proceeding. It considered that the existence of a
194 Case 191/82 supra.
195 ibid, at 2946-7.
- 367 -
discretionary power free from review by the Court in this respect
could not be deduced from the concept of Community interest^^.
The Advocate-General agreed with the applicant that it was entitled
to a proper exercise of discretion free from misuse of power or a
patent disregard of Community law^^. She was of the opinion that
even if the Commission had a discretion with regard to the initiation
of proceedings, this was not free from review. In the present case
the refusal to initiate proceedings, she noted did not relate to the
interests of the Community but rather was concerned with whether
there was sufficient evidence^®.
The Court held that:
whilst it is true that the Commission, when exercising the
powers assigned to it in Regulation No. 3017/79, is under a
duty to establish objectively the facts concerning the
existence of subsidization practices and of injury caused
thereby to Community undertakings, it is no less true that
it has a wide discretion to decide, in terms of the
interests of the Community, any measures needed to deal with
the situation which it has established^^.
In the light of these considerations the Court had to determine
whether the applicant had the right to bring an action. It detailed
at length the complainant's procedural rights under the Regulation
and held that:
the complainants may not be refused the right to put before
the Court any matters which would facilitate a review as to
whether the Commission has observed the procedural
guarantees granted to the complainants by Regulation No.
3017/79 and whether or not it has committed manifest errors
in its assessments of the facts, has omitted to take into
196 ibid. at 2927
197 ibid. at 2947
198 ibid. at 2948-9.
199 ibid. at 2934-5,
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consideration any essential matters of such a nature as to
give rise to a belief in the existence of subsidization or
has based the reasons for its decision on considerations
amounting to misuse of powers. In that respect the Court
is required to exercise its normal powers of review over a
discretion granted to a public authority, even though it has
no jurisdiction to intervene in the exercise of the
discretion reserved to the Community authorities by the
aforementioned Regulation'^.
This corresponds with the Court's understanding of its limits in the
review of the Community authorities' discretion when matters of a
complex and economic nature are at issue. Ultimately, the Court's
review will extend to ensuring that the interested parties procedural
rights under the legislation are guaranteed.
The First Allied case'^l was concerned more particularly with the
question of discretion in relation to the "interests of the
Community" in imposing provisional duties where an undertaking had
been removed. The Commission argued that the term "interests of the
Community" was imprecise and therefore was not amenable to judicial
review. The Advocate-General agreed that the Commission enjoyed a
wide discretion in deciding whether to impose provisional duties
under Article 10 of Regulation 3017/79. This discretion the
Advocate-General noted became even wider where an undertaking had
been removed under Article 10(6). He concluded and the Court
concurred by holding that the authorities were under no obligation to





ibid, at 2935, paragraph 30 of Judgment.
Case 239 and 275/82 supra,
ibid, at 1048.
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In the Second Allied case^^ the Court had to consider those
entities in the Community whose interests would be affected by the
imposition of duties. The applicants contended that the interests
of the Community should be interpreted as those of the Community as a
whole, and not as the particular interest of certain Community
producers. In particular it argued that the interests of consumers
were not examined^^. pn reply the Council noted that an analysis
of the interests of the Community involved a wide discretion in
assessing political and economic circumstances, and the weighing up
of various factors internal and external to the Community. The
interests of consumers and, in particular, their long term interests
were taken into account. Given such a discretion, the Court must
limit its review to determining whether a manifest error or a misuse
of power had been committed^^^.
The Court decided in favour of the applicants on the basis that
Article 13(3) of Regulation 3017/79 had been breached206> it,
however, did not make reference to the extent to which the Court
would review the exercise of discretion on the part of the Community
authorities with respect to the interests of those entities which
would be affected by the imposition of duties. It stated that it
did not relieve the Community authorities of their obligation to
state the reasons why, in their view, intervention was
207necessary^' .
The discretion afforded to the Community authorities by the term
"interests of the Community" is sufficiently wide to permit them to
203 Case 53/83 supra.
204 ibid, at 1651.
203 ibid, at 1652.
206 Supra at footnote 122.
207 ibid, at 1634.
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depart from previous practice. In Canon v. Council.208
applicants argued that in assessing injury to Community industry, the
authorities took no account of whether the European producers were
efficient. In previous cases it had calculated the level of duty
needed to remedy injury by reference not to all producers but in
relation to the most efficient. However, in the present case, it
had departed from this practice by basing its injury finding on the
average between the efficient and the inefficient producers.
Advocate-General Slynn rejected this argument. He argued that,
where there was injury caused by dumping, the Regulation stated that
duties could be imposed if it was in the interests of the
Community. He noted that the concept was not defined with the
result that this gave the Community authorities a wide discretion.
Given this, the authorities were not bound to follow previous
practice^^. p^g Court made no reference to the extent of the
authorities' discretion but held nevertheless that:
the fact that a Community producer is facing difficulties
attributable in part to causes other than the dumping is not
a reason for depriving that producer of all protection
against the injury caused by the dumping^!®.
4.4. Calculation of Duties and Refusal to
Accept Undertakings
4.4.1. Calculation of Duties
In Nashua Corporation v. Council & Commission the applicant was of
the view that the same method used for calculating the dumping margin
should be used to calculate the anti-dumping duty to be imposed.




Case 277 and 300/85 supra.
ibid, at 5790-5791.
ibid. at 5809, paragraph 63 of Judgment.
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For the calculation of the anti-dumping duty, Article 13(3) of
Regulation 2176/84 merely requires the institutions not to exceed
either the dumping margin established or the extent of the
injury, if a lower duty than the dumping margin would be adequate
to remove the injury. The institutions thus enjoy a wide
discretion in choosing the method for calculating the duty and
are not obliged to adopt for that purpose the same method as that
used for determining the dumping margin'^.
4.4.2. Refusal to Accept Undertakings
The Community authorities when terminating proceedings, may accept
price undertakings rather than impose duties. The reasons for
adopting such a course of action are self-explanatory. They allow a
controversial situation to be settled amicably, they save time and,
above all, are flexible. The acceptance of price undertakings are,
however, completely at the discretion of the Commission. Of all the
categories discussed to date, this undoubtedly is the one category
where the Court will be slow to review the exercise of that
discretion.
In the Mini Ballbearing cases some of the applicants'1' complained
that the Community authorities failed to take into account the
undertakings offered. Advocate-General Mancini noted that the
Commission was required in the exercise of the powers conferred upon
it by Regulation 3017/79 to establish in an objective manner whether
there was evidence of dumping practiced by undertakings from outside
the Community. The Court, however, had held in Fediol that it was
no less true that the Commission had a very wide discretion to select
in terms of the interests of the Community the most appropriate
Cases 133 and 150/87 supra at 46, paragraph 36 of Judgment.
'1' Case 240/84 NTN Toyo Bearing Co. Ltd. v. Council, Case
256/84 Koyo Seiko Co. Ltd. v. Council, Case 258/84 Nippon
Seiko K.K. v. Council and Case 260/84 Minebea Co. Ltd. v.
Council supra.
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measures for dealing with the situation which it had
O 1 O
established^-1-'. In these circumstances, he concluded that it was
for the Commission alone to consider whether a price undertaking
would have been sufficient to safeguard the Community's economic
interests. The Court noted that there was no provision in
Regulation 3017/79 which compelled the Community authorities to
accept price undertakings offered^-^. It was clear from Article
10 of Regulation 3017/79 that it was for the Community authorities in
the exercise of their discretionary power to determine whether such
undertakings were acceptable21®.
In Technointorg v. Commission and Council21® the applicants had
also offered price undertakings which the Commission refused on the
basis that these were unacceptable. The Court followed its decision
in the Mini Ballbearing cases by holding that no provision of
Regulation 2176/84 compelled the Community authorities to accept
price undertakings. On the contrary, it followed on from Article 10
of Regulation 2176/84 that it was for the Community authorities to
assess whether undertakings offered were acceptable^-'-''. The Court
concluded that, by refusing to accept the undertakings offered by
Technointorg, the Commission had not exceeded the limits of its
discretion^-*-®.
21® ibid, at 1846-7.
21^ See Case 258/84 supra at 1971, paragraph 51 of Judgment;
Case 260/84 supra at 2011, paragraph 48 of Judgment.
21® Case 260/84 ibid.
21® Case 294/86 and 77/87 supra.
917 ibid. at 6117, paragraph 45 of Judgment.
9 1 ft ibid. paragraph 48 of Judgment.
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The above decisions related to undertakings offered by exporters.
More recently, in Nashua Corporation v. Commission and Council219
the Court had to consider the refusal by the Commission to accept an
undertaking from the applicant, an original equipment manufacturer
(OEM). Because the products under consideration were purchased for
importation into the Community Nashua was regarded as an importer.
The Court noted that the practice of the Community authorities in not
accepting undertakings from importers was based not only on Article
10 of Regulation 2176/84 but also on Article 7 of the GATT
Anti-Dumping Code.
The Court held that the Community authorities had not exceeded their
discretion in refusing to accept the undertakings offered. This was
justified on two grounds:
First, acceptance of the undertaking offered by an importer
would have the effect of encouraging him to continue to
obtain supplies from outside the Community at dumped
prices. Secondly, other importers would have to receive
the same treatment and this, on account of the large number
of companies involved, would make it extremely difficult to
monitor compliance with the undertakings^^.
4.5. Evaluation
Inevitably, as more and more undertakings from third countries
which manufacture "high-tech" consumer goods are investigated for
dumping, the Court is drawn into the dilemma of determining the
extent of its review on the exercise of the powers which confer a
margin of discretion on the Community authorities.
The Court has from the inception of the European Economic Community
held that the exercise of powers by the Community authorities which
confer on them a wide discretion should be subject to its review.
As the findings of the Community authorities are of a highly complex
219 Cases 133 and 150/87 supra.
220 ibid, at 48, paragraph 46 of Judgment.
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and technical nature in anti-dumping cases, the Court has adopted the
general principle that its review is limited to verifying whether the
relevant procedural rules have been complied with, whether the
reasons for the decision are adequate, whether the facts on which the
choice is made are accurate and most importantly whether there has
been a manifest error of appraisal or a misuse of powers. The onus
of proving the latter lies fairly and squarely on the shoulders of
the applicant. To date, this has proved to be an insurmountable
hurdle to discharge.
The Court has held that the Community authorities have not exceeded
the margin of discretion by attempting to construct a normal value
which is as close as possible to that which would have been
established if there had been sufficient sales in the ordinary course
of trade on the domestic market. Likewise, it has approved the
inclusion of a profit margin in the constructed normal value which
reflected profits realised by the sales of the products in the same
general category. Where a sales company operates as a sales
department of a parent company, the Court has condoned the practice
of the Community authorities to include their selling expenses when
constructing normal value.
When domestic and export prices vary appreciably, the Court has
approved the practice of the Community authorities to assess export
prices on a transaction-by-transaction basis in order to avoid
negative dumping. It has held that the choice of method used to
establish the dumping margin does not have to be the same in
assessing normal value and export price.
Due to the fact that the majority of information on which the
Community authorities base their findings of injury is confidential,
the Court is reluctant to review these findings. It appears to be
the case that the Court considers that the protection of Community
industry is paramount. It has held that the Community authorities
had not exceeded their discretion by not excluding Community
producers when considering the effects of the dumped products on
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Community industry, where those producers had imported the dumped
product. This will be the case where the Community authorities show
that this was done to enable a producer to complete its range of
models or where the imports were minimal even though this caused
injury to the other Community producers.
It has also held that the term "interests of the Community" confers
on the Community authorities a sufficiently wide discretion to enable
them to decide what are the appropriate measures required to deal
with a given situation. This discretion will be even wider when an
applicant has violated a price undertaking. However, the Court will
exercise its review in the exercise of that discretion where the
procedural rights of an interested party are at issue.
Finally, with respect to the acceptance or refusal of an undertaking,
the Court has noted that generally speaking these are subject to more
practical considerations. For these reasons, it is submitted that
the Court will be less likely, if at all, to review the exercise of
the Commission powers in this respect.
5. MISUSE OE POWERS
This ground of illegality because of the difficulties in proving it
has rarely been relied upon by an applicant in the cases that have
come before the Court.
In Nippon Seiko KK v. Council22^ the applicants alleged that the
Council by imposing definitive duties as a sanction to compel
compliance with the price undertakings given had misused their
powers222. Without making an express reference as to whether the
22^ Case 119/77 supra.
222 ibid, at 1317.
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Council had misused its power the Court held that by virtue of the
anti-dumping Regulation it was unlawful for one and the same
anti-dumping procedure to be terminated on the one hand by the
Commission's acceptance of a price undertaking and on the other by
imposition by the Council of a definitive anti-dumping duty^^.
In Import Standard Office v. Council^^ the applicants argued that
the order to definitively collect the provisional duties constituted
a misuse of powers because its real purpose was to pave the way for
the adoption by the Council of definitive duties^^.
Advocate-General Warner was of the opinion that this argument was
misconceived, first because there was no evidence that this was the
Council's real purpose, and second because the point was founded on
an erroneous premise. He noted that there was nothing in the basic
Regulation which precluded the Council from ordering the definitive
collective of the provisional duties. He concluded that it was open
for the Council, while assenting to the acceptance of the
undertaking, to decide the fate of the provisional duty226>
In Brother Industries Ltd. v. Council^'', the applicants argued
that the margin of profit (71.18 per cent) included in the normal
value of the three Brother models for which normal value was
constructed was excessively high and was wrongly determined. They
contended that this constituted inter alia a misuse of powers^^.
Advocate-General Slynn whilst agreeing that the selling, general and
223 ibid, at 1329.
224 Case 118/77 supra.
22^ ibid, at 1289.
226 ibid, at 1250.
227 Case 56 and 250/85 supra.
228 ibid. 5693.
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administrative expenses were miscalculated, held the applicant had




The system of judicial remedies in the European Community and
Article 173 in particular provide the Court with the power to review
the legality of acts of the Community authorities. It is
undoubtedly the case that the Community authorities enjoy a large
measure of discretion in the exercise of their powers under the
legislation governing safeguard measures. In this respect it is
important that the Community authorities which apply the law are also
bound by it. Eor this very reason the Court has stated that it has
the power to review the exercise of the powers which confer a margin
of discretion on the Community authorities, albeit in a limited
manner. By so doing the Court is able to exercise an element of
control over them and so ensure that the rule of law is observed.
The right of a natural or legal person to challenge an act of the
institutions and in particular acts of general application depends on
whether they have the necessary locus standi to do so. The Court
has adopted a distinct and separate approach to the admissibility of
actions involving safeguard measures. Its reason for doing so was
to allow interested parties, who would otherwise not have had the
opportunity, to challenge the legality of Community acts imposing
safeguard measures.
The test applied by the Court to determine whether an applicant has
sufficient locus standi is whether the economic agent in question was
concerned by the findings relating to the existence of dumping
complained of. Generally speaking, exporters or producers,
associated importers and in limited circumstances original equipment
manufacturers (OEMs) will have the requisite locus standi since they
can normally establish that they were identified in the measure
adopted or that they were concerned by the preliminary
investigations. The Court has, however, extended the scope of locus
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standi where safeguard measures are involved. In a number of
decisions it was prepared to confer on other interested parties,
notably complainants, locus standi because they had certain
procedural rights which were guaranteed by the legislation in
question. This was all the more important given that those parties
would otherwise not have had locus standi.
Independent importers as a general rule will not have locus standi as
they will neither be identified in the measure nor have specific
findings made about them. They will be required to challenge the
collection of anti-dumping duties in the national courts. They may,
however, have locus standi in two limited situations; where they are
challenging a measure permitting the definitive collection of
provisional duties and where they can establish that they had entered
into binding contracts prior to the adoption of quantitative
restrictions.
The Commission and the Council have recognised the fact that private
parties should have locus standi, and rightly so given that the
Community authorities should be the proper defendants in any action
challenging Community acts imposing safeguard measures. The
alternative is an action by the importers who bear the duties in the
Member States and ultimately a ruling by the Court in terms of
Article 177(l)(b) of the EEC Treaty. It is now probably the case
that in anti-dumping proceedings the locus standi of those categories
of persons who might seek to challenge a measure imposing duties has
been finally clarified.
Prior to the final judgment of the Court parties often attempt to
obtain an award of interim measues. Certain conditions have to be
fulfilled before the Court will make such an award. An applicant
will have to establish a prima facie case and must show to the
satisfaction of the Court that the measures are urgent. They will
be urgent if "serious and irreparable" damage is being caused to the
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applicant and that the balance of interests point in their favour in
the sense that the grant of interim measures would not cause
appreciable injury to Community industry.
To date there have been few successful cases. What is not in doubt
is that an applicant would not be successful in having the effects of
a Regulation imposing either provisional or definitive anti-dumping
duties suspended even if bank guarantees were offered pending the
outcome of the main application. It is submitted that these general
propositions would be equally applicable to an application for
interim measures involving other safeguard measures.
The grounds of illegality in Article 173 upon which the Court will
review the merits of a case involving safeguard measures are lack of
competence, misuse of powers, infringement of an essential procedural
requirement and an infringement of the Treaty or a rule relating to
its application. An applicant will not usually allege lack of
competence or misuse of powers as it would require to discharge a
heavy onus of proof in respect of each of these grounds of
illegality. It is more often the case that an applicant will rely
on allegations relating to a breach of an essential procedural
requirement or an infringement of the Treaty or a rule relating to
its application.
A breach of an essential procedural requirement as a ground of
illegality is aimed at ensuring that an applicant's rights of defence
are protected and that it is made fully aware of the reasons why the
particular decision was taken. The Court has stated that it will
ensure that an applicant's right to a defence of his interests is
protected. It is submitted that the Community authorities are under
a duty to ensure that an applicant is clearly and fully informed of
the case against it. This duty will be discharged according to the
Court where the Community authorities provide the applicant with
sufficient information to allow it to present a case. The right to
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examine all the information has to be balanced with the duty not to
disclose confidential information. The Court has held that in
balancing these two principles an applicant's defence of its
interests must not be deprived of its substance. It is important
that an interested party has sufficient information in which to
defend its interests. At the same time the confidentiality rules
should be respected otherwise undertakings fearing that their
business secrets may be disclosed will not co-operate. It is
difficult to envisage under the present rules how further information
could be disclosed other than by some form of confidentiality bond
between lawyers like the system that exists in the United States.
In defending its interests an applicant is entitled to a fair
hearing, though the Court has held that this right must be compatible
with the requirements of good administration. This does not mean,
however, that the Community authorities are exempted from providing a
sufficient explanation as to why such a restrictive interpretation of
an applicant's rights of defence are required by practical
considerations.
The Community authorities are also under an obligation to provide a
statement of reasons for their decision in such a manner that it
discloses in a clear and unequivocal way the reasons for the
particular decision so as to enable the applicant to defend its
rights and allow the Court to exercise its supervisory jurisdiction.
This obligation like the obligation to provide information has to be
reconciled with the duty not to disclose confidential information.
The Court will take into account the nature of the measure in
question, the power exercised and the extent to which the applicant
has co-operated with the authorities in deciding whether the
statement of reasons are sufficient. It is fair to say that the
Commission and the Council Regulations are now more detailed and for
the most part sufficiently reasoned as a result of the Court's case
law and new legislation. This is to be welcomed and encouraged.
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The more transparent the Community acts imposing safeguard measures
are the less likely affected parties will object on the grounds of
insufficient reasoning.
By far the most important ground of illegality is that relating to an
infringement of the Treaty or a rule relating to its application.
In exercising its power of review under this ground the Court has had
to consider the application of the general principles common to the
laws of the Member States which are now an important part of its
jurisprudence.
The applicants have on a number of occasions invoked the principle of
non-discrimination. This principle is aimed at ensuring persons in
like or identical situations are treated equally. This is a
question of fact to be decided on the facts of each case. It is
submitted, however, that even if an applicant can show that there has
been discrimination where the duties have been imposed as a result of
findings correctly made the Court will not necessarily annul the
measure in question.
The Community authorities have more recently departed from previous
practice in certain areas and in particular in the calculation of
dumping. Where they have done so the applicants have alleged that
the principle of legal certainty has been breached in that the
Community authorities practice was unpredictable and arbitrary. The
Court has condoned this practice. It has ruled that traders cannot
claim to have a legitimate expectation that the means originally
chosen will be maintained since these may be altered by the Community
authorities in the exercise of their powers. Furthermore the Court
has held that the failure by the Community authorities to explain or
provide in advance the criteria which they intend to apply in a given
case when imposing a provisional or definitive duty does not
constitute a breach of the principle of legal certainty. The
present practice of the Community authorities in relation to the
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anti-dumping rules was codified and is now part of Regulation
2423/88.
Where the Community authorities have breached the principle of
proportionality, i.e. the means used in a given situation must be
proportionate to the end to be achieved, the Court will annul the
measure in question or the offending part of if. In particular,
when a provision in the legislation allows for a lesser duty to be
applied and if such a lesser duty is sufficient in the circumstances
to remove the injury, failure to do so will mean that the measure in
question or parts thereof will be annulled. Such a principle is
important given that the aim of the safeguard measure is to remove
the injury to Community industry but not such that the exporter in
question is discriminated against vis-a-vis other exporters.
Occasionally, an applicant may allege that the powers exercised by
the Community authorities were not in conformity with the GATT
rules. This invariably raises the question of whether provisions of
international agreements, and in particular the GATT, are directly
effective. The Court has emphasised that there is an obligation on
the Community to ensure that the provisions of the GATT are observed
in relations with non-Member States which are parties to the GATT.
Until recently the Court has not been prepared to hold that the
provisions of the GATT are directly effective. In the Third Fediol
case it was held that the GATT provisions are directly effective in
relation to the New Commercial Policy Instrument. This decision is
to be welcomed and it is hoped that the Court will extend its
reasoning to cases involving the Anti-Dumping Rules.
Because investigations associated with safeguard measures are of a
highly complex and technical nature the Community authorities are
endowed with a wide margin of discretion in the exercise of their
powers. The Court has from the inception of the European Economic
Community held that the exercise of powers by the Community
authorities which confer on them a wide discretion should be subject
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to its review. It has, in relation to safeguard measures, adopted
the general principle that its review is limited to verifying whether
the relevant procedural rules have been complied with, whether the
reasons for the decision are adequate, whether the facts on which the
choice is made are accurate and most importantly whether there has
been a manifest error of appraisal or misuse of powers.
The Court has held that the Community authorities did not exceed
their powers when they constructed a normal value which was as close
as possible to that which would have been established if there had
been sufficient sales on the domestic market. Likewise it has
approved the inclusion of a profit margin in the constructed normal
value which reflected the profit realised by the sales of the product
in the same general category on the domestic market. Where a sales
company operates as a sales department of a parent company the Court
has condoned the practice of the Community authorities to include the
sales company's selling expenses when constructing normal value.
In constructing the dumping margin the Court has approved the
practice of assessing the export price when these vary by the
transaction-by-transaction method in order to avoid negative
dumping. The authorities in determining the dumping margin do not
have to use the same method in assessing normal value and export
price. The choice of method is within the authorities' discretion
and, by choosing a method corresponding to a particular situation,
this discretion had not been exceeded.
The Court considers the protection of Community industry as
paramount. Where a complainant industry has imported the dumped
product the Community authorities may exclude such producers. In a
recent number of cases the Community authorities did not exclude such
Community producers because either the producer imported the dumped
product in order to complete its range of models or these imports
were minimal even though they caused injury to the other Community
producers.
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It has also held that the term "interests of the Community" confers
on the Community authorities a sufficiently wide discretion to enable
them to decide what measures are appropriate to deal with a given
situation. This discretion will be even wider when an applicant has
violated a price undertaking. The Court will, however, exercise its
review in the exercise of that discretion where the procedural rights
of an interested party are in issue. The decision to accept or
refuse an undertaking is one subject to practical considerations.
For this reason the Court will be less likely, if at all, to review
the exercise of the Commission's powers in this respect.
Whilst the above practices are now codified in Regulation 2423/88 the
case law of the Court gives some indication of^how it reacts to those
situations when it is required to review the exercise of discretion
by the Community authorities.
Owing to economic and political pressures and more importantly to the
size of the task and the length of time involved the Court is
unwilling to evaluate the factual assessment upon which the Community
authorities have imposed safeguard measures. The review of this
assessment, it is submitted, could be given greater consideration if
the Court of First Instance were given the jurisdiction to review
anti-dumping and other safeguard measures. Perhaps the Council of





(Acts whose publication is obligatory)
COUNCIL REGULATION (EEC) No. 2423/88
of 11 July 1988
on protection against dumped or subsidized imports from
countries not members of the European Economic Community-'-
THE COUNCIL OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES,
Having regard to the Treaty establishing the European Economic
Community, and in particular Article 113 thereof,
Having regard to the Regulations establishing the common organization
of agricultural markets and the Regulations adopted under Article 235
of the Treaty applicable to goods manufactured from agricultural
products, and in particular the provisions of those Regulations which
allow for derogation from the general principle that protective
measures at frontiers may be replaced solely by the measures provided
for in those Regulations,
Having regard to the proposal from the Commission,
Whereas by Regulation (EEC) No. 2176/84^, as amended by Regulation
(EEC) No. 1761/87^, the Council adopted common rules for protection
against dumped or subsidized imports from countries which are not
members of the European Economic Community;
Whereas these rules were adopted in accordance with existing
international obligations, in particular those arising from
Article VI of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (hereinafter
referred to as 'GATT'), from the Agreement on Implementation of
Article VI of the GATT (1979 Anti-Dumping Code) and from the
Agreement on Interpretation and Application of Articles VI, XVI and
XXIII of the GATT (Code on Subsidies and Countervailing Duties);
Whereas in applying these rules it is essential, in order to maintain
the balance of rights and obligations which these Agreements sought
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by the Community's major trading partners, as reflected in
legislation or established practice;
Whereas it is desirable that the rules for determining normal value
should be presented clearly and in sufficient detail; whereas it
should be specifically provided that where sales on the domestic
market of the country of export or origin do not for any reason form
a proper basis for determining the existence of dumping, recourse may
be had to a constructed normal value; whereas it is appropriate to
give examples of situations which may be considered as not
representing the ordinary course of trade, in particular where a
product is sold at prices which are less than the costs of
production, or where transactions take place between parties which
are associated or which have a compensatory arrangement; where it is
appropriate to list the possible methods of determining normal value
in such circumstances;
Whereas it is expedient to define the export price and to enumerate
the necessary adjustments to be made in those cases where
reconstruction of this price from the first open-market price is
deemed appropriate;
Whereas, for the purpose of ensuring a fair comparison between export
price and normal value, it is advisable to establish guidelines for
determining the adjustments to be made in respect of differences in
physical characteristics, in quantities, in conditions and terms of
sale and to draw attention to the fact that the burden of proof falls
on any person claiming such adjustments;
Whereas the term 'dumping margin' should be clearly defined and the
Community's established practice for methods of calculation where
prices or margins vary codified;
Whereas it seems advisable to lay down in adequate detail the manner
in which the amount of any subsidy is to be determined;
Whereas it seems appropriate to set out certain factors which may be
relevant for the determination of injury;
Whereas it is necessary to lay down the procedures for anyone acting
on behalf of a Community industry which considers itself injured or
threatened by dumped or subsidized imports to lodge a complaint;
whereas it seems appropriate to make it clear that in the case of
withdrawal of a complaint, proceedings may, but need not necessarily,
be terminated;
Whereas there should be cooperation between the Member States and the
Commission, both as regards information about the existence of
dumping or subsidization and injury resulting therefrom, and as
regards the subsequent examination of the matter at Community level;
whereas, to this end, consultations should take place within an
advisory committee;
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Whereas it is appropriate to lay down clearly the rules of procedure
to be followed during the investigation, in particular the rights and
obligations of the Community authorities and the parties involved,
and the conditions under which interested parties may have access to
information and may ask to be informed of the essential facts and
considerations on the basis of which it is intended to recommend
definitive measures;
Whereas it is desirable to state explicitly that the investigation of
dumping or subsidization should normally cover a period of not less
than six months immediately prior to the initiation of the proceeding
and that final determinations must be based on the facts established
in respect of the investigation period;
Whereas to avoid confusion, the use of the terms 'investigation' and
'proceeding' in this Regulation should be clarified;
Whereas it is necessary to require that when information is to be
considered as being confidential, a request to this effect must be
made by the supplier, and to make clear that confidential information
which could be summarized but of which no non-confidential summary
has been submitted may be disregarded;
Whereas, in order to avoid undue delays and for administrative
convenience, it is advisable to introduce time limits within which
undertakings may be offered;
Whereas, it is necessary to lay down more explicit rules concerning
the procedure to be followed after withdrawal or violation of
undertakings;
Whereas it is necessary that the Community's decision-making process
permit rapid and efficient action, in particular through measures
taken by the Commission, as for instance the imposition of
provisional duties;
Whereas, in order to discourage dumping, it is appropriate to
provide, in cases where the facts as finally established show that
there is dumping and injury, for the possibility of definitive
collection of provisional duties even if the imposition of a
definitive anti-dumping duty is not decided on, on particular
grounds;
Whereas it is essential, in order to ensure that anti-dumping and
countervailing duties are levied in a correct and uniform manner,
that common rules for the application of such duties be laid down;
whereas, by reason of the nature of the said duties, such rules may
differ from the rules for the levying of normal import duties;
Whereas experience gained from the implementation of Regulation (EEC)
No. 2176/84 has shown that assembly in the Community of products
whose importation in a finished state is subject to anti-dumping duty
may give rise to certain difficulties;
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Whereas in particular:
where assembly or production is carried out by a party which is
related or associated to any of the manufacturers whose exports
of the like product are subject to an anti-dumping duty, and
where the value of the parts or materials used in the assembly or
production operation and originating in the country of origin of
the product subject to an anti-dumping duty exceeds the value of
all other parts or materials used,
such assembly or production is considered likely to lead to
circumvention of the anti-dumping duty;
Whereas, in order to prevent circumvention, it is necessary to
provide for the collection of an anti-dumping duty on products thus
assembled or produced;
Whereas it is necessary to lay down the procedures and conditions for
the collection of duty in such circumstances;
Whereas the amount of anti-dumping duty collected should be limited
to that necessary to prevent circumvention;
Whereas provision should be made for the review of regulations and
decisions to be carried out, where appropriate, in part only;
Whereas, in order to avoid abuse of Community procedures and
resources, it is appropriate to lay down a minimum period which must
elapse after the conclusion of a proceeding before such a review may
be conducted, and to ensure that there is evidence of a change in
circumstances sufficient to justify a review;
Whereas it is necessary to provide that, after a certain period of
time, anti-dumping and countervailing measures will lapse unless the
need for their continued existence can be shown;
Whereas appropriate procedures should be established for examining
applications for refunds of anti-dumping duties; whereas there is a
need to ensure that refund procedures apply only in respect of
definitive duties or amounts of any provisional duty which have been
definitively collected, and to streamline the existing procedures for
refunds;
Whereas this Regulation should not prevent the adoption of special
measures where this does not run counter to the Community's
obligations under the GATT;
Whereas agricultural products and products derived therefrom might
also be dumped or subsidized; whereas it is, therefore, necessary to
supplement the import rules generally applicable to these products by
making provision for protective measures against such practices;
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Whereas, in addition to the above considerations, which, in essence,
led to the adoption of Regulation (EEC) No. 2176/84, experience has
shown that it is necessary to define more precisely certain of the
rules to be applied and the procedures to be followed in the context
of anti-dumping proceedings.
Whereas, for the determination of normal value, it is appropriate to
ensure that when this is based on domestic prices, the price should
be that actually paid or payable in the ordinary course of trade in
the exporting country or country of origin and, therefore, the
treatment of discounts and rebates should be clarified, in
particular, with regard to deferred discounts which may be recognized
if evidence is produced that they were not introduced to distort the
normal value. It is also desirable to state more explicitly how
normal value is established on the basis of constructed value, in
particular, that the selling, general and administrative expenses and
profit should be calculated, depending on the circumstances, by
reference to the expenses incurred and the profit realized on
profitable sales made by the exporter concerned or by other producers
or exporters or on any reasonable basis. In addition, it is
appropriate to state that, where the exporter neither produces nor
sells the like product in the country of origin, the normal value
shall normally be established by reference to the prices or costs of
the exporter's supplier. Finally, it is considered necessary to
define more precisely the conditions under which sales at a loss may
be considered as not having been made in the ordinary course of
trade;
Whereas, for the determination of export prices, it is advisable to
ensure that this is based on the price actually paid or payable and,
therefore, the treatment of discounts and rebates should be
clarified. In cases where the export price has to be reconstructed,
it is necessary to state that the costs to be used in this
reconstruction include those normally borne by an importer but paid
by any party which appears to be associated with the importer or
exporter;
Whereas, for the comparison of normal value and export prices, it is
necessary to ensure that this is not distorted by claims for
adjustments relating to factors which are not directly related to the
sales under consideration or by claims for factors already taken into
account. It is therefore appropriate to define precisely the
differences which affect price comparability and to lay down more
explicit rules on how any adjustment should be made, in particular,
for differences in physical characteristics, transport, packing,
credit, warranties and other selling expenses. With regard to such
selling expenses, it is appropriate, for reasons of clarity, to
specify that no allowance should be made for general selling expenses
since such expenses are not directly related to the sales under
consideration with the exception of salesmen's salaries which should
not be treated differently to commissions paid. For reasons of
administrative convenience, it is also appropriate to specify that
claims for individual adjustments which are insignificant should be
disregarded;
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Whereas, it is expedient to clarify Commuity practice with regard to
the use of averaging and sampling techniques;
Whereas, in order to avoid undue disruption to proceedings, it is
advisable to clarify that the supply of false or misleading
information may lead to such information being disregarded and any
claims to which it refers being disallowed;
Whereas, experience has shown that, it is necessary to prevent the
effectiveness of anti-dumping duties being eroded by the duty being
borne by exporters. It is appropriate to confirm that, in such
circumstances, additional anti-dumping duties may be imposed, where
necessary retroactively;
Whereas, experience has also shown that the rules relating to the
expiry of anti-dumping and countervailing measures should be
clarified. For this purpose and in order to facilitate the
administration of these rules, provision should be made for the
publication of a notice of intention to carry out a review;
Whereas, it is appropriate to state more explicitly the methods to be
used in the calculation of the amount to any refund, thus confirming
the consistent practice of the Commission, as regards refunds and the
relevant principles contained in the notice which the Commission has
published concerning the reimbursement of anti-dumping duties^;
Whereas it is appropriate to take advantage of this opportunity to
proceed to a consolidation of the provisions in question,
HAS ADOPTED THIS REGULATION:
Article 1
Applicability
This Regulation lays down provisions for protection against dumped or





1. An anti-dumping duty may be applied to any dumped product whose
release for free circulation in the Community causes injury.
O.J. No. C 266, 22.10.1986, p. 2.
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2. A product shall be considered to have been dumped if its export
price to the Community is less than the normal value of the like
product.
B. NORMAL VALUE
3. For the purposes of this Regulation, the normal value shall be:
(a) the comparable price actually paid or payable in the
ordinary course of trade for the like product intended for
consumption in the exporting country or country of origin.
This price shall be net of all discounts and rebates
directly linked to the sales under consideration provided
that the exporter claims and supplies sufficient evidence
that any such reduction from the gross price has actually
been granted. Deferred discounts may be recognized if they
are directly linked to the sales under consideration and if
evidence is produced to show that these discounts were based
on consistent practice in prior periods or on an undertaking
to comply with the conditions required to qualify for the
deferred discount.
(b) when there are no sales of the like product in the ordinary
course of trade on the domestic market of the exporting
country or country of origin, or when such sales do not
permit a proper comparison:
(i) the comparable price of the like product when exported
to any third country, which may be the highest such
export price but should be a representative price; or
(ii) the constructed value, determined by adding cost of
production and a reasonable margin of profit. The
cost of production shall be computed on the basis of
all costs, in the ordinary course of trade, both fixed
and variable, in the country of origin, of materials
and manufacture, plus a reasonable amount for selling,
administrative and other general expenses. The amount
for selling, general and administrative expenses and
profit shall be calculated by reference to the expenses
incurred and the profit realized by the producer or
exporter on the profitable sales of like products on
the domestic market. If such data is unavailable or
unreliable or is not suitable for use they shall be
calculated by reference to the expenses incurred and
profit realized by other producers or exporters in the
country of origin or export on profitable sales of the
like product. If neither of these two methods can be
applied the expenses incurred and the profit realized
shall be calculated by reference to the sales made by
the exporter or other producers or exporters in the
same business sector in the country of origin or export
or on any other reasonable basis.
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(c) where the exporter in the country of origin neither produces
nor sells the like product in the country of origin, the
normal value shall be established on the basis of prices or
costs of other sellers or producers in the country of origin
in the same manner as mentioned in subparagraphs (a) and
(b). Normally the prices or costs of the exporter's
supplier shall be used for this purpose.
4. Whenever there are reasonable grounds for believing or suspecting
that the price at which a product is actually sold for consumption in
the country of origin is less than the cost of production as defined
in paragraph 3 (b) (ii), sales at such prices may be considered as
not having been made in the ordinary course of trade if they:
(a) have been made in substantial quantities during the
investigation period as defined in Article 7(l)(c); and
(b) are not at prices which permit recovery, in the normal
course of trade and within the period referred to in
paragraph (a) of all costs reasonably allocated.
In such circumstances, the normal value may be determined on the
basis of the remaining sales on the domestic market made at a price
which is not less than the cost of production or on the basis of
export sales to third countries or on the basis of the constructed
value or by adjusting the sub-production-cost price referred to above
in order to eliminate loss and provide for a reasonable profit.
Such normal value calculations shall be based on available
information.
5. In the case of imports from non-market economy countries and, in
particular, those to which Regulations (EEC) No. 1765/82^ and (EEC)
No. 1766/82^ apply, normal value shall be determined in an
appropriate and not unreasonable manner on the basis of one of the
following criteria:
(a) the price at which the like product of a market economy
third country is actually sold:
(i) for consumption on the domestic market of that
country; or
(ii) to other countries, including the Community; or
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(c) if neither price nor constructed value as established under
(a) or (b) provides an adequate basis, the price actually
paid or payable in the Community for the like product, duly
adjusted, if necessary, to include a reasonable profit
margin.
6. Where a product is not imported directly from the country of
origin but is exported to the Community from an intermediate country,
the normal value shall be the comparable price actually paid or
payable for the like product on the domestic market of either the
country of export or the country of origin. The latter basis might
be appropriate inter alia, where the product is merely transshipped
through the country of export, where such products are not produced
in the country of export or where no comparable price for it exists
in the country of export.
7. For the purpose of determining normal value transactions between
parties which appear to be associated or to have a compensatory
arrangement with each other may be considered as not being in the
ordinary course of trade unless the Community authorities are
satisfied that the prices and costs involved are comparable to those
involved in transactions between parties which have no such link.
C. EXPORT PRICE
8. (a) The export price shall be the price actually paid or payable
for the product sold for export to the Community net of all
taxes, discounts and rebates actually granted and directly
related to the sales under consideration. Deferred
discounts shall also be taken into consideration if they are
actually granted and directly related to the sales under
consideration.
(b) In cases where there is no export price or where it appears
that there is an association or a compensatory arrangement
between the exporter and the importer or a third party, or
that for other reasons the price actually paid or payable
for the product sold for export to the Community is
unreliable, the export price may be constructed on the basis
of the price at which the imported product is first resold
to an independent buyer, or if the product is not resold to
an independent buyer, or not resold in the condition
imported, on any reasonable basis. In such cases,
allowance shall be made for all costs incurred between
importation and resale and for a reasonable profit margin.
These costs shall include those normally borne by an
importer but paid by any party either in or outside the
Community which appears to be associated or to have a
compensatory arrangement with the importer or exporter.
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Such allowances shall include, in particular, the following:
(i) usual transport, insurance, handling, loading and
ancillary costs;
(ii) customs duties, any anti-dumping duties and other
taxes payable in the importing country by reason of
the importation or sale of the goods;
(iii) a reasonable margin for overheads and profit and/or
any commission usually paid or agreed
D. COMPARISON
9. (a) The normal value, as established under paragraphs 3 to 7,
and the export price, as established under paragraph 8,
shall be compared as nearly as possible at the same time.
For the purpose of ensuring a fair comparison, due allowance
in the form of adjustments shall be made in each case, on
its merits, for the differences affecting price
comparability, i.e. for differences in:
(i) physical characteristics;
(ii) import charges and indirect taxes;
(iii) selling expenses resulting from sales made:
at different levels of trade, or
in different quantities, or
under different conditions and terms of sale,
(b) Where an interested party claims an adjustment it must prove
that its claim is justified.
10. Any adjustments to take account of the differences affecting
price comparability listed in paragraph 9(a) shall, where warranted,
be made pursuant to the rules specified below.
(a) Physical characteristics:
The normal value as established under paragraphs 3 to 7
shall be adjusted by an amount corresponding to a reasonable
estimate of the value of the difference in the physical
characteristics of the product concerned.
(b) Import charges and indirect taxes:
Normal value shall be reduced by an amount corresponding to
any import charges or indirect taxes, as defined in the
notes to the Annex, borne by the like product and by
materials physically incorporated therein, when destined for
consumption in the country of origin or export and not




(i) Transport, insurance, handling, loading and ancillary
costs:
Normal value shall be reduced by the directly related
costs incurred for conveying the product concerned
from the premises of the exporter to the first
independent buyer. The export price shall be
reduced by any directly related costs incurred by the
exporter for conveying the product concerned from its
premises in the exporting country to its destination
in the Community. In both cases these costs
comprise transport, insurance, handling, loading and
ancillary costs.
(ii) Packing:
Normal value and export price shall be reduced by the
respective, directly related costs of the packing for
the product concerned.
(iii) Credit:
Normal value and export price shall be reduced by the
cost of any credit granted for the sales under
consideration.
The amount of the reduction shall be calculated by
reference to the normal commercial credit rate
applicable in the country of origin or export in
respect of the currency expressed on the invoice.
(iv) Warranties, guarantees, technical assistance and
other after-sales services:
Normal value and export price shall be reduced by an
amount corresponding to the direct costs of providing
warranties, guarantees, technical assistance and
services.
(v) Other selling expenses:
Normal value and export price shall be reduced by an
amount corresponding to the commissions paid in
respect of the sales under consideration. The
salaries paid to salesmen, i.e. personnel wholly
engaged in direct selling activities, shall also be
deducted.
Amount of the adjustment:
The amount of any adjustment shall be calculated on the
basis of relevant data for the investigation period or the
data for the last available financial year.
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(e) Insignificant adjustments:
Claims for adjustments which are insignificant in relation
to the price or value of the affected transactions shall be
disregarded. Ordinarily, individual adjustments having an
ad valorem effect of less than 0.5% of that price or value
shall be considered insignificant.
E. ALLOCATION OF COSTS
11. In general, all cost calculations shall be based on available
accounting data, normally allocated, where necessary, in proportion
to the turnover for each product and market under consideration.
F. LIKE PRODUCT
12. For the purposes of this Regulation, 'like product' means a
product which is identical, i.e., alike in all respects, to the
product under consideration, or, in the absence of such a product,
another product which has characteristics closely resembling those of
the product under consideration.
G. AVERAGING AND SAMPLING TECHNIQUES
13. Where prices vary:
normal value shall normally be established on a weighted average
basis,
export prices shall normally be compared with the normal value on
a transaction-by-transaction basis except where the use of
weighted averages would not materially affect the results of the
investigation,
sampling techniques, e.g. the use of the most frequently
occurring or representative prices may be applied to establish
normal value and export prices in cases in which a significant
volume of transactions is involved.
H. DUMPING MARGIN
'Dumping margin' means the amount by which the normal value
exceeds the export price.




1. A countervailing duty may be imposed for the purpose of off¬




of origin or export, upon the manufacture, production, export or
transport of any product whose release for free circulation in the
Community causes injury.
2. Subsidies bestowed on exports include, but are not limited to,
the practices listed in the Annex.
3. The exemption of a product from import charges or indirect taxes,
as defined in the Notes to the Annex, effectively borne by the like
product and by materials physically incorporated therein, when
destined for consumption in the country of origin or export, or the
refund of such charges or taxes, shall not be considered as a subsidy
for the purposes of this Regulation.
4. (a) The amount of the subsidy shall be determined per unit of
the subsidized product exported to the Community.
(b) In establishing the amount of any subsidy the following
elements shall be deducted from the total subsidy:
(i) any application fee, or other costs necessarily
incurred in order to qualify for, or receive benefit
of, the subsidy;
(ii) export taxes, duties or other charges levied on the
export of the product to the Community specifically
intended to offset the subsidy.
Where an interested party claims a deduction, it must prove
that the claim is justified.
(c) Where the subsidy is not granted by reference to the
quantities manufactured, produced, exported or transported,
the amount shall be determined by allocating the value of
the subsidy, as appropriate, over the level of production or
exports of the product concerned during a suitable period.
Normally this period shall be the accounting year of the
beneficiary.
Where the subsidy is based upon the acquisition or future
acquisition of fixed assets, the value of the subsidy shall
be calculated by spreading the subsidy across a period which
reflects the normal depreciation of such assets in the
industry concerned. Where the assets are non-depreciating,
the subsidy shall be valued as an interest-free loan.
(d) In the case of imports from non-market economy countries and
in particular those to which Regulations (EEC) No. 1765/82
and (EEC) No. 1766/82 apply, the amount of any subsidy may
be determined in an appropriate and not unreasonable manner,
by comparing the export price as calculated in accordance
with Article 2 (8) with the normal value as determined in
accordance with Article 2 (5). Article 2 (10) shall apply
to such a comparison.
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1. A determination of injury shall be made only if the dumped or
subsidized imports are, through the effects of dumping or
subsidization, causing injury i.e., causing or threatening to cause
material injury to an established Community industry or materially
retarding the establishment of such an industry. Injuries caused by
other factors, such as volume and prices of imports which are not
dumped or subsidized, or contraction in demand, which, individually
or in combination, also adversely affect the Community industry must
not be attributed to the dumped or subsidized imports.
2. An examination of injury shall involve the following factors, no
one or several of which can necessarily give decisive guidance:
(a) volume of dumped or subsidized imports, in particular
whether there has been a significant increase, either in
absolute terms or relative to production or consumption in
the Community;
(b) the prices of dumped or subsidized imports, in particular
whether there has been a significant price undercutting as
compared with the price of a like product in the Community;
(c) the consequent impact on the industry concerned as indicated







prices (i.e., depression of prices or prevention of





3. A determination of threat of injury may only be made where a
particular situation is likely to develop into actual injury. In
this regard account may be taken of factors such as:
(a) rate of increase of the dumped or subsidized exports to the
Community;
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(b) export capacity in the country of origin or export, already
in existence or which will be operational in the foreseeable
future, and the likelihood that the resulting exports will
be to the Community;
(c) the nature of any subsidy and the trade effects likely to
arise therefrom.
4. The effect of the dumped or subsidized imports shall be assessed
in relation to the Community production of the like product when
available data permit its separate identification. When the
Community production of the like product has no separate identity,
the effect of the dumped or subsidized imports shall be assessed in
relation to the production of the narrowest group or range of
production which includes the like product for which the necessary
information can be found.
5. The term 'Community industry' shall be interpreted as referring
to the Community producers as a whole of the like product or to those
of them whose collective output of the products constitutes a major
proportion of the total Community production of those products except
that:
when producers are related to the exporters or importers or are
themselves importers of the allegedly dumped or subsidized
product the term 'Community industry' may be interpreted as
referring to the rest of the producers;
in exceptional circumstances the Community may, for the
production in question, be divided into two or more competitive
markets and the producers within each market regarded as a
Community industry if,
(a) the producers within such market sell all or almost all
their production of the product in question in that market,
and
(b) the demand in that market is not to any substantial degree
supplied by producers of the product in question located
elsewhere in the Community.
In such circumstances injury may be found to exist even where a major
proportion of the total Community industry is not injured, provided
there is a concentration of dumped or subsidized imports into such an
isolated market and provided further that the dumped or subsidized
imports are causing injury to the producers of all or almost all of




1. Any natural or legal person, or any association not having legal
personality, acting on behalf of a Community industry which considers
itself injured or threatened by dumped or subsidized imports may
lodge a written complaint.
2. The complaint shall contain sufficient evidence of the existence
of dumping or subsidization and the injury resulting therefrom.
3. The complaint may be submitted to the Commission, or a Member
State, which shall forward it to the Commission. The Commission
shall send Member States a copy of any complaint it receives.
4. The complaint may be withdrawn, in which case proceedings may be
terminated unless such termination would not be in the interest of
the Community.
5. Where it becomes apparent after consultation that the complaint
does not provide sufficient evidence to justify initiating an
investigation, then the complainant shall be so informed.
6. Where, in the absence of any complaint, a Member State is in
possession of sufficient evidence both of dumping or subsidization
and of injury resulting therefrom for a Community industry, it shall
immediately communicate such evidence to the Commission.
Article 6
Consultations
1. Any consultations provided for in this Regulation shall take
place within an Advisory Committee, which shall consist of
representatives of each Member State, with a representative of the
Commission as chairman. Consultations shall be held immediately on
request by a Member State or on the initiative of the Commission.
2. The Committee shall meet when convened by its chairman. He
shall provide the Member States, as promptly as possible, with all
relevant information.
3. Where necessary, consultation may be in writing only; in such
case the Commission shall notify the Member States and shall specify
a period within which they shall be entitled to express their
opinions or to request an oral consultation.
4. Consultation shall in particular cover:
(a) the existence of dumping or of a subsidy and the methods of
establishing the dumping margin or the amount of the
subsidy;
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(b) the existence and extent of injury;
(c) the causal link between the dumped or subsidized imports and
injury;
(d) the measures which, in the circumstances, are appropriate to
prevent or remedy the injury caused by dumping or the
subsidy and the ways and means for putting such measures
into effect.
Article 7
Initiation and subsequent investigation
1. Where, after consultation it is apparent that there is sufficient
evidence to justify nitiating a proceeding the Commission shall
immediately:
(a) announce the initiation of a proceeding in the Official
Journal of the European Communities; such announcements
shall indicate the product and countries concerned, give a
summary of the information received, and provide that all
relevant information is to be communicated to the
Commission; it shall state the period within which
interested parties may make known their views in writing and
may apply to be heard orally by the Commission in accordance
with paragraph 5;
(b) so advise the exporters and importers known to the
Commission to be concerned as well as representatives of the
exporting country and the complainants;
(c) commence the investigation at Community level, acting in
cooperation with the Member States; such investigation
shall cover both dumping or subsidization and injury
resulting therefrom and shall be carried out in accordance
with paragraphs 2 to 8; the investigation of dumping or
subsidization shall normally cover a period of not less than
six months immediately prior to the initiation of the
proceeding.
2. (a) The Commission shall seek all information it deems to be
necessary and, where it considers it appropriate, examine
and verify the records of importers, exporters, traders,
agents, producers, trade associations and organizations.
(b) Where necessary the Commission shall carry out
investigations in third countries, provided that the firms
concerned give their consent and the government of the
country in question has been officially notified and raises
no objection. The Commission shall be assisted by
officials of those Member States who so request.
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3. (a) The Commission may request Member States:
to supply information,
to carry out all necessary checks and inspections,
particuarly amongst importers, traders and Community
producers,
to carry out investigations in third countries,
provided the firms concerned give their consent and the
government of the country in question has been
officially notified and raises no objection.
(b) Member States shall take whatever steps are necessary in
order to give effect to requests from the Commission. They
shall send to the Commission the information requested
together with the results of all inspections, checks or
investigations carried out.
(c) Where this information is of general interest or where its
transmission has been requested by a Member State, the
Commission shall forward it to the Member States, provided
it is not confidential, in which case a non-confidential
summary shall be forwarded.
(d) Officials of the Commission shall be authorized, if the
Commission or a Member State so requests, to assist the
officials of Member States in carrying out their duties.
4. (a) The complainant and the importers and exporters known to be
concerned, as well as the representatives of the exporting
country, may inspect all information made available to the
Commission by any party to an investigation as distinct from
internal documents prepared by the authorities of the
Community or its Member States, provided that it is relevant
to the defence of their interests and not confidential
within the meaning of Article 8 and that it is used by the
Commission in the investigation. To this end, they shall
address a written request to the Commission indicating the
information required.
(b) Exporters and importers of the product subject to
investigation and, in the case of subsidization, the
representatives of the country of origin, may request to be
informed of the essential facts and considerations on the
basis of which it is intended to recommend the imposition of
definitive duties or the definitive collection of amounts
secured by way of a provisional duty.
(c) (i) requests for information pursuant to (b) shall:
(aa) be addressed to the Commission in writing,
(bb) specify the particular issues on which
information is sought,
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(cc) be received, in cases where a provisional
duty has been applied, not later than one
month after publication of the imposition
of that duty;
(ii) the information may be given either orally or in
writing as considered appropriate by the Commission.
It shall not prejudice any subsequent decision which
may be taken by the Commission or the Council.
Confidential information shall be treated in
accordance with Article 8;
(iii) information shall normally be given no later than
15 days prior to the submission by the Commission of
any proposal for final action pursuant to
Article 12. Representations made after the
information is given shall be taken into
consideration only if received within a period to be
set by the Commission in each case, which shall be
at least 10 days, due consideration being given to
the urgency of the matter.
5. The Commission may hear the interested parties. It shall so
hear them if they have, within the period prescribed in the notice
published in the Official Journal of the European Communities, made a
written request for a hearing showing that they are an interested
party likely to be affected by the result of the proceeding and that
there arc particular reasons why they should be heard orally.
6. Furthermore the Commission shall, on request, give the parties
directly concerned an opportunity to meet, so that opposing views may
be presented and any rebuttal argument put forward. In providing
this opportunity the Commission shall take account of the need to
preserve confidentiality and of the convenience of the parties.
There shall be no obligation on any party to attend a meeting and
failure to do so shall not be prejudicial to that party's case.
7. (a) This Article shall not preclude the Community authorities
from reaching preliminary determinations or from applying
provisional measures expeditiously.
(b) In cases in which any interested party or third country
refuses access to, or otherwise does not provide, necessary
information within a reasonable period, or significantly
impedes the investigation, preliminary or final findings,
affirmative or negative, may be made on the basis of the
facts available. Where the Commission finds that any
interested party or third country has supplied it with false
or misleading information, it may disregard any such
information and disallow any claim to which this refers.
8. Anti-dumping or countervailing proceedings shall not constitute a
bar to customs clearance of the product concerned.
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9. (a) An investigation shall be concluded either by its
termination or by definitive action. Conclusion should
normally take place within one year of the initiation of the
proceeding.
(b) A proceeding shall be concluded either by the termination of
the investigation without the imposition of duties and
without the acceptance of undertakings or by the expiry or
repeal of such duties or by the termination of undertakings
in accordance with Articles 14 or 15.
Article 8
Confidentiality
1. Information received in pursuance of this Regulation shall be
used only for the purpose for which it was requested.
2. (a) Neither the Council, nor the Commission, nor Member States,
nor the officials of any of these, shall reveal any
information received in pursuance of this Regulation for
which confidential treatment has been requested by its
supplier, without specific permission from the supplier.
(b) Each request for confidential treatment shall indicate why
the information is confidential and shall be accompanied by
a non-confidential summary of the information, or a
statement of the reasons why the information is not
susceptible of such summary.
3. Information will ordinarily be considered to be confidential if
its disclosure is likely to have a significantly adverse effect upon
the supplier or the source of such information.
4. However, if it appears that a request for confidentiality is not
warranted and if the supplier is either unwilling to make the
information public or to authorize its disclosure in generalized or
summary form, the information in question may be disregarded.
The information may also be disregarded where such request is
warranted and where the supplier is unwilling to submit a
non-confidential summary, provided that the information is
susceptible of such summary.
5. This Article shall not preclude the disclosure of general
information by the Community authorities and in particular of the
reasons on which decisions taken in pursuance of this Regulation are
based, or disclosure of the evidence relied on by the Community
authorities in so far as necessary to explain those reasons in court
proceedings. Such disclosure must take into account the legitimate




Termination of proceedings where protective measures
are unnecessary
1. If it becomes apparent after consultation that protective
measures are unnecessary, then, where no objection is raised within
the Advisory Committee referred to in Article 6 (1), the proceeding
shall be terminated. In all other cases the Commission shall submit
to the Council forthwith a report on the results of the consultation,
together with a proposal that the proceeding be terminated. The
proceeding shall stand terminated if, within one month, the Council,
acting by a qualified majority, has not decided otherwise.
2. The Commission shall inform any representatives of the country of
origin or export and the parties known to be concerned and shall
announce the termination in the Official Journal of the European




1. Where, during the course of an investigation, undertakings are
offered which the Commission, after consultation, considers
acceptable, the investigation may be terminated without the
imposition of provisional or definitive duties.
Save in exceptional circumstances, undertakings may not be offered
later than the end of the period during which representations may be
made under Article 7 (4) (c) (iii). The termination shall be
decided in conformity with the procedure laid down in Article 9 (1)
and information shall be given and notice published in accordance
with Article 9 (2). Such termination does not preclude the
definitive collection of amounts secured by way of provisional duties
pursuant to Article 12 (2).
2. The undertakings referred to under paragraph 1 are those under
which:
(a) the subsidy is eliminated or limited, or other measures
concerning its injurious effects taken, by the government of
the country of origin or export; or
(b) prices are revised or exports cease to the extent that the
Commission is satisfied that either the dumping margin or
the amount of the subsidy, or the injurious effects thereof,
are eliminated. In case of subsidization the consent of
the country of origin or export shall be obtained.
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3. Undertakings may be suggested by the Commission, but the fact
that such undertakings are not offered or an invitation to do so is
not accepted, shall not prejudice consideration of the case.
However, the continuation of dumped or subsidized imports may be
taken as evidence that a threat of injury is more likely to be
realized.
4. If the undertakings are accepted, the investigation of injury
shall nevertheless be completed if the Commission, after
consultation, so decides or if request is made, in the case of
dumping, by exporters representing a significant percentage of the
trade involved or, in the case of subsidization, by the country of
origin or export. In such a case, if the Commission, after
consultation, makes a determination of no injury, the undertaking
shall automatically lapse. However, where a determination of no
threat of injury is due mainly to the existence of an undertaking,
the Commission may require that the undertaking be maintained.
5. The Commission may require any party from whom an undertaking has
been accepted to provide periodically information relevant to the
fulfilment of such undertakings, and to permit verification of
pertinent data. Non-compliance with such requirements shall be
construed as a violation of the undertaking.
6. Where an undertaking has been withdrawn or where the Commission
has reason to believe that it has been violated and where Community
interests call for such intervention, it may, after consultations and
after having offered the exporter concerned an opportunity to
comment, apply provisional anti-dumping or countervailing duties




1. Where preliminary examination shows that dumping or a subsidy
exists and that there is sufficient evidence of injury caused thereby
and the interests of the Community call for intervention to prevent
injury being caused during the proceeding, the Commission, acting at
the request of a Member State or on its own initiative, shall impose
a provisional anti-dumping or countervailing duty. In such cases,
release of the products concerned for free circulation in the
Community shall be conditional upon the provision of security for the
amount of the provisional duty, definitive collection of which shall
be determined by the subsequent decision of the Council under
Article 12 (2).
2. The Commission shall take such provisional action after
consultation or, in cases of extreme urgency, after informing the
Member States. In this latter case, consultations shall take place
10 days at the latest after notification to the Member States of the
action taken by the Commission.
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3. Where a Member State requests immediate intervention by the
Commission, the Commission shall within a maximum of five working
days of receipt of the request, decide whether a provisional
anti-dumping or countervailing duty should be imposed.
4. The Commission shall forthwith inform the Council and the Member
States of any decision taken under this Article. The Council,
acting by a qualified majority, may decide differently. A decision
by the Commission not to impose a provisional duty shall not preclude
the imposition of such duty at a later date, either at the request of
a Member State, if new factors arise, or on the initiative of the
Commission.
5. Provisional duties shall have a maximum period of validity of
four months. However, where exporters representing a significant
percentage of the trade involved so request or, pursuant to a notice
of intention from the Commission, do not object, provisional anti¬
dumping duties may be extended for a further period of two months.
6. Any proposal for definitive action, or for extension of
provisional measures, shall be submitted to the Council by the
Commission not later than one month before expiry of the period of
validity or provisional duties. The Council shall act by a
qualified majority.
7. After expiration of the period of validity of provisional duties,
the security shall be released as promptly as possible to the extent
that the Council has not decided to collect it definitively.
Article 12
Definitive action
1. Where the facts as finally established show that there is dumping
or subsidization during the period under investigation and injury
caused thereby, and the interests of the Community call for Community
intervention, a definitive and anti-dumping or countervailing duty
shall be imposed by the Council, acting by qualified majority on a
proposal submitted by the Commission after consultation.
2. (a) Where a provisional duty has been applied, the Council shall
decide, irrespective of whether a definitive anti-dumping or
countervailing duty is to be imposed, what proportion of the
provisional duty is to be definitively collected. The
Council shall act by a qualified majority on a proposal from
the Commission.
(b) The definitive collection of such amount shall not be
decided upon unless the facts as finally established show
that there has been dumping or subsidization, and injury.
For this purpose, 'injury' shall not include material
retardation of the establishment of a Community industry,
nor threat of material injury, except where it is found that
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this would, in the absence of provisional measures, have
developed into material injury.
Article 13
General provisions on duties
1. Anti-dumping or countervailing duties, whether provisional or
definitive, shall be imposed by Regulation.
2. Such Regulation shall indicate in particular the amount and type
of duty imposed, the product covered, the country of origin or
export, the name of the supplier, if practicable, and the reasons on
which the Regulation is based.
3. The amount of such duties shall not exceed the dumping margin
provisionally estimated or finally established or the amount of the
subsidy provisionally estimated or finally established; it should be
less if such lesser duty would be adequate to remove the injury.
4. (a) Anti-dumping and countervailing duties shall be neither
imposed nor increased with retroactive effect. The
obligation to pay the amount of these duties is incurred in
accordance with Directive 79/623/EEC^.
(b) However, where the Council determines:
(i) for dumped products:
that there is a history of dumping which caused
injury or that the importer was, or should have
been, aware that the exporter practices dumping and
that such dumping would cause injury, and
that the injury is caused by sporadic dumping, i.e.
massive dumped imports of a product in a relatively
short period, to such an extent that, in order to
preclude it recurring, it appears necessary to
impose an anti-dumping duty retroactively on those
imports; or
(ii) for subsidized products:
in critical circumstances that injury which is
difficult to repair is caused by massive imports in
a relatively short period of a product benefiting
from export subsidies paid or bestowed
inconsistently with the provisions of the GATT and
O.J. No. L 179 17.7.1979 p. 31.
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of the Agreement on Interpretation and Application
of Articles VI, XVI and XXIII of the GATT, and
that it is necessary, in order to preclude the
recurrence of such injury, to assess countervailing
duties retroactively on these imports; or
(iii) for dumped or subsidized products:
that an undertaking has been violated,
the definitive anti-dumping or countervailing duties may be
imposed on products in relation to which the obligation to
pay import duties under Directive 79/623/EEC has been or
would have been incurred not more than 90 days prior to the
date of application of provisional duties, except that in
the case of violation of an undertaking such retroactive
assessment shall not apply to imports which were released
for free circulation in the Community before the violation.
5. Where a product is imported into the Community from more than one
country, duty shall be levied at an appropriate amount on a non¬
discriminatory basis on all imports of such product found to be
dumped or subsidized and causing injury, other than imports from
those sources in respect of which undertakings have been accepted.
6. Where the Community industry has been interpreted as referring to
the producers in a certain region; the Commission shall give
exporters an opportunity to offer undertakings pursuant to Article 10
in respect of the region concerned. If an adequate undertaking is
not given promptly or is not fulfilled, a provisional or definitive
duty may be imposed in respect of the Community as a whole.
7. In the absence of any special provisions to the contrary adopted
when a definitive or provisional anti-dumping or countervailing duty
was imposed, the rules on the common definition of the concept of
origin and the relevant common implementing provisions shall apply.
8. Anti-dumping or countervailing duties shall be collected by
Member States in the form, at the rate and according to the other
criteria laid down when the duties were imposed, and independently of
the customs duties, taxes and other charges normally imposed on
imports.
9. No product shall be subject to both anti-dumping and counter¬
vailing duties for the purpose of dealing with one and the same
situation arising from dumping or from the granting of any subsidy.
10. (a) Definitive and anti-dumping duties may be imposed, by way of
derogation from the second sentence of paragraph 4(a), on
products that are introduced into the commerce of the
Community after having been assembled or produced in the
Community, provided that:
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assembly or production is carried out by a party which
is related or associated to any of the manufacturers
whose exports of the like product are subject to a
definitive anti-dumping duty,
the assembly or production operation was started or
substantially increased after the opening of the
anti-dumping investigation,
the value of parts or materials used in the assembly or
production operation and originating in the country of
exportation of the product subject to the anti-dumping
duty exceeds the value of all other parts or materials
used by at least 50%.
In applying this provision, account shall be taken of the
circumstances of each case, and, inter alia, of the variable
costs incurred in the assembly or production operation and
of the research and development carried out and the
technology applied within the Community.
In that event the Council shall, at the same time, decide
that parts or materials suitable for use in the assembly or
production of such products and originating in the country
of exportation of the product subject to the anti-dumping
duty can only be considered to be in free circulation in so
far as they will not be used in an assembly or production
operation as specified in the first subparagraph.
Products thus assembled or produced shall be declared to the
competent authorities before leaving the assembly or
production plant for their introduction into the commerce of
the Community. For the purposes of levying an anti-dumping
duty, this declaration shall be considered to be equivalent
to the declaration referred to in Article 2 of Directive
79/695/EEC8.
The rate of the anti-dumping duty shall be that applicable
to the manufacturer in the country of origin of the like
product subject to an anti-dumping duty to which the party
in the Community carrying out the assembly or production is
related or associated. The amount of duty collected shall
be proportional to that resulting from the application of
the rate of the anti-dumping duty applicable to the exporter
of the complete product on the cif value of the parts or
materials imported; it shall not exceed that required to
prevent circumvention of the anti-dumping duty.
O.J. No. L 205, 13.8.1979, p. 19.
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(d) The provisions of this Regulation concerning investigation,
procedure, and undertakings apply to all questions arising
under this paragraph.
11. (a) Where the exporter bears the anti-dumping duty, an
additional anti-dumping duty may be imposed to compensate
for the amount borne by the exporter.
(b) When any party directly concerned submits sufficient
evidence showing that the duty has been borne by the
exporter, e.g. that the resale price to the first
independent buyer of the product subject to the anti-dumping
duty is not increased by an amount corresponding to the
anti-dumping duty, the matter shall be investigated and the
exporters and importers concerned shall be given an
opportunity to comment.
Where it is found that the anti-dumping duty has been borne
by the exporter, in whole or in part, either directly or
indirectly and where Community interests call for
intervention, an additional anti-dumping duty shall, after
consultation, be imposed in accordance with the procedures
laid down in Articles 11 and 12.
This duty may be applied retroactively. It may be imposed
on products in relation to which the obligation to pay
import duties under Directive 79/623/EEC has been incurred
after the imposition of the definitive anti-dumping duty,
except that such assessment shall not apply to imports which
were released for free circulation in the Community before
the exporter bore the anti-dumping duty.
(c) Insofar as the results of the investigation show that the
absence of a price increase by an amount corresponding to
the anti-dumping duty is not due to a reduction in the costs
and/or profits of the importer for the product concerned
then the absence of such price increase shall be considered
as an indicator that the anti-dumping duty has been borne by
the exporter.




1. Regulations imposing anti-dumping or countervailing duties and
decisions to accept undertakings shall be subject to review, in whole
or in part, where warranted.
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Such review may be held either at the request of a Member State or on
the initiative of the Commission. A review shall also be held where
an interested party so requests and submits evidence of changed
circumstances sufficient to justify the need for such review,
provided that at least one year has elapsed since the conclusion of
the investigation. Such requests shall be addressed to the
Commission which shall inform the Member States.
2. Where, after consultation, it becomes apparent that review is
warranted, the investigation shall be re-opened in accordance with
Article 7, where the circumstances so require. Such re-opening
shall not per se affect the measures in operation.
3. Where warranted by the review, carried out either with or without
re-opening of the investigation, the measures shall be amended,
repealed or annulled by the Community institution competent for their
introduction. However, where measures have been taken under the
transitional provisions of an Act of Accession the Commission shall
itself amend, repeal or annul them and shall report this to the
Council; the latter may, acting by a qualified majority, decide that
different action be taken.
Article 15
1. Subject to the provisions of paragrphs 3, 4 and 5, anti-dumping
or countervailing duties and undertakings shall lapse after five
years from the date on which they entered into force or were last
modified or confirmed.
2. The Commission shall normally, after consultation and within six
months prior to the end of the five year period, publish in the
Official Journal of the European Communities a notice of the
impending expiry of the measure in question and inform the Community
industry known to be concerned. This notice shall state the period
within which interested parties may make known their views in writing
and may apply to be heard orally by the Commission in accordance with
Article 7 (5).
3. Where an interested party shows that the expiry of the measure
would lead again to injury or threat of injury, the Commission shall,
after consultation, publish in the Official Journal of the European
Communities a notice of its intention to carry out a review of the
measure. Such notice shall be published prior to the end of the
relevant five year period. The measure shall remain in force
pending the outcome of this review.
However, where the initiation of the review has not been published
within six months after the end of the relevant five year period the
measure shall lapse at the end of that six month period.
4. Where a review of a measure under Article 14 is in progress at
the end of the relevant five year period, the measure shall remain in
force pending the outcome of such review. A notice to this effect
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shall be published in the Official Journal of the European
Communities before the end of the relevant five year period.
5. Where anti-dumping or countervailing duties and undertakings
lapse under this Article the Commission shall publish a notice to
that effect in the Official Journal of the European Communities.
Such notice shall state the date of expiry of the measure.
Article 16
Refund
1. Where an importer can show that the duty collected exceeds the
actual dumping margin or the amount of the subsidy, consideration
being given to any application of weighted averages, the excess
amount shall be reimbursed. This amount shall be calculated in
relation to the changes which have occurred in the dumping margin or
the amount of the subsidy which were established in the original
investigation for the shipments to the Community of the importer's
supplier. All refund calculations shall be made in accordance with
the provisions of Articles 2 or 3 and shall be based, as far as
possible, on the same method applied in the original investigation,
in particular, with regard to any application of averaging or
sampling techniques.
2. In order to request the reimbursement referred to in paragraph 1,
the importer shall submit an application to the Commission. The
application shall be submitted via the Member State in the territory
of which the products were released for free circulation and within
three months of the date on which the amount of the definitive duties
to be levied was duly determined by the competent authorities or of
the date on which a decision was made definitively to collect the
amounts secured by way of provisional duty.
The Member State shall forward the application to the Commission as
soon as possible, either with or without an opinion as to its merits.
The Commission shall inform the other Member States forthwith and
give its opinion on the matter. If the Member States agree with the
opinion given by the Commission or do not object to it within one
month of being informed, the Commission may decide in accordance with
the said opinion. In all other cases, the Commission shall, after




This Regulation shall not preclude the application of:
1. any special rules laid down in agreements concluded between the
Community and third countries;
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2. the Community Regulations in the agricultural sector and of
Regulations (EEC) No. 1059/699, (EEC) No. 2730/7510, an(j
(EEC) No. 2783/75-11-; this Regulation shall operate by way of
complement to those Regulations and in derogation from any
provisions thereof which preclude the application of anti-dumping
or countervailing duties;
3. special measures, provided that such action does not run counter
to obligations under the GATT.
Article 18
Repeal of existing legislation
Regulation (EEC) No. 2176/84 is hereby repealed.
References to the repealed Regulation shall be construed as
references to this Regulation.
Article 19
Entry into force
This Regulation shall enter into force on the third day following its
publication in the Official Journal of the European Communities.
It shall apply to proceedings already initiated.
This Regulation shall be binding in its entirety and directly
applicable in all Member States.




9 O.J. No. L 141, 12.6.1969, p. 1.
10 O.J. No. L 281, 1.11.1975, p. 20.
11 O.J. No. L 282, 1.11.1975, p. 104.
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ANNEX
ILLUSTRATIVE LIST OF EXPORT SUBSIDIES
(a) The provision by governments of direct subsidies to a firm or an
industry contingent upon export performance.
(b) Currency retention schemes or any similar practices which involve
a bonus on exports.
(c) Internal transport and freight charges on export shipments,
provided or mandated by governments, on terms more favourable
than for domestic shipments.
(d) The delivery by governments or their agencies of imported or
domestic products or services for use in the production of
exported goods, on terms or conditions more favourable than for
delivery of like or directly competitive products or services for
use in the production of goods for domestic consumption, if (in
the case of products) such terms or conditions are more
favourable than those commercially available on world markets to
their exporters.
(e) The full or partial exemption, remission, or deferral
specifically related to exports, of direct taxes or social
welfare charges paid or payable by industrial or commercial
enterprises. Notwithstanding the foregoing, deferral of taxes
and charges referred to above need not amount to an export
subsidy where, for example, appropriate interest charges are
collected.
(f) The allowance of special deductions directly related to exports
or export performance, over and above those granted in respect to
production for domestic consumption, in the calculation of the
base on which direct taxes are charged.
(g) The exemption or remission in respect of the production and
distribution of exported products, or indirect taxes in excess of
those levied in respect of the production and distribution of
like products when sold for domestic consumption. The problem
of the excessive remission of value added tax is exclusively
covered by this paragraph.
(h) The exemption, remission or deferral of prior stage cumulative
indirect taxes on goods or services used in the production of
exported products in excess of the exemption, remission or
deferral of like prior stage cumulative indirect taxes on goods
or services used in the production of like products when sold for
domestic consumption; provided, however, that prior stage
cumulative indirect taxes may be exempted, remitted or deferred
on exported products even when not exempted, remitted or deferred
on like products when sold for domestic consumption, if the prior
stage cumulative indirect taxes are levied on goods that are
physically incorporated (making normal allowance for waste) in
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the exported product. This paragraph does not apply to the
value added tax systems and border tax adjustments related
thereto.
(i) The remission or drawback of import charges in excess of those
levied on imported goods that are physically incorporated (making
normal allowance for waste) in the exported product; provided,
however, that in particular cases a firm may use a quantity of
home market goods equal to, and having the same quality and
characteristics as, the imported goods as a substitute for them
in order to benefit from this provision if the import and the
corresponding export operations both occur within a reasonable
time period, normally not to exceed two years. This paragraph
does not apply to value added tax systems and border tax
adjustments related thereto.
(j) The provision by governments (or special institutions controlled
by governments) of export credit guarantee or insurance
programmes, of insurance or guarantee programmes against
increases in the costs of exported products or of exchange risk
programmes, at premium rates, which are manifestly inadequate to
cover the long-term operating costs and losses of the programmes.
(k) The grant by governments (or special institutions controlled by
and/or acting under the authority of governments) of export
credits at rates below those which they actually have to pay for
the funds so employed (or would have to pay if they borrowed on
international capital markets in order to obtain funds of the
same maturity and denominated at the same currency as the export
credit), or the payment by them of all or part of the costs
incurred by exporters or financial institutions in obtaining
credits, in so far as they are used to secure a material
advantage in the field of export credit terms. Provided,
however, that if the country of origin or export is a party to an
international undertaking on official export credits to which at
least 12 original signatories to the Agreement on Interpretation
and application of Articles VI, XVI and XXIII of the GATT are
parties as of 1 January 1979 (or a successor undertaking which
has been adopted by those original signatories), or if in
practice the country of origin or export applies the interest
rate provisions of the relevant undertaking, an export credit
practice which is in conformity with those provisions shall not
be considered an export subsidy.
(1) Any other charge on the public account constituting an export
subsidy in the sense of Article XVI of the GATT.
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Notes:
For the purposes of this Annex the following definitions apply:
1 The term "direct taxes" shall mean taxes on wages, profits,
interest, rents, royalties, and all other forms of income, and
taxes on the ownership of real property.
2 The term "import charges" shall mean tariffs, duties, and other
fiscal charges not elsewhere enumerated in these Notes that are
levied on imports.
3 The term "indirect taxes" shall mean sales, excise, turnover,
value added, franchise, stamp, transfer, inventory and equipment
taxes, border taxes and all taxes other than direct taxes and
import charges.
4 "Prior stage" indirect taxes are those levied on goods or
services used directly or indirectly in making the product.
5 "Cumulative" indirect taxes are multi-staged taxes levied where
there is no mechanism for subsequent crediting of the tax if the
goods or services subject to tax at one stage of production are
used in a succeeding stage of production.
6 "Remission" of taxes includes the refund or rebate of taxes.
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APPENDIX 2
COUNCIL REGULATION (EEC) No. 288/82
of 5 February 1982
on common rules for imports-*-
THE COUNCIL OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES,
Having regard to the Treaty establishing the European Economic
Community, and in particular Article 113 thereof,
Having regard to the instruments establishing common organization of
agricultural markets and to the instruments concerning processed
agricultural products adopted in pursuance of Article 235 of the
Treaty, in particular the provisions of those instruments which allow
for derogation from the general principle that all quantitative
restrictions or measures having equivalent effect may be replaced
solely by the measures provided for in those same instruments,
Having regard to the proposal from the Commission,
Whereas the common commercial policy must be based on uniform
principles: whereas the import rules established by Regulation (EEC)
No. 926/792 are an important aspect of that policy;
Whereas the liberalization of imports, that is to say the absence of
any quantitative restrictions subject to exceptions and derogations
provided for in Community rules, is the starting point for common
rules in this field;
Whereas the Commission must be informed by the Member States of any
danger created by trends in imports which might call for protective
measures;
Whereas it may become apparent that there should be either community
survelliance at national level over certain of these imports;
Whereas, in such a case, the Commission must examine import terms and
conditions, import trends, the various aspects of the economic and
commercial situation, and the measures, if any, to be taken;
Whereas in this case the putting into free circulation of the
products concerned should be made subject to production of an import
document satisfying uniform criteria; whereas that document must, on
1 O.J. No. L 35, 9.2.1982, p. 1.
2 O.J. No. L 131, 29.5.1979, p. 15.
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declarations or on simple application by the importer, be issued or
endorsed by the authorities of the Member States within a certain
period but without the importer thereby acquiring any right to
import; whereas the document must therefore be valid only during
such period as the import rules remain unchanged;
Whereas it is in the interest of the Community that the Member States
and the Commission should make as full an exchange as possible of
information resulting from either Community surveillance or
surveillance at national level;
Whereas it is for the Commission and the Council to adopt the
protective measures called for by the interests of the Community with
due regard for existing international obligations; whereas,
therefore, protective measures against a country which is a
contracting party to GATT may be considered only if the product in
question is imported into the Community in such greatly increased
quantities and on such terms or conditions as to cause, or threaten
to cause, substantial injury to Community producers of like or
directly competing products, unless international obligations permit
derogation from this rule;
Whereas Member States should be empowered, in certain circumstances
and provided that their actions are on an interim basis only, to take
protective measures individually;
Whereas Articles 14(6) and 16(1) of Regulation (EEC) No. 926/79
provide that the Council shall decide on the adjustments to be made
to that Regulation;
Whereas a review of the Regulation, in the light of experience gained
in applying it, has shown that it is necessary to adopt more precise
criteria for assessing possible injury and to introduce an
investigation procedure while still allowing the Commission and the
Member States to introduce appropriate measures in urgent cases;
Whereas to this end more detailed provisions should be introduced on
the opening of investigations, on the checks and inspections
required, on the hearing of those concerned, the treatment of
information obtained and the criteria for assessing injury;
Whereas the provisions on the investigations introduced by this
Regulation do not prejudice Community or national rules concerning
professional secrecy;
Whereas, furthermore, in a desire for simplicity and greater
transparency of import arrangements, it seemed preferable to draw up
a list of quantitative restrictions still applicable at national
level rather than a common liberalization list;
Whereas a procedure should be available for application where import
restrictions maintained by certain Member States are amended;
whereas in order to prevent these autonomous amendments from
constituting obstacles to the implementation of the common commercial
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policy and from injuring the interests of the Community or one of its
Member States, these amendments should be subject to prior
consultation and, where necessary, to an authorization procedure;
Whereas, in addition, the provisions of the Agreement on import
licencing procedures signed within the framework of GATT should be
transposed into Community law, in particular so as to ensure a
greater transparency of the systems of restrictions applied by the
Member States;
Whereas the Regulation this amended should be published in its
entirety,




1. This Regulation shall apply to imports of products covered by the
Treaty originating in third countries, except for
textile products subject to specific common import rules for the
duration of those rules, subject to measures which may be taken
regarding these products in accordance with Title IV,
the products originating in State-trading countries listed in
Regulation (EEC) No. 925/793;
the products originating in the People's Republic of China listed
in Regulation (EEC) No. 2532/784,
products originating in Cuba.
2. Importation into the Community of the products referred to in
paragraph 1 shall be free, and therefore not subject to any
quantitative restriction, without prejudice to
measures which may be taken under Title V,
measures maintained under Title VI,
quantitative restrictions for the products listed in Annex I and
maintained in the Member States indicated opposite these products
in that Annex.
3 O.J. No. L 131, 29.5.1979, p. 1.
4 O.J. No. L 306, 31.10.1978, p. 1.
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Article 2
The Council may, acting by a qualified majority on a proposal from
the Commission, decide to delete certain products from Annex I, if it
considers that such action is not liable to create a situation where
the reintroduction of protective measures would be justified.
TITLE II
Community information and consultation procedure
Article 3
The Commission shall be informed by the Member States should trends
in imports appear to call for surveillance or protective measures.
This information shall contain the available evidence on the basis of
the criteria laid down in Article 9. The Commission shall pass on
this information to all the Member States forthwith.
Article 4
Consultations may be held, either at the request of a Member State or
on the initiative of the Commission. They shall take place within
eight working days following receipt by the Commission of the
information provided for in Article 3 and, in any event, before the
introduction of any measure of surveillance or protective measure by
the Community.
Article 5
1. Consultation shall take place within an advisory committee
(hereinafter called "the Committee") which shall consist of
representatives of each Member State with a representative of the
Commission as chairman.
2. The Committee shall meet when convened by its chairman. He
shall provide the Member States, as promptly as possible, with all
relevant information.
3. Consultation shall cover in particular:
(a) terms and conditions of importation, import trends, and the
various aspects of the economic and commercial situation as
regards the produce in question;
(b) the measures, if any, to be taken.
4. Consultations may be in writing if necessary. The Commission
shall in this event inform the Member States, which may express their
opinion or request oral consultations within a period of five to





1. Where, after consultation it is apparent to the Commission that
there is sufficient evidence to justify an investigation, the
Commission shall:
(a) announce the opening of an investigation in the Official
Journal of the European Communities; such announcements
shall give a summary of the information received, and
stipulate that all relevant information is to be
communicated to the Commission; it shall state the period
within which interested parties may make known their views
in writing;
(b) commence the investigation, acting in cooperation with the
Member States.
2. The Commission shall seek all information it deems to be
necessary and, where it considers it appropriate, after consulting
the Committee, endeavour to check this information with importers,
traders, agents, producers, trade associations and organizations.
The Commission shall be assisted in this task by staff of the Member
State on whose territory these checks are being carried out, provided
this Member State so wishes.
3. The Member States shall supply the Commission, at its request and
following procedures laid down by it, with all information at their
disposal on developments in the market of the product being
investigated.
4. The Commission may hear the interested natural and legal
persons. Such parties must be heard where they have applied in
writing within the period laid down in the notice published in the
Official Journal of the European Communities, showing that they are
actually likely to be affected by the outcome of the investigations
and that there are special reasons for them to be heard orally.
5. Where the information requested by the Commission is not supplied
within a reasonable period, or the investigation is significantly
impeded, findings may be made on the basis of the facts available.
Article 7
1. At the end of the investigation, the Commission shall submit a
report on the results to the Committee.
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2. If the Commission considers that no Community surveillance or
protective measures are necessary, it shall publish in the Official
Journal of the European Communities, after consulting the Committee,
a notice that the investigations are closed, stating the main
conclusions of the investigations.
3. If the Commission considers that Community surveillance or
protective measures are necessary, it shall take the necessary
decisions in accordance with Titles IV and V.
4. The provisions of this Title shall not preclude the taking, at
any time, of surveillance measures in accordance with Articles 10 to
14 or, in an emergency, protective measures in accordance with
Articles 15 to 17.
In the latter case, the Commission shall immediately take the
investigation measures it considers to be still necessary. The
results of the investigation shall be used to re-examine the measures
taken.
Article 8
1. Information received in pursuance of this Regulation shall be
used only for the purpose for which it was requested.
2. (a) Neither the Council, nor the Commission, nor Member States,
nor the officials of any of these, shall reveal any
information of a confidential nature received in pursuance
of this Regulation, or any information provided on a
confidential basis, without specific permission from the
supplier of such information.
(b) Each request for confidentiality shall state the reasons why
the information is confidential.
However, if it appears that a request for confidentiality is
unjustified and if the supplier of the information wishes
neither to make it public nor to authorize its disclosure in
general terms or in the form of a summary, the information
concerned may be disregarded.
3. Information will in any case be considered to be confidential if
its disclosure is likely to have a significantly adverse effect upon
the supplier or the source of such information.
4. The above paragraphs shall not preclude reference by the
Community authorities to general information and in particular to
reasons on which decisions taken in pursuance of this Regulation are
based. These authorities must, however, take into account the
legitimate interest of the legal and natural persons concerned that
their business secrets should not be divulged.
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Article 9
1. The examination of the trend of imports, of the conditions in
which they take place and of the substantial injury or threat of
substantial injury to Community producers resulting from such
imports, shall cover in particular the following factors:
(a) the volume of imports, in particular where there has been a
significant increase, either in absolute terms or relative to
production or consumption in the Community;
(b) the prices of the imports, in particular where there has been a
significant price undercutting as compared with the price of a
like product in the Community;
(c) the consequent impact on the Community producers of similar or
directly competitive products as indicated by trends in certain






prices (i.e. depression of prices or prevention of price
increases which would normally have occurred),
profits,
return on capital employed,
cash flow,
employment.
2. Where a threat of serious injury is alleged the Commission shall
also examine whether it is clearly foreseeable that a particular
situation is likely to develop into actual injury. In this regard
account may be taken of factors such as:
(a) rate of increase of the exports to the Community;
(b) export capacity in the country of origin or export, already in
existence or which will be operational in the foreseeable future,





1. Where developments on the market in respect of a product
originating in a third country covered by this Regulation threaten to
cause injury to Community producers of like or directly competing
products and where the interests of the Community so require,
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importation of that product may be made subject, as the case may be,
to:
(a) retrospective Community surveillance carried out according to the
procedures laid down in the Decision referred to in paragraph 2,
or
(b) prior Community surveillance carried out according to the
procedures laid down in Article 11.
In these cases the product together with the indication "EUR" shall
be entered in Annex II.
2. Where the decision to impose surveillance is taken simultaneously
with the liberalization of importation of the product in question,
that decision shall be taken by the Council, acting by a qualified
majority on a proposal from the Commission. In ail other cases it
shall be taken by the Commission and Article 15(5) shall apply.
3. The surveillance measures shall be of limited duration. Unless
otherwise provided, they shall cease to be valid at the end of the
second half calendar year following that in which they were
introduced.
Article 11
1. Products under prior Community surveillance may be put into free
circulation only on production of an import document. Such document
shall be issued or endorsed by Member States, free of charge, for any
quantity requested and within a maximum of five working days
following submission, in accordance with the national laws in force,
either of a declaration or simply of an application by any Community
importer, regardless of his place of business in the Community,
without prejudice to the observance of the other conditions required
by the regulations in force.
2. Subject to any provision to the contrary made when surveillance
was imposed and under the procedure there followed, the declaration
or application by the importer must give:
(a) the name and address of the importer;
(b) a description of the product with the following particulars:
commercial description,
tariff heading, or reference number, of the product in the





(c) the cif price free-at-frontier and the quantity of the product in
units customarily used in the trade in question;
(d) the proposed date or dates as well as the place or places of
importation.
Member States may request further particulars.
3. Paragraph 2 shall not preclude the putting into free circulation
of the product in question if the unit price at which the transaction
is effected exceeds that indicated in the import document, or if the
total value or quantity of the products to be imported exceeds the
value or quantity given in the import document by less that 5%. The
Commission, having heard the opinions expressed in the Committee and
taking account of the nature of the products and other special
features of the transactions concerned, may fix a different
percentage, which, however, should not normally exceed 10%.
4. Import documents may be used only for such time as arrangements
for the liberalization of imports remain in force in respect of the
transactions concerned and in any event not beyond the expiry of a
period laid down, with regard to the nature of the products and other
special features of the transactions, at the same time and by means
of the same procedure as the imposition of surveillance.
5. Where the decision taken under Article 10 so requires, the origin
of products under Community surveillance must be proved by a
certificate of origin. This paragraph shall not prejudice other
provisions concerning the production of any such certificate.
6. Where the product under prior Community surveillance is not
liberalized in a Member State, the import authorization granted by
that Member State may replace the import document.
Article 12
1. Where importation of a product has not been made subject to prior
Community surveillance within a period of eight working days
following the end of consultations, the Member State, having informed
the Commission under Article 3 may carry out surveillance over such
importation at national level.
2. In cases of extreme urgency the Member State may carry out
surveillance at national level after informing the Commission in
accordance with Article 3. The latter shall inform the other Member
States.
3. The Commission shall be informed, upon the entry into force of
the surveillance, of the detailed rules for its application and shall
amend Annex II by means of a notice published in the Official Journal
of the European Communities, by entering the name of the Member State
applying the surveillance opposite the product in question.
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Article 13
Products under national surveillance may be put into free circulation
only on production of an import document. Such document shall be
issued or endorsed by the Member State, free of charge, for any
quantity requested and within a maximum of five working days
following submission of a declaration or simply of an application by
any Community importer, regardless of his place of business in the
Community, without prejudice to the observance of the other
conditions required by the regulations in force. Import documents
may be used only for such time as arrangements for the liberalization
of imports remain in force in respect of the transactions concerned.
Article 14
1. Member States shall communicate to the Commisison within the
first 10 days of each month in the case of Community surveillance and
within the first 20 days of each quarter in the case of national
surveillance:
(a) in the case of prior surveillance, details of the sums of money
(calculated on the basis of cif prices) and quantities of goods
in respect of which import documents were issued or endorsed
during the preceding period;
(b) in every case, details of imports during the period preceding the
period referred to in subparagraph (a).
The information supplied by Member States shall be broken down by
product and by countries.
Different provisions may be laid down at the same time and by the
same procedure as the surveillance arrangements.
2. Where the nature of the products or special circumstances so
require, the Commission may, at the request of a Member State or on
its own initiative, amend the timetables for submitting this
information.




1. Where a product is imported into the Community in such greatly
increased quantities and/or on such terms or conditions as to cause,
or threaten to cause, substantial injury to Community producers of
like or directly competing products, and where a critical situation,
in which any delay would cause injury which it would be difficult to
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remedy, calls for immediate intervention in order to safeguard the
interests of the Community, the Commission may, acting at the request
of a Member State or on its own initiative:
(a) limit the period of validity of import documents within the
meaning of Article 11 to be issued or endorsed after the entry
into force of this measure;
(b) alter the import rules for the product in question by providing
that it may be put into free circulation only on production of an
import authorization, the granting of which shall be governed by
such provisions and subject to such limits as the Commission
shall lay down pending action, if any, by the Council under
Article 16.
The measures referred to in (a) and (b) shall take effect
immediately.
2. Where the establishment of a quota constitutes a withdrawal of
liberalization, account shall be taken in particular of:
the desirability of maintaining, as far as possible, traditional
trade flows,
the volume of goods exported under contracts concluded on normal
terms and conditions before the entry into force of a protective
measure within the meaning of this Title, where such contracts
have been notified to the Commission by the Member State
concerned,
the need to avoid jeopardizing achievement of the aim pursued in
establishing the quota.
3. (a) The measures referred to in this Article shall apply to
every product which is put into free circulation after their
entry into force. They may be limited to imports intended
for certain regions of the Community.
(b) However, such measures shall not prevent the putting into
free circulation of products already on their way to the
Community provided that the destination of such products
cannot be changed and that those products which, under
Articles 10 and 11 may be put into free circulation only on
production of an import document are in fact accompanied by
such a document.
4. Where intervention by the Commission has been requested by a
Member State, the Commission shall take a decision within a maximum
of five working days of receipt of such request.
5. Any decision taken by the Commission under this Article shall be
communicated to the Council and to the Member States. Any Member
State may, within one month following the day of communication, refer
such decision to the Council.
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6. If a Member State refers the decision taken by the Commission to
the Council, the Council shall, by a qualified majority, confirm,
amend or revoke the decision of the Commission.
If within three months of the referral of the matter to the Council,
the latter has not given a decision, the measure taken by the
Commission shall be deemed revoked.
Article 16
1. Where the interests of the Community so require, the Council may,
acting by a qualified majority on a proposal from the Commission,
adopt appropriate measures:
(a) to prevent a product being imported into the Community in such
greatly increased quantities and/or on such terms or conditions
as to cause, or threaten to cause, substantial injury to
Community producers of like or directly competing products;
(b) to allow the rights and obligations of the Community or of all
its Member States to be exercised and fulfilled at international
level, in particular those relating to trade in primary products.
2. Article 15(2) and (3) shall apply.
Article 17
1. In the following cases a Member State may, as an interim
protective measure, alter the import rules for a particular product
by providing that it may be put into free circulation only on
production of an import authorization, the granting of which shall be
governed by such provisions and subject to such limits as that Member
State shall lay down:
(a) where there exists in its territory a situation such as that
defined as regards the Community in Article 15(1);
(b) where such measure is justified by a protective clause
contained in a bilateral agreement between the Member State
and a third country.
2. (a) The Member State shall inform the Commission and the other
Member States by telex of the reasons for and the details of
the proposed measures. The Commission and the other Member
States shall treat this information in strictest confidence.
The Commission shall forthwith convene the Committee. The
Member State may take these measures after having heard the
opinions expressed by the Committee.
(b) Where a Member State claims that the matter is especially
urgent, consultations shall take place within a period of
five working days following information transmitted to the
Commission; at the end of this period, the Member State may
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take these measures. During this period the Member State
may make imports of the product in question subject to
production of an import authorization to be granted under
the procedure and within the limits to be laid down at the
end of the said period.
3. The Commission shall be notified by telex of the measures
immediately following their adoption.
4. The notification shall be equivalent to a request within the
meaning of Article 15(4). The measures shall operate only until the
coming into operation of the decision taken by the Commission.
However, where the Commission decides not to introduce any measure or
adopts measures pursuant to Article 15, different from those taken by
the Member State, its decision shall apply as from the sixth day
following its entry into force, unless the Member State which has
taken the measures refers the decision to the Council; in that case,
the national measures shall continue to operate until the entry into
force of the decision taken by the Council and for the maximum of one
month following referral of the matter to the latter. The Council
shall take a decision before the expiry of that period. The Council
may under the same conditions decide in certain cases to extend this
period, which may, in no fashion, exceed a total of three months.
The preceding subparagraph does not affect the Member States' right
of recourse under Article 15(5) and (6).
5. This Article shall apply until 31 December 1984. Before
31 December 1983, the Commission shall propose to the Council
amendments to be made to it. The Council shall act, before
31 December 1984 by a qualified majority, upon the Commission
proposal. However, the provisions relating to protective measures:
justified by a safeguard clause contained in a bilateral
agreement shall not be effected by that time limit,
concerning imports of products which have been liberalized in
certain Member States but subject to quota in other shall apply
until 31 December 1987.
Article 18
1. While any measure of surveillance or protective measure applied
in accordance with Titles IV and V is in operation, consultations
within the Committee shall be held, either at the request of a Member
State or on the initiative of the Commission. The purpose of such
consultations shall be:
(a) to examine the effects of the measure;
(b) to ascertain whether its application is still necessary.
2. Where, as a result of the consultations referred to in
paragraph 1, the Commission considers that any measure referred to in
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Articles 10, 12, 15 or 16 should be revoked or amended it shall
proceed as follows;
(a) where the Council has acted on a measure, the Commission shall
propose that it be revoked or amended; the Council shall act by
a qualified majority;
(b) in all other cases, the Commission shall amend or revoke
Community protective measures and measures of surveillance.
Where this decision concerns national measures of surveillance,
it shall apply as from the sixth day following its publication in
the Official Journal of the European Communities, unless the
Member State which has taken the measure refers it to the
Council; in that case the national measure shall continue to
operate until the entry into force of the decision taken by the
Council, but in no event after the expiry of a period of three
months following referral of the matter to the latter. The
Council shall act before the expiry of that period.
TITLE VI
Transitional and final provisions
Article 19
1. By 31 December 1984 at the latest, the Council shall decide on
the adjustments to be made to this Regulation for the purpose of
greater uniformity of rules for imports. The Council shall act by a
qualified majority on a proposal from the Commission and with due
regard to the progress of the common commercial policy.
2. Pending these adjustments:
(a) in so far as standardization between the areas of liberalization
has not been wholly realized. Member States may subject imports
of products not included in the Annex to Regulation (EEC)
No. 925/79 to the requirement that not only the country of origin
but also the country of purchase or the country of export shall
be among the countries covered by this Regulation; for the
Federal Republic of Germany, this shall apply also to those
products included in the Annex to the abovementioned Regulation
whose importation is not yet exempted in respect of all third
countries, under German import arrangements, from the requirement
of an import authorization;
(b) the Italian Republic may subject imports of products originating
in Egypt, Yugoslavia and Japan to the requirement that the
country of origin shall be the same as the country of export;
(c) import documents required for Community surveillance under
Article 11 shall be valid only in the Member State which issued
or endorsed them;
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(d) the Benelux countries and the Italian Republic may retain the
automatic-licence or import-declaration formalities currently
applied by them to imports originating in Japan and Hong Kong;
(e) the Member States listed in Annex II opposite the products marked
with an asterisk may retain national surveillance over imports of
such products, including imports under automatic licences;
Article 12, Article 13, last sentence, Article 14 and Article 18
shall not be applicable;
(f) this Regulation shall not preclude the continuance of measures
taken by the Italian Republic - pursuant to the Ministerial
Decree of 6 May 1976, including the list annexed thereto and the
subsequent amendments to it - making subject to special
authorization the importation of articles, machinery and
equipment, whether used or new but in poorly maintained
condition, falling within heading No. 73.24, Chapters 84 to 87
and 93 or subheading 97.04B of the Common Customs Tariff.
3. Member States shall forward to the Commission details of any
measures taken in conformity with the Agreement on import licensing
procedures concluded by the Community by Decision 80/271/EEC^. In
particular they shall make available to the Commission the rules and
all information concerning the procedures for the submission of
requests for licences, including the conditions relating to
admissibility of persons, enterprises or institutions who submit such
requests. All changes of these rules shall also be sent to the
Commission.
Article 20
1. Where a Member State which applies an import restriction referred
to in the last indent of Article 1(2) intends to change it, it shall
inform the Commission and the other Member States thereof.
2. (a) At the request of the Commission or a Member State, the
measures referred to in paragraph 1 shall be the subject of
prior consultation within the Committee.
(b) If the Commission does not request on its own initiative
consultations within five working days after receiving the
information referred to in paragrph 1, nor at the request of
a Member State made sufficiently early before the end of the
said period the Member State concerned, may then put the
proposed measure into effect.
(c) In other cases, the consultation procedure shall commence
within five working days after the expiry of the period
provided for in (b).
5 O.J. No. L 71, 17.3.1980, p. 1.
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3. (a) If after consultation no objection has been raised by the
other Member States or by the Commission, the Commission
shall forthwith inform the Member State concerned, which may
put the measure into effect immediately.
(b) In other cases, the Member State concerned may not put the
proposed measure into effect until three weeks after the
opening of the consultation.
(c) If, within this period, the Commission submits to the
Council, under Article 113 of the Treaty, a proposal meeting
the objections raised, the proposed measure may not be put
into effect until the Council has acted.
4. In cases of extreme urgency, the following provisions shall
apply:
(a) a quota may be reduced or any possibility of importation may be
taken away without prior consultation but after the transmission
of information referred to in paragraph 1;
(b) when a quota has been exhausted and the economic requirements of
a Member State call for additional imports from the non-member
country or countries benefiting from the quota the Member State
concerned may, without prior notification, open additional import
facilities up to a maximum of 20% of the quantity or value of the
exhausted quota; it shall forthwith inform the Commission and
the other Member States thereof. The emergency procedure laid
down in this paragraph shall not apply once the opening of
negotiations with the non-member country concerned has been
authorized;
(c) at the request of any Member State or of the Commission,
subsequent consultation under the terms of paragraph 3 shall be
held on measures taken by a Member State under this paragraph.
5. Where a Member State intends to make a unilateral change to its
import arrangements for a petroleum product which is entered in
Annex I and referred to in Article 3 of the Council Regulation (EEC)
No. 802/68 of 27 June 1968 on the common definition of the concept of
the origin of goods^, it shall inform the Commission and the other
Member States thereof. The procedure laid down in paragraphs 2, 3
and 4 shall be applicable in this case; the other provisions of this
Regulation shall not apply.
6. The Benelux countries may, where they are mentioned in Annex II
opposite a product listed in that Annex and marked with an asterisk,
6 O.J. No. L 148, 28.6.1968, p. 1.
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retain the automatic licence formality as currently applied by them;
such licences shall be issued, free of charge, for any quantity
requested and simply on submission of an application by the Community
importer, regardless of his place of business in the Community;
Article 13 shall not apply to these products.
Article 21
Without prejudice to other Community provisions, this Regulation
shall not preclude the adoption or application by Member States;
(a) of prohibitions, quantitative restrictions or measures of
surveillance on grounds of public morality, public policy or
public security; the protection of health and life of humans,
animals or plants, the protection of national treasures
possessing artistic, historic or archaeological value, or the
protection of industrial and commercial property;
(b) of special formalities concerning foreign exchange;
(c) of formalities introduced pursuant to international agreements in
accordance with the Treaty.
Article 22
1. This Regulation shall be without prejudice to the operation of
the instruments establishing the common organization of agricultural
markets or of Community or national administrative provisions derived
therefrom or of the specific instruments adopted under Article 235 of
the Treaty applicable to goods resulting from the processing of
agricultural products; it shall operate by way of complement to
those instruments.
2. However, in the case of products covered by the instruments
referred to in paragraph 1, Articles 10 to 14 and 18 shall not apply
to those in respect of which the Community rules on trade with third
countries require the production of a licence or other import
document.
Articles 15, 17 and 18 shall not apply to those products in respect
of which such rules make provision for the application of
quantitative import restrictions.
Article 23
The Commission shall publish at regular intervals an updated text of
Annexes I and II which will take account of Acts adopted in
ccordance with this Regulation both by the Community and by Member
States. The Commission shall be informed of the introduction,
amendment or repeal of all national measures.
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Article 24
Regulation (EEC) No. 926/79 is hereby repealed.
References to the repealed Regulation shall be understood as
referring to this Regulation.
Article 25
This Regulation shall enter into force on the day of its publication
in the Official Journal of the European Communities.
This Regulation shall be binding in its entirety and directly
applicable in all Member States.






COUNCIL REGULATION (EEC) No. 2641/84
of 17 September 1984
on the strengthening of the common commercial policy
with regard in particular to protection against
illicit commercial practices^
THE COUNCIL OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES,
Having regard to the Treaty establishing the European Economic
Community, and in particular Article 113 thereof,
Having regard to the rules establishing the common organization of
agricultural markets and the rules adopted under Article 235 of the
Treaty, applicable to goods processed from agricultural products, and
in particular those provisions thereof which allow for derogation
from the general principle that any quantitative restriction or
measure having equivalent effect may be replaced solely by the
measures provided for in those instruments,
Having regard to the proposal from the Commission,
o
Having regard to the opinion of the European Parliament"1,
Having regard to the opinion of the Economic and Social Committee-3,
Whereas the common commercial policy must be based on uniform
principles, notably with regard to commercial protection; whereas
Council Regulation (EEC) No. 2176/84 of 23 July 1984 on protection
against dumped or subsidized imports from countries not members of
the European Economic Community^ and the rules for imports laid
down pursuant to Regulation (EEC) No. 288/82^, as amended by
Regulations (EEC) No. 899/83°, (EEC) No. 1765/827 and (EEC)"
1 O.J. No. L 252, 20.9.1984, p. 1.
2 O.J. No. C 205, 1.8.1983, p. 2.
3 O.J. No. C 211, 8.8.1983, p. 24.
4 O.J. No. L 201, 30.7.1984, p. 1.
5 O.J. No. L 35, 9.2.1982, p. 1.
6 O.J. No. L 103, 21.4.1983, p. 1.
7 O.J. No. L 195, 5.7.1982, p. 1.
- 438 -
No. 1766/82®, as amended by Regulations (EEC) No. 35/83^ and
(EEC) No. 101/84-''^, constitute important components of that policy;
Whereas in the light of experience and of the conclusions of the
European Council of June 1982, which considered that it was of the
highest importance to defend vigorously the legitimate interests of
the Community in the appropriate bodies, in particular GATT, and to
make sure the Community, in managing trade policy, acts with as much
speed and efficiency as strengthened, notably in the fields not
covered by the rules already adopted;
Whereas to this end it is advisable to provide the Community with
procedures enabling it:
to respond to any illicit commercial practice with a view to
removing the injury resulting therefrom,
to ensure full exercise of the Community's rights with
regard to the commercial practices of third countries;
Whereas, in particular, the Community should be enabled to remove the
injury resulting from third countries' practices whose illicit nature
is evident from their incompatibility regarding international trade
practices either with international law or with the generally
accepted rules;
Whereas the measures taken under the procedures in question should,
however, be without prejudice to other measures in cases not covered
by this Regulation which might be adopted directly pursuant to
Article 113 of the Treaty;
Whereas the Community must act in compliance with its international
obligations and, where such obligations result from agreements,
maintain the balance of rights and obligations which it is the
purpose of those agreements to establish;
Whereas it is necessary to confirm, by establishing a formal
complaints procedure, the right of Community industry to submit to
the Commission any complaint regarding illicit commercial practices
by third countries;
Whereas for the purposes of implementation of this Regulation there
should be cooperation between the Member States and the Commission
and, to this end, arrangements should be made for consultations




O.J. No. L 195, 5.7.1982, p. 21.
O.J. No. L 5, 7.1.1983, p. 12.
O.J. No. L 14, 17.1.1984, p. 7.
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Whereas it is appropriate to lay down clearly the rules of procedure
to be followed during the examination, in particular the rights and
obligations of the Community authorities and the parties involved,
and the conditions under which interested parties may have access to
information and may ask to be informed of the essential facts and
considerations resulting from the examination procedure;
Whereas, in conducting the defence of its commercial interests, the
Community needs to have at its disposal a decision-making process
which permits rapid and effective action,
HAS ADOPTED THIS REGULATION;
Article 1
Aims
This Regulation establishes procedures in the matter of commercial
policy which, subject to compliance with existing international
obligations and procedures, are aimed at;
(a) responding to any illicit commercial practice with a view to
removing the injury resulting therefrom;
(b) ensuring full exercise of the Community's rights with regard
to the commercial practices of third countries.
Article 2
Definitions
1. For the purposes of this Regulation, illicit commercial practices
shall be any international trade practices attributable to third
countries which are incompatible with international law or with the
generally accepted rules.
2. For the purposes of this Regulation, the Community's rights shall
be those international trade rights of which it may avail itself
either under international law or under generally accepted rules.
3. For the purposes of this Regulation, injury shall be any material
injury caused or threatened to Community industry.
4. The term 'Community industry' shall be taken to mean all
Community producers:
of products identical or similar to the product which is the
subject of illicit practices or of products competing
directly with that product, or
who are consumers or processors of the product which is the
subject of illicit practices,
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or all those producers whose combined output constitutes a major
proportion of total Community production of the products in
question; however:
(a) when producers are related to the exporters or importers or
are themselves importers of the product alleged to be the
subject of illicit practices, the term 'Community industry'
may be interpreted as referring to the rest of the
producers;
(b) in particular circumstances, the producers within a region
of the Community may be regarded as the Community industry
if their collective output constitutes the major proportion
of the output of the product in question in the Member State
or Member States within which the region is located provided
that:
(i) where the illicit practice concerns imports into the
Community, their effect is concentrated in that Member
State or those Member States,
(ii) where the illicit practice concerns Community exports
to a third country, a significant proportion of the
output of those producers is exported to the third
country concerned.
Article 3
Complaint on behalf of Community producers
1. Any natural or legal person, or any association not having legal
personality, acting on behalf of a Community industry which considers
that it has suffered injury as a result of illicit commercial
practices may lodge a written complaint.
2. The complaint must contain sufficient evidence of the existence
of illicit commercial practices and the injury resulting therefrom.
Proof of injury must be given on the basis of the factors indicated
in Article 8.
3. The complaint shall be submitted, to the Commission, which shall
send a copy thereof to the Member States.
4. The complaint may be withdrawn, in which case the procedure may
be terminated unless such termination would not be in the interests
of the Community.
5. Where it becomes apparent after consultation that the complaint
does not provide sufficient evidence to justify initiating an
investigation, then the complainant shall be so informed.
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Article 4
Referral by a Member State
1. Any Member State may ask the Commission to initiate the
procedures referred to in Article 1.
2. It shall supply the Commission with the necessary evidence to
support its request. Where illicit commercial practices are
alleged, proof thereof and of the injury resulting therefrom must be
given on the basis of the factors indicated in Article 8.
3. The Commission shall notify the other Member States of the
requests without delay.
4. Where it becomes apparent after consultation that the request
does not provide sufficient evidence to justify initiating an
investigation, then the Member State shall be so informed.
Article 5
Consultation procedure
1. For the purpose of consultations pursuant to this Regulation, an
advisory committee, hereinafter referred to as 'the Committee1, is
hereby set up and shall consist of representatives of each Member
State, with a representative of the Commission as chairman.
2. Consultations shall be initiated at the request of a Member State
or on the initiative of the Commission. The chairman of the
Committee shall provide the Member States, as promptly as possible,
with all relevant information in his possession.
3. The Committee shall meet when convened by its chairman.
4. Where necessary, consultations may be in writing. In such case
the Commission shall notify in writing the Member States who, within
a period of eight working days from such notification shall be




1. Where, after consultation, it is apparent to the Commission that
there is sufficient evidence to justify initiating an examination
procedure and that it is necessary in the interest of the Community,
the Commission shall act as follows:
(a) it shall announce the initiation of an examination procedure
in the Official Journal of the European Communities; such
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announcement shall indicate the product and countries
concerned, give a summary of the information received, and
provide that all relevant information is to be communicated
to the Commission; it shall state the period within which
interested parties may make known their views in writing and
may apply to be heard orally by the Commission in accordance
with paragraph 5;
(b) it shall so officially notify the representatives of the
country or countries which are the subject of the procedure,
with whom, where appropriate, consultations may be held;
(c) it shall conduct the examination at Community level, acting
in cooperation with the Member States.
(a) If necessary, and notably in cases of allegations of illicit
commercial practices, the Commission shall seek all the
information it deems necessary and attempt to check this
information with the importers, traders, agents, producers,
trade associations and organizations, provided that the
undertakings or organizations concerned give their consent.
(b) Where necessary, the Commission shall carry out
investigations in the territory of third countries, provided
that the governments of the countries concerned have been
officially notified and raise no objection within a
reasonable period.
(c) The Commission shall be assisted in its investigation by
officials of the Member State in whose territory the checks
are carried out, provided that the Member State in question
so requsts.
3. Member States shall supply the Commission, upon request, with all
information necessary for the examination, in accordance with the
detailed arrangements laid down by the Commission.
4. (a) The complainants and the exporters and importers concerned,
as well as the representatives of the principal exporting or
importing country or countries concerned, may inspect all
information made available to the Commission except for
internal documents for the use of the Commission and the
administrations, provided that such information is relevant
to the protection of their interests and not confidential
within the meaning of Article 7 and that it is used by the
Commission in its examination procedure. The persons
concerned shall address a reasoned request in writing to the
Commission, indicating the information required.
(b) The complainants and the exporters and importers concerned
and the representatives of the principal exporting or
importing country or countries concerned may ask to be
informed of the principal facts and considerations resulting
from the examination procedure.
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5. The Commission may hear the parties concerned. It shall hear
them if they have, within the period prescribed in the notice
published in the Official Journal of the European Communities, made a
written request for a hearing showing that they are a party primarily
concerned by the result of the procedure.
6. Furthermore, the Commission shall, on request, give the parties
primarily concerned an opportunity to meet, so that opposing views
may be presented and any rebuttal argument put forward. In
providing this opportunity the Commission shall take account of the
wishes of the parties and of the need to preserve confidentiality.
There shall be no obligation on any party to attend a meeting and
failure to do so shall not be prejudicial to that party's case.
7. When the information requested by the Commission is not supplied
within a reasonable time or where the investigation is significantly
impeded, findings may be made on the basis of the facts available.
8. The Commission shall take a decision as soon as possible on the
opening of a Community examination procedure following any complaint
or request made in accordance with Articles 3 and 4; the decision
shall normally be taken within 45 days of referral; this period may
be extended to 60 days in special circumstances.
9. When it has concluded its examination the Commisison shall report
to the Committee. The report should normally be presented within
five months of the announcement of initiation of the procedure,
unless the complexity of the examination is such that the Commission
extends the period to seven months.
Article 7
Confidentiality
1. Information received pursuant to this Regulation shall be used
only for the purpose for which it was requested.
2. (a) Neither the Council, nor the Commission, nor Member States,
nor the officials of any of these, shall reveal any
information of a confidential nature received pursuant to
this Regulation, or any information provided on a
confidential basis by a party to an examination procedure,
without specific permission from the party submitting such
information.
(b) Each request for confidential treatment shall indicate why
the information is confidential and shall be accompanied by
a non-confidential summary of the information or a statement
of the reasons why the information is not susceptible of
such summary.
3. Information will normally be considered to be confidential if its
disclosure is likely to have a significantly adverse effect upon the
supplier or the source of such information.
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4. However, if it appears that a request for confidentiality is not
warranted and if the supplier is either unwilling to make the
information public or to authorize its disclosure in generalized or
summary form, the information in question may be disregarded.
5. This Article shall not preclude the disclosure of general
information by the Community authorities and in particular of the
reasons on which decisions taken pursuant to this Regulation are
based. Such disclosure must take into account the legitimate




1. An examination of injury shall involve in particular the
following factors:
(a) the volume of Community imports or exports concerned,
notably where there has been a significant increase or
decrease, either in absolute terms or relative to production
or consumption on the market in question;
(b) the prices of the Community producers' competitors, in
particular in order to determine whether there has been,
either in the Community or on third country markets,
significant undercutting of the prices of Community
producers;
(c) the consequent impact on Community industry as defined in







prices (that is, depression of prices or prevention of





2. Where a threat of injury is alleged, the Commission shall also
examine whether it is clearly foreseeable that a particular situation
is likely to develop into actual injury. In this regard, account
may also be taken of factors such as;
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(a) the rate of increase of exports to the market where the
competition with Community products is taking place;
(b) export capacity in the country of origin or export, which is
already in existence or will be operational in the
foreseeable future, and the likelihood that the exports
resulting from that capacity will be to the market referred
to in point (a).
1. Injury caused by other factors which, either individually or in
combination, are also adversely affecting Community industry must not
be attributed to the practices under consideration.
Article 9
Termination of the procedure
1. When it is found as a result of the examination procedure that
the interests of the Community do not require any action to be taken,
the procedure shall be terminated in accordance with Article 12.
2. (a) When, after an examination procedure, the third country or
country concerned take(s) measures which are considered
satisfactory the procedure may also be terminated in
accordance with the provisions of Article 11.
(b) The Commission shall supervise the application of these
measures, where appropriate on the basis of information
supplied at intervals, which it may request from the third
countries concerned and check as necessary.
(c) Where the measures taken by the third country or countries
concerned have been rescinded, suspended or improperly
implemented or where the Commission has grounds for
believing this to be the case or, finally, where a request
for information made by the Commission as provided for by
point (b) has not been granted, the Commission shall inform
the Member States, and where necessary and justified by the
results of the investigation and the new facts available any
measures shall be taken in accordance with Article 11.
Article 10
Adoption of commercial policy measures
1. Where it is found as a result of the examination procedure that
action is necessary in the interests of the Community in order to:
(a) respond to any illicit commercial practice with the aim of
removing the injury resulting therefrom; or
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(b) ensure full exercise of the Community's rights with regard
to the commercial practices of third countries
the appropriate measures shall be determined in accordance with the
procedure set out in Article 11.
2. Where the Community's international obligations require the prior
discharge of an international procedure for consultation or for the
settlement of disputes, the measures referred to in paragraph 3 shall
only be decided on after that procedure has been terminated, and
taking account of the results of the procedure.
3. Any commercial policy measures may be taken which are compatible
with existing international obligations and procedures, notably;
(a) suspension or withdrawal of any concession resulting from
commercial policy negotiations;
(b) the raising of existing customs duties or the introduction
of any other charge on imports;
(c) the introduction of quantitative restrictions or any other
measures modifying import or export conditions or otherwise
affecting trade with the third country concerned.
4. The corresponding decisions shall state the reasons on which they
are based and shall be published in the Official Journal of the
European Communities. Publications shall also be deemed to




1. The decisions referred to in Articles 9 and 10 shall be adopted
in accordance with the following provisions.
2. Where a response to an illicit commercial prctice within the
meaning of Article 1(a) is to be made:
(a) where the Community follows formal international
consultations or dispute settlement procedures, decisions
relating to the initiation, conduct, or termination of such
procedures shall be taken in accordance with Article 12;
(b) where the Community, after the conclusion of such an
international procedure, has to take a decision on the
measures of commercial policy to be adopted, the Council
shall act, on the proposal from the Commission, in
accordance with Article 113 of the Treaty, by a qualified
majority, not later than 30 days after receiving the
proposal.
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3. Where the full exercise of the Community's rights within the
meaning of Article 1(b) is to be ensured, the Council shall act, on
the proposal from the Commission, in accordance with Article 113 of
the Treaty, by a qualified majority, not later than 30 days after
receiving the proposal.
Article 12
Should reference be made to the procedure provided for in this
Article, the matter shall be brought before the Committee by its
chairman.
The Commission representative shall submit to the Committee a draft
of the decision to be taken. The Committee shall discuss the matter
within a period to be fixed by the chairman, depending on the urgency
of the matter.
The Commission shall adopt a decision which it shall communicate to
the Member States and which shall apply after a period of 10 days if
during this period no Member State has referred the matter to the
Council.
The Council may, at the request of a Member State and acting by a
qualified majority revise the Commission's decision.
The Commission's decision shall apply after a period of 30 days if
the Council has not given a ruling within this period, calculated
from the day on which the matter was referred to the Council.
Article 13
This Regulation shall not apply in cases covered by other existing
rules in the common commercial policy field. It shall operate by
way of complement to the:
rules establishing the common organization of agricultural
markets and their implementing provisions;
specific rules adopted under Article 235 of the Treaty,
applicable to goods processed from agricultural products.
It shall be without prejudice to other measures which may be taken
pursuant to Article 113 of the Treaty.
Article 14
This Regulation shall enter into force on the third day following its
publication in the Official Journal of the European Communities.
- 448 -
This Regulation shall be binding in its entirety and directly
applicable in all Member States.
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